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 This study describes the evolution of a possible future for Asia 2001-2021.  It 
envisions the realization of two longstanding US goals: peaceful political unification of 
Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, and peaceful Korean unification.  Nothing 
dramatic occurs on the global front, no major wars break out, and both economic and 
technological change are evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In short, we develop an 
example of what Herman Kahn called a “surprise free” scenario. 
Our world of 2021, however, is not a world entirely congenial to the U.S.  For 
example, there is a stasis in Northeast Asia with China, Korea, Japan and Russia all 
equipped with sizable arsenals of cruise and ballistic missiles, some of which carry 
nuclear weapons.  Korea, upon the final exit of US forces in 2018, has found growing 
alignment with China the preferred course.  China, for various internal economic and 
political reasons, feels increasingly surrounded and frustrated in exercising its hegemonic 
rights.  The manner of U.S. withdrawal from Korea and its impending withdrawal from 
Okinawa and all Japanese bases except Yokosuka has reduced Japanese confidence in the 
U.S.  The result has been incremental reinterpretation of Article 9 of its constitution and 
development of a non-imperial defense force, which includes a “deterrent” capability 
resting on its missile forces.  The integration of Taiwan has given China an opportunity to 
re-deploy forces to positions along the inner island chain Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOC) from Sakhalin to Malaysia.  This southeastward move has been resisted or 
accommodated by the countries in the area, and Darwin, Australia, has been developed to 
receive some of the US forces leaving Northeast Asia. 
viii 
Thus, although the “war tinder” of Korea and Taiwan are gone, global economic 
prosperity has brought with it a much heavier reliance on trade much of which travels by 
ship.  The diminished size of the U.S. presence, particularly the U.S. fleet, which had 
been the backbone for protection of the Asian SLOCs, has become a central national 
security concern for the ASEAN nations and, indeed, all nations in the area.   
Three teams of officer-students in the first class of the Systems Engineering and 
Integration (SEI-1) curriculum developed the above scenario in detail for Korea, 
Australia and Japan. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are their work.  They describe the evolution of 
Korean unification; Australian efforts to cement protective relations with the United 
States and others with similar interests; and the “coming out of the penalty box” by Japan 
as she rides her reinvigorated economy and takes increasing responsibility for her own 
defense. The context for their work, described in Chapters 1 and 2, was provided by a 
supporting group of NPS faculty and outside experts and utilized forces evolved in 
previous Naval Postgraduate School 1997-99 scenario development studies of China, 
U.S., Iran and India military forces for the 2000-2020 period.  This Preface, the Study 
Director’s Forward, the Study Executive Summary and the three Country Executive 
Summaries provide a good introduction to this report.  In the Annexes to Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 there are tables which summarize the scenarios, and provide a short overview of 
events described in the body of the report.  
The study had two purposes: first, to offer one possible and plausible picture of an 
Asian security future.  While no one can know its likelihood, this picture is factually 
based and follows logically from a wealth of detailed analysis which includes 
geopolitical, economic, demographic and technological considerations; second, to 
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provide a vehicle to integrate the educational and professional experiences of the officer-
students.  Each of the country teams had four officers self-selected for a particular 
country from the pool of 7 Singapore and 5 US officers. 
Throughout the period covered by this study, the U.S. is at the center of a “uni-
polar world”, making the dangerous presumption that she will continue to be “number 
one”.  We believe that this work, although it develops just a single trajectory from today 
to 2021, contributes to the ongoing debate about our future security.  The uncongenial 
consequences of “more of the same” points up the need for action and change.  Large 
dominant organizations often tend to preserve existing ways of doing business and lose 
their position because they fail to seize the opportunities and face the challenges of a 
changing and highly competitive environment. 
Norm Augustine’s Law X, The Law of Surrealistic Planning, states  “If today 
were half as good as tomorrow, it would still be twice as good as yesterday”, arose from 
his examination of forecasts of the number of ships expected to exist in the future Navy.  
It is our view that the work presented here avoids such “rose-colored glasses” projections 
by insisting upon explicit assumptions across geopolitical, economic and technological 
dimensions.  By making assumptions explicit, we have exposed the properties of one 
trajectory of events through time.  In combination with, other diverse trajectories it forms 
a better basis for strategic planning than simple extrapolation of previous trends.  It 
provide a basis for asking “what if” questions essential to the formation of sound robust 
plans. 
For example, if our story’s 2021 missile based standoff in military power in 
Northeast Asia, seems incredible, then a decision maker can back up the scenario to that 
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point and explore alternative paths.  Max Frisch in his play, “Biography”, permits his 
characters to stop the play, chose a point in the past where they would like to have done 
something different, return to that point and then start the action again.  This should work 
out well for the actor who chooses to return and start again; however, because the rules 
permit every other character to change their previous decisions, it frequently turns into a 
world that the first character finds no better than that he originally faced – just different.  
One consequence of conducting this and previous studies is that we have gained 
some insight into how to do them and what value that they provide.  
First:  We believe our study is broader, deeper and more explicitly dynamic than 
those normally devoted to creating scenarios.   
Broader – because we have used teams composed of both US and 
Singapore officers to allow us to “see ourselves as others see us”; and also 
because the questions that inform our deliberations can’t be answered 
without cutting across the usual boundaries of government departments, 
non-governmental actors, and across the academic disciplines  
Deeper – because economic and technological constraints cause “pet 
rocks” to be surfaced and rejected; because the competitive and dynamic 
assessments we use preclude both 10 foot tall or “stupid” enemies; 
because the 20 year horizon allows technology to mature and support 
innovation.  Finally, because our team at the Naval Postgraduate School 
brings together an unusual combination of military officer students with 
recent field experience from the US Army and Navy and the Singapore 
Army, Navy and Air Force; departmental faculty with deep knowledge of 
xi 
their disciplines; and a host of accessible experienced scholars, 
government officials, and military commanders resident within the family 
of the Naval Postgraduate School.  
 Second:  We observed that two successive teams of students and faculty prior to 
this SEI-1 study struggled with the problem of projecting US military development over 
the next 20 years.  “Steaming as before” with only modest improvement at the margin 
was the best they could produce despite admonition to think “out of the box” and explicit 
guidance to exploit emerging technological opportunities.  They were being “realistic”.  It 
is possible, of course, that today’s US defense planning system has found the best 
possible mix of forces for now and for any future.  That seems unlikely.  However it was 
the U.S. policy, strategy, and military capability that was used in the SEI-1 study reported 
here.  In effect, the world the SEI-1 study finds in 2021 results because the U.S. was 
pictured as overconfident in its enduring military advantage and loyal political allies, and 
its actions were so conventional.  
 Therefore, a basic finding is the need for deep and sustained study of ourselves as 
others see us, as reflected in the “six questions” which form the basis of the students’ 
task.  This must be done: (1) by a rolling appraisal well into the future, long enough for 
others to reshape their strategic and technological doctrines; and, (2) by a careful 
appraisal of our international friends’ vision of self-interest, not just an examination of 
likely enemies.   
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 In addition to insights that we have gained from conducting this study there are 
six issues that should concern US policy makers about the world of 2021, which we have 
constructed: 
 1. Japan, Korea, Russia and China are already nuclear weapons states or are on 
the verge of becoming nuclear. 
 2. Sea Lines of Communication 
a. The peaceful resolution of the Taiwan/PRC separation and the Korean 
unification has changed the points of friction.  In particular, new jeopardy to Asian trade 
routes has developed while trade has become increasingly vital. 
 b. With a quiet, but tense, Northeast Asia, focus shifts toward the South China 
Sea.  What does this imply for the positioning of US forces, particularly naval forces, in 
the western Pacific?  Is home-porting in Darwin part of the answer? 
 4. The proliferation of increasingly cheap cruise and ballistic missiles with 
precision targeting and selected use of nuclear and non-nuclear warheads has 
dramatically changed the nature of warfare. 
 5. Missile defense is a possible response, but can it be made to work, is it 
affordable, and is it better than a pure deterrence strategy? 
6.  Is there any real difference in a missile world between a homeland defense and 
a forward deployed engaged US military?  Is the depth of the battlespace such that all 
points of the globe represent a potential threat to the U.S?  Homeland defense of the 
United States historically reflected our geographical isolation from the rest of the world.  
In the face of many actors with a global reach, where is the “boundary” of our homeland?  
Do you want to fight “over there” or “over here”?  Do you have a choice? 
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 These questions are suggested by this work.  While we do not answer them, we do 





Study Director’s Forward 
Why should a Systems Engineering and Integration curriculum work on and 
produce a study whose purpose is to define military capability offered by a twenty year 
evolution of force structure?  What possible relevance does this have to “systems 
engineering and integration” and officer education?  There are two different definitions of 
“systems engineering and integration” useful in answering these questions.  To highlight 
the differences let us describe the two types of system engineers and integrators through 
the work that each undertakes.  The first we’ll call the “institution system engineer”, who 
takes a large-scale innovation at the level of his institution’s fundamental mission from 
“idea” to capability.  Seldom are these found outside of the largest organizations in a 
society and they frequently address the fundamental survival needs of those societies.  
The second is the “customer-driven system engineer”: who presupposes the existence of 
an institutional customer (public or private); who assumes that there exists a customer’s 
“requirement”; and, for whom fulfilling the requirement within the constraints of time 
and budget constitutes success.  The failure of the customer system engineer does not 
result in the demise of the society, just the demise of his enterprise.  We will use both 
definitions to help answer the “why” of SEI. 
When you examine this study you will find that “missile warfare” has become the 
heart of the Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Russian military capability.  These missiles - 
cruise, ballistic, interceptor – can be equipped with a variety of warheads.  Nuclear, 
biological, chemical, explosive, and hit-to-kill lethality mechanisms can be attached to 
any and or all of the missile types.  The missiles may be used for “offense/strike” or 
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“defense”.  Further, you will find that low observability – stealth - has become a standard 
feature of vehicle design.   
Before World War II missile warfare meant guns firing projectiles, stealth meant 
camouflage, and missile defense meant dig your foxhole deeper.  The technological 
innovations of WWII provided the foundation, however immature, for missile warfare 
and stealth vehicles.  Inventing, developing and producing the naval systems which we 
take for granted, and which are the “gold standard” for the arsenals assembled by the 
three country teams reported in this study, can largely be laid at the feet of three of the 
USN’s greatest institution system engineers.  Levering Smith, husbander of the fleet 
ballistic missile (FBM)  – Polaris, Poseidon and Trident; Hyman Rickover, steward of the 
nuclear reactor which made possible the first stealthy, long endurance submarine - 
Nautilus; Wayne E. Meyer, creator of the first effective defense against anti-ship guided 
missiles – and, the “Father of Aegis”.  Not one of these men is free of controversy or 
critics or acolytes.  All had or have extraordinary stamina, depth of technical experience, 
breadth of education gained through a lifelong habit of intense study of topics far afield 
from their “current” assignments.  They all were tenacious in the protection of their 
prerogatives to guide their programs.  They represented themselves as engineers of 
systems, but the system that each built was the system that built the FBM’s, the nuclear 
ships, and the Aegis fleet.  They built the home for the second type of system engineer - 
the customer system engineer. 
Smith, Rickover and Meyer dreamed of a world which was different and set out to 
exploit technological opportunity to realize it. However, they realized that it was not 
enough to produce a good work plan.  They needed to understand what problem deserved 
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to be solved.  They realized that if Clausewitz is right, that war is an extension of national 
policy by other means, then knowing and shaping national policy could be an outgrowth 
of the form of war machine that they could create.  Mutual Assured Destruction could not 
exist without the assured destruction provided by nuclear weapons.  But more assured 
(than bombers or silo based ICBMs) delivery of nuclear weapons was offered by the 
FBM solution, made possible by Teller’s small thermonuclear weapons, which fitted a 
“small” nuclear warhead atop solid fueled rockets carried by a stealthy vehicle – the 
ballistic missile nuclear submarine.  Coming full circle, technology is creeping up on a 
defense against ballistic missiles and the foundation of the USNs ballistic missile defense 
offering is the cruise missile killer “Aegis”.   
Technology doesn’t become systems and fleet capability overnight. The FBM 
submarine with nuclear warhead was born of a confluence of people and ideas in the mid-
1950’s and given highest development priority that put a capability in place in less than 
seven years.  Rickover through Nautilus proved nuclear powered submarines could be 
built.  Smith through Polaris (A-1) proved a solid fueled rocket could be built with 
sufficient range to be effective when launched from a submarine.  Aegis, was born of the 
failure in 1963-64 Typhon, the advanced analog, naval air defense system of its day.  
Aegis struggled 17 years to the first deployment of Ticonderoga, CG-47, in 1981 and 
ameliorated the modern “Kamikaze” problem.  Smith, Rickover and Meyer provided the 
leadership that gives us these capabilities today.  
What did their leadership consist of?  Where did they learn it?  Who were they 
leading?  Smith was weapons officer of Indianapolis, CA-35, during WWII, before she 
was lost to submarine attack in the Philippine Sea in 1945.  He was a graduate educated 
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member of the “cannon cocker” or ordnance club of the Navy.  He had both battle 
experience and a fine sense of the advantages of solid rockets for the naval environment.  
When the Jupiter liquid fueled rocket was proposed in the mid-1950s for the FBM it was 
Smith who understood its complexity for shipboard operations and safety hazard.  He 
thus pursued development of improved fuel that allowed a different class of solid fueled 
rocket.  As he took over the FBM program office from its founding director, Admiral 
Raborn, he learned to articulate with great clarity the role that the FBM played.  He could 
talk comfortably with Congress, ship engineers and designers, fleet operators, Defense 
Department strategists, and the public.  Quiet competence was how he was characterized.  
He was in office for nearly 25 years.  On 6 May 1962 he brought of the only full 
operational launch of a nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missile from its operational 
submarine to the successful explosion of its nuclear warhead at full range - a feat never 
accomplished by any land-based system because of safety concerns.  He fully appreciated 
the international political consequences of showing that “it worked”. 
Rickover had no natural allies in the Navy.  In today’s argot he “had an attitude”, 
was politically astute enough to neuter the Chief of Naval Personnel by having final 
approval of selection for service in the nuclear navy, and could “plant a kiss” on those 
Senators and Congressman who kept him in office year-after-year long after normal 
retirement age.  In his later years, he was effectively used by generations of his “nuclear” 
officers to foil their opponents in the struggle for the direction of the USN.  He 
demonstrated awe inspiring, intimidating competence, which he freely used to achieve 
his objectives.  Was he a balanced thinker about the Navy?  He never felt limited, for 
example, by the concept of submariners whose experience was with the limited non-
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nuclear submarines, frequently characterized as surface ships that could submerge more 
than once.  Is the USN better off because of him?  Would the Cold War have been 
different if its long-range ballistic missiles had ended up deployed on the two cruisers, 
Chicago and Albany, that lived their last days with never completed mid-ship missile 
launching spaces?  Would the USN and country benefit from having more like him in an 
era where technological opportunity has never been greater?     
Smith and Rickover had first call for support in a country desperate for a strategic 
nuclear deterrent.  Brickbat priorities, the countries highest, moved them to the head of 
the line in any industrial establishment in the United States.  Rickover’s ownership of the 
selection and development of the “nuclear officers and men” who operated his “nuclear 
fleet” were features never available to Wayne Meyer.  Yet, when looking back, it is clear 
that Meyer showed that it was possible, without Brickbat priority, to buy an air defense 
capability of such quality that it gave the aircraft carrier, the twentieth century USN’s 
capital ship, a new lease on life.  The carrier faced a determined Soviet efforts in anti-
carrier warfare based on space surveillance, long range bombers, submarines all striking 
with a plethora of cruise missiles.  Meyer, with the leadership habits of a Bible belt 
preacher of his native Missouri, can bring the threat of hell-fire and damnation 
realistically to his audiences and then with an eloquence, drama, and clear technological 
mastery of his subject show that there is salvation.  His personal experiences as a seaman 
recruit at the end of WWII, his move to the officer corps and a series of tours to get a 
university education and then superb graduate education in “fire control”, his operational 
assignment to make the mission critical radar on a small radar picket destroyer on the US 
defense line work against the Soviet bomber threat, his tour as technical director of the 
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Navy’s engineering station established to “fix” its highly unreliable surface to air missile 
air defense systems were the foundation of his understanding and skill at articulating for 
all audiences why Aegis was needed.  His Navy, as late as ten years after starting the 
Aegis development, wasn’t sure that Aegis was worth the money.  Many believed that 
Aegis would bankrupt the Navy.  Many believed it couldn’t work.  Few believed that it 
would change the way the world and the Navy thought about air defense.  Few saw that it 
made the risk for carrier operations manageable.  Today he is vindicated.  Yet, he, in a 
case study on Aegis in 1990, noted that Aegis is “twenty-five years old”, and nothing is 
coming along to replace it.  
Where does the USN develop such leaders?  Is it possible to give them a head 
start through education?  Does the USN need such broad gauged leaders today?  It was 
the hypothesis of SEI 1 that you could take a line officer and give him an educational 
experience that would seed his ability to be the system engineer of a world of systems 
that do not yet exist.  The systems that will take today’s immature technology and drive it 
into innovative ways of achieving the most important missions.  The second type of 
system engineer is crucial for success by the first type, but innovation – the creation of 
new capabilities, not reform, which is the improvement of existing capabilities – demands 
the first type.   
The Navy has historically depended upon its officers to lead the evolution of its 
mission capability.  It has always assumed that the “commanding officer” can organize 
his command to efficiently and effectively accomplish his assigned mission.  It is our 
view that he cannot organize his mission without the qualities seen in the institutional 
system engineer.  A modern command is a billion dollars worth of equipment, hundreds 
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to thousands of people, and incomplete system engineering - since no designer can know 
all of the environments where the nation will put his creation.  The Commanding Officer 
is the final system engineer before the battle.  Will he play his instrument like a country 
fiddler or Jascha Heifetz?  It is to this end that we at the Naval Postgraduate School have 
dedicated our efforts in creating and offering the Systems Engineering and Integration 
curriculum.  The “problem” reported in the following pages we believe calls for both 
breadth and depth and prepares our students to begin the long process of leading 
institutional change and innovation needed by our countries if they are to remain 




Introduction:   
This report covers group projects undertaken by the first class in a new 18 month 
System Engineering and Integration curriculum initiated at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in September 1999.  The curriculum emphasizes science and quantitative methods 
and weaves together the elements and considerations that must underlie successful new 
defense system development and acquisition. One unique aspect of the curriculum is that 
each student works as a member of a team on a large problem that draws on all aspects of 
his NPS education.  This team project serves in place of a master’s thesis and has as its 
principal purpose to provide the student with a deep, demanding, and relevant educational 
experience.  However, the problems are also chosen with a view to adding to the body of 
knowledge useful to decision makers in the defense establishment. 
In the broadest sense any new system must fill a national security need; it must 
also be affordable and technologically feasible.  Therefore, national objectives, threats, 
economic constraints and costs, technology, and operational art all play important parts in 
System Engineering.  Because major defense systems are capital intensive and have long 
lives, defense system developers and designers must do their best to peer into the future 
and deal with the inherent uncertainties that this entails.  One of the most useful tools is 
the construction of a range of technically informed and economically realistic forward-
looking scenarios.  While no one can predict the future, the range of future possibilities 
can be limited and explored with a view to building systems that are robust over a variety 
of possible potential futures.  In this regard the student projects draw heavily on Peter 
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Schwartz’ seminal work on long-range planning and scenario development, The Art of 
the Long View. 
In the last four years students from a variety of curricula participated in a two-
course seminar in which they developed twenty-year projections of possible future forces 
for China (two cases), Iran, India, and the US.  In each case plans were developed in 
three sequential epochs.  At the end of each epoch each student team was given updates 
on the world situation and feedback on the actions of other teams.  The same procedure 
was followed in the work covered in this report. The class was divided into three regional 
teams: Japan, Korea, and Australia.  Each team was given the task of developing the 
forces for its country in four sequential steps, with feedback on the world situation and 
the actions of other teams provided at the outset and at the end of each planning period.  
Initially, the teams developed a current picture of each country, with special attention to 
national security objectives and threats, the economy and prospects for growth, the 
percentage of GDP devoted to defense, demographics, and geography.  The end result 
was a picture of one possible set of forces for each country in 2020, and a coherent story 
describing how and why that posture resulted. 
It must be emphasized that these projections are not predictions.  Our work is in 
the spirit of the old maxim, “If you can’t predict the future, then I can’t change it.”  We 
saw instances in which each team reacted to the plans of the other two and to the actions 
at each epoch described below.  More to the point for US defense planning, the actions of 
the participants suggest that we might want to take actions so that some of the projections 
do not become predictions.  Still what we have achieved is only a first step toward 
building the array of scenarios that could form a useful backdrop for defense planning. 
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Background:  
The world beyond the direct control of the countries studied was largely free of 
surprises viewed from the perspective of 2021. 
The United States experienced modest (3%) economic growth with pressure on 
the defense budget deriving from imperial overreach and domestic entitlements.  
Nonetheless the defense program continued to grow at 3% and contained no dramatic 
departures.  Growing tension between the competing priorities of power projection and 
home defense (National Missile Defense, anti-terrorism, and anti-drug) became more 
pronounced.  Despite some success in modernization and recapitalization, there was a 
slow but definite switch in the correlation of forces toward the regional powers.  
Homeland defense programs included a serious effort to develop BMD and anti-cruise 
technology with a view to earliest practical deployment of NMD.   
Elsewhere in the world a number of potential trouble spots were resolved.  
Taiwan and the PRC were peacefully reunified in 2008.  The reunification process 
proceeded steadily on the Korean Peninsula.  Japan and Russia reached a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of all outstanding issues and ratified a peace treaty in 2009. Closer 
economic ties developed between the two countries with joint efforts to develop Siberian 
energy initiated in 2006. 
After the reunification of Korea, US military forces in these Korea were 
completely withdrawn by 2018 and plans were well along to remove from Japan 
everything but the CVBG and fleet support at Yokosuka.  With fewer forces in the 
Western Pacific, The US reemphasized its ties with Australia and Japan with the growing 
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expectation that those countries would play a more proactive role in insuring military 
stability. 
Russia was clearly recovering from the post-Soviet malaise by 2010, with a 
foreign policy beginning to match her reduced capabilities.  National security strategy 
emphasized defense of the Russian Federation and influence in the surrounding area.  
Chinese growth and military vigor was a primary concern and called forth a dual 
response: in the absence of conventional force parity, Russia relied on its continuing 
nuclear superiority to deter the Chinese.  In addition, closer ties with Japan, particularly 
for the joint development of Siberian natural resources, gave Japan a stake in stability in 
the area. 
China’s impressive economic growth continued, albeit stabilizing at a reduced 
rate of about 5%, deemed disappointing to much of the Chinese population.  The country 
continued to “devolve,” as political power increasingly shifted from Beijing to the 
regions and provinces.  Economically, much of the vigor stemmed from the private sector 
with the State Owned Enterprises continuing to impose heavy burdens.  The economic 
slow-down engendered questioning of the legitimacy of the regime, which responded by 
expanding its role in East Asia and appealing to Chinese nationalism.  The PRC’s 
agreement with Taiwan included gradual merger of the military forces between 2008 and 
2018, resulting in a shift of air and naval presence to the South China Sea, and expanded 
bases on Hainan, the Paracels, and Mischief Reef (near the Philippines).  Taking 
advantage of her expanded presence China made clear that it was considering expanded 
security arrangements (including basing) with Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Friendly relations were sought with a unifying Korea and Thailand.  Overall, the 
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government of the PRC felt lessening of control at home and increasing encirclement 
from abroad despite a satisfactory solution to the Taiwan problem.  Hence China’s 
strategy looked to ways to break out and secure her rightful role of East Asian Primacy.  
India’s economy experienced a renaissance in the new millennium - achieving a 
growth rate of 5.5%.  Principally driven by concerns about China, India gradually 
increased defense spending to 4% of GDP. 
The work of the regional SEI teams was based on this background: 
Korea: 
Korea is unified by 2020.  The combined military forces of the formerly DPRK 
and ROK are capable of substantial regional air, land and sea operations in defense of the 
Peninsula and the sea-lines of communication vital to the Korean economy.  Although the 
DPRK gave up its fissile material as part of the unification process, the unified Korea 
feels the need for a credible deterrent and can field nuclear weapons on short notice. 
As unification progressed, a strategic alignment with China seemed to address 
many day-to-day economic, geopolitical and military security concerns.  After the 
complete withdrawal of United States Forces Korea in 2018, the US called upon Japan to 
take a leadership role in the region.  This was perceived as a threat to Korean sovereignty. 
 The process of reunification of North and South Korea was pivotal.  In 2004, 
reunification planning began in earnest when the DPRK and the ROK formally agreed to 
pursue unification options.  Within two years, however, the DPRK’s economic situation 
worsened to the point of imminent collapse.  Statesmen from both nations established the 
preconditions for unification and the ROK provided a $10B(US) average annual aid 
package – or roughly 2% of the South’s GDP to help the DPRK save face and national 
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sovereignty.  In exchange, the DPRK agreed to launch a comprehensive biological and 
chemical clean-up program and began to re-channel excess manpower from demobilizing 
forces to infrastructure improvements.  In accordance with the preconditions for 
unification, the United States was invited to begin withdrawing troops from the 
Peninsula. 
 The DPRK’s first priority was to rid the Peninsula of US military presence while 
the ROK demanded democracy and a move towards a market economy in the north.  The 
North had little choice.  An aid-based foreign policy strategy was essential to the DPRK’s 
prospects for survival, especially with respect to energy supplies and foodstuffs.  It was to 
the advantage of both the ROK and the DPRK to entertain an incremental transition 
allowing the northern regime to avoid extinction and ultimately permit a meaningful, 
longer-term process of reconciliation with the south. 
 Epoch three’s dramatic beginning was marked by the signing of the Pamunjon 
Treaty which formalized the reunification of North and South.  In 2018, Korea held its 
first prefectural elections and the United States Army held closing ceremonies at the US 
Army Base in Yeongsan.  Tensions between Korea and Japan grew, and raised concerns 
about the United State’s commitment to regional stability.  This triggered Korea’s 
unilateral strategic and economic alignment with the PRC.  Korea’s historic and ethnic 
ties to China proved a powerful additional lure.  
 By the end of 2020, Korea’s national security strategy focused more on protection 
of national sovereignty and commerce activities.  The alignment with China ensured 
increased security, especially in the areas where Korea was most vulnerable and it 
translated to a significantly more focused and lethal national military strategy that sought 
 xxvii 
to deter any adversary’s use of cruise or ballistic missiles, protection from sea invasion, 
and a directed defense against SLOC blockages or disruption. 
 With increased capital flows to the region, the South’s economy grew steadily at 4 
percent through 2005 and then at 5.9 percent through 2020.  They contributed 2 percent 
of their GDP to the North for infrastructure improvements.  This economic aid package 
allowed the North to sustain double-digit growth throughout the 2010-2015 period, and 
wane to a nominal 7.2 percent in 2020.  Defense expenditures in the South were 3.5 
percent of GDP. The North, with its smaller national economy, spent nearly 30 percent of 
the GDP on defense. 
 With the prefectural elections in 2018, Korea saw a shift in military capabilities 
and the role of the unified defense force.  Korea sits on the doorstep to a maritime 
environment and its desire for sea power is linked to a growing Korean reliance on a 
coastal economy.  With the imminent rise of the maritime powers of Japan and China, a 
high priority was given to Korea’s maritime forces with emphasis placed on the navy and 
the air force.  The principal army mission has become the maintenance of social order.  
The force improvement program priorities were established to accomplish the national 
military strategy and included Intelligence / Early Warning; Cruise / Ballistic Missile 
Defense; Precision Engagement; and Agile Combat Support. 
The Air Force gradually acquired advanced tactical aircraft suitable for a future 
operational environment, with considerable effort focused on improving the agile combat 
support for better response and flexibility.  New AEW / ESM, air refueling assets were 
also procured, as well as long-range UAVs for both intelligence and combat.  Modern, 
air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles were procured for extended-range precision strikes 
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on ground and sea surface targets.  The Air Force’s main challenge, however, lay with the 
search for the best, combined force mix, comprising manned and unmanned air platforms 
and conventional long-range standoff strike missiles. 
 The Navy was modernized for regional sea control in the blue water.  With a 
constantly expanding naval budget, Korea procured advanced ocean-going Aegis-class 
destroyers, equipped with anti-air guided missiles as well as extended range cruise 
missiles.  Korea’s navy also procured new patrol submarines utilizing Air Independent 
Propulsion and the Russian Kilo-class diesel submarines. 
 The Army was rapidly downsized from a combined force of 1.5 million in year 
2000 to about 860,000 in 2020.  New weapons and equipment (including a much 
expanded combat helicopter fleet) improved combat effectiveness.  At 2020 the Army is 
reluctant to relinquish dominance in Korean military affairs, but a further shift to a 
marine outlook seems likely. 
 Given the absence of declared programs for nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, Korea’s cruise and ballistic missile development programs received top 
developmental priority.  Korea’s ballistic force of approximately 1000 missiles was 
primarily dedicated to deterrence.  Long-range missiles were preferred, accuracy was 
improved, and short-range stockpiles were reduced. 
  The alignment with China resulted in Korea’s loss of access to US military 
technology.  This caused some slowdown of Korea’s military modernization efforts and 




During the first two decades of the 21st century, Australia grew to be a respected 
leader in Southeast Asian affairs.  She participated in the general prosperity in the region 
during the first two decades of the 21st century with a GDP growth rate between 3 and 
4.5%, facilitated by trade, knowledge sharing, emerging technologies and effective 
government.  This provided the opportunity to develop a defense force matched to the 
country’s goals.  Defense of the homeland continued to be the top priority, but Australia 
also sought to aid in non-proliferation of WMD, and also to maintain freedom of the seas 
in the area.  Military force developments for Coalition Operations and Military 
Operations Other than War (MOOTW) were consistent with the Defense White Paper of 
2000. 
To accomplish the goals established in the White Paper, the percent of GDP 
devoted to defense was increased from 1.9% to about 2.5% by 2010 and remained at that 
level through 2020.  Initially the allocation of funds was changed to emphasize R&D and 
new systems procurement over current operations.  As the newly modernized force 
emerged, the demands on it grew, and by 2020 the allocation to current operations 
returned to former levels. 
The Howard Doctrine articulated in the Defense White Paper of 2000 aligned 
Australia to the interests and objectives of the United States.  However, slowing US 
economic growth and lack of public support resulted in reduced defense spending and US 
military retrenchment in the region.  In an effort to sustain a respectable military presence 
in Southeast Asia, Australia made a considerable investment to enlarge and enhance 
Darwin as a port, military complex, and north-south railroad terminal. 
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China appeared ready to fill the power vacuum.  Increased presence in the South 
China Sea, basing overtures to the Philippines, and overtures to the unstable government 
of Indonesia caused great concern in Australia.  This combined with Australia’s 
perception of the US resulted in an increasingly independent Australian security policy. 
Continued Indonesian instability threatened the archipelago waterways, which 
took on increased significance as Australia’s exports of energy and iron ore to Japan 
increased.  While counting less on the US for political/military support, Australia 
continued close links for procurement of modern military systems, thereby saving money 
and gaining interoperability.  Advanced maritime assets like the Howard-class Aegis 
destroyers and the F/A-18 E/F Hornet fighters were among steps to enhance Australia's 
authority as a regional maritime power. However, Australia chose to develop specific 
technology niches in energy storage and supply technology as well as space launching 
capabilities. 
At the beginning of the century, Australia’s ability to project forces beyond 1000 
miles was limited to frigate-sized surface vessels and Collins-class submarines. In 
addition to enhanced capabilities at sea, growing problems in Indonesia required the 
ability to project military forces to regional hotspots.  As a result, Australia modernized 
the land forces, and developed an amphibious assault force, initially comprising two 
Marine brigades and their associated amphibious vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft.  By 2020, 
Australia raised two additional infantry brigades.  
R&D into a variety of energy related technologies paid off for the Australians.  
Solar, coal, storage, and much improved offshore oil exploration played an important role 
for the Australians by 2020. In the final epoch, Australia fielded a HEL missile defense 
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system for Darwin, developed the technology for a Theater Ballistic Missile defense 
system using airborne lasers and/or ground Free Electron Lasers, and deployed diode 
pumped solid-state laser anti-ship missile defense system for naval ships.  
The resulting ADF in 2020 supports the nation’s military strategy.  It is able to 
operate autonomously or with allies.  With the developments undertaken in the port of 
Darwin, Australia offers attractive basing options for the United States in the Pacific.  
 
Japan:  
Diplomatic relations in East Asia during the first two decades of the 21st century 
evolved from individual hedging strategies for an uncertain future to a triangular balance 
of power involving China, Japan, and the United States.  The relative influence of the 
three powers shifted during the period. By 2020 the declining role of US and the gradual 
ascension of both China and Japan is generating pressures for realignment. 
In Japan the economic reforms instituted by the new Progressive Political Party in 
2001 resulted in drastic restructuring that produced a trade and financial resurgence.  The 
rejection of a permanent UN Security Council seat for Japan in 2006 changed domestic 
opinion in support of a greater international role for Japan.  Additionally, the draw down 
of US forces in Korea caused Japan to question the firmness of the US commitment to 
Japanese defense.  China’s more assertive role in the East and South China Seas 
presented increased threats to Japanese security.  Korean reunification in 2016 and 
subsequent removal of US troops there and the planned start in Japan beginning in 2020 
caused Japanese planners to initiate efforts toward military autonomy. 
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Domestically, economic reforms resulted in significant short-term pain but long-
term gain as Japan’s GDP returned to positive growth after 2006. Japanese producers 
increased automation and advanced, less labor-intensive means of production.  
Concurrently the government encouraged more women to join the labor force and 
prolonged the participation of older workers. Government promotion of spending on 
education, training, and R&D also contributed to the positive economic climate. Japan 
continued to diversify its sources of energy during the twenty-year period.  Dependence 
on oil imports decreased by 20% between 2000 and 2020.  Domestic generation and 
cooperative endeavors with Russia and Australia lessened oil dependence to 1/3 of 
Japan’s total. While not fully self-reliant for energy production, Japan has limited 
vulnerabilities by both diversifying fossil fuel suppliers and promoting means of internal 
power generation. 
Japan’s defense strategy, throughout the scenario, increasingly rested upon self-
reliance.  Japan’s strategic vision became the twin pillars of defense and deterrence.  
Under the pillar of defense, Japan sought a force capable of responding to the full 
spectrum of warfare. The JSDF also implemented a long-term plan to manufacture and 
field large numbers of long-range missiles for deterrence.  Nevertheless, Japan continued 
to adhere to the US-Japan Security Arrangements.  These agreements were continuously 
re-evaluated due to realignments in the regional power structure but remained integral to 
Japan’s defense strategy.  
By 2020 the Japanese military had achieved self-sufficiency for homeland 
defense, including advanced and comprehensive C4ISR, and has state-of-the-art, 
domestically produced weapons (including a large conventional missile force).  The 
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JSDF at 2020 also has weaknesses: the lack of a nuclear deterrent, comprehensive missile 
defense, and robust ASW.  To limit its strategic vulnerabilities, Japan must address these 
deficiencies, further diversify energy sources and strive for continued self-sufficiency in 
all three components of national power: economic, military, and political. 
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Insights and Trends: 
Seeing ourselves as others see us.  The “flash points” of Northeast Asia, 
North/South Korea and Taiwan/PRC, once removed, changed the kind of military forces 
required in Northeast Asia.  In particular, the quick reaction enforcements provided by 
USAF and USN units were no longer needed to rescue South Korea.  How the US and its 
allies understand the transition from having this ready US reserve to something else may 
play heavily in the planning calculus of Japan and Korea.   Our previous studies of 
potential force structures of possible competitors were innovative and informative, but 
the concurrent work on US force structure evolution was uninspired despite our best 
efforts.  The present work - the study of our allies’ force evolution - has forced us to see 
US foreign and military policy through our allies’ eyes.   The sight is disquieting, but 
revealing.  This leads to an important insight: we need to study US policy, in a deep, 
sustained and systematic way as reflected in the structure provided by the “six questions” 
– to see ourselves as others see us.  This must be done: (1) by a rolling appraisal – epoch 
by epoch - well into the future, long enough for others to reshape their strategic and 
technological doctrines; and, (2) by a careful appraisal of our international friends’ vision 
of self-interest, not just an examination of likely enemies.   
 PRC attention can move elsewhere.  With the resolution of the Taiwan issue and 
the reunification of Korea the PRC is free to move its attention southeastward or 
northward or westward.  In this study the look was southeastward with the result that 
major ocean trade routes from Sakhalin to Indonesia are exposed to pressure.  The 
reaction of the area’s states is collaborative defense efforts to ensure freedom of the seas.  
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Japan becoming a full capability world power.  Although the Japan team did not 
choose to finish their development of nuclear weapons, the possibility looms much larger 
in 2020 than is the case today.  Should they develop them they are fully capable of 
delivering them with their large inventory of cruise missiles and few ballistic missiles.  
While Japan’s growing military power and independence is seen as threatening by Korea, 
a unified Korea’s alliance with China clearly is perceived as threatening by Japan.  As a 
result tensions are growing and the possibility of conflict beyond 2020 is also increased. .  
The growing ties between Japan and Russia also suggest that local armed conflict 
between Japan and Korea could draw in China and Russia as well. 
Missile inventories provide the basis for stasis between Korea, Japan, Russia and 
the PRC.  Long range cruise missiles launched from air, sea and land coupled to ballistic 
missiles give all neighbors a “deterrent” capability.  Invasions of Japan or by Japan 
would be highly destructive and drawn out affairs.  The 150,000 man Japanese Army is 
not a capable invasion force.  The missiles coupled to the air and space based surveillance 
systems make strategic surprise by invasion nearly impossible.  The missiles enable 
wounding your attacker, but as with all mutual assured destruction strategies it is difficult 
to envision events once the missiles have all been fired.  The net assessments Japan 
suggest that the major cities of China would be destroyed and a great loss born by Japan.   
Emergence of a greater sense of regional identity in East and Southeast Asia.  The 
states of the region gave increasing consideration to organizational processes that first 
became prominent in the last decade of the 20th century, raising the possibility that an 
effective Asian grouping might become a peer competitor of Europe and the Americas.  
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This trend was underscored by the ambiguous quest for a regional leadership role by 
China, Japan, and a cluster of smaller states.   
Distracted elephants. Disengagement of Chinese and US military spheres opened 
much greater freedom of maneuver within the region – especially for advanced, wealthy 
nations such as Australia, Japan and Korea.  They found themselves with greatly 
expanded latitude to formulate independent national security strategies, and to make a 
difference within the region.  As a result, the “elephants” were obliged to take serious 
account of the policies of smaller powers.  Thus, the individual country scenarios 
(described in detail later in this report), and the common scenario (outlined in this 
chapter) evolved together. 
We could have done better.  As the second decade of the 21st century came to an 
end in 2020 many observers in Japan, Korea, and Australia -- as well as their counterparts 
in the major and smaller states throughout the Pacific Rim region -- recognized that 
events which transpired from 2000-2020 demonstrated a lack of foresight at the start of 
the new century.  A need was recognized for better ways to cope with regional 




Issues for the US: 
 Is the nuclearization of NE Asian countries missile forces preferable to the 
previously provided US nuclear umbrella?  With the pending withdrawal of most US 
forces from Japan, what replaces the “blood sacrifice” that assures the Japanese that the 
US would react to an attack and defend them? 
 Reduced US naval presence impact on SLOC protection.  The Japanese, Koreans 
and Australians all realized that the USN was the mainstay of protection of their ocean 
going trade.  The US fleet provides the certitude that egregious abuse of freedom of the 
seas cannot persist.  With fewer forces in NE Asia and the potential pressure along the 
inner island chain from Sakhalin to Malaysia, does alternative positioning of USN forces 
become attractive?  In particular, homeporting forces in Darwin provide for coverage 
northward as well as westward to the Indian Ocean.  What forces?  What relationship to 
facilities at Subic Bay, Guam, Singapore, and Vietnam?   
 Are cheap, domestically produced cruise and ballistic missiles a problem?  The 
technology to design and manufacture accurate, affordable cruise and ballistic missiles 
will be available in Korea, Japan, Russia, PRC, and their clients.  Controlling the 
proliferation of such missiles through technology control regimes will be increasingly 
difficult as electronic, computational, and materials skills proliferate in support of the 
basic needs of business to compete globally.  
 Why buy missile defenses?  Defense of military capabilities, such as ships, is 
justified to avoid being disarmed and rendered defenseless.  City and nation protection, 
with the large areas needing protection, argues for an alternative defense to that used to 
protect discreet military units and forces.  The orbiting of ballistic missile interceptors is 
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technically more attractive than the heroic geometries of ground based systems which are 
much more expensive per unit area defended.  A US system with ballistic missile defense 
coverage of allies may offer an interesting alternative to the US provided MAD umbrella 
of the past 50 years.  Interceptors on orbit vs nuclear cruise missiles in the Japanese 
inventory?  Which is preferable? 
Homeland Defense, where are the borders?  Is there any real difference in a 
missile world between a homeland defense and a forward deployed engaged US military?  
Is the depth of the battlespace such that all points of the globe represent a potential threat 
to the US?  Homeland defense of the United States historically expressed our 
geographical isolation from the rest of the world.  In the face of many actors with a global 
reach, where is the “boundary” of our homeland?  Do you want to fight “over there” or 
“over here” or do you have a choice?  This raises the age-old issue of where the first line 
of defense of the US really lies.  Is it forward with vigorous engagement in Japan, Korea, 
and Australia (as well as in NATO)?  Or in 2020 and beyond is it closer to home?  In 
either case is gradual evolution of the present forces and service shares appropriate, or are 
radical departures called for to deal with the new political realities as well as the rapid 
pace of technological change?  The presumptions made about the US and the references 
to imperial overstretch imply that the current review ongoing in the DOD will fail to 
bring about the sharply focused restructuring without which the scenarios outlined here 
are, though not predictable, possible, and credible. 
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CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 
A.  Purposes of this Study.  
 1.  To offer a possible and plausible story whose probability no one can know.  To 
offer it as a thoughtful provocation for anyone concerned with avoiding strategic surprise.  
To identify national security issues worthy of extending our investigation to one of your 
own. (Note: All events prior to March 2001 occurred, all events after March 2001 are 
synthetic, created by the study teams.) 
 2.  To provide a vehicle to integrate the educational and professional experiences of 
the officer-students in the NPS Systems Engineering and Integration curriculum.  
 
B.  SEI Program Description and “The Problem” 
 1.  The Problem and this Report.   
 This study was conducted by the first class of the newly established NPS Systems 
Engineering & Integration (SEI-1) curriculum during the Fall and Winter quarters of 
FY2001, October 2000 – March 2001.  Preparation for this work began in October 1999.  
The students were told that they would conduct a study that called upon them to apply 
and integrate what they learned in the curriculum and knew as military professionals.  
“The Problem” became the vehicle for this integration. 
 Development of a geopolitically, economically, and technologically feasible 
evolution of the military forces of Korea, Australia, and Japan over the period January 
2001 to December 2020 was “the problem” chosen.  The state of the world external to 
these countries was provided by the Study Management and Consulting Board (SMCB) 
composed of faculty and outside experts.  For example, it was stipulated that North and 
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South Korea would reunite at some time during the 2001–2021 period, but precisely 
when and how was left to Team Korea.  Study assumptions about political, economic and 
military developments for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China 
(ROC), the Russia Federation, the United States of America (USA), the Republic of 
Indonesia, the Republic of India, and general world conditions are described in Chapter 2.  
 2.  Study Participants and Authors. 
 The authors of this report are the twelve students in SEI-1 and faculty associated with 
the curriculum.  The seven Singapore and five US military officers self-selected 
themselves into country teams of four officers per country.  They have been responsible 
for Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this report.  The biographies for each officer are incorporated 
in the appropriate chapter.  The study's Executive Summary was written by Prof. 
Emeritus Patrick Parker, economist, strategic thinker, business executive, and former 
OSD official now with the NPS Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis (IJWA).  The 
Preface, Forward, conclusion portions of the Executive Summary and Chapter 1 were 
written by the study director, Prof. Michael Melich, a physicist and system engineer also 
of the Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis and Physics Department of NPS.  Chapter 2 
was written by Prof. Raymond Franck, an economist and USAF Brigadier General (Ret) 
of the NPS Graduate School of Business and Public Policy.  Selected SMCB members 
drafted contributions to Chapters 1, 2, 6, and 7 and worked closely with the country 
teams.  
 Members of the  Executive Board of the SMCB were:  Prof Edward Olsen, Asian 
Area Studies specialist with extensive knowledge of Korea and Japan from the National 
Security Affairs Department;  retired Prof Michael Sovereign, economist, former head of 
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the Operations Research Department and the Command, Control and Communications 
Academic Group at NPS, and former OSD Special Projects Director in OSD 
(Comptroller) now with IJWA and Editor-in-Chief for this report;  Prof Wayne Hughes 
tactician, analyst and USN Captain (Ret) of the Operations Research Department;  Prof. 
Robert Harney, a physicist, veteran of Livermore and Lincoln Laboratories, combat 
system engineering Professor in the Total Ships Systems Engineering program and 
resident in the NPS Physics Department;  Dr. Edward Smith, international relations 
strategist, USN Captain (Ret) and intelligence officer, now with Boeing Corporation’s 
think-tank in Washington, DC; plus messieurs Parker, Melich, and Franck previously 
mentioned.   
 Other members of the SMCB who brought their particular expertise to the 
deliberations of the teams and reviewed their work and provided advice were:  Professor 
Glen Browder, retired Member of Congress and NPS Distinguished Visiting Professor of 
National Security Affairs;  Prof Phil DePoy, former President of the Center for Naval 
Analyses, former President of the National Opinion Research Center and now NPS Chair 
Professor of Expeditionary Warfare in the IJWA;  retired Admiral Ace Lyons, former 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet;  Prof Orin Marvel, system engineer with the 
NPS Command and Control Academic Group;  Prof Paul McCarthy, USN Admiral (Ret), 
former Commander of Seventh Fleet, former executive with McDonald Douglas, and 
now NPS Conrad Chair Professor of Financial Management in the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy;  USN Admiral (Ret) Tom Mercer, former Battle Group 
Commander in the Western Pacific,  former Superintendent of NPS,  now Executive 
Director of the NPS Foundation;  Prof Hos-ub Park, Research Director, Department of 
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Maritime Strategy and Policy, Korean Naval War College, retired Captain (Republic of 
Korea Navy) and visiting scholar in the NPS National Security Affairs Department;  Ms. 
Cathy Spencer, formerly Director of Threat and Lethality, in the OSD Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization and now a member of the staff of IJWA;  Dr. Walter LaBerge, 
former OSD R&D official, former Lockheed-Martin executive, former Director of the 
Naval Laboratory at China Lake, now of the IJWA;  Dr. Lowell Wood, Senior Staff 
Member, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory;  Dr. Charles Wolf, international economist, 
former head of the Rand Graduate School, senior economic advisor and corporate fellow 
in international economics at Rand, now senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution; 
and S. Enders Wimbush, director of summer studies for the OSD Office of Net 
Assessment, VP, International Strategy & Policy, Hicks & Associates, Inc. 
 3.  SEI Origins and Operation.    
 The Systems Engineering and Integration Curriculum is a new, inter-disciplinary 
offering designed specifically to create a modern military “officer of the line”,  able to 
understand and grapple with the scientific, technological, system, economic, military, and 
geopolitical complexity of our modern world.  Approximately 75% of the curriculum is 
devoted to the study of discipline-based topics, such as,  physics, engineering, program 
management, traditional systems engineering, and military operational planning as 
provided through the Joint Professional Military Education program specified by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The remaining 25% of the course is devoted to a topical study 
whose purpose is to exercise these disciplines in the solution of  “a problem”.  
 The “problem” portion of the curriculum began with a broad ranging discussion of 
the way that military planners have tried with greater and lesser success to prepare for an 
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unknown future.  Case studies were offered ranging from the impact of the longbow on 
armored knights, then to the development of modern management information systems 
for the US Department of Defense by Robert McNamara, next, to the consequences of the 
technological revolutions in sensors, information handling, nanotechnology, and 
biotechnology, and finally to current efforts to innovate within the DOD and US armed 
services under the banner of the “revolution in military affairs”.  Texts for this portion 
included Peter Schwartz's “The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an 
Uncertain World” and Stephen Rosen's “Winning the Next War:  Innovation and the 
Modern Military”.  
 In the first quarter field trips were taken to, among other places,  the Raytheon 
Missile factory in Tucson, the Litton Shipyard in Pascagoula, MS, the Naval Center for 
Space Technology at the Naval Research Laboratory, the Warfare Analysis Laboratory at 
the Applied Physics Laboratory/Johns Hopkins University.   A series of guest lectures 
were received on topics as diverse as Dr. Charles Wolf's Rand projections of economic 
developments in Asia, to the energy and demographic sub-studies incorporated in the 
“Summer Studies” carried out for Andy Marshall's DOD Office of Net Assessment and 
presented by S. Enders Wimbush.  The students also met weekly during the second six 
months of the curriculum in seminars where they presented results of self-selected 
pertinent topics of research, ranging from how current fighter/attack aircraft operate to 
the arguments raging about the technical feasibility of ballistic missile defense.   In 
October 2000, one year after the first class started, we began a three month “dress 
rehearsal”.  This “dress rehearsal” gave a chance to conduct the entire study of the 20-
year evolution and to scope the major features of our work.  This was but one of four 
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classes that the SEI students were taking at the time.  From January 10 , 2001 to 
graduation on March 29th, the students have devoted full time to research and preparation 
of this report.  
 The Asian context for this study was developed in a series of similar “dress rehearsal” 
studies carried out in 1998 and 1999. In particular, this “Area Denial” work covered  the 
2000–2020 evolution of the military forces of the Peoples Republic of China (twice), the 
USA (twice), Iran (once) and India (once). .  These studies had their origin in 1994 CNO-
chartered task force of the CNO Executive Panel (CEP), called the Innovation Task 
Force.  Actions spurred by the recommendations of this panel include:  a new charter for 
the CNO's Strategic Studies Group; elevation of the President of the Naval War College 
to three-star rank;  creation of the Navy Warfare Development Command; and a series of 
studies carried out at NPS under the sponsorship of the CEP and the Office of Naval 
Research.  Capt Edward Smith was the project officer for the CEP for this work.  Mr. 
Andrew Marshall, chartered in February 2001 to conduct a strategic review of the US 
Defense Department by Secretary Rumsfeld, has been a member of the CEP and its 
Innovation Task Force.  He has made the case that there is a pressing need for innovation 
by the US national defense establishment, not just reform—which simply improves the 
performance of what is already in place. 
 4.  Methodology: How we did the study and the “six questions”! 
 Studies of this sort are not predictions nor are they so intended, but instead develop an 
explicit, internally consistent description of possible linked events.  They are scenarios 
developed in the spirit of Peter Schwartz's support of a “strategic conversation” as 
described in his aforementioned book.  The goal is to explore and make explicit the 
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assumptions that underlie current and planned investments and actions.  These 
explorations prompt a search for alternatives that may disrupt current efforts and point to 
alternative policies and, in our studies, made explicit in changed investments in military 
forces and their capabilities.   
 This study is modeled on the 1997–1999 “Innovation in Naval Warfare Systems—
Area Denial Systems—Red Teams” studies conducted for the CNO Executive Panel and 
the Office of Naval Research.  A fuller description of this work can be found in the June 
2000 issue of the NPS Research Newsletter, entitled “THE PLANNER'S DILEMMA: 
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, AND LONG-RANGE PLANNING”, 
available at www.nps.navy.mil under research/publications.   There are two main features 
of these studies, which are carried forward in the SEI-1 work: 
 a.  Epochs -  Living life as it comes. 
 The twenty years under consideration are examined in four 5 year epochs,  Jan2001–
Dec2005,  Jan2006–Dec2010, Jan2011–Dec2015, and Jan2016–Dec2020.  At the end of 
each epoch the three officer-student country teams make decisions, driven in part by “net 
assessments”,  which can alter the assumed strategic context which governed the previous 
five years evolution.  For the initial epoch the national security strategy and defense plans 
of each country as stated in 2000 are assumed.   This direct tie to current forces and 
conditions responds directly to the criticism of many futurist studies  - “How can you get 
there from here?”  Our study team offers a plausible and possible route that will take you 
from today to a point 20 years in the future. 
 b.  The Six Questions – Spanning from the neighborhood, to goals, to possibilities, to 
actions, to estimates of consequences five years at a time. INSERT FIGURE?  
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 For each epoch the teams addressed these questions:   
 Q1.  What is the expected threat to your territory and national interests, and what 
strategies, e.g., territorial or other ambitions, might you pursue that could generate a 
conflict or confrontation during this epoch or in the periods to come? 
 Q2.  What economic, foreign and military policies and programs do you choose to 
pursue for this epoch? 
 Q3.  What is the projected size of your national economy for the years of this epoch? 
 Q4.  How much of the national economy do you intend to spend on national defense 
during this epoch? And, what fraction will go for the creation of the “Area Denial Force” 
or other military capability not currently found in your nations force structure 
 Q5.  How much of the national defense expenditure will you allocate to each of the 
following resource allocation categories? 
  A.  Current operations 
  B.  Combat System Procurement 
  C.  Intelligence 
  D.  Counterintelligence 
  E.  Research & Development 
   1.  Basic Research 
   2.  Specific capability development, e.g., high energy 
   lasers 
   3.  Combat System Development to provide a change in: 
    a.  Area Coverage of the Combat System (Detection, Engagement,   
    Control, Command subsystems) 
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    b.  Fire Power, number of simultaneously engaged targets 
    c.  Responsiveness, time delay 
    d.  Countermeasure susceptibility reduction 
    e.  Availability of combat system, e.g., logistics, base structure.  
 Q6.  What is your resulting force structure anticipated for the end of the epoch, and 
what is your general operational concept for utilizing these forces in a conflict or 
confrontation?  And, what are their projected combat capabilities characterized in terms 
of the five categories listed in the fifth question (E3), Combat System Development? 
 
C.  Organization and Execution of the Study 
 1.  Teams.   
 The 12 SEI-1 officer-students were assigned, four each to the Korea, Australia and 
Japan teams.  Within each group responsibility for a particular aspect of the research and 
reporting was made.  Generally, within a team a responsible person was identified for the 
following work: 
 a.  Integration of the team's country report.  
 b.  Characterization of the external environment. 
 c.  Characterization of national combat systems and capabilities, including net 
assessments. 
 d.  Characterization of national investment plans with detailed description of 
investments in military capabilities.  
 e.  Technology and system forecasting, design and investment. 
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 There was no permanently assigned faculty member to work with each team, a 
significant change from the 1997–99 “Area Denial” studies.  However, the study director 
met nearly every morning in each team's  “war room” for 15–45 minutes, during the 
January–March 2001 period.  Minutes of these meetings were generated by the team and 
emailed to the study director and used to track the daily decisions/debates as the study 
evolved.  Although there was a division of responsibility the four man teams worked on 
multiple topics and interacted with each other and to some extent with the members of 
the other country teams.  For example, the order of battle used by the Korean and 
Japanese Teams were based upon information exchanged.    
 2.  War Rooms.   
 Each country team was assigned a “war room” within which to document research, 
deliberate with each other and external people, and prepare the reports, briefings and 
other final documentation.  The walls in three windowless rooms (120–140 square feet) 
were festooned with 8.5x11 inch sheets of paper that captured the current state of 
research.  These rooms were also equipped with internet connections, computers, tables, 
chairs, filing cabinet or bookcases and a flip chart or white board.  
 3.  Study Management and Consultative Board (SMCB). 
 Professors Olsen and Franck spent considerable time with each of the teams helping 
them define answers to Questions 1 through 4.  Other members of the board were 
consulted as required.  During the October –December 2000 “dress rehearsal” as the 
teams completed their study of epochs 1, 2 and 3, members of the SMCB emulating the 
national deliberative and decision bodies of the country, would meet in the war rooms for 
an informal briefing/seminar.  A similar, but more structured review with stand-up 
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briefings were presented at the end of each Epoch during the January–February 2001 
work.  The results of these interactions helped clarify issues, provide guidance and 
formed the foundation for the work on the epoch.  
 4.  Fall Quarter: 2 October – 15 December 2000.  
This was a workshop or laboratory (0-12 in NPS class and laboratory notation) class. The 
Fall course was a complete run-through of the study, a “dress rehearsal” for the Winter 
“fulltime” study. 
 a.  First, there was no attempt to coordinate the scenarios used by the country teams 
during the Fall quarter. During the winter quarter a common world scenario was evolved 
(see Chapter 2).  In the Fall for example, everyone assumed (as stipulated for the study) 
that North and South Korea were to be unified in the period 2001–2021, but the Japanese 
team selected a reunification date of 2018 while the Korean team selected a phased 
integration starting in 2006.  In the winter quarter, the time table developed by Korea in 
the Fall was used for the common scenario.  This meant that the Japan team had to adjust, 
or slow, their scenario development.  
 b.  Second, Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have produced official “defense 
white papers” and some auxiliary supporting documentation.   The North Koreans do not 
produce such public documentation.  The final report of the country teams imitated the 
format of their respective  “defense white paper” and supporting documentation to the 
extent practicable.  However, it became clear as we worked through the study that the 
scope of the defense white papers did not necessarily capture all pertinent considerations.  
Thus this report deviates at times from the form of those official documents.  This is 
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particularly true of the development of investment plans in the level of detail and the “net 
assessments” exploited to address question 6.  
 c.  The Fall final briefing was given in a public presentation before an audience of 
about 40 interested people.  Approximately 3 hours was devoted to the briefing and 
discussion.  
 5.  Winter Quarter: 10 January – 29 March 2001.   
The entire working week of the class was devoted to the conduct, writing, and 
presentation of the study.  The following is the schedule followed:  
 a. 10 January – 15 February 2001:  Work through each of the epochs with “decision 
days” at the end of each epoch conducted with SMCB and outside consultants in a 
briefing theater.  The time devoted to Epoch 1 was about four days, while Epoch 4 took 
about 10 work days.  The fall quarter spent more time developing the current factual state 
of the world, thus the fall Epoch 1 took more time than did the winter Epoch 1.  Later 
Epochs require more invention and less research on the factual state of the country 
studied.  All this was done within the context of a common global scenario.  Each epoch 
is written up by the teams and delivered after the briefing to the SMCB.  Note that details 
of the common scenario responded to decisions being made by the three country teams 
sequentially, interactively and competitively.  Thus, there was no direct extrapolation to a 
desired end state, which was in sharp contrast to the 1997–99 studies which tended to 
decide on a desired end state and then resist any attempts to alter plans in response to 
changed circumstances.  Rather, the teams had to adjust their plans in accordance with 
changing circumstances.  They could not go back and change earlier epoch's decisions.  
 b.  16 February – 5 March 2001:  Write up studies and prepare “one-hour” briefing.  
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 c.  5–15 March 2001:  Briefings were given to Prof. P.C. Lui, Singapore's Chief 
Defense Scientist and subsequently to the Superintendent of the NPS, Rear Admiral 
David Ellison.  A video tape of the briefing was recorded to accompany this report.  
 d.  16–28 March 2001:  Refine and publish the final report.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THE GLOBAL SCENARIO, 2001-2021 
 
The following retrospective view of the situation in East Asia from 2001 through 
2020 provided the background against which the strategic, defense and budgetary debates 
in Korea, Australia, and Japan were played out.  It defines their evolving security 
environment and, hence, many of the forces driving the military force structure decisions 
that each country made over the period.  Although this much abbreviated background 
scenario is presented as a continuous retrospective, the retrospective was actually 
presented to the defense planning teams in terms of four sequential epochs with teams 
reacting only to what would have been known in that epoch. 
The first two decades of the 21st century evolved from a century marked by two 
world wars, numerous local wars, and fears of a third, and worse, world war.  In 
particular, the early phase of the 21st century was preceded by a decade of political, 
economic, and strategic experimentation in a "post-Cold War era" (to use the label 
applied retrospectively) that shaped the transition to a new century.  While expectations 
for the new century and a new millennium were high, they were mixed with 
apprehensions about the legacy of past tensions, as well as constraints imposed by nature, 
geopolitics, and societal inertia.  In the Asia-Western Pacific region the Japanese, 
Koreans, and Australians faced distinct but inter-related circumstances that are 
summarized here. 
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A. Global Developments 
The world beyond the direct control of the countries studied (Australia, Japan and 
Korea) experiences what would have been termed a largely surprise-free scenario, viewed 
from the perspective of 2001. 
1.  Political Restraint 
Athough history had clearly not ended, the more apocalyptic visions of post-Cold 
War world affairs likewise did not materialize.  Great power rivalries continued.  NATO-
EU and Russia frequently found themselves at odds over security issues in the former 
Warsaw Pact, especially in the Balkans.  The Taiwan Question was a continual source of 
tension in US-PRC relations until the Taiwan-PRC reunification of 2008.  The traditional 
distrust and rivalry between India and China deepened as both countries steadily 
increased their economic and military power.   
However, a number of great-power rivalries were avoided or defused.  The 
reunification agreements of 2006 in Korea and 2008 in China permitted a significant 
disengagement of the military perimeters of the US and China.  Japan and Russia reached 
a mutually satisfactory settlement of all outstanding border issues which, stated in a treaty 
ratified by both countries in 2009. 
Various regional instabilities continued, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Balkans, the coca regions of Latin America, and parts of South Asia.  However, a rough 
consensus developed among the great powers about dealing with such matters.  The 
United States sought a role of reinsurer of regional stability – with countries within the 
various regions putting most of the troops on the ground.  This effort was most successful 
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in Europe, with the EU assuming an ever-larger role on that continent.  Elsewhere, results 
were decidedly mixed; U.S. forces continued a constant cycle of small-scale contingency 
operations – mostly of peacemaking, peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance in nature. 
 2.  Technology, Globalization And Material Prosperity 
 Called by many a golden age, the early decades of the 21st century were a period of 
unprecedented improvements in material welfare.  Obituaries for the business cycle 
proved premature.  However, it had clearly moderated, with only mild recessions 
occasionally interrupting an overall record of growth, prosperity and stability in all the 
advanced and in many of the developing nations.   
The progressive application of information technologies to all areas of economic 
activity caused growth in total factor productivity that was remarkable for both rate and 
length in which it had been sustained.  Continued expansion of international trade, and 
global economic opportunity, was also a major factor in the economic expansion. 
 3.  Energy 
 Throughout this period, energy was expensive, and a worrisome problem.  But, it 
proved manageable and not a significant drag on any of the advanced economies.  
Extensive and increasing use of control devices and advanced materials lessened energy 
use (a major benefit of Information Age technologies). 
 Saudi Sweet Light Crude was generally priced in the low- to mid-thirties (2000 US$).  
Ready availability of carbon-based energy sources at higher prices served to moderate 
OPEC policies.  Moreover, all countries with the wherewithal to do so took strong and 
effective steps to diversify energy sources.  These measures included the following: 
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(1) exploiting new sources of carbon-based fuels, to include new fuel types, as well as oil 
and natural gas at inconvenient locations; (2) increased emphasis on dirty fuels such as 
coal (with new pollution controls); (3) major emphasis on nuclear power, to include 
breeder reactors; and (4) development of “renewable” energy sources. 
 
B.  Regional Powers: Elephants And Others 
1. RUSSIA: elephant on the mend 
By 2010, Russia was clearly recovering from its post-Soviet malaise and Putin-era 
“grandeur” – one of the manifestations being a more pronounced regional focus, vice 
global.  National security strategy aimed for control and defense of the Russian 
Federation and attaining primacy in the “near abroad.”  Russian policy held firm to the 
ingrained belief that an empire is a god-given right, but with ambitions scaled back to 
more closely reflect means (which were nonetheless clearly increasing). 
Expansionist efforts focused south to the former Central Asian Soviet Republics.  
Russian strategists saw opportunities in the form of natural resources and strategic 
position to be regained, as well as threats from militant Islamic movements. 
Security of eastern frontiers was a continuing worry, with Chinese growth and clearly 
increasing interest in expansion.  The Russian response emphasized a Japanese 
connection.  Agreements for development of Siberian energy sources (2006), and a “final 
settlement” of all territorial issues, including the Kurile Islands (2009).  Russan aims 
were to improve hard currency position, and to create a Japanese interest in opposing 
Chinese expansion into Siberia.   
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Overall, Russia supported development of energy sources in its central and eastern 
regions for both economic and security reasons.  Sales of energy were intended to raise 
hard currency, which improved economic welfare, but also provided the wherewithal to 
better resist any Chinese expansion to its north.  Russia aggressively developed energy 
resources and the pipelines for transport – energetically courting investors from Europe, 
North America and Japan – but not from China.   
Russia did, however, develop energy pipelines from its own territory to China and 
sold petroleum and natural gas to the PRC.  It also collaborated with Korea and China to 
join the Trans-Siberian railroad to the Korea-Manchuria railway.  Once again, Russia 
avoided Chinese or Korean investment in this project. 
Throughout these two decades, there was an uneasy military stalemate with China.  
Russia was continually worried about its ability to deal with any serious Chinese 
incursion, while the Chinese appeared to be worried about the sheer size of the Siberian 
land mass.  In any event, however, China appeared to be drawn more to its southeast than 
to its north, and this particular correlation of forces was not tested. 
Despite frequent and well-publicized disagreements, the Russian Federation 
maintained peaceful and civil relations with NATO and the EU to the west.  Direct 
relations with the US were built on the legacy of the Cold War, reflecting the geopolitical 
distance between the two countries.  Several rounds of negotiations with the US resulted 
in slow, grudging, gradual loosening of ABM Treaty restrictions. 
Despite its economy recovery, Russia’s role in the world economy remained centered 
on its raw materials and defense industries.  The military-industrial sector continued to 
possess significant technical capabilities, but was perennially short of the orders (and the 
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cash) needed to transform some world-class designs into weapons produced in quantity.  
A growing economy and increasing government revenues meant the Russian Ministry of 
Defense was able to embark on a significant, but not fully adequate, recapitalization 
program.   
Propelled by government encouragement and clear self-interest, the military-
industrial enterprises aggressively sought foreign sales.  Major customers included China 
and India.  Russian defense industries themselves slowly and painfully adjusted to post-
Soviet realities.  Accepted as the least of evils, mergers proceeded apace, the most 
prominent being the combined Mikoyan-Sukhoi design bureau agreed in 2007.  Joint 
ventures with foreign firms were regarded as an indirect path to hard currency, and 
accordingly pursued with determination.  Partners included firms in France, South Africa, 
and Israel for a wide variety of platforms and munitions, and also with the United States 
for space launch vehicles. 
2. China: regional elephant and frustrated hegemon.   
The Mao-Deng dynasty remained in place without serious challengers in 2020.  The 
decades preceding saw continuing economic growth.  There were problems however.  
While economic growth was substantial, 5% per year, it was not enough to fully meet the 
regime’s political needs.  After a long period of substantially higher growth, the majority 
of Chinese citizens considered 5% disappointing. 
The country continued to “devolve,” as political activity increasingly shifted toward 
the regions and provinces, an outgrowth of the “one country, many systems” announced 
in Beijing in 2006 (part of the negotiations over reunification with Taiwan).  The main 
sources of economic growth were the small-scale Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs).  
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The State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), as a group, proved remarkably resistant to both 
commercial viability and being closed down.  Faced with a form of political and 
economic fragmentation, serious long-term problems like the SOEs and reduced ability to 
deliver economic growth, the regime faced a chronic and continuing crisis of legitimacy. 
The regime’s response emphasized domestic control – as exemplified by strong 
reactions to Falun Gong, Tibet autonomy movements and similar groups.  The regime 
also emphasized appeals to Chinese nationalism.  Official sources increasingly referred to 
China’s rightful role of primacy in East Asia. 
Although it never fully solved the problem of translating increased GDP into 
increased government revenues, government expenditures nonetheless continued their 
substantial grow.  This enabled a significant military buildup with defense getting a 
consistent 2% of GDP and a growing share of government expenditures. 
Given its increased means, and continuing political difficulties, the regime decided to 
solve its legitimacy problems by appealing to Chinese nationalism and expanding the 
Middle Kingdom’s role in East Asia.  The PRC's agreement with Taiwan for a 10-year, 
phased unification process (2008-2018) included gradual merger of the Taiwan Defense 
Forces with the PLA.  Although forces on Taiwan were not fully available to PLA 
operational control until 2018, forces previously earmarked against Taiwan became 
available for other regional missions. 
One visible change in the Chinese order of battle was a shift in basing from the 
Formosa Straits to the south, clearly visible by 2010 with special focus on Hainan Island.  
The PRC used the new forces in that region to expand air and naval presence in the South 
China Sea -- establishing larger bases in the Paracels and Mischief Reef (near the 
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Philippines).  A PLA White Paper published in 2011 referred to China’s “Fourfold 
Celestial Burden” in East Asian affairs – consisting of typhoon prediction and warning; 
humanitarian response to natural disasters; ridding Asian waters of pirates; and 
safeguarding the welfare of ethnic Chinese regardless of citizenship. 
Taking advantage of that expanded presence, China made clear it was considering 
security options vis-a-vis Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines.  Regarding Vietnam, 
China exerted pressure for access to basing rights (such as Cam Ranh Bay) by extending 
economic cooperation and encouraging Hanoi to learn from the China-friendly policies of 
Thailand and a unifying Korea. 
Regarding the Philippines, China sought basing rights at Subic Bay and on Palawan 
Island in exchange for PRC economic and military aid to the Philippines, and for PRC 
assistance in coping with ongoing Muslim insurgencies.  A number of foreign observers 
interpreted this as part of China's larger campaign to deal with Islamic pressures in the 
East Asian region and along the Pacific Rim. 
Regarding Indonesia, China sought an open invitation from Jakarta to provide 
humanitarian assistance whenever needed.  In that context, China emphasized its role as 
protector of ethnic Chinese throughout the region.  Hanoi, Manila and Jakarta responded 
cautiously to Beijing's overtures, and seriously explored their options within ASEAN, 
with the US, and with Japan. 
One general result of Chinese expansionism was a reluctance by near neighbors such 
as VietNam, Thailand and Myanmar to either fully join or actively resist the Chinese 
band wagon.  While many countries were hedging their bets, a number of security 
arrangements in the Western Pacific were clearly focused on the PRC.  Outward 
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manifestations included military staff talks and joint exercises, all with clear focus on the 
PLA.  Sea control exercises were regular feature, with varying national participation, but 
with regular interest by Russia, Japan, India and various ASEAN navies. 
China’s view: the government of the PRC felt a lessening of control at home and 
increasing encirclement from abroad, despite a satisfactory solution to the Taiwan 
Question.  Hence, national security strategy aimed at ways to break out from perceived 
confinements to secure China’s rightful role of East Asian primacy. 
The Views of China’s Neighbors:  The neighboring countries’ response to Chinese 
expansionism reflected three classic modes of response to any powerful, expanding and 
nearby state: (1) resistance, (2) accommodation, or (3) diversion of the threat to another 
direction.  Korea originally thought in terms of resistance but eventually decided on 
accommodation.  Australia, Japan and India chose resistance.  Russia decided on a 
mixture of accommodation (through energy and arms sales), diversion of the threat 
(encouragement of Chinese ambitions elsewhere in East Asia) and resistance (by 
emphasizing close ties with Japan).  The smaller states in Southeast Asia hoped to 
preserve their flexibility – by generally trying to remain on good terms both with the PRC 
and its rivals. 
3. Other Regional Actors 
a. India: Emerging Elephant.   
After decades of underachievement, the Indian economy experienced a renaissance in 
the new millennium – achieving growth rates of approximately 5.5% per year.  This 
economic growth resulted directly in increases in government revenues.  Given concern 
over Chinese expansionism, India gradually increased defense share of GDP to 4%, with 
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modernization emphasis on territorial defense of the northern border; quick, decisive 
offensive operations against Pakistan; and maritime power projection in cooperation with 
ASEAN, Australia, as well other powers such Japan and the United States should 
circumstances be favorable. 
b. Indonesia 
 Indonesia had recovered a degree of political stability by 2005, which led to a 
reasonably robust economic recovery (3% growth per year).  However, this uneasy 
political stability was bought by loosening the bonds of the Indonesian central 
government and the dominance of the Javanese. A military-supported palace coup in 
2015 resulted in a change of regimes but no significant change in national policies or the 
weakening position of the central government.  The result was the emergence of a de 
facto confederation of still quarreling regions, continued widespread unrest, and, in the 
case of Irian Jaya, an open rebellion that necessitated UN intervention.  The Indonesian 
military remained for the most part poorly equipped relatively weak, and badly 
underfunded.  It also found itself mostly concerned with maintenance of domestic order 
and Jakarta’s authority – and increasingly unable to defend Indonesian territory from 
other armed forces in the region. 
c. United States: The Elephant from Abroad:  
1. The Double Overstretch 
 Following the surprisingly rapid economic growth of the 1990s, the U.S. transitioned 
to a soft landing early in the new century.  Growth settled into a relatively steady and 
uneventful 3% per year.  However, this was not enough to avoid the squeeze caused by 
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the double overstretch of international commitments and domestic entitlements.  US 
policymakers faced a number of hard policy choices. 
Imperial Overstretch: the military remained committed to multiple peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian and other short-of-combat operations.  National policies 
intended to reduce the number and size of such commitments were only partially 
successful.  While the Pentagon became increasingly adept at working around small-scale 
contingencies in its budgeting process, such near-term turbulence continued to hamper 
long-term military planning and cause some underfunding of investment programs. 
 Entitlements Overstretch:  Social security and medicare grew rapidly (and about as 
previously expected), greatly restricting resource allocations in the non-defense 
“discretionary” categories. Among other things, this meant tough sledding for policy 
initiatives that entailed significant resource commitments. 
2. Economic Developments 
Despite general prosperity, it was fashionable to be pessimistic in the first decade of 
the new century. However, optimism became fashionable once again after 2010, due to 
maturing of bio- and nano-technologies.  After 2010, the US government and business 
enterprises became more interested in linking economic development, trade and 
international events.  This resulted in an increased willingness to respond to regional 
crises, had there been any serious crises identified and agreed upon. 
3.   Military Affairs 
The defense budget, driven by the size of international commitments and the need to 
recapitalize the forces, grew at a fairly steady rate of 3% (real) per year.  Relative shares 
among services and defense agencies did not change much.  Despite successes in 
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modernization, there was nonetheless a slow, but definite switch in correlation of forces 
in favor of the regional powers (to include relative capabilities for high-intensity 
conventional combat). 
There was a continuing (sometimes acrimonious) competition for defense resources 
between global force projection and homeland defense (to include NMD, cruise missile 
defense, anti-terrorism, and anti-drug missions).  Homeland defense programs included a 
serious effort to develop BMD technology with a view to earliest practical deployment of 
a National Missile Defense.  There were significant expenditures and significant 
progress, but it was a problem still not completely solved in 2020. 
Recognizing that the Western Pacific presence in Japan and Korea was both less 
needed and more unpopular, the US scaled back its regional presence accordingly.  There 
was an almost complete withdrawal of troops from Korea by 2018 and Japan by 2020 is 
expecting removal of all US forces with the notable exception of a carrier battle group at 
Yokosuka.   
 With impending withdrawal of forces from the Western Pacific, the United States 
reemphasized its ties with Australia and Japan – with those countries asked to be first on 
the ground in any small-scale military operations in their respective areas of operation.  
One unintended consequence of this policy change was a widespread interpretation that 
the United States had asked Japan to take over its leadership role in the Western Pacific. 
 The forces “released” from the Western Pacific were planned for basing elsewhere in 
the region (e.g., Darwin), return to the US for “expeditionary” missions, or were 
deactivated in keeping with a slow decline in Order of Battle units and personnel. 
4. The American Policy Debate That Never Happened 
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 For a number of reasons, the United States never seriously rethought its national 
security and military strategies in this period.  The imperial overstretch ensured that many 
near-term crises consumed policy makers’ (and policy analysts’) time and attention.  
Also, the “unipolar moment” (as it was called after the demise of the USSR) seemed to 
be indefinitely extended, and extendable.  There was no observable sea change that was 
sufficient to provoke a serious national-level review of overall national policy and 
strategy.  That same climate produced a high degree of satisfaction with longstanding 
policy; this mood was perhaps best captured in Henry Kissinger’s retrospective on Asian 
policy (Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2010), which concluded that the ongoing Chinese and 
Korean reunifications were clear triumphs of US policy initiatives begun in the early 
1970s.   
 While a number of people, both within and outside the government, warned of the 
need for change, they were generally prophets not accorded much honor.  There was no 
attention-getting event to provoke a serious reexamination of foreign and national 
security policies.  Thus, US policies, strategies and military programs were notable 
mainly for a surprising lack of change.   
 In 2021, the United States found itself confronting an East Asia which featured a 
Korean-Chinese alignment, Japan actively considering nuclear armaments, as well as a 
powerful, resentful, expansionist China.  All in all, the situation in Northeast Asia was 
not regarded with great comfort or satisfaction in Washington.  Foreign policy 
commentators began seriously asking why we hadn’t taken more effective steps to 
prevent these developments. 
d.  Overall Trends For The Western Pacific Rim 
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In the course of the first two decades of the 21st century several trends became 
evident and are elaborated in this report in the chapters on Korea, Japan, and Australia 
that follow.  Foremost was the revival of nationalist sentiments throughout Asia after the 
region's countries experienced a lessening of Cold War era constraints.  Assertive 
nationalism was most dramatic in China -- which persisted in its quest for consolidating a 
"Greater China" and extending its influence throughout the region by persuasion and 
intimidation.  The successful and peaceful integration of Taiwan within the PRC greatly 
facilitated pursuit of these ends.  However, it also was evident in Russia which made 
serious efforts to rebuild past national security institutions and to reach out to the region 
as a major player.  This nationalist trend was also demonstrated in Korea's peaceful 
reunification, which had significant results for its ties with China and the United States, 
and by resurgent efforts in Japan to pursue greater strategic self-reliance and regional 
connections.  The following chapters provide details on these Northeast Asian 
developments and Australian responses to their impact on Australasia. 
A second, and related, trend was the emergence of a greater sense of regional 
identity in East and Southeast Asia.  The states of the region gave increasing 
consideration to organizational processes that first became prominent in the last decade of 
the 20th century, raising the possibility that an effective Asian grouping might become a 
peer competitor of Europe and the Americas.  This trend was underscored by the 
ambiguous quest for a regional leadership role by China, Japan, and a cluster of smaller 
states.   
Third, the disengagement of Chinese and US military spheres opened much 
greater freedom of maneuver within the region – especially for advanced, wealthy nations 
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such as Australia, Japan and Korea.  They found themselves with greatly expanded 
latitude to formulate independent national security strategies, and to make a difference 
within the region.  As a result, the “elephants” were obliged to take serious account of the 
policies of smaller powers.  Thus, the individual country scenarios (described in detail 
later in this report), and the common scenario (outlined in this chapter) evolved together. 
Finally, a passive trend was evident in the ways the United States' engagement 
roles in the Western Pacific evolved, causing the Smith administration inaugurated in 
January 2021 to order a review of past U.S. policies to determine what might have been 
done more effectively over the past two decades. 
As the second decade of the 21st century came to an end in 2020 many observers 
in Japan, Korea, and Australia -- as well as their counterparts in the major and smaller 
states throughout the Pacific Rim region -- recognized that events which transpired from 
2000-2020 demonstrated a lack of foresight at the start of the new century.  They 
resolved to learn from these experiences in the hope that their track records would 
improve by the middle of the 21st century -- better positioning the countries of Asia to 
cope with regional multilateralism and realize the long-term prospects for developing 
regional structures for governance. 
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Executive Summary 
 In the year 2020, Korea is unified.  The combined military forces of the former DPRK and 
ROK are capable of substantial regional air, land and sea operations in defense of the peninsula and 
the sea-lanes of communication that have supported sustained positive economic growth of the 
economy.  Although the DPRK gave up its fissile material in an act of good faith, the unified Korea 
feels the need to possess a credible deterrent and has the capability to field nuclear weaponry.  Korea 
decided that a strategic alignment with China is mutually beneficial toward solving many day-to-day 
economic, geopolitical and military security concerns.  The USFK (United States Forces Korea) have 
completely withdrawn.  Following the USFK withdrawal from the peninsula, the US called upon 
Japan to take a leadership role in the region.  This appeared as a threat to Korean sovereignty as Japan 
now has a substantial military strike capability.   
 The process of reunification of North and South Korea was pivotal in geopolitical and military 
events of the last 20 years.  This study began with the following reunification assumptions: there 
would be no Korean Peninsular conflict throughout the study period; US troops would be withdrawn 
from Korea; the region would see a marked rise in Japanese militarism; relations between Korea and 
China would warm in later epochs. 
 In 2004, reunification planning began in earnest when the DPRK and the ROK formally agreed 
to pursue unification options.  Within two years, however, the DPRKs economic situation worsened 
to the point of imminent collapse.  Statesmen from both nations established the preconditions for 
unification and the ROK provided a $10B(US) average annual aid package, or roughly two percent of 
the Souths GDP to help the DPRK save face and national sovereignty.  In exchange, the DPRK 
agreed to launch a comprehensive biological and chemical clean-up program and began to re-channel 
excess manpower from demobilized forces into infrastructure improvements.  In accordance with the 
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preconditions for unification, the United States was invited to begin withdrawing troops from the 
peninsula. 
 The DPRKs first priority was to rid the peninsula of US military presence while the ROK 
demanded democracy and a move towards a market economy in the North.  The bottom line for the 
North was that it had little choice.  An aid-based foreign policy strategy was essential to the DPRKs 
prospects for near- to mid-term survival, especially with respect to provisions of energy supplies and 
foodstuffs.  It was to the advantage of both the ROK and the DPRK to entertain an incremental 
transition allowing the Northern regime to avoid extinction and ultimately permit a meaningful, 
longer-term process of reconciliation with the South.   
 Epoch threes dramatic beginning was marked by the signing of the Pamunjon Treaty which 
formalized the reunification of North and South Korea and ended the longest armistice in modern 
history.  And although the US presence shrunk to 50 percent of its 2005 size, it continued to provide a 
stabilizing element to the peninsula.  The North offered up its fissile materials in a show of good faith 
and for the first time in history, the two Koreas fielded a single team in the 2012 Olympics under a 
unified flag.  The unified co federal council removed the political boundaries to allow the merging of 
the two economies and focused on state-supported family reunions and tourism to reconnect long 
separated families.  Informal talks and discussions centered primarily around foreign policy 
arrangements with the four powers as well as long-range defense planning by way of a joint military 
council.   
 In 2018, Korea held its first prefectural elections and the United States Army held closing 
ceremonies at the US Army Base in Yeongsan.  But in an unsettling foreign policy maneuver, the US 
called upon Japan to take the lead in ensuring regional stability.  This and several additional events 
helped to precipitate tensions between Korea and Japan and raised concerns about the United States 
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commitment to regional stability.  Ultimately, it triggered Koreas unilateral strategic and economic 
alignment with the PRC.  
 Koreas historic and ethnic ties to China proved a powerful lure.  Adding the substantial Sino-
Korean trade and growing concerns over Japanese militarism without the stabilizing force of the 
United States, Korean leaders welcomed Chinas invitation to political alignment.   
 Clearly, the North was no longer viewed as the primary threat to the former South Korea and 
the nation took on a more global defensive posture.  By the end of 2020, Koreas national security 
strategy focused more on protection of national sovereignty and all commercial activities.  The 
alignment with China ensured increased security, especially in the areas where Korea was most 
vulnerable.  This translated to a significantly more focused and lethal national military strategy that 
sought to deter any adversarys use of cruise or ballistic missiles, protection from sea invasion, and a 
directed defense against Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) blockages or disruption.   
 With increased capital flows to the region, the Souths economy grew steadily at four percent 
through 2005 and 5.9 percent per annum through 2020 as they contributed two percent of the GDP to 
the North for infrastructure improvements.  This economic aid package, allowed the North to sustain 
double-digit growth throughout the 2010-2015 period, and a nominal 7.2 percent in 2020.  Defense 
expenditures in the South were 3.5 percent of GDP with current operations allocated 70 percent and 
force improvement program spending at 30 percent.  The North with its smaller national economy 
spent nearly 30 percent of the GDP on defense, 70 percent of that on current operations and 30 percent 
on force improvement programs.   
 With the prefectural elections in 2018, Korea saw a shift in military capabilities and the role of 
the unified defense force.  Korea sits on the doorstep to a maritime environment and its desire for sea 
power is linked to a growing Korean reliance on a coastal economy.  With the imminent rise of the 
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maritime power of Japan and China, a high priority was given to Koreas maritime forces buildup with 
emphasis placed on the navy and the air force.  The Korean Armys mission had also changed to 
include that of assisting the authorities in maintaining social order in a unified Korea.    
 The force improvement programs were established to accomplish the national military strategy 
and included Intelligence / Early Warning; Cruise / Ballistic Missile Defense; Precision Engagement; 
and Agile Combat Support.  The air force gradually acquired advanced tactical aircraft suitable for a 
future operational environment, with considerable effort focused on improving the agile combat 
support for better response and flexibility.  New AEW / ESM, air refueling assets were also procured 
in view of departing US forces.  An area that has received emphasis in the air force and other arms has 
been the development and purchase of long-range UAVs for intelligence and even combat missions.  
In addition, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles were procured for extended-range attacks and for 
strategic and precision strikes on ground and sea surface targets respectively.  The new resulting force 
structure was thus a qualitatively superior force with the ability to render prompt fire support to the 
ground and naval forces.  The air forces main challenge, however, remains the search for the best 
force mix, comprising manned and unmanned air platforms and conventional long-range standoff 
strike missiles. 
 The navy was modernized to adjust to three-dimensional warfare, signaling a departure from 
littoral protection to projection of power in the blue water.  With a constantly expanding naval budget, 
Korea procured advanced ocean-going Aegis-class destroyers, like the new Korean-designed KDX 
destroyers armed with state-of-the-art weapon systems in the SM-2 and SM-3 variants of anti-air 
guided missiles as well as extended range anti-ship cruise missiles.  Koreas navy also procured 
submarines that included new patrol submarines like the German Type 214 utilizing AIP (Air 
Independent Propulsion) and the Russian Kilo-class diesel submarines.  
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 The army was rapidly downsized from a combined force of 1.5 million in year 2000 to about 
860,000 in 2020.  This was accomplished through the reorganization of its front-line corps, infantry 
divisions and brigades, into mechanized ones.  Korea also increased the armys combat effectiveness 
by supplementing units with new weapons and equipment   Emphasis was placed too on the armys 
combat helicopters, whose importance in influencing a battle was clearly demonstrated in the Persian 
Gulf War.  Koreas policy thus expanded the combat helicopter fleet and fully integrated its 
employment in land battles.  Major issues concerning integration of doctrine and equipment were 
pivotal to the success of a unified Korean Army.  
 Given the absence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Koreas cruise and ballistic 
missile development program received top developmental priority.  Koreas ballistic force of 
approximately 1000 was primarily dedicated to a strategy of minimum deterrence, which meant that 
no potential enemy would launch a strike against Korea without suffering retaliation.  Consequently, 
long-range ballistic missiles were preferred over short-range ones in a unified Korea, resulting in the 
reduction of its short-range stockpiles with the funds channeled to the development of more accurate 
longer-range ones.   
 Korean military planners (this study team) used the static net assessment to analyze the correct 
size of the military and the balance of capabilities within each service.  A number of scenarios were 
considered for their ability to provide meaningful insights.  During the first 15 years, a DPRK Invasion 
was considered as the South looked with cautious optimism towards unification and their ability to 
defend ROK soil.  Issues included the DPRK sustainment capabilities and no intervening influence 
other than USFK.  Looking outward in the region and forward to unification, a limited war with China 
as a unified Korean force was used.  Finally, a Japanese naval blockade and concurrent SLOC 
interdiction scenario was used in the final epoch to evaluate the capability of existing forces to protect 
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maritime trade routes and sea lines of communication.  A deficiency identified during the early epochs 
was the inability to protect the vital sea lines of communication with a blue water naval force even 
with an accompanying supportive air force.  Korea remains vulnerable to cruise and ballistic attacks 
and lacks a robust offensive cruise missile capability.  With these deficiencies Korea realizes the need 
for a realignment of the threat-based capabilities by decreasing the army, increasing the navy and 
stabilizing the air force funding levels in the subsequent epoch.   
 As stated in its 1999 White Paper, South Koreas technological goals of achieving an 
indigenous production capability of major weaponry, modernizing the military into a technology-
centered force, and a Use Domestic Weapons First policy, encapsulate Koreas philosophy.  Self-
reliance permeated Koreas technological acquisitions throughout the epochs.  From an analysis of its 
industrial capabilities in 2000, Korea concluded that MEMS and biotechnology would be the enabling 
technologies for attainment of Koreas technological goals. 
 Indigenously, Korea was now capable of building its own combat and support ships like the 
KDX-class destroyers and major ground combat systems such as armored and artillery systems.  Its 
unification has given Korea a nuclear-capable BM program.  Through joint production efforts, Korea 
has gained access to new technological weapons.  To build its indigenous capabilities, Korea license 
produced the FX fighter and T-214 submarine in order to acquire the required technology, 
infrastructure and knowledge base.  Due to economic reasons, however, Korea continues to import 
conventional missile technology for direct combat engagements.   
 Koreas two key technical partners continue to be Israel and Russia.  Its cooperation with Israel 
was to acquire miniaturization and tactical HEL (High-Energy Laser) technology, while its alliance 
with Russia focused on acquiring their missile and HPM (High Power Microwave) weapons 
technology.  With France, Korea has secured its rocket and missile propulsion and guidance 
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technology.  In the fourth epoch, Koreas cooperation with China in its HPM program was a means of 
fostering closer military ties.  In earlier epochs, however, Korea had exploited the US-ROK alliance to 
gain access to high technology weapons.  This access ended with Koreas alignment to China.  
 Koreas technology development has been characterized by an increased use of unmanned 
platforms and dependence on digitization, as well as leaning towards the use of directed energy 
weapons as an affordable military solution.  Its technological development had identified that its 
transformation into a high-technology military force would exploit the revolutionary advances of 
MEMS technology.  The reunification process forced Korea to align itself with China resulting in 
Koreas loss of access to US MEMS and related military technology.  The implications are thus a 
slowdown of Koreas military modernization efforts and a reduced logistics supportability of its US 
legacy systems for post 2021 epochs as a compromise for Koreas need for national self-preservation. 
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A. Epoch One (2001 – 2005) 
1. Strategy 
a. Introduction 
 The following section is written from the South Korean strategic military planning 
perspective.  It is written retrospectively from December 2005 and the table below captures the 
significant events of the epoch. 
Epoch One Events   2001 – 2005 
North and South Peaceful Coexistence.  Sunshine Policy in effect 
North Korea’s impending economic collapse 
United States and North Korea nuclear non-proliferation talks 
North and South “Muddle along” policy 
Formal agreements to pursue unification options 
Establishment of Intra-Korean currency 
Table 3-1.  Epoch One Significant Events 
b. Geopolitical/Military Situation – Cooperation and Conflict 
 Although tensions in the region remained high, the military powers of China, Russia, Japan, 
and the United States continued to work for peaceful resolution of long-standing disputes.  As 
cooperation outweighed conflict in this tenuous period, the region trended towards neutralizing 
or stabilizing factors.  Each of the four major powers sought to maximize their security 
advantages while the US maintained the power advantage in the region.  China, as the second 
largest power in the region, viewed the strengthening ties between Japan and the United States as 
a threat.  Furthermore, several events of the previous decade have kept relations between the 
Chinese and the Americans cool.   
1) 1999 NATO air strikes against Serbia 
2) Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade 
3) Chinese defense workers installing fiber optic lines in Iraq 
3-10 
 More importantly, political ties between Japan and China were unstable.  On the surface, 
Beijing and Moscow relations contributed significantly to regional stability while arms transfers 
from Russia to China threatened to trigger a regional arms race.  Finally, relations between Japan 
and Russia were characterized as quid pro quo.   
c. Four Major Power’s Policies 
 While the tide of relation’s ebb and flow, each of the four major powers maintains specific 
policies with respect to the Korean Peninsula.  The United States maintained its long-standing 
policy of war deterrence and denuclearization.  During the last decade, the US became more 
vocal in its support of reunification efforts based on free trade and democracy.  Japan continued 
on diplomatic neutral ground notwithstanding its bilateral security policies with the United 
States.  Japan furthermore maintained credibility through unobtrusive and quiet diplomacy with 
Korea, China, and Russia.  China carried the brunt of North Korea’s economic crisis while its 
policies strongly favored regional stability conducive to economic development.  To that end, 
China and North Korea enjoyed warm relations based on common interests and ethnic ties.  
Russia sought to create a stable environment but with Russian influences.  Not unlike the US, 
Russia also supported reunification, denuclearization, and an arms reduction.  
d. Four Major Power’s Posture 
 The US maintained a general security posture that attempted to balance ground force posture 
with naval presence and included three main missions:  Stabilizing force; defense of Japan and 
South Korea; security of SLOCs in the Pacific. 
 Japan continued to cite North Korea’s 1998 Daepo-dong missile launch as the rationale for 
its enhanced posture and some Japan watchers predicted a reemergence of Japanese militarism to 
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pre-World War II levels.  Several new strategic assets were fielded including several intelligence 
satellites, new frigates, a two thousand ton submarine, and two new E-3x AWACS. 
 Although not bound by treaties, China maintained a defense-only policy.  However, the PRC 
continued to vigorously modernize outdated equipment and revamp her military force structure.  
China also continued to voice strong concerns over the joint TMD project between Japan and the 
US and is increasing its weapons development capabilities.   
 Russia continues to rebuild her military in the image of a leaner, more rapid, mobile force.  
Russia maintained multilateral military policies and strongly opposes the US -Japan TMD 
project. 
e. What Changed?  
 Formal agreements between Pyongyang and Seoul to investigate and pursue unification 
options served to boost optimism and warm relations between the two nations.  This was 
followed shortly by the announcement of an intra-Korean currency designed to streamline 
merging economies, increase trade, and build overall confidence.  Otherwise, little else changed 
between North and South Korea from the previous decade.  The 2001 to 2005 epoch is therefore 
characterized as the “Muddle Along” epoch.  Economic, social, and political suffering remained 
widespread in the North.  
 The “Sunshine Policy” is President Kim Dae Jung’s philosophy or proposed formula for 
unification, which envisions this process as occurring in three stages.  Stage one is described as a 
confederation characterized as one nation, two states, and two independent governments that 
seeks to institutionalize inter-Korean cooperation.  Integral to stage one are regularly scheduled 
North-South summit conferences and the activation of a co federal council.   The “would be” co 
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federal council will be tasked ultimately with unification planning and will include the following 
sub-councils: 
4) Joint Economic Council (JEC) responsible for economic merging and viability. 
5) Joint Social Council (JSC) responsible for state supported family reunion planning, 
tourism, etc. 
6) Joint Foreign Policy Council (JFPC) responsible for scheduling and directing informal 
talks and discussions that will ultimately result in foreign policy decisions. 
7) Joint Military Council (JMC) responsible for developing and making defense policy 
recommendations to include demobilization, modernization.  The JMC is additionally 
responsible for close coordination with the JSC on issues involving the social impacts of 
large-scale demobilization. 
 The “Sunshine Policy’s” second stage involved creating a federation characterized as one 
nation, one state, and two autonomous regional governments.  Under this system, the central 
government would handle issues of a national or strategic focus such as foreign policy and 
diplomacy while the regional governments would be responsible for the lesser, clearly internal 
matters.  The subsequent third stage would then be a fully unified, single nation.   
f. Reunification 
 Scholars worldwide are watching for several indicators of change that will drive 
reunification.  Key indicators include: major political-military change in the North; growing 
economic and political vulnerabilities in the North; regime or state collapse in the North; and 
waning alliances between North Korea and China and Russia.  We have already seen clearly the 
extreme vulnerability of the North’s economic situation, which many North Korea watchers 
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believe will trigger a collapse of the current regime.  Also, the aid reduction from Russia and 
China is viewed as a potential trigger point for absorption by the South.  
 There are four likely scenarios or a combination thereof which political scientists believe will 
characterize a reunification of North and South Korea.  They are:   
1) Unification through peaceful integration and negotiation 
2) Unification through absorption following a collapse of North Korea 
3) Unification through conflict or war 
4) Sustained disequilibrium and potential external intervention 
 South Korea hopes for a peaceful integration called a soft landing.  We would prefer to avoid 
a hard landing, or an absorption following a total economic collapse, but the North with its juche 
philosophy may hold on to the very end.  Worse still would be conflict or war in an act of 
desperation by the North to maintain sovereignty.   
g. Economic Summary 
 Absent an egregious economic downturn in the region and with recognition of the 1997 
crisis, the South Korean economy is assumed to experience a GDP growth rate on the order of 4 
percent per annum through 2005.  Beginning with a GDP of $344 B(US) in exchange rate (XR) 
terms (as opposed to purchasing power parity), ROK will average $387 B(US) annually 
throughout epoch 1.1  ROK defense expenditures remain constant at 3.5 percent of GDP or an 
average of $12.8 B(US) per annum in XR terms.  The military spending is allocated traditionally 
with 70 percent assigned to current operations, maintenance, personnel (salary/food/clothing), 
facility operation and construction, and US Forces Korea support.  The remaining 30 percent was 
                                                 
1 RAND, Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications, presented to Naval Postgraduate School by Dr. 
Charles Wolf, Jr, December 1999.   
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assigned to Force Improvement Programs (FIP).  The FIP allocation includes research and 
development, and equals about four percent of the overall defense budget.    
 There is a paucity of reliable economic data available with regard to the size and efficiency 
of the North Korean economy.  The economic data and subsequent calculations discussed herein 
are recognized to be imprecise.  However, the calculations are within a rough first order of 
magnitude and suffice for comparison purposes.  In 1999, the DPRK was reported to have a GDP 
in PPP terms as $15.8 B(US).2  Comparing the relative ratio of ROK to DPRK GDP in PPP and 
applying the ratio to the XR estimate of ROK GDP allowed an optimistic and useful conversion 
of DPRK GDP.  In PPP terms, during epoch one, the total ROK ($4191 B(US)) to DPRK 
($93B(US)) GDP ratio was 45.2.  Applying that ratio to the ROK (XR) GDP yielded a DPRK 
GDP of $8.6 B(US).  The DPRK real GDP growth was projected at 6.2 percent throughout the 
epoch with DPRK defense spending between 27 and 30 percent of GDP.  During the first epoch, 
the assumption is that actual defense spending by the DPRK was 30 percent of GDP.  Allocation 
of this defense expenditure was not postulated. 
h. South Korean Strategy   
 The first epoch’s NSS (National Security Strategy) revolved around the tenants of peace, 
stability, and war deterrence through peaceful coexistence.  Additionally, a focus on international 
cooperation sought to share security resources and diffuse peninsular tensions.   
 The NMS (National Military Strategy) ultimately sought to deter an invasion by North Korea 
and protect the sea lines of communication.  South Korea also desired to strengthen military ties 
with other regional powers.  Modernization efforts focused on a smaller, more lethal force 
structure that capitalized on strengthening external military ties. 
                                                 
2 The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., June 30, 2000 from Bank of Korea and National Statistical Office, Seoul, 
Republic of Korea. 
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2. National Defense 
a. South Korea’s Force Improvement Plans3 
 In light of the rapid changes in the security environment, the types of future warfare, and the 
accelerated development of advanced weapon systems, it was imperative to restructure ROK’s 
military force.  The current restructuring placed an emphasis on the acquisition of essential 
capability that could be employed against North Korea's military provocations with regard for 
future security uncertainties.  Given the limitations in defense resources, however, it was 
particularly important to promote a qualitative improvement in inter-service force capabilities 
and a balanced force structure.  Since restructuring required years of advanced planning, the 
ROK armed forces intended to implement it as a long-term plan.  The ROK armed forces are 
transforming the current personnel-based structure to a quality-oriented, technology-intensive 
one and have placed a first priority on securing core capability.  Taking also into account the 
changing role of the USFK, the prospects for South-North Korean security relations, and the 
limitations in defense resources, the ROK armed forces will promote a balanced development of 
three services, thus maximizing the joint force capability.  
 To lay the foundation for the 21st century and national unification, the ROK armed forces 
have implemented defense modernization programs in manpower management, information, and 
science and technology with modernization in defense information as the top priority project. 
The December 1994 switch of the OPCON to the ROK has added urgency to the project.  
Modernization in defense science and technology, guided by the principle that South Korea will 
make all vital weapon systems indigenously, has proceeded with the selection and development 
of priority weapon systems and improvement of the defense R & D system.  C3I modernization 
is a critical element in combat operations.  It is a "force multiplier" that combines military assets 
                                                 
3 Reference: http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/korea/milit1-1.html#1  
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organically and enhances the overall effectiveness of military power. The ROK armed forces 
have endeavored to create an automated command system, which will significantly shorten time 
to sense, decide, and respond to any threat.  In tandem with the development of joint war fighting 
capability under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the armed forces have focused on 
real-time war fighting in terms of different services, echelons, and functions.  In connection with 
the defense information management system, the Korean C3I system will be on par with that of  
advanced industrial nations. 
1) ROK Army (ROKA) 
 On August 31st 1998, the North Korean government shocked the world when they 
tested a Daepo-dong missile with a range of 2000 km.  President Kim Dae Jung's 
predecessors had previously promised to purchase either a US Patriot or a Russian-made 
S-300 missile defense system, but not before the year 2000.  A Patriot battalion would 
cost the ROK in excess of $1 billion while the Russian system would cost significantly 
less.  It now appears that President Kim has changed course.   He has instructed the 
ROK's Agency for Defense Development to accelerate work on a medium-range surface-
to-air missile that will have a range of 40 km.  It is being designed to intercept invading 
North Korean military aircraft and Scud-type missiles.  The system will not be 
operational until 2008 and the decision had been to go ahead with the purchase of the 
Russian S-3004 system that appeared to be comparable in performance with the US 
Patriot but significantly lower in costs.  Korea also continued to invest in upgrading its 
fleet of tanks and armored fighting vehicles with the locally made Hyundai K1 MBT and 
                                                 
4 Detailed description of the S-300 is available in the Annex 3D3 
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Daewoo’s KAFV5.  Following an increasing worldwide market trend of having a 
powerful armored vehicle, Daewoo Heavy Industries (DHI) developed the Korean 
Armored Fighting Vehicle (KAFV) by reinforcing its firing power to the standard KIFV6.  
The KAFV, with its increased firing power and survivability, can be operated as 
organizational equipment in the mechanized infantry and cavalry units.  The KAFV 
40/50 was developed indigenously by DHI and has a 40mm grenade and a 50-caliber 
machine gun that is currently operated by the Korean Army.  This vehicle can transport a 
squad over all terrain to the target area and can fire during maneuvering, even at night.  
With a total combat weight of 13.9 tons including turret system, KAFV can be operated 
at a maximum speed of 70km per hour. A gunner operates its turret and the target is 
observed by visible sight.  The KAFV successfully completed their test & evaluation 
trials in overseas countries as well as in Korea in the year 1995, and currently draws 
much attention from several countries. 
Combat System 2000 Procurement Demobilization 2005
Active Divisions  23 - - 23 
Personnel (thousands) 560 - - 560 
Reserve Divisions  23 - - 23 
Tanks 2100 66 66 2100 
APC / AIFV7 2500 66 66 2500 
Attack Helicopters 100 48 48 100 
Gun Artillery 4550 - - 4550 
Rocket Artillery 180 - - 180 
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 12 - - 12 
Air Defense Artillery 600 - - 600 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 1000 20 35 985 
Table 3-2.  ROK Army Force Structure 2005 
                                                 
5 Information on the KAFV is borrowed from the Federation of American Scientist and more detailed information is 
available in Annex 3D3. 
6 Detailed description of the KIFV is available in Annex 3D3. 
7 Armored Personnel Carrier / Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle. 
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2) ROK Navy (ROKN) 
 The term "Naval Power" means a lot more than just having a few good modern ships 
and subs, or even an aircraft carrier.  It also means having the political will and financial 
ability to use them whenever and wherever necessary in an effort to try and dictate the 
outcome or course of events in a crisis or hot spot.  Recognizing the viable DPRK force 
to the north, focusing South Korean naval projection in that direction would seemingly 
deplete resources probably better used on defense of the SLOC’s, if required.  However, 
with a communist neighbor still hard to trust, the focus will remain sharply on the North 
for some time.  The new FFG/DDG types ensure more powerful and self-sufficient forces 
at sea in case USN assistance is slow in responding.  If the ROK did want for whatever 
reason to have a more influential maritime effect on the region, then it will probably need 
more than a few modern destroyers to do so.  
 The 3,900 ton King Kwang-Gae-To-Dae-Wang was commissioned in 1998, and was 
the first of the KDX-1 class FFGs fitted with 8 Block 1C Harpoons, and RIM-7P Sea 
Sparrow in the Mk 48 VLS.  The second of the class was commissioned in 1999, and 
according to Janes, the third of the KDX-1 class ships Xangmanchae was commissioned 
by the end of 1999.  They are designated DD type. By the year 2005 the ROK navy 
possess nine KDX destroyers inclusive of the KDX-3 that are Aegis-class destroyers.  
They represent a major leap forward for the ROK Navy in providing a modern fighting 
capability.  The KDX-2 and KDX-3 have a comprehensive area defense SAM system 
fitted (using SM-2MR), and the KDX-3 will be a 7,000-9,000 ton class vessel fitted with 
the Aegis combat system and radar.  Nine hulls were produced for the KDX program, 
three of each type.  They rival the latest destroyers from China and Japan in modern war 
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fighting capability.  The American Mk 45 Mod 4 5"/62 lightweight gun system was 
chosen for the KDX-2 DDG.  It was co-produced under license in South Korea.  The 
Rolling Air Frame missile (RAM) was chosen for the KDX-2.  Service date for the first 
KDX-2 was December 2005.  In addition, the ROK Navy has taken delivery of its 9th 
Chang Bogo (Type 209) class SSK (diesel-electric).  Additionally, the design for the first 
of three follow-on class submarines is confirmed to be the German Type 214 submarines 
with a block order of six additional units under the 5-year defense.  Moreover, an 
additional nine Kang Keong class MCMVs are planned as well. The YangYang is the 
lead ship in an improved Kang Keong MCMV class, seven or eight of this new type are 
planned.  
 Within the ROK naval air arm, an additional twelve Super Lynx are on order to form 
a second squadron. In addition to their ASW role, they are fitted with Sea Skua ASM.  
The planned purchase of an additional eight P-3C’s also materialized in epoch one. Other 
projects under construction include three new minesweepers, and two 7,500-ton class 
underway replenishment vessels.  The ROK Navy is unlikely to emerge as a major naval 
power in the region, at least not for some time, and only if it decides it wants to have a far 
greater influence in regional affairs.  However, they do have tremendous potential 
emerging as a warship builder.  
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Combat System 2000 Procurement Demobilization 2005 
Maritime Patrol A/C 8 8 - 16 
Submarines 18 2 5 15 
Destroyer 5 4 - 9 
Frigates 16 - 5 11 
Coastal Patrol 118 - - 118 
Amphibious 33 - 3 30 
Mine Warfare 15 5 3 17 
Table 3-3.  ROK Navy Force Structure 2005 
3) ROK Air Force (ROKAF)8   
 The ROKAF received its first F-16 aircraft in 1986-88. Deliveries of the second 
ROKAF buy of F-16s, known as the Korean Fighter Program (KFP), began in 1994. The 
first few were built at Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems (LMTAS) with the 
remainder being produced under license at Samsung Aerospace in Sachon, Korea.  Major 
upgrades are either in development or being incorporated so that all F-16 versions remain 
modern and fully supportable well into the next century.  Additional F-16 sales were 
finalized in 2000.  LMTAS completed modifying the first Korean F-16 with the 
AN/ALQ-165 Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) 9 with Korea accepting the 
aircraft on February 26, 1999, according to schedule.  
Combat System 2000 Procurement Demobilization 2005 
Fighter 485 - - 485 
Ground Attack 0 - - 0 
Bomber 0 - - 0 
Air Refueling 0 - - 0 
AEW / ESM 0 - - 0 
Reconnaissance /UAV 38 90 - 128 
Trainer A/C 153 45 - 198 
Transport A/C 12 - - 12 
Table 3-4.  ROK Air Force Structure 2005 
                                                 
8Reference:  http://www.pcarena.com/sim/news/f16.htm  
9 Refer to Annex 3F2-A for detail description of ASPJ. 
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b. North Korea’s Force Improvement Plans  
 With the economic difficulties faced in the North, it can only be very selective in its 
investment decisions.  Not much has changed since 2000.  Emphasis has been placed in the areas 
of ballistic missile and special force developments.   The following tables represent the resulting 
force structures for the DPRK armed forces. 
Combat System 2000 Procurement Demobilization 2005
Active Divisions  80 - - 80 
Personnel (thousands) 1000 - - 1000 
Reserve Divisions  37 - - 37 
Tanks 3500 - - 3500 
APC / AIFV10 2500 - - 2500 
Attack Helicopters 50 - - 50 
Gun Artillery 8200 - - 8200 
Rocket Artillery 2300 - - 2300 
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 55 - - 55 
Air Defense Artillery 6000 - - 6000 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 5500 - - 5500 
Table 3-5.  DPRK Army Structure 2005 
Combat System 2000 Procurement Demobilization 2005 
Maritime Patrol A/C - 12 - 12 
Submarines 25 - - 25 
Destroyer - - - - 
Frigates 3 - - 3 
Coastal Patrol 448 - - 448 
Amphibious 266 - - 266 
Mine Warfare 24 - - 24 
Table 3-6.  DPRK Navy Structure 2005 
                                                 
10 Armored Personnel Carrier / Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
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Combat System 2000 Procurement Demobilization 2005 
Fighter 241 - - 241 
Ground Attack 321 - - 321 
Bomber 80 - - 80 
Air Refueling - - - - 
AEW / ESM - - - - 
ASW / Patrol - - - - 
Reconnaissance /UAV - - - - 
Trainer A/C 263 - - 263 
Transport A/C 304 - - 304 
Table 3-7.  DPRK Air Force Structure 
1) Strategic Weapons Development 
 North Korea's WMD programs pose a major threat to the Korean peninsula and its 
surrounding neighbours.  This threat has advanced considerably over the past five years, 
particularly with the enhancement of North Korea's missile capabilities.  There is 
significant evidence that undeclared nuclear weapons development activity continues, 
including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related 
high explosive tests.  This means that the South cannot discount the possibility that North 
Korea could produce additional nuclear weapons outside of the constraints imposed by 
the 1994 Agreed Framework.  
 In the last five years, North Korea's missile capabilities have improved dramatically.  
North Korea has produced, deployed and exported missiles to Iran and Pakistan, launched 
a three-stage missile (Daepo-Dong 1), and continues to develop a larger and more 
powerful missile (Daepo-Dong 2).  Unlike before, North Korea can now strike even the 
United States with a missile which is capable of delivering high explosive, chemical, 
biological, or possibly nuclear weapons.  The United States and its allies are currently  
unable to defend against this threat.  The progress that North Korea has made over the 
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past five years in improving its missile capabilities and its record as a major proliferator 
of ballistic missiles and missile technology, when combined with its development 
activities on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, ranks North Korea as one of the 
greatest missile proliferation threats in the world. 
a) Nuclear Weapons 
 Based upon North Korea's efforts to acquire plutonium, it can be concluded that 
Pyongyang set out to build first-generation, implosion-type plutonium bombs 
comparable to the "Fat Man" bomb that the United States dropped on Nagasaki in 
1945  which used 6.2 kilograms of plutonium and produced an explosive yield of 23 
kilotons.  It took the United States about four years to produce the first-ever 
plutonium bomb.  By comparison, North Korea has had decades to work on a bomb 
and has had ample opportunity to exploit large amounts of declassified information 
on nuclear weapons programs.  With respect to weapon design, North Korea 
reportedly has produced and tested explosive triggers for detonating nuclear weapons 
as recently as November 1998.  As a general rule, the biggest hurdle for a would-be 
nuclear power is the acquisition of fissile material such as enriched uranium or 
plutonium. It is reasonable to assume that North Korea has made or could make a 
nuclear explosive device capable of producing a significant nuclear yield.  While such 
a device Might not compare favorably to the most modern weapons possessed by the 
five de jure nuclear weapon states, even a few kilotons of yield could approach the 




b) Chemical and Biological Weapons 
 North Korea possesses biological weapons production and dispensing technology, 
including the capability to deploy chemical or biological weapons on missiles.  The 
DPRK is generally credited with possessing a full range of chemical warfare agents 
including nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. The South Korean government 
believes that the DPRK followed the Russian pattern of developing chemical warfare 
weapons for a wide range of weapons systems, including artillery above 82 mm, 
multiple rocket launchers, Soviet-derived FROGs (Free Rocket Over Ground), SCUD 
missiles, aerial bombs and spray tanks.  Additionally, the DPRK biological weapons 
(BW) effort is believed to focus on traditional agents: plague, typhoid, cholera, 
anthrax, smallpox, yellow fever, botulinum toxin, and hemorrhagic fevers.  It is 
generally assumed that, to the extent capable, the DPRK would seek to provide BW 
munitions for the same range of weapons as it does with chemical munitions.  
c) Ballistic Missiles 
 Development in ballistic missiles continues to receive top priority in the North 
Korean People’s Army.  The resulting force structure for 2005 is shown below: 
Combat Systems 2000 Procurement Demobilization 2005 
Scud B 100 - - 100 
Hwasong 5 150 - - 150 
Hwasong 6 250 - - 250 
No-Dong 1 / 2 36 50 - 86 
Daepo-Dong 1 - 25 - 25 
Table 3-8.  DPRK Ballistic Missile Structure 2005 
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3. Net Assessment 
a. Introduction   
 The static net assessment was chosen as a tool to highlight deficiencies in defense 
capabilities.  A perspective towards military force structure asking the question, “What if?” was 
taken to answer the question, “Are we covered?”  The static net assessment was chosen over the 
more robust dynamic or campaign and vulnerability analysis due to time, information and 
resource constraints.  It is recognized that the static assessment may not always take into account 
the qualitative technological advantage that some systems may possess, nor are reliability or 
maintainability issues evident.  Additionally, doctrine, survivability and some specific system 
performance measures were not included.  This point illustrates that these assessments are first 
order approximations.  The fidelity attendant to information regarding logistics, proximity, 
mobility, and operational factors such as detection and engagement times are not precise enough 
to go beyond a first order approximation.  However, these approximations generated rough draft 
deficiency lists for further discussion and proposed solutions that may mitigate any glaring 
deficiencies.  Ultimately, the deficiencies and the proposed solutions were prioritized for 
procurement funding and subsequent acquisition of fielded systems.   
 A number of scenarios were considered for their ability to provide meaningful insights.   
The scenarios were based upon the Korean NSS supported by the NMS.  Within this established 
boundary, the “neighborhood” powers and their potential as a threat to national security are 
discussed.  Required military capabilities are identified if this “neighbor” became an aggressor 
and a scenario that balanced testing of those capabilities was developed.   
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 The net assessment for epoch one is derived from scenarios that are congruent with the ROK 
inward focus on peaceful peninsular coexistence as unification talks are looked upon by the 
general military planning staff with an optimistic suspicion. 
b. Scenario One:  Overland Invasion by North Korea 
 Scenario One is an overland invasion by North Korea against the US and South Korean 
Alliance’s Combined Forces Command (CFC).  South Korean and US Forces Korea military 
personnel constitute the CFC.  The purpose of this scenario is to illustrate the military 
capabilities and deficiencies of S. Korean-US alliance in the event of a NK invasion.   The 
intention is to evaluate the capabilities of the CFC alliance against the DPRK without any 
external intervention factors. 
1) Army Order of Battle 
 On the ground, the North has over one million active duty soldiers.  This is nearly 30 
percent of all North Korean males between the ages of 13 to 32.  This compares with the 
South's 560,000 soldiers.  North Korea has two times the number of tanks (4,000 to 
2,000), field artillery units (10,200 to 5,000), and surface-to-air missiles (5500 to 985).  It 
also has the world's largest organized special operations forces, approximately 88,000 
personnel.  Its troops are positioned close to the DMZ, which minimizes preparations 
needed for an attack and it has invested heavily in artillery which includes long-range 
systems that can reach across the border into Seoul itself.  While the accuracy of this 
artillery may be questioned, the sheer volume of fire available is formidable.  
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Combat System DPRK CFC ROK USFK 
Active Divisions 80 24 23 1 
# Personnel (K) 1000 588 560 27.5 
Reserve Divisions 37 23 23 -- 
MBT 3500 2240 2100 140 
APC / AIFV 2500 2670 2500 170 
AH 50 172 100 72 
Gun Artillery 8200 4580 4550 30 
Rocket Artillery 2300 210 180 30 
SSM 55 12 12 -- 
ADA 6000 600 600 -- 
SAM 5500 985 985 -- 
Table 3-9.  DPRK and CFC Army Order of Battle 
2) Navy Order of Battle 
 At sea, the North has 25 attack and smaller non-attack submarines, to the South's 15, 
which includes nine of the newly acquired attack submarine.   The North originally had 
26 submarines, but one was lost during the September 1996 incident while the rest were 
decommissioned with upgrading work performed on the remainder.  The ROK navy has a 
reasonable force in numbers, and also has the ability to project that power beyond 
territorial waters or regional confines.  South Korea’s primary core force comprises 11 
Ulsan class Frigates and 7 Chung Buk (ex-US Gearing class) destroyers and small force 
of modern diesel fast attack submarines. However, the addition of the new KDX-1/2/3 
classes over the last few years has strengthened this projection capability.  This contrasts 
with the DPRK fleet comprised primarily of coastal patrol types. ROK has a good 
number of similar types to counter them, as well as a far more effective air force 
capability.  In the case of a conflict, the DPRK fleet would be highly vulnerable.  
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Combat System DPRK CFC ROK USFK 
Maritime Patrol A/C 12 16 16 -- 
Submarines 25 15 15 -- 
Destroyers -- 9 9 -- 
Frigates 3 11 11 -- 
Coastal Patrol Boats 448 118 118 -- 
Amphibious 266 30 30 -- 
Mine warfare 24 17 17 -- 
Table 3-10.  DPRK and CFC Navy Order of Battle 
3) Air Force Order of Battle 
 The DPRK Air Force, while near parity to the ROK Air Force in terms of aggregate 
combat aircraft, lacks modern capability.  Their vintage former Soviet equipment is 
hardly a match for the more modern ROK air assets.  Their MiG-21 Fishbed and MiG-23 
Flogger fighters are aging, and the limited numbers of capable MiG-29 Fulcrums are not 
much of a match for the ROK’s F-16 Falcon’s, F-4 Phantom’s and F-5 Tigershark’s.  
The ROK maintenance and upgrade programs have kept the older vintage aircraft 
(Phantom and Tigershark) more capable than the daylight visual MiG-21’s and MiG-
23’s.  See Annex 3D2 for a specific breakdown of aircraft types and quantities.   
Combat System DPRK CFC ROK USFK 
Fighter 241 555 485 70 
Ground Attack 321 20 -- 20 
Bomber 80 -- -- -- 
Air Refueling -- -- -- -- 
AEW / ESM -- 8 8 -- 
Recce / UAV -- 129 128 1 
Trainer A/C 263 198 198 -- 
Transport A/C 304 20 12 8 
Table 3-11.  DPRK and CFC Air Force Order of Battle 
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4) Concept of Operation 
 The primary objective of Pyongyang in conducting an overland invasion of South 
Korea is to facilitate unification of the two Koreas by force.  North Korea's first action in 
a war scenario would be the launch of a ballistic missile attack on South Korea.  We 
would also expect them to target naval forces patrolling the Pacific.  A simultaneous 
stage would be a barrage from the thousands of artillery tubes positioned just north of the 
DMZ, resulting in heavy casualties for the CFC headquarters, supply stations and 
transportation units.  Other components of a North Korean attack include strikes against 
airfields and fortified military targets by fighters and bombers.   Meanwhile, Seoul and its 
13.5 million people would be in a state of panic.  
 On the same day, North Korea would be expected to execute a rapid naval operation 
that would transport its special task force consisting of 88,000 men into the South along 
the eastern seaboard.  Using a variety of means such as submarines, hovercraft, small 
planes, helicopters, rafts, hang gliders and fishing boats, the first units would probably 
land in the Kang Neung area in northeastern Korea.  A second unit could land in the 
Pohang area.  In the Pusan area, a third unit could land to deliver maximum surprise and 
damage to the CFC.  
 The North Korean special operations team would be working simultaneously with 
underground forces that would then emerge through tunnels dug underneath Seoul and 
surrounding cities.  There are over 25 major tunnels that have been discovered in Seoul 
and outlaying areas.  In effect, thousands of special operations teams would be inserted 
into the South to attack critical targets such as command and communication centers, air 
defense systems, airfields and supply depots.  
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 The ensuing ground battle would be centered on how successful the North Koreans 
are in penetrating the South.  While CFC forces are deployed along the eastern coast to 
defend against the Special Forces, a large portion of the North Korean million-man army 
would cross the DMZ.  The terrain along the DMZ is, however, very rugged and favors 
the defending CFC.  Still, the North Koreans would have a significant advantage because 
of their sheer numbers.  
 Penetrating into Seoul would be a difficult task for the North, as CFC air support 
would mount a strong effort to prevent any enemy units and reinforcements from 
crossing defensive lines.  Within the second week, the South would be able to use its air 
superiority to do essentially what North Korea used its long-range systems for, the 
destruction of transportation units, roads, logistical centers, supply centers, etc.  At that 
point, the primary focus for air attacks would be destroying roads and columns.  Should 
North Korean forces reach the battlefield, CFC ground forces would be engaged in 
defensive battles and counterattacks to push back any penetration into Seoul.  
Unfortunately for the South, there would not be time for any major deployment from the 
United States unless reinforcements were already in place as a result of a long period of 
tension.  
 If the CFC forces are successful in repelling the North back across the DMZ, how far 
the front line advances beyond the DMZ will largely depend on politics -- in particular, 
Chinese sensitivity to movement north of Pyongyang.  The danger facing the CFC is an 
escalation of the hostilities toward a war with China.  China would only support the 
DPRK in war if Seoul was clearly the aggressor or if China desired for some reason to 
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expel the US from Asia.  However, direct confrontation appears unlikely as China 
demonstrates a deep commitment to long-term economic development.  
5) Committed Forces Comparison (DPRK vs. CFC) 
 From the arrayed orders of battle, the most probable commitment of forces by each 
side is illustrated.  Based upon resource, proximity and readiness issues, the assumptions 
made were that DPRK commits 60-70 percent of its forces against 100 percent of CFC 
forces to the conflict.   
Combat System DPRK DPRK Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Active Divisions 80 50 24 24 
# Personnel (K) 1000 650K 587.5 588 
Reserve Divisions 37 25 23 23 
MBTs 3500 2300 2240 2240 
APC / AIFV 2500 1700 2670 2670 
AH 50 30 172 172 
Gun Artillery 8200 5500 4580 4580 
Rocket Artillery 2300 1500 210 210 
SSM 55 40 12 12 
ADA 6000 7300 600 600 
SAM 5500 7300 985 985 
Table 3-12. DPRK Vs CFC Army Assessment  
Combat System DPRK DPRK Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Maritime Patrol A/C 6 4 16 16 
Submarines 25 16 15 15 
Destroyers -- -- 9 9 
Frigates 3 3 11 11 
Patrol Boats 448 298 118 118 
Amphibious 266 177 30 30 
Mine warfare 24 16 17 17 




Combat System DPRK DPRK Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Fighter 241 160 555 555 
Ground Attack 321 264 30 30 
Bomber 80 53 -- -- 
Air Refueling -- -- -- -- 
AEW / ESM -- -- 1 1 
Recce / UAV -- -- 129 129 
Trainer A/C 263 175 198 198 
Transport 304 202 20 20 
Table 3-14.  DPRK Vs CFC Air Force Assessment  
6) Results.   
a) CFC 
 The CFC's advantages are: a strong defensive position, a world-class regional air 
force assisted by the US Air Force, dominance over the seas, and better training.  
Perhaps the greatest advantage the CFC enjoys is the South's economic and industrial 
resources that would be readily available.  If there were to be any success at all 
against the South Korean-US alliance, it would depend largely on how the North 
Koreans decided to start the war.  However, any significant interruption of the CFC 
C3 network could change the face of the conflict. 
b) DPRK 
 The DPRK is arguably well suited and prepared to carry out a massive surprise 
attack.  If the DPRK were to commence such an attack, it would be in a time of 
moderate tension, where it would be able to catch CFC forces in garrison and its air 
forces on the ground.  Currently, North Korea's front-line infantry and artillery units 
are positioned forward with attack supplies (ammunition, fuel, etc.).  However, if the 
conflict becomes protracted, North Korea would be unable to sustain their forces.  
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Sustainment depends upon oil, food, and weapons supply lines to the battle area, 
which is currently a major weakness in the DPRK.  
7) Conclusions 
 CFC will win a bloody war as the DPRK lacks the sustainment capability to conduct 
a successful operation. The only hope North Korea has for success is if it reenacts an 
offensive rush to the city of Pusan, similar to the attack of 1950.  The North must be able 
to prosecute and end the war before the USFK are allowed reinforcement, which would 
give DPRK temporary control of the peninsula.  However, the North's success in the 
1950s depended on the balance of military capabilities on the peninsula, as well as the 
absence of the US and the slow arrival of its reinforcements.  The balance in the 1990s is 
now firmly in Seoul's favor and US assistance during the event of war would help expel 
the invaders.  Yet, without question, the end result of a war in this era would be the loss 
of thousands, perhaps millions, of lives on both sides.  While the CFC would utilize its 
naval and air superiority, the North Koreans would prove difficult to expel because of 
their ability to take cover in caves, mountains, valleys and man-made tunnels.  The 
tunnels, built since 1964, would easily cause severe problems in search and destroy 
operations since the element of surprise is in the favor of North Korea.   
 The DPRK retains the capability to deploy chemical and biological weapons.  If used, 
chemical and biological agents would severely restrict the ability of the CFC to defend.  
However, it would also bring an overwhelming response and political pressure from 
global leaders, including the US.   
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c. Scenario Two:  North Korea/China (Red Team) vs. South Korea/USFK (CFC)  
 We will now consider the possibility of a behind the scenes involvement of China to support 
a North Korean overland invasion.  Before delving into the net assessment proper, it is important 
to first examine how the involvement of China changes the balance of forces in this conflict.  To 
do that, we will again adopt the approach of comparing the respective orders of battle, then 
describe the possible invasion scenario, perform the net assessment and conclude with the 
findings from the net assessment. 
1) PRC Army Order of Battle11  
 For the ground forces, China’s presence reinforces the already huge number of troops 
of North Korea.  See Table below. 
Combat System PRC DPRK RED CFC ROK USFK 
Active Divisions 44 80 124 24 23 1 
# Personnel (K) 1983 1000 2983 588 560 27.5 
Reserve Divisions 80 37 117 23 23 -- 
MBTs 6750 3500 10250 2240 2100 140 
APC / AIFV 9060 2500 11560 2670 2500 170 
AH 500 50 550 172 100 72 
Gun Artillery 14500 8200 22700 4580 4550 30 
Rocket Artillery 3800 2300 6100 210 180 30 
SSM ? 55 55+ 12 12 -- 
ADA 15000 6000 21000 600 600 -- 
SAM ? 5500 5500+ 985 985 -- 
Table 3-15.  Red Team and CFC Army Order of Battle 
2) PRC Navy Order of Battle 
 In terms of the Navy Order of Battle, China possesses a large number of surface 
combatants like destroyers, frigates and a large number of missile and torpedo boats as 
                                                 
11 For greater details on actual year 2000 Chinese Army Order of Battle, refer to 
http://www.periscope.ucg.com/nations/asia/china/army/index.html. 
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well as a large number of submarines.  China’s entry thus brings about a numerical 
superiority in the number of naval forces for all classes. 
Combat System PRC DPRK RED CFC ROK USFK 
Maritime Patrol 30 12 42 16 16 -- 
Submarines 69 25 94 15 15 -- 
Destroyers 27 -- 27 9 9 -- 
Frigates 41 3 44 11 11 -- 
Patrol Boats 219 448 667 118 118 -- 
Amphibious 90 266 356 30 30 -- 
Mine warfare 83 24 107 17 17 -- 
Table 3-16.  Red Team and CFC Navy Order of Battle 
3) PRC Air Force Order of Battle12   
 Below is the Air Force Order of Battle.  Notice that China’s involvement brings to the 
table for North Korea the possibility of employing large numbers of fighters and 
bombers. 
Combat System PRC DPRK RED CFC ROK USFK 
Fighter 2851 241 3092 555 485 70 
Ground Attack -- 321 321 20 -- 20 
Bomber 235 80 315 -- -- -- 
Air Refueling 10 -- 10 -- -- -- 
AEW / ESM 16 -- 16 8 8 -- 
Recce / UAV -- -- -- 129 128 1 
Trainer A/C -- 263 263 198 198 -- 
Transport 322 304 626 20 12 8 
Table 3-17.  Red Team and CFC Air Force Order of Battle 
4) Scenario Description 
 The second scenario, an overland invasion, portrays North Korea soliciting and 
obtaining military support from China.  Recall the first scenario involved North Korea 
pitting its forces against the Combined Forces Command (CFC).  The weakness that led 
                                                 
12 For greater details on actual Chinese Air Force Order of Battle, refer to 
http://www.periscope.ucg.com/nations/asia/china/airforce/index.html.  
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to the North’s defeat by the CFC was its lack of sustainment capability; a deficiency that 
has remained the DPRK’s Achilles heel since the conclusion of the Korean conflict in 
1953.  
5) Concept of Operations 
 Again, the objective in conducting an overland invasion of South Korea is to facilitate 
unification of the two Koreas by force.  North Korea’s military strategy would remain 
similar to the first scenario.  The availability of Chinese support to overcome identified 
deficiencies such as sustainment capability, establishing naval blockades to choke off 
South Korea from the sea, and achieving air superiority through the provision of bombers 
and fighters to complement the existing North Korean Air Force. 
 The important thing to note is that China’s participation allows North Korea to fully 
commit its forces in the overland invasion, which in the previous scenario demanded that 
North Korea maintain some forces behind to establish rear security.  China’s participation 
is, however, limited to the provision of weapons systems and operators (bombers, 
fighters, and ships) rather than army manpower.  This is due to political reasons of not 
wanting to be perceived as an aggressor. 
 As in the first invasion scenario, North Korea's first action in a war scenario would be 
the launch of a conventional Ballistic Missile (BM) attack on South Korea.13  However, 
the DPRK is now able to launch three times as many BMs due to the provision of these 
added missiles from China.  Additionally, China would provide North Korea with surface 
combatant ships from three of its seven in the Chinese East Sea Fleet, together with 500 
                                                 
13 A reason for the North’s invasion of the South is the securing of the economic infrastructure of the South to avert 
North Korea’s possible economic collapse.  Consequently, the use of nuclear weapons is deemed highly improbable 
as it would mean the total destruction of just these resources that the North so desperately seeks.  A possible 
alternative is the employment of nuclear weapons in high altitude blasts to generate huge EMPs to disrupt the 
command, control, and communications assets of the more modern South Korea military. 
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fighters and 60 bombers.  The conduct of the conflict would play out as per the first 
scenario.   Again, the invasion scenario ignores the influence of US forces not already in 
Korea from the onset of the conflict.  In other words, these two invasion scenarios portray 
a worst-case picture for the CFC.  
6) Committed Forces Comparison.   
a) Army 
 With the commitment of the entire North Korean Army against the South 
Koreans, we see that the numbers have now shifted in favor of the North.14  The 
South Korea/US force only possesses a distinctive advantage in its Attack 
Helicopter (AH) numbers.   
Combat System Red Team Red Team Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Active Divisions 124 80 24 24 
# Personnel (k) 2983 1000 588 588 
Reserve Divisions 117 37 23 23 
MBT 10250 3500 2240 2240 
APC/AIFV 11560 2500 2670 2670 
AH 550 50 172 172 
Gun Artillery 22700 8200 4580 4580 
Rocket Artillery 6100 2300 210 210 
SSM 55+ 55+ 12 12 
ADA 21000 6000 600 600 
SAM 5500+ 5500 985 985 
Table 3-18.  Red Team vs. CFC Army Assessment 
                                                 
14 Yi Young-hui, a leading South Korean intellectual, argued in a Korea’s Congressional testimony in 1988 that the 
South’s military is stronger than the North, a view that the South Korea’s own military acknowledged in 1990.  
Hangyore Sinmum reiterated the view in a 1995 editorial that “South Korea’s military strength is a match for that of 
North Korea or, as some people estimate, is superior to that of North Korea given the capability of South Korea’s 
state-of-the-art weapons.”  Suh, Jae-Jung.  Duality to Reciprocity:  America’s Two-War Doctrine and Peace on the 
Korean Peninsula.  University of Pennsylvania.  22 Oct 2000.  http://focusweb.org/focus/pd/sec/SuhJaeJung.html.  
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b) Navy 
 The navy figures also portray a gloomy picture for the South Koreans.  
China’s numerous missile and torpedo boats blockading the various SLOCs in the 
East China Sea will effectively cut off South Korea from the South.  The presence 
of these boats will also serve to delay the entry of the US 7th Fleet into the 
Combat Zone. 
Combat System Red Team Red Team Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Maritime Patrol 30 20 16 16 
Submarines 94 24 15 15 
Destroyers 27 4 9 9 
Frigates 44 8 9 11 
Coastal Patrol Boats 667 350 118 118 
Amphibious 356 278 30 30 
Mine warfare 107 36 17 17 
Table 3-19.  Red Team vs. CFC Navy Assessment 
c) Air Force 
 Chinese support to the North Koreans has diminished the South Korea/US air 
advantage from the first scenario.  The provision of numerous bombers by the 
Chinese means that South Korea/US ground forces are more vulnerable to air 
attack. 
Combat System Red Team Red Team Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Fighter 3092 717 555 555 
Ground Attack 321 321 20 20 
Bomber 315 113 -- -- 
Air Refueling 10 2 -- -- 
AEW / ESM 16 2 --- -- 
Recce / UAV -- -- 129 129 
Trainer A/C 263 -- -- -- 
Transport 626 304 20 20 
Table 3-20.  Red Team vs. CFC Air Force Assessment 
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7) Results 
 In Scenario Two, we deduce that the Red Team prevails - a reversal of results from 
Scenario One.  The important lesson that we derive from the net assessment is that a 
technologically inferior force can still defeat a technologically advanced force through 
the employment of sheer overwhelming numbers.  In our case, the CFC is defeated 
because South Korea/US forces are essentially overwhelmed by the numerical superiority 
of the Red Team, though their weapons are antiquated and technologically inferior.  An 
added point is the pivotal role the Chinese Navy plays in delaying the arrival of US Navy 
reinforcements into Korea long enough for North Korea forces to secure the South and 
establish a stubborn defense capable of repulsing a US counterattack. 
 The CFC Air Forces no longer enjoy air superiority.  At best, air parity is attained.  
The employment of DPRK Special Forces is still a very big threat since air insertion is 
still viable. Chinese naval support does effectively choke off South Korea from the East 
China Sea and delays the entry of the US Navy into the theater.15  This also effectively 
takes away the sustainment advantage enjoyed by South Korea over the North in 
Scenario One. The North eventually overwhelms the South on the ground.  A substantial 
advantage in terms of numbers of the North’s SAMs may nullify the CFC AH advantage.  
d. Epoch One Net Assessment Conclusions  
 From the conduct of static net assessments of the two scenarios, we are able to highlight the 
following : 
                                                 
15 The North must be able to end the war before the US Army enters the fray, which would give them temporary 
control of the peninsula.  NSCF Task Force on Korean Security.  South Korea’s Modernization Program and North 
Korea’s Military Strategy.  1998.  http://www.nscf.net/South%20Korean%20Modernization %20Program.htm.   
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1) DPRK 
 The DPRK military will need to bolster its sustainment capability before it can even 
consider an invasion of the ROK.  In quantitative terms, North Korea has sufficient 
numbers of weapons to overwhelm the ROK (if US is not involved).  The age of these 
weapons, however, will reduce their combat effectiveness against the more modern but 
smaller South Korean military.  Thus, for South Korean planners, overtures of 
China/North Korean cooperation, especially military related ones must be viewed with 
great suspicion. 
2) ROK 
 For the South, the present deficiencies are two-fold.  Foremost, is the dependence on 
US military presence on the peninsula.  This dependency could tip the balance of power 
between the two Koreas in the event that US pulls out for whatever reasons.  Second, we 
have identified that the key to defeat by the Red Team was due to a lack of early 
warning/situational awareness of the enemy’s disposition such that allied forces could not 
be brought to bear in time to win the necessary engagements.   




4. Technology Development 
a. Overview 
 Before beginning the discussion on Team Korea’s justifications for the technology paths 
pursued in our study, several points require mentioning.  The technological approach for the two 
Koreas first started with some baseline documents.   
 For North Korea, a conscious decision had been made to adapt whatever scarce information 
is available to tell the story of the North’s technology base and its Research and Development 
(R&D) program.  Consequently, the assertions made herein are the author’s assessments.  For the 
study on South Korea, the baseline was essentially the White Paper 1998 and 1999.  It must, 
however, be clarified that these two documents did not provide details on South Korea’s 
industrial capacity or capability.  The technological industry assessments made in the various 
epochs were thus the author’s own observations and deductions.  
 A common approach adopted by the author and applied to both Koreas was the policy that it 
was better to invest in areas that maintained each country’s military advantage than to invest in 
entirely new areas, unless favorable conditions already existed in the country.  Keeping in mind 
these points, the following story traces the defense technology developments and acquisitions of 
North and South Korea and also a subsequent unified Korea from January 2001 to December 
2020. 
b. Approach  
 The approach used in determining the two Korea’s technological investment decisions was 
based on the following framework.  First, a study was made to understand each country’s 
defense technology-related goals and its strategy for achieving these goals.  Next the defense 
industrial base existing within the country was assessed for its strengths and weaknesses. The 
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extent this industrial base was able to support current acquisitions and the capacity of the 
industry to support subsequent and future programs was estimated.  The vulnerabilities and 
deficiencies of each country’s present force structures were next evaluated and from there 
possible technological solutions were listed.   
 From this list, an assessment was made to how these technologies were to be acquired.  
Essentially, the technological solutions could take either one of the four acquisition methods, 
namely indigenous R&D/production, joint R&D/production, licensed production, or direct 
import.  Having listed all the relevant choices and understanding the possible capacity of the 
supporting defense industrial base, a final assessment was made of the enabling technologies 
required to bring up the country’s R&D and production capability from its current state to the 
desired state and the approximate time required.  This consequently constitutes the country’s 
long-term R&D programs.  
c. Technology Assumptions of Study 
 From historical trends, there are seven identified factors that affect the technological 
advancements pursued by countries that also apply to the two Koreas in our study.  These factors 
are: performance, economics, and average cost of a system16, religion, environment, education 
levels, and politics.17  With these considerations, a common set of working assumptions was 
defined to describe the workings and global treatment of technology.  Of utmost importance to 
this study was the applicability of Moore’s Law. 
1) Moore’s Law 
 The prediction put forth by Moore’s Law that computing power capability increases 
exponentially is assumed to be valid for the timeframe of our study.  The governing rule 
                                                 
16 Average cost of a system, based on Moore’s Law follows an exponential growth and doubles every 5 years. 
17 Harney, R.C.  Technological Assessment for Military Strategic Planning and Innovation.  21. 
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of thumb that applies to microprocessor-related technology18 has the following 
implications.  First, the half-life for technological advancement is about 15 years and 
follows an exponential curve.  This implies that the capability of any particular 
technology doubles between 12 to 18 years19.  Second, the assumption that cost doubles 
every five years means that the forecasting of the country’s R&D budget must take this 
into account.  And more importantly, microprocessor clock speeds will double every 18 
months. 
2) Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) 
 The general trend shows that countries are pursuing efficient force improvement 
programs that emphasize improving quality economically, considering the rapidly 
changing science and technology and security environment.  This has the effect of 
countries adopting more efficient defense acquisition policies.20 
3) Controls over Technology Transfer 
 This assumption reflects the global trend of countries today in building up a defense 
industry as a significant revenue-generating extension of their economies.  With 
economic growth as the fundamental driver in the cultivation of a defense industry, 
countries naturally could adopt protectionist policies to ensure that they would be able to 
derive substantial benefit from their own technological inventions and innovations.  
Consequently, any country attempting to cultivate and develop its own defense industry 
must adopt one of several approaches.  
                                                 
18 For every technological marvel in 2000, there will be three new such marvels in 2025.  Harney, R.C.  
Technological Assessment for Military Strategic Planning and Innovation.  21. 
19 A deviation of three years is the author’s own assessment. 
20 White Paper 1998.  160. 
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a) One, the country can acquire this technology through investment in its own defense 
and industrial R&D capability.  This course is only economically viable if the 
necessary infrastructure is already available.  Otherwise, a huge commitment in its 
economic resources must be first made to develop this infrastructure.  
b) Two, a country could share in a joint R&D and production of the technology..  
Economically, such an arrangement would result in monetary savings and even 
shorten the acquisition time for the countries concerned.  This option is good as it 
pulls together more resources than would otherwise be available to the individual 
countries. 
c) A country could engage in the licensed production of particular weapon systems.  
Such a course is good for countries to pursue when they possess the prerequisite 
civilian industrial base for production but not the required military technology.   
d) Four, the last and least preferred method is through direct sales of weapon systems 
from one country by another.  This course does not facilitate any technology transfer 
though the process does allow the country purchasing the equipment to acquire 
capabilities provided by the weapons, which it would otherwise not have. 
4) Dual-Use Technology Policy 
  As initially covered under the introduction on licensed production above, the global 
trend is the development of a defense industry in parallel with civilian industry.   
d. DPRK’s Technology Focus   
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology  
 DPRK’s first epoch technological goals remain focused on its philosophy of juche,  
The country’s limited availability of resources forces its technology acquisition strategy 
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to remain primarily on the reverse engineering of outdated former-Soviet Union and 
China weapons from the 1950s.  DPRK has also actively sought technology transfers 
from sympathetic nations21.  This strategy is, however, becoming less and less viable due 
to North Korea’s deplorable economy, which makes hard currency unavailable. 
2) Defense R&D Budget 
 Maintaining the budget allocations defined earlier, the tables below summarize the 
epoch one defense and R&D budget breakdowns. 
 
Table 3-21.  DPRK Defense Budget Breakdown 
Table 3-22.  DPRK FIP Budget Breakdown 
                                                 
21 Of which the two biggest contributors used to be China and the former Soviet Union. 
 GDP Defense O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 27.0% 18.9% 8.1% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 6.2%  
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2001 8.071 2.179 1.525 0.654 
2002 8.572 2.314 1.620 0.694 
2003 9.103 2.458 1.720 0.737 
2004 9.667 2.610 1.827 0.783 
2005 10.267 2.772 1.940 0.832 
Total 45.680 12.334 8.634 3.700 
Average 9.136 2.467 1.727 0.740 
 Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D
%GDP 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
% 50.0% 20.0% 30.0% 5.0% 35.0% 
%Def Bud 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5%
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil
2001 $0.196 $0.078 $0.118 $0.033 $0.229 
2002 $0.208 $0.083 $0.125 $0.035 $0.243 
2003 $0.221 $0.088 $0.133 $0.037 $0.258 
2004 $0.235 $0.094 $0.141 $0.039 $0.274 
2005 $0.249 $0.100 $0.150 $0.042 $0.291 
Total $1.110 $0.444 $0.666 $0.185 $1.295







%GDP 2.8% 2.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 
% 35.0% 70.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 
%Def Bud 10.5% 7.4% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2001 $0.229 $0.160 $0.034 $0.023 $0.011 
2002 $0.243 $0.170 $0.036 $0.024 $0.012 
2003 $0.258 $0.181 $0.039 $0.026 $0.013 
2004 $0.274 $0.192 $0.041 $0.027 $0.014 
2005 $0.291 $0.204 $0.044 $0.029 $0.015 
Total $1.295  $0.907 $0.194 0.130 0.065 
Average $0.259  0.15 0.03 0.022 0.011 
Table 3-23.  DPRK R&D Budget Breakdown 
e. DPRK’s Technology Investments. 
 DPRK’s technological strength continues to reside in its ability to reverse-engineer major ex-
Soviet Union weapons.  Most of its factories continue to operate well below their capacity due to 
a lack of available resources.  For the first epoch, DPRK had concentrated on upgrading its 
massive inventory of land-based weapons, especially in its armored and artillery forces. 
f. DPRK’s R&D Program. 
 From the table below, the first epoch continued the reverse engineering efforts of old Soviet 
and Chinese equipment.  Though unconfirmed, ROK suspects that DPRK continues to pursue 
indigenous R&D on its satellite and SOF insertion capabilities program.  DPRK also continued 
with its secret development of chemical and biological weapons. 




Small Naval Craft 
Small Arms 
Satellite 
BM (Iran, Pakistan, Israel) 
Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Table 3-24.  DPRK Defense Systems Acquisition Method Summary 
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 Regarding Ballistic Missile (BM) research, ROK is quite convinced that DPRK has been 
secretly working in collaboration with Iran and Pakistan, with Israel’s involvement highly 
suspect.  DPRK’s BM-related technologies continue to use 1980s technology.  Due to the 
DPRK’s use of older generation technology (of at least two generations behind ROK), the 
country’s present inventory of missiles is not accurate.  Consequently, Team Korea feels that the 
bulk of its technological investments will be spent on investing and developing BM-related 
technologies, especially in the field of missile control guidance.  In summary, as of 2005, DPRK 
is still devoting much of its R&D efforts in BM technology.  
g. ROK’s Technology Focus. 
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology 
 The ROK goals for the first epoch continue to follow those of early 2000 in its quest 
for self-reliance and indigenous defense production.  The focus has, however, started to 
become more regional with a reduced emphasis on the ROK Army, especially in the 
attainment of a credible blue-water ROK Navy.  Foremost priority for the ROK Navy is 
the protection of ROK’s sea lines of communications (SLOCs).  Supporting the Navy’s 
SLOC protection priority is the ROK Air Force’s emphasis on achieving and maintaining 
air superiority.  This emphasis has in turn translated into the acquisition of an advanced 
air combat capability.  And supporting the ROK Air Force’s air superiority priority, the 
army’s emphasis is the build-up of air and coastal defense capabilities. MND had 
identified that the need for space and maritime surveillance systems.  Consequently, 
MND placed emphasis on space developments to answer the DBA needs. 
 The strategy for the first epoch essentially remained similar to that of the previous 
decade.  ROK had, however, started actively dealing with Israel to solicit US technology 
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and also Russia (as part of its loan repayment arrangements to ROK) in its quest to 
reduce the ROK’s dependence on the US for its technology. 
2) Defense R&D Budget 
 Maintaining the budget allocations defined earlier, the tables below summarize the 
epoch one defense and R&D budget breakdowns. 
 GDP Defense O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.1% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 4.0%    
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2001 357.760 12.522 8.765 3.756 
2002 372.070 13.022 9.116 3.907 
2003 386.953 13.543 9.480 4.063 
2004 402.431 14.085 9.860 4.226 
2005 418.529 14.649 10.254 4.395 
Total 1,937.744 67.821 47.475 20.346 
Average 387.549 13.564 9.495 4.069 
Table 3-25.  ROK Defense Budget Breakdown 
 Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
% 50.0% 20.0% 30.0% 5.0% 35.0% 
%Def Bud 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2001 $0.935 $1.247 $0.935 $0.150 $0.488 
2002 $0.973 $1.297 $0.973 $0.156 $0.508 
2003 $1.012 $1.349 $1.012 $0.163 $0.528 
2004 $1.052 $1.403 $1.052 $0.169 $0.549 
2005 $1.094 $1.459 $1.094 $0.176 $0.571 
Total $5.066 $6.755 $5.066 $0.814 $2.645 
Average $1.013 $1.351 $1.013 $0.163 $0.529 
Table 3-26.  ROK FIP Budget Breakdown 
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FDP (80% of R&D) ADD (20% of R&D)  
Army Navy AF EO MW AC UWA WS 
% R&D 
Budget 
24.0 32.0 24.0 5.5 5.9 6.1 1.6 1.0 
Year US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil
2001 0.117 0.156 0.117 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.008 0.005 
2002 0.122 0.163 0.122 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.008 0.005 
2003 0.127 0.169 0.127 0.029 0.031 0.032 0.008 0.005 
2004 0.132 0.176 0.132 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.009 0.005 
2005 0.137 0.183 0.137 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.009 0.005 
Total 0.635 0.846 0.635 0.146 0.155 0.160 0.042 0.025 
Average 0.106 0.141 0.106 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.007 0.004 
Table 3-27.  ROK R&D Budget Breakdown 
h. ROK’s Technology Investments 
1) National Defense Plan 
 From the 2001-2005 Mid-term Defense Budget, the following weapons systems were 
acquired by the three services through December, 2005.  These procurements are 
categorized into DBA (which encompassed Information and Command/ DBA and 












2 Comms Satellites 
1 Spy Satellite 
Joint C3I System 
 
Strategic Strike Space Launch Capability Space Launch Platform 
Ground 
Operations 
Improved lethality, agility 









Develop surface combat capability 
Protection of SLOCs 
8 P-3Cs 
13 Super Lynx 
3 K. Keong MHC 
3 Chang Bogo 
4 KDX 
Air Operations Advanced Air Combat 
Advanced Trainer Capability 
10 A-50 
1 E3 AWACS 
45 KT-1 Trainer 
10 KOX-1 FAC 
80 UAV 
150 AMRAAM 
Table 3-28.  ROK Weapon Systems Acquisition 
2) Existing Capabilities 
 As of 2005, the ROK’s indigenous efforts and capacity remain unchanged from the 
previous decade.  ROK possesses an indigenous capability to build major and minor 
surface ships and ground combat systems, but a limited indigenous capability to produce 
combat aircraft22.  The aerospace industry is still on the path to maturity.  In spite of the 
advances in ROK’s capability to produce weapon platforms, it does not, however, yet 
                                                 
22 By this time, however, South Korea has developed and built its indigenous KT-2 jet trainers.  It decided on its 
choice of the F-X fighter program to replace the aging RF-4s.  The end state of this program is that South Korea 
effected a licensed production capability thereby securing technology transfers relating to manufacturing modern 
fighter aircraft.  Ultimately, this brought South Korea even closer to achieving its long-term aim of indigenously 
producing its own advanced combat fighter aircraft.  Team Korea assesses this possibility of occurring around 2020. 
3-51 
possess an indigenous capability to produce high technology armaments like AAM, 
ASM, or SAM23. 
Indigenous R&D 
and Production 













































Table 3-29.  ROK Defense Systems Acquisition Method Summary 
 The epoch witnessed the joint production of ROK’s first pair of spy satellites, with 
US’s assistance.  These satellites were similar to the IKONOS in terms of specifications 
and dimensions, except that these spy satellites the resolution was only up to three 
meters.  For the ROK Air Force, the FX fighter was finally chosen.  The ROK also 
successfully began the licensed production on its next generation of Air Independent 
Propulsion (AIP) submarines, the German-designed Type-214.  Due to the need to 
overcome ROK’s deficiencies in air surveillance, MND had decided to effect foreign 
military sales (FMS) with the US on the AWACS and P-3Cs. 
i. Assessed Vulnerabilities and Deficiencies from Epoch One 
 From the Net Assessment performed at the end of epoch one, the ROK’s identified 
vulnerabilities include coastal defense, protection of SLOCs, protection against rear area attacks, 
and over-reliance on the United States for its strategic and tactical aviation needs, its Navy, and 
                                                 
23 South Korea has, however, assembled the Pegasus SAM system, which is essentially an integration of a HAWK 
SAM system onto a K-200 platform. 
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its  leadership  responsible for training and readiness.  The key weaknesses were essentially the 
protection of SLOCs and ROK’s over-reliance on the US.  This resulted from ROK’s 
deficiencies in the number of blue water ships and its lack of airborne and space-based sense 
systems.  
 Based on the weaknesses identified, ROK’s solutions to these deficiencies are to focus its 
technological investment in acquiring a better DBA capability, hardware modernization to build-
up its blue water capability, and acquisition of tactical aviation systems, and advanced munitions. 
j. ROK’s R&D Programs 
 The two focus set forth by MND in epoch one follows from the earlier decade, which are to 
invest heavily in the development of high-tech weapons and to secure the ability to develop core 
technologies suitable for the Korean military environment.  The table below thus summarizes the 
major R&D efforts for the first epoch. 
2001-2005 
Direction Items to procure 
Upgrade & Modernization of present 
systems 
Advanced Fighter Technology 
Advanced Surface Combatant Technology 
Miniaturized Systems 
Space Launch systems 
AIP Propulsion 
FX 
Air Mine Field 
KSR-1 
Micro Air Sensor 
KDX-III 
T-214 
Table 3-30.  ROK Major R&D Emphasis 
 To address the deficiencies, however, the R&D focus for the upcoming epoch became the 
acquisition of even better blue water capabilities than the existing KDX-1/-2 destroyers and even 
greater surveillance coverage capabilities and platforms with emphasis on space-based systems. 
Based on the FDP (Force Development Program) allocations, the table below summarizes the 
services and DBA R&D investments.  The programs of interest that will be elaborated further 
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essentially deal with the DBA investments.  The point to note is that a significant proportion of 
the DBA and R&D spending focuses on the space and defense digitization efforts.  












Bil R&D Program 
US$ 
Bil 
AH-64D $0.150 Torpedoes $0.030 FX $0.200 Communications Satellites $0.080 
KIFV $0.020 Submarine (T-214) $0.150 A/T-50 $0.050 Spy Satellites $0.220 
K1-A1 










$0.030   KOX-1 $0.025 Micro Air Sensor $0.080 
    UAV $0.010 Defense Digitization $0.215 
    AAM $0.020   
Others $0.285 Others $0.216 Others $0.235 Others $0.039 









Table 3-31.  ROK R&D Programs 
1) Defense Digitization for the New Millennium 
 The end of the first epoch also saw the conclusion of phase one of the defense 
digitization effort.  In this phase, the defense digitization effort included completing the 
computerization of the MND’s information system, consolidation of mega data 
processing centers, and the establishment of the digitization training centers. 
 With MND’s decision to fully computerize its information system in 2001 in support 
of its top priority of integrating command and control information systems, some 200 
data processing computer centers were consolidated into five to seven mega centers.  This 
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consolidation was completed in 2005.24  In concert with this consolidation in 2001, the 
military also placed importance on the establishment of an integrated command, control, 
communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
system.25  Hence, the idea for the JC3IS took on new meaning.  At end 2001, MND 
completed its goal of installing office automation systems in all parts of the military and 
systems providing services to civilians.  Then in end 2002, the military also completed 
the establishment of 150 digitization training centers nationwide.  By end 2005, the first 
phase of the defense digitization effort is almost completed. 
2) Space Program Development Update 
 In 2001, MOST (Ministry of Science & Technology) announced that it would build 
its own space center at a cost of 130 billion won ($102 M(US)) on the island of Woe 
Narodo, Kohung province, off the southern coast to launch a satellite by 2005.26  With its 
construction completed in 2004, South Korea finally achieved the ability to launch its 
own rockets into space in 2005, thereby achieving a significant milestone in its space 
program.  Finally in 2004 and 2005, South Korea’s first two spy satellites were put into 
orbit with US assistance. 
3) Micro-Air Sensor Network (MASN) – Korea’s Strategic DBA Solution 
 Concurrent with the ROK feasibility study on space-based sensors, the idea of the 
micro-air sensor network was born.  Based on revolutionary advances already taking 
                                                 
24 “Defense Ministry aims to upgrade computer-based information systems”, The Korea Herald, January 30, 2001.  
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2001/01/31/200101310039.asp.  
25 “Defense Ministry aims to upgrade computer-based information systems”, The Korea Herald, January 30, 2001.  
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2001/01/31/200101310039.asp. 
26Building the space center on an island would be less costly to expand facilities than other places.  The blueprint 
calls for the purchase of the site, ordering of equipment and groundwork completed by 2003, with buildings 
completed by 2004.  This would facilitate the launch of a low-orbit satellite in 2005.  “South Korea to build space 
center on remote island”, Space Wire, January 30, 2001.   
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/010130082438.nyawlsl4.html.  
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place in 2000 in the fields of nanotechnology and bioengineering, MND projected and set 
the goal of putting in place a micro-air sensor network by the year 2020.  The risk of this 
investment was classed as moderately high and a total program budget of US$3.5 billion 
spaced over 20 years was approved.  To make the program affordable, MND solicited the 
participation from industry due to its commercial potential and dual-use technology.  
Thus the development of the MASN concept is tied closely to the development of the 
ROK’s space program. 
 The concept of the Micro-Air Sensor Network (MASN) is similar to the application 
of nano-satellite technology for military applications, that of employing a swarm of 
miniature satellites communicating with micro sensors on a battlefield and conveying 
important surveillance and tactical information.27  In the case of the MASN, however, the 
platform differs as micro-air vehicle (MAV) and/or super pressure balloons instead of 
nano-satellites are utilized as the primary sensing platform.  A more detailed discussion 
of the concept is found in Annex 3E3. 
4) Aerial Mine Field System (AMFS) 
 Similarly, in concept with the MASN development, is the exploration and planned 
development of the AMFS that also exploits in nanotechnology and MEMS.  Instead of 
providing a sense capability, the AMFS is a passive offensive weapon used for enhancing 
ROK’s air defense capability.  As discussed earlier, the AMFS comprises MAVs armed 
as weapons that could either be titanium-tipped or carry a shaped-charge plastique.28  
Conceptually, the AMFS is just what its namesake implies – that of forming a mine field 
                                                 
27 “PicoSat Constellations Debuts November”, Spacedaily, October 11, 1999. 
28 Titanium-tipped MAVs would result in a rain of red-hot fragments through thousand pounds of jet fuel and 
ammunition when sucked into jet engine air intakes would fracture the whirling turbine blades.  Jim Wilson, “Micro 
Warfare:  Small, smart and deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular Mechanics, February 
2001.  http://www.popularmechanics.com. 
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in three-dimensional space.  Upon attaining technology maturity and mass production, 
MND predicts that the individually-armed mines could cost as little as US$5.  A more 
detailed discussion of the concept is also covered in Annex 3E3. 
k. Enabling Technologies. 
1) Micro-/Nano-/Pico-satellite29 Program – Long-Term R&D Effort   
 Towards the end of 2000, based on preliminary concept studies embarked by the 
ROK military in with consultation with MOST and KARI (Korean Aerospace Research 
Institute) among other ministries, it was concluded that many potential military 
applications were deemed to exist.  Due to the US’s lack of openness in sharing such 
technology, ROK had to form a strategic alliance with Israel to obtain access to 
technology.  ROK’s satellites would eventually incorporate Israel’s TechSat stabilization 
system that allows it to be launched into an arbitrary orientation with no spin yet stabilize 
and orient itself after release.  Concurrently, ROK also continued its joint efforts with 
traditional partners – the United Kingdom and France; the former in micro-satellite 
technology and the latter in rocket platform and launch technology. 
 Due to considerations arising from a need to reduce launch costs, micro-satellite 
technology was viewed as an enabling technology.  Based on Year 2000 US estimates, 
micro-satellites cost ranged from US$100,000 to several million dollars, with 
development cycles ranging from a few months to a few years.30 
                                                 
29 The distinctions of the three types of satellites referred to in the heading is borne out by the satellite’s core weight.  
Pico-satellites have core weights less than 1 kg, nanosatellites range between 1 to 10 kg, and micro-satellites range 
between 10 to 100 kg. 
30 Bruce Moomaw, “MicroSats Are Go At AeroAstro”, Spacedaily, September 1, 1999.  In another 2000 mission, 
the US also tested the Nanosat Constellation Trailblazer mission, comprising three nanosats (octagons measuring 16 
inches across and 8 inches high) at a cost of US$28 million. 
3-57 
2) Micro-Air Vehicles (MAV).   
 Towards 2002, ROK embarked on its MAV program in support of its MASN 
concept.  For purpose of comparison, ROK’s MAV technology base was assumed to be 
five years behind the US.  Based on initial concept studies conducted in 2001, MND 
projected that by end 2015, ROK would possess the ability to produce its own line of 
MAVs to support the MASN concept, namely a “hovering spy craft only 23 centimeters 
across” adapted from the US.31  As an indication of R&D costs involved, the US has put 
upward of US$50 million to create the flapping-wing airframes, microscopic jet engines 
and molecule-size avionics packages needed to make MAVs a reality.32 
 Present developments of MAVs for military applications involve merging the 
aerodynamics of insects with GPS navigation and molecular physics to create an arsenal 
of tiny reconnaissance tools.  Used as weapons, these MAVs could either carry a shaped-
charge plastique or be titanium-tipped33.  For propulsion, the present generation of MAVs 
utilize piezoelectric motors that produce linear rather than rotator motion.34  The most 
powerful power source to date is the British Defense Evaluation and Research Agency’s 
(DERA) 13mm Microjet demonstrated at the Farnborough International 2000 Air Show, 
with flight duration times of up to 1 hour attained by mixing hydrogen peroxide with 
                                                 
31 The hovering craft weighed 1.4 kilograms and managed to takeoff, hover, and move around in at slow and 
medium speeds, with an endurance of about an hour on the 200 grams of fuel it carried.  This craft was built and 
tested by Micro Craft, a US aerospace company.  K. Kleiner, “Backpack Drone Peers Behind Enemy Lines”, 
Spacewar, October 21,2000. 
32 Jim Wilson, “Micro Warfare:  Small, smart and deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular 
Mechanics, February 2001.  http://www.popularmechanics.com. 
33 Titanium-tipped MAVs would result in a rain of red-hot fragments through thousand pounds of jet fuel and 
ammunition when sucked into jet engine air intakes would fracture the whirling turbine blades.  Jim Wilson, “Micro 
Warfare:  Small, smart and deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular Mechanics, February 
2001.  http://www.popularmechanics.com. 
34 At the Center for Intelligent Mechatronics at Vanderbilt University, researchers have successfully applied this 
theory to build tiny piezoelectric actuators that can flap wings.  Jim Wilson, “Micro Warfare:  Small, smart and 
deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular Mechanics, February 2001.  
http://www.popularmechanics.com. 
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kerosene or a similar fuel.35  For the MAV’s payload, the eventual goal is a half-ounce 
payload allowance for guidance system, video camera, and transmitter requirements.36 
 To reinforce the MND’s decision on investing in MEMS and miniaturization 
technology, microelectronics is identified as the driving force behind shrinking systems. 
In accordance with Moore’s Law, on-board computational capabilities per unit volume 
will continue to increase.  As of 2000, GPS receivers weigh as little as 6 grams and 
measure 3 inches.  And through the use of infrared (IR) ports, instructions could be 
programmed into MAVs or used to send coordinating instructions within a swarm. 
 As of 2001, the leading concepts for MAVs were the Black Widow and the Bat.  The 
Black Widow, a six-inch, electrically powered disc-shaped MAV that launches at the 
touch of a button from a shoulder-carried unit, features a 2-gram microflight control 
system for remote operation of the front-mounted propeller and two control flaps.  It has 
already flown for 16 minutes with a cruising speed of 35 mph.  It is equipped with a 
commercial low-resolution, sugar-cube-sized video camera weighing less than a penny, 
drastically reducing the camera’s size and weight.37  The Bat, on the other hand, is not 
too far removed from a radio-controlled model airplane that relies on an off-the-shelf 
internal combustion engine for propulsion.  Its video images can be transmitted from as 
far as a mile away.38 
 In 2001, UCLA made a breakthrough in coaxing ringlike groups of rotaxane 
molecules to exhibit the on/off behavior of transistors thereby creating the potential to put 
                                                 
35 Jim Wilson, “Micro Warfare:  Small, smart and deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular 
Mechanics, February 2001.  http://www.popularmechanics.com. 
36 David Pescovitz, “Tiny Spies in the Sky”, Discovery Online – Micro Air Vehicles.   
 http://discovery.com/stories/technology/microplanes/microplanes.html.  
37 David Pescovitz, “Tiny Spies in the Sky”, Discovery Online – Micro Air Vehicles.   
 http://discovery.com/stories/technology/microplanes/microplanes.html. 
38 David Pescovitz, “Tiny Spies in the Sky”, Discovery Online – Micro Air Vehicles.   
 http://discovery.com/stories/technology/microplanes/microplanes.html. 
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computing power of 10 Pentium processors in one-hundredth the space of one of these 
tiny chips.  And because rotaxane molecule transistors could be switched on and off 
using light, there are no bulky wire interconnections needed.39  Many researchers agree 
that MEMS, stamped out like integrated circuits, are the key to making MAVs that can 
fly on autopilot.  MEMS accelerometers could enable onboard computers to calculate the 
MAV’s coordinates relative to its launch point.40  It’s possible that microwave 
transmissions and wafer-thin solar panels could help charge the MAV’s batteries but 
fossil fuels are still the most efficient source of power.41  
3) Balloons/Super Pressure Balloons 
 As an alternative pursuit to satellites as a high altitude surveillance platform, MND 
also considered the military application of balloon-based42 sensor platforms.  
Complementing the development of MAVs too is the exploration of super pressure 
balloons as the delivery platform for the MASN and AMFS concepts.  In this 
development, low-cost, high-altitude, and extended on-station times are the driving 
requirements.43  The goal is the ultimate attainment of Very Long Endurance (VLE) 
                                                 
39 Jim Wilson, “Micro Warfare:  Small, smart and deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular 
Mechanics, February 2001.  http://www.popularmechanics.com. 
40 David Pescovitz, “Tiny Spies in the Sky”, Discovery Online – Micro Air Vehicles.   
 http://discovery.com/stories/technology/microplanes/microplanes.html. 
41 One gram of petroleum provides 13.1 W-h of power, while a 1-gram lithium battery kicks out only 0.3 w-h of 
juice.  David Pescovitz, “Tiny Spies in the Sky”, Discovery Online – Micro Air Vehicles.   
 http://discovery.com/stories/technology/microplanes/microplanes.html. 
42 HAE airplanes or balloons can do exactly what a satellite does, but with more flexibility and with less investment.  
For some communications applications, these platforms enjoy the following critical advantages over satellites:  
distance, location, and recovery.  Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, Blimps, Balloons, and Long 
Endurance Vehicles.”  Future Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  
Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
Inc, 1997.  211.  Also, balloon-launched payloads are ideal for high-resolution optical and infrared telescopes.  As a 
quick reference, the radar horizon at 20 km is approximately 500 km. 
43 Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, Blimps, Balloons, and Long Endurance Vehicles.”  Future 
Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  Progress in Astronautics and 
Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, 1997.  211. 
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mission systems44, whose requirements translate to aircraft that minimize the propulsive 
power to maintain a station through efficient airfoils, and have low wing loading, high 
aspect ratio wings, and an efficient powerplant that consumes minimum fuel at loiter 
power.45  An analysis of ROK’s DBA requirements shows that speed and mobility are not 
important factors other than to maintain a geostationary position over the earth in the 
presence of winds.   
 Additionally, the analysis of available wind pattern data reveals that the lower 
stratosphere around 20 km is an optimum region for these operations,46 and that higher in 
the stratosphere, winds begin to increase in speed and follow global scale and patterns 
that are regular and predictable with season and location.47  The data also shows that 
balloon drift patterns over ten days follow fairly narrow patterns.48 Thus, missions that 
require extremely long endurance, very large area views, long distance communications 
relays, electronics intelligence collection, missile launch detection and destruction, and 
                                                 
44 VLE missions typically last in terms of days and involve communications relay, jamming, or electronic jamming 
and earth surveillance. 
45 Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, Blimps, Balloons, and Long Endurance Vehicles.”  Future 
Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  Progress in Astronautics and 
Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, 1997.  212. 
46 Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, Blimps, Balloons, and Long Endurance Vehicles.”  Future 
Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  Progress in Astronautics and 
Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, 1997.  214.  Marcy, W. 
L., and Hookway, R. O., “Propulsion Options for the HI-SPOT Long Endurance Drone Airship,” Martin Marietta 
Corp., Sep 1979. 
47 Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, Blimps, Balloons, and Long Endurance Vehicles.”  Future 
Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  Progress in Astronautics and 
Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, 1997.  214. 
48 After ten days, most balloons completed between one-half global circumnavigation and one complete global 
circumnavigation.  The mean difference in latitude at that time was 8.5 degrees, or a ground distance of 
approximately 950 km.  At an altitude of 36 km, the balloon has a line-of-sight footprint on the ground of 730 km 
radius.  Thus even with a drift distance of 950 km, the balloon retains visibility of a sizeable portion of the original 
footprint.  Other points to note are that ending latitude was found to be dependent upon starting latitude and month 
but not on starting longitude, and starting longitude was not found to be a significant factor, except for an Equator 
launch in the 30 day category.  Reitinger, Kurt C.  Analysis of Simulated Drift Patterns of a High Altitude Balloon 
Surveillance System.  NPS.  June 1993.  43. 
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the survivability provided at extremely high altitudes are candidates for stratospheric 
unmanned aircraft.49   
 From the above consideration, a choice was available to pursue either the 
employment of super pressure balloons or high altitude endurance unmanned aerial 
vehicles (HAE UAV).  Based on ROK’s indigenous technology and cost analysis (against 
the use of satellites and with each other), MND decided that the former was the more 
economical and realizable of the two options,50 with the added requirement that such a 
system must perform surveillance missions at an altitude of 20 km and deployable for up 
to 10 days.  As a comparison in 2001, the cost of producing a new super-pressure Ultra 
Long Duration Balloon (ULDB) totals approximately $2.5 M(US).51  And so began 
ROK’s balloon development program.  
 
                                                 
49 Fulghum, D. A., “Tier 2+ Tricks Enemy Missiles,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 10, 1995. 
50 As an example, at under 15 miles altitude, solar airplanes (HAE UAVs) are much closer to the ground than any 
satellite, allowing use of much cheaper transmitters and reuse of scarce frequency spectrum. Because solar airplanes 
can land and take-off as needed, their payloads can incorporate the latest technology and avoid obsolence.  At well 
under $10 mil each in production, solar airplanes can also be significantly less expensive than satellites, which can 
cost up to $100 mil or more to build and launch.  “Solar Aircraft One Step Closer to Commercial Satellite 
Substitute”, SpaceDaily, December 17, 1998.  http://www.spacedaily.com/news/solarcell-98m.html.   When 
compared with using balloons, a quick estimate used here is that costs for balloon operations will probably only 
amount to 10% to 30% of the HAE UAV operation costs.  Also, the basic technology (for modern stratospheric 
balloons) is mature and mission success rates are well above 95%.  Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, 
Blimps, Balloons, and Long Endurance Vehicles.”  Future Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and 
Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, 1997.  219. 
51 “New Super-Pressure Research/Exploration Balloon Prototype Successfully Launched for NASA,” 
http://www.ifai.com/ NewsDetails.php? ID=179.   
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Epoch One Summary 
 Singularly the largest topic between the two Koreas in the last decade, reunification planning 
took a decisive turn this epoch.  Leaders from the opposed states signed a bilateral covenant 
outlining an agreement to formally pursue unification options.   
 Despite the formal start of unification planning, military restructuring during this epoch is 
largely based on legacy decisions and is centered on the acquisition of capabilities employed 
against North Korea’s military provocations.  The ROK armed forces are in the process of 
transforming the current personnel-based structure to a quality-oriented, technology-intensive 
one with an emphasis on joint operations. 
 This epoch’s net assessment scenarios highlighted the deterring and stabilizing effect the US 
presence had on the peninsula; e.g. that early warning and situational awareness are pivotal to 
defense of South Korean soil and that the North is incapable of sustaining an invasion of the 
South without aid from China.    
 While North Korea’s technological developments focused on its ballistic missile program,  
South Korea concentrated on developing its defense digitization, space program, micro-air 
sensor network, and air mine field system.  To set in motion the South’s goal of reducing its 
reliance on the US for its military systems, South Korea actively solicited Israel and Russia’s 
technology for its weapons programs.  And so, the country set in place policies to support the 
development of the necessary infrastructure for pursuing these technologies for future military 
applications. 
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B. Epoch Two (2006 – 2010) 
1. Strategy 
a. Introduction 
 Epoch two is the time period from January 2006 until December 2010. Highlighted below are 
the significant events of the epoch.   
Epoch Two Events   2006 - 2010 
DPRK threatens collapse 
Bailout of DPRK by ROK 
Preconditions for unification 
US begins withdrawal of forces 
Phased unification plan 
DPRK reduces Army by 20% -- creation of Civil Conservation Corps 
Formation of Confederation 
Table 3-32.  Epoch Two Significant Events 
 Towards the end of epoch one, the ROK and DPRK formalized an agreement to investigate 
and pursue unification options. While the DPRK’s economic situation worsened to the point of 
imminent collapse, statesmen from both nations established the preconditions for unification and 
the ROK provided an aid package averaging $10 B(US) annually to help the DPRK save face 
and maintain its national sovereignty.  Among the preconditions, the United States was invited to 
begin withdrawing troops from the peninsula and the DPRK demobilized 15 divisions, or 20 
percent of their force.  By the end of the epoch, the two Koreas completed the first stage of Kim 
Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” with the formation of a confederation. 
b. The North Korean Collapse  
 DPRK’s primary reasons of reaching a point of imminent collapse in the second epoch 
revolved around its failure to act quid pro quo with respect to four main dilemmas.  First, the 
DPRK attempted to sustain an increasingly sclerotic command economy while continuing to 
invest 25-30 percent of a dwindling GDP on defense.  Second, party leaders attempted to 
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compensate for acute structural problems in the economy without relaxing their hold on central 
political control.  Third, the DPRK continued to participate in bilateral and multilateral accords 
and negotiations, thereby gaining international assistance, while refusing concessions that might 
challenge Pyongyang's larger diplomatic and political strategies.  And finally, the DPRK 
attempted to maintain its foreign policy opening to the United States while avoiding the full scale 
relations with South Korea that could undermine the North’s national sovereignty and exclusive 
claims to legitimacy on the peninsula.  This failure to give ‘something for something’ led to the 
DPRK’s imminent collapse. 
c. Preconditions for Unification  
 In a remarkable show of bilateral cooperation, statesmen from both Korea’s agreed in 
concept to the following preconditions for  unification: 
DPRK ROK 
US forces must withdraw from 
South Korea 
DPRK must democratize and 
move towards market economy 
ROK must abolish anti-
communistic security laws 
DPRK must downsize military 
 Must reach arms control 
agreement 
 Must seek social and cultural 
homogeneity 
Table 3-33.  Preconditions for Unification 
 The DPRK’s first priority was to rid the peninsula of US military presence while the ROK 
demanded democracy and a move towards a market economy in the North.  The bottom line for 
the North was that they had no other choice.  An aid-based foreign policy strategy was essential 
to the DPRK’s prospects for near- and mid-term survival, especially with respect to provisions of 
energy supplies and foodstuffs.  Although the North remained stubbornly resistant to change and 
the opening of its system, reform was its only escape from continued erosion and eventual 
collapse.  By this logic, it was to the advantage of both the ROK and the DPRK to entertain an 
3-65 
incremental transition, allowing the North regime to avoid extinction and ultimately permit a 
longer-term process of reconciliation with the South.   
d. The United States Begins Withdrawal from South Korea  
 While the world applauded the efforts of the two Koreas to bring the 50-plus year armistice 
to a peaceful conclusion, the US had little recourse but to honor the wishes of the ROK and abide 
by the preconditions for unification.  Returning US servicemen received a hero’s welcome 
complete with a ticker tape parade through Times Square and virtually every American 
hometown.  As the world watched the media spectacle, USFK continued to send all non-essential 
personnel home.  In the end, the US avoided reduction in significant combat units and withdrew 
a mere 10 percent by 2010.  Influential media sources worldwide reported the concerns of 
peninsular policy makers that the US is dragging her feet. 
Figure 3-1.  US Withdrawal Timeline 
 
















e. Phased Unification Plan  
 The most significant step toward a unified Korea was the Phased Unification Plan that called 
for incremental changes designed to boost confidence, establish collaborative programs and 
policies, and resuscitate struggling economies.  Foreign investors gained access to virgin markets 
in the North allowing China, Russian, and US investments to see a potential return on their 
decades of gratis support.  In exchange, the DPRK agreed to launch comprehensive biological 
and chemical clean-up programs and re-channel the excess manpower from demobilizing forces 
into the Conservation Corps to work on infrastructure improvements.   
f. Economic Summary  
 Economically, two percent of ROK’s GDP went to the DPRK in the form of a $10 B(US) 
average annual aid package targeting infrastructure improvements and social programs.  
Although the DPRK continued to commit up to 30 percent of its GDP to defense expenditures, 
no part of the ROK aid package was allowed to be used to that end.  Both states realized roughly 
six percent52 annual growth and started mutual projects including an oil pipeline from Siberia 
and the reconnection of the Trans-Korea railroad. 
g. Confederation 
 In this epoch we witnessed the beginning formation of a confederation characterized as one 
nation with two states and two independent governments and institutionalization of inter-Korean 
cooperation.  A co federal council is stood up to address the larger policy issues.  Significant 
contributions by the co federal council weren’t to begin until the third epoch.  
                                                 
52 Discussion with Professor Robert G Frank, School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA.  October 23, 2000.  Discussion focused on two scenarios that would allow calculation of credible 
ROK GDP growth rates.  Scenario analogous to German unification of the 1990’s (DPRK collapse and subsequent 
takeover by ROK) and the US Marshall Plan of post World War II era (Confederation of DPRK and ROK with 
ROK as senior partner).  The German case established the upper bound of 5% of ROK GDP to the DPRK, while the 
Marshall case established the lower boundary of 2% of ROK GDP to DPRK.  Based upon a 15-20 year plan for 
unification the 2% of ROK GDP as an aid package seemed reasonable, with a resultant 5.9% ROK GDP growth rate 
through 2010.   
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2. National Defense 
a. South Korea’s Force Improvement Plans  
 The ROK Defense Improvement Plan was initiated in 1976 to modernize and improve the 
combat effectiveness of the ROK armed forces.  In epoch two the ROK forces continued 
modernization and improvements in many key areas through indigenous weapons production, 
co-production, and procurement through FMS and direct commercial channels.  This was a 
period where the two Koreas engaged one another through mutual cooperation with the 
implementation of the seven- year phased plan.  Korea has moved away from preparing strictly 
for an inter-peninsular war to building a force with new subs, destroyers, long-range aircraft and 
AWACS for promoting its regional interests as well, perhaps in preparation for a unified Korea.   
 Early in the epoch, the ROK focused on securing tactical early warning systems and 
achieving major improvements in current combat capability.  Later, this focus shifted to 
acquisition of advanced weapon systems to further increase war-deterring capability. Economic 
success makes it possible for the ROK to share a larger proportion of security-related costs on 
the Korean Peninsula.  However, it must be noted that these contributions come while the ROK 
is also modernizing its force structure, establishing a more modern command and control system, 
improving the quality of life for its armed forces, and experiencing increasing political pressures 
to expand spending on domestic programs.  
b. Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) 
 ROKA is intent on modernizing its forces, with emphasis on maneuver warfare, activation of 
additional attack helicopter battalions, and enhancement of its special operations forces. There 
will continue to be an emphasis on indigenous production and co-production —this focus is 
3-68 
driven by national pressure to enhance the Korean industrial base by acquiring advanced 
technologies. 
 Indigenous development and production include an advanced artillery fire control system, 
and the PRC-999K tactical radio.  The ROKA is also developing tracked air defense systems53 
and has deployed one system in the Seoul area. Co-production programs with the US include the 
K-1 main battle tank, K-200 Korean Infantry Fighting Vehicle, K-55 self propelled 155mm 
howitzer, M-9 Armored Combat Earthmover, and the UH-60P utility helicopter.  These have 
been successful programs.  Additionally, the ROK is actively pursuing the procurement of 
additional battalions of MLRS and long range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS).  The 
ROK ultimately wishes to acquire the most advanced versions, M270A1 and ATACMS Block 
1A, of the systems.  
 The ROKA aviation modernization program is another ambitious effort designed to infuse 
new technology, expand force structure, and develop a day/night engagement and sustainment 
capability.  Lift and cargo capabilities continue to receive attention, and there is now a renewed 
emphasis on procurement of an advanced attack helicopter such as the US RAH-66 Comanche.  
In addition, the United States and Seoul have made significant progress in talks over the 
extension of the range of Seoul’s missile armaments.  
 In a 1970s agreement with Washington, South Korea voluntarily set its missile range limit at 
180 kilometers in order to receive US missile technology.  The KARI with a view to developing 
its own satellite launch vehicles had developed a series of KSR research rockets.  The KSR-1 
single-stage solid-propellant sounding rocket has had two successful launches.  A KSR-2 two-
stage rocket is being developed and will be 11.21 m long, have a launch weight of 1,930 kg and 
                                                 
53 ChunMa “Pegasus”. Refer to Annex 3F-5 for system description. 
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will carry a 150 kg payload to around 200 km altitude. A three-stage rocket, KSR-3, capable of 
reaching an altitude of 350 km, is planned for development.  
 In 2006, the United States agreed to Seoul’s proposal of boosting the missile range to 300 km 
for deployment and 500 km for scientific research development so as to effectively cover all of 
North Korea’s territory.  With this, a secondary use for these rocket development programs 
became manifest into a series of ballistic missiles with ranges from 100 to 900 km.  The KSR-1 
has a launch weight of 1,400 kg, a payload of 200 kg and a range of 180 km. South Korea had 
expended much effort in developing a 300 km range SRBM with a 500 kg payload (within the 
MTCR guidelines), to be able to counter any ballistic missile attacks from North Korea.  
Combat System 2006 Procurement Demobilization 2010 
Active Divisions 23 - - 23 
Personnel (thousands) 560 - - 560 
Reserve Divisions  23 - - 23 
Tanks 2100 100 100 2100 
APC / AIFV54 2500 100 100 2500 
Attack Helicopters 100 72 50 122 
Gun Artillery 4550 - 250 4300 
Rocket Artillery 180 - - 180 
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 12 - - 12 
Air Defense Artillery 600 - - 600 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 985 28 35 978 
Table 3-34.  ROK Army Force Structure 2010 
c. Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN)  
 As the ROKN expands the strategic range of its primary surface and subsurface combatant 
forces, it continues to upgrade its Naval Air Force’s ASW/Maritime patrol capability. All planes 
have been outfitted with inverse synthetic aperture radar that will significantly increase its 
maritime patrol capabilities. ROK Navy is aggressively pursuing the acquisition of additional 
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improved P-3X aircraft with the first four being delivered in epoch two.  The aircraft, along with 
the major support facilities (supply warehouse, hangar, maritime Air Operations Center, weapons 
magazine, maintenance facilities) at Pohang gives the ROK Navy a robust maritime surveillance 
capability in the Asian littoral.  
 Germany's HDW was widely regarded as the most promising bidder among industry sources 
for the follow-on submarine program due to its involvement in the nation's first-stage submarine 
program, "KSS-1," which started in 1991.  Under the KSS-1 plan, which calls for the 
construction of nine 1,200 ton-class submarines for the Navy by 2000, the German firm has 
provided technology for the production of its Type 209 submarines to the Koreans. Daewoo 
Shipbuilding has served as the local contractor.  The Defense Ministry had eventually selected 
Germany's HDW as its contractor for its 1.27 trillion-won ($1.12 B(US)) submarine project as it 
excelled in terms of prices and logistics support over France's DCNI, which championed its 
'Scorpene' submarine.  Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering and Hyundai Heavy 
Industries were the joint contractors MND had selected to supply the 1,800-ton Type 21455 
submarines to the navy by 2009.  
 The ROKN force improvement program also calls for the continual replacement of its aging 
destroyer class ships (old US Navy FRAM I and II hulls) with a modern indigenous naval force 
based on an a 7000 ton class Aegis-class ship called KDX-III.  As of 2006, the inventory stood at 
three of each class of KDX-I / II / III class ships.  The navy will embark on the indigenous 
construction of a modified KDX destroyer that will serve as the battle ship of the 21st century.  In 
addition, the ROK Navy is executing a major C3I upgrade commencing in 2000 using the US 
Navy’s Global Command & Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M) and UHF SATCOM as the 
communications backbone.  The current plans include UHF SATCOM, Navy Order Wire, and 
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GCCS-M for operational shipboard and command center use.  The Korean OSIS Evolutionary 
Development (KOED) is a wide area network intelligence fusion and dissemination system 
connecting the fleet commanders and ROK Navy Headquarters; installation is in progress. The 
third component of the master ROK Navy C3I upgrade architecture is the Korean Naval Tactical 
Data System (KNTDS).  
Combat System 2006 Procurement Demobilization 2010 
Maritime Patrol 16 4 - 20 
Submarines 15 3 6 12 
Destroyer 9 4 - 13 
Frigates 11 - 5 6 
Coastal Patrol 118 5 - 113 
Amphibious 30 3 - 33 
Mine Warfare 17 - 5 12 
Table 3-35.  ROK Navy Force Structure 2010 
d. Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) 
 ROKAF procurement initiatives in epoch two include airborne C3I, and airborne early 
warning capability. Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) across the ROKAF fleet (F-4, F-16 
Falcon, and possible F-5 modernization) are measures pending delivery of Korean Fighter 
Program F-16s, the Future Fighter (FX), and the Korean Trainer (KTX-II) aircraft.  
 Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company and Korea Aerospace Industry (KAI) signed a joint 
marketing agreement on the T-50 advanced jet trainer.  The T-50 is an advanced jet trainer that 
will prepare pilots for modern jet fighters. A derivative known as the A-50, is a fighter-lead-in 
trainer and light attack aircraft.  The T-50 is equipped with the most modern subsystems and will 
be an ideal trainer for the KF-16s and other modern fighter aircraft," said M.K. Chang, senior 
vice president of KAI and T-50/A-50 program director.  The T-50 program is currently in full-
scale development with Lockheed Martin as a subcontractor to KAI for development and 
production.  Lockheed Martin Aeronautics’ responsibilities include the wings, flight controls and 
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avionics integration.  The first test aircraft was rolled out late 2000 with first flight in June 2002. 
The ROKAF plans to replace its T-38, F-5 and A-37 fleets with the T-50/A-50. The initial 
production order is expected to be approximately 100 aircraft with first delivery in 2005. The 
following table shows the resulting force structure for the ROKAF at the year 2010. 
Combat System 2006 Procurement Demobilization 2010 
Fighter 485 15 130 370 
Ground Attack 10 50 - 60 
Bomber - - - - 
AEW / ESM 1 2 - 3 
Reconnaissance / UAV 128 10 - 138 
Air Refueling - - - - 
Trainer A/C 198 238 130 306 
Transport A/C 12 - - 12 
Table 3-36.  ROK Air Force Structure 2010 
e. North Korea Force Improvement Plans  
 Unable to match the CFC's technologically advanced war-fighting capabilities, especially in 
a period of economic difficulties, the North's leadership focused on high-payoff investments in 
developing asymmetrical capabilities such as ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and 
weapons of mass destruction.  A huge proportion of the North’s defense budget was invested in 
completing the ballistic missile development and for weapons of mass destruction.  Conventional 
forces, though obsolete, are numerically overwhelming.  Aging equipment and weapon systems 
are being retired with the rest being upgraded to retain combat effectiveness while reducing the 
cost for maintenance.  The bulk of the demobilization was across the army while the navy and air 
force remained relatively unchanged from epoch one. 
f. Korean People’s Army (KPA)   
 North Korea fields an artillery force of over 10,000 self-propelled and towed weapon 
systems.  Without moving any artillery pieces, the North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds an 
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hour against the CFC defenses for several hours.  The artillery force includes 500 long-range 
systems deployed over the past decade.  The proximity of these long-range systems to the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks.  
 As a gesture of goodwill to secure foreign aid in its failing economy, North Korea agrees to 
re-channel approximately 20 percent of its troops into a conservation corps to assist in the 
building of the Trans-Korea railway and other infrastructures in an attempt to revive its faltering 
economy.  This is seen in the reduction of 20 divisions, inclusive of reserves in the army and 
across the army’s huge inventory of combat system.  The following table shows the resulting 
force structure for the KPA in the year 2010. 
Combat System 2006 Procurement Demobilization 2010 
Active Divisions  80 - 15 65 
Personnel (thousands) 1,000 - 187 813 
Reserve Divisions  37 - 5 32 
Tanks 3,500 - 700 2,800 
APC / AIFV56 2,500 - 500 2,000 
Attack Helicopters 50 - 10 40 
Gun Artillery 8,200 - 875 7,325 
Rocket Artillery 2,300 - 300 2,000 
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 55 - - 55 
Air Defense Artillery 6,000 - 1,750 4,250 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 5,500 - 2,500 3,000 
Table 3-37.  DPRK Army Structure 2010 
g. Korean People’s Navy (KPN)  
 North Korea retired its aging fleet of Whisky class submarines.  From Moscow, it secured 
two Kilo class submarine at a “friendship price”.  These Kilo class submarines came complete 
with the upgraded Type 53 (test-71) 533mm torpedoes – the newest version of which is in 
service with the Russian Navy. Weighing 1,820kg, the torpedo has a 205kg explosive warhead 
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and is powered by a silver-zinc single-use ampoule battery. Maximum speed is 40kts and range 
is claimed to be up to 20km.  Target detection ranges are 1,500m for submarines and 180m for 
surface vessels. 
Combat System 2006 Procurement Demobilization 2010 
Maritime Patrol 12 - - 12 
Submarines 25 2 4 23 
Destroyer - - - - 
Frigates 3 - - 3 
Coastal Patrol 448 - - 443 
Amphibious 266 - - 266 
Mine Warfare 24 - - 24 
Table 3-38.  DPRK Navy Structure 2010 
h. Strategic Weapons Development 
1) Ballistic Missiles 
 The North's asymmetric forces are formidable, heavily funded, and cause for concern. 
The progress of the North's ballistic missile program indicates that it remains a top 
priority.  DPRK’s ballistic missile inventory now includes over 500 SCUDs of various 
types.  The production and deployment of medium-range Ro-dongs capable of striking 
US bases in Japan also continues.  Pyongyang is developing multi-stage missiles with the 
goal of fielding systems capable of striking the continental United States.  The 2,000-
kilometer range Daepo-dong 1 is operational and the North Koreans are continuing on 
works on the 5,000 plus kilometer Daepo-dong 2.   
Combat Systems 2005 Procurement Demobilization 2010 
Scud B 100 - - 100 
HwaSong 5 150 - - 150 
HwaSong 6 250 - - 250 
Ro-dong 1 / 2 86 40 - 136 
Daepo-Dong 1 25 50 - 75 
Daepo-Dong 2 0 25 - 25 
Table 3-39.  DPRK Ballistic Missile Structure 2010 
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2) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
 WMD are essentially used as bargaining chips to solicit for concessions from the 
world.  The North Koreans agreed to a biological and chemical clean up by allowing UN 
led inspection teams into Pyongyang.  However, by now the North Korean are able to 
effectively and accurately deliver nuclear capable systems and have extracted enough 
weapons-grade plutonium for up to 6 warheads. 
i. United States Forces in Korea (USFK)  
 Trade friction between North and South Korea is on the rise as is anti-Americanism in South 
Korea.  Many younger Koreans blame the United States for the continued division of Korea. 
South Korea, meanwhile, is becoming more capable of defending itself, and the United States 
Department of Defense is expected to withdraw some 7,000 military personnel from Korea 
within the first next 5 years as part of the pre-conditions to reunification between the two Koreas. 
This amounts to a 10percent reduction in USFK. The resulting force structure in 2010 is as 
follows. 
US Army  US Air Force  
Personnel 25,000 Fighters 60 
Active Divisions 1 Ground Attack 18 
MBTs 120 Reconnaissance 1 
APC / AIFV 150 Transport -- 
Attack Helicopter 65   
Gun Artillery 25 Rocket Artillery 25 
Table 3-40.  USFK Structure 2010 
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3. Net Assessment   
 This epoch is marked by South Korea’s militarily cautious and suspicious stance towards 
unification as the defense of the country still focuses towards the DPRK as the most likely 
aggressor. 
a. Scenario One:  Overland Invasion by North Korea  
 Scenario One is an overland invasion by North Korea against the US and South Korean 
Alliance’s CFC.  The purpose of this scenario is to illustrate the military capabilities and 
deficiencies of the US-ROK alliance in the event of a DPRK invasion.  The intention is to 
evaluate the capabilities of the CFC alliance against the DPRK without any external intervention 
factors.   
1) Order of Battle (DPRK vs. CFC)   
 The aggregate categorical orders of battle have changed very little since the previous 
epoch.  The only exceptions are the demobilization of twenty percent of the DPRK Army 
and the procurement and modernization efforts by the ROK.  See Annex 3D for the 
orders of battle for the DPRK and ROK forces.  The US Forces Korea combat strength 
remains the same.   
2) Scenario Description   
 The scenario is a full-scale invasion of the ROK by the DPRK.  Some of the key 
assumptions include:  
a) The relative exclusion of USFJ (US Forces Japan) in the conflict is due to the agile 
operational concept of the DPRK.  Other US forces in Japan are caught off-guard and 
are unable to get there in time.  The element of surprise is accomplished by DPRK. 
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b) The preponderance of the US Seventh fleet is out of the region conducting Indian 
Ocean operations.  This includes the entire Carrier Battle Group (CVBG).  No other 
Pacific carrier battle group is able to sortie in a timely manner. 
c) Due to the economic and political imprudence, North Korea will only use WMD as 
a bargaining chip.  
d) Conventional attack will include ballistic missiles.  
3) Objectives   
 The objectives of surprise and violence attempt to negate the CFC’s mobility and 
prevent any major reinforcement by the US.  The strategy includes artillery and missile 
attacks, the use of covert operational facilities and amphibious SOF insertion. This is in 
addition to SOF forces that presumably have already infiltrated South Korean territory.   
4) Committed Forces Comparison   
 DPRK commits two-thirds of their forces while holding one-third in reserve.  One 
hundred percent of CFC forces are committed to the defense of ROK territory as 
complete SOF infiltration overwhelms the CFC and necessitates total commitment.   
a) Army   
  For the armies involved, there is near parity in personnel and gun artillery.  
DPRK has an advantage in rocket artillery, ADA, SAM, and SSM assets.  The CFC 
has a distinct advantage in the AH, AIFV, and APC categories.   
b) Navy   
  For the naval assets, DPRK enjoys a numerical advantage in submarines, patrol 
boats and amphibious vehicles.  The CFC has a distinct advantage in destroyers and 
frigates, with a slight advantage in maritime patrol aircraft, and mine warfare assets. 
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c) Air Force   
  In the air forces, there is near quantitative parity when aggregating fighter, 
ground attack and bomber aircraft categories. However, as in epoch one the 
technological superiority of the CFC aircraft is a distinctive advantage.  There is a 
definite numerical advantage for the CFC with respect to AEW, Reconnaissance, and 
UAV platforms. 
 
Table 3-41.  Scenario One Army Committed Forces 
Combat System DPRK DPRK Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Maritime Patrol 12 12 20 20 
Submarine 23 18 12 12 
Destroyer -- -- 13 13 
Frigate 3 3 11 11 
Coastal Patrol  443 296 121 121 
Amphibious 266 200 33 33 
Mine warfare 24 16 20 20 
Table 3-42.  Scenario One Navy Committed Forces 
Combat System DPRK DPRK Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Active Divisions 65 44 24 24 
# Personnel (K) 813K 542K 585K 585K 
Reserve Divisions 32 22 23 23 
MBT 2800 1870 2320 2320 
APC / AIFV 2000 1400 2650 2650 
AH 40 30 188 188 
Gun Arty 7325 4880 4325 4325 
Rocket Arty 2000 1300 205 205 
SSM 55 36 12 12 
ADA 8250 5500 600 600 
SAM 3000 2000 512 512 
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Combat System DPRK DPRK Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Fighter 241 160 430 430 
Ground Attack 321 214 78 78 
Bomber 80 53 -- -- 
Air Refueling -- -- -- -- 
AEW / ESM -- -- 3 3 
Recce / UAV -- -- 139 139 
Trainer A/C 263 175 306 306 
Transport 304 200 37 37 
Table 3-43.  Scenario One Air Force Committed Forces 
5) Results   
 The results of the static net assessment shows that the CFC and DPRK armies are at 
near parity with reference to personnel.  Superiority on the ground is not assured, as there 
is significant SOF impact on command and control, synchronization and the overall 
capability of joint operations.  The CFC and DPRK navies are comparable in overall 
numbers of combat vessels with the exception of amphibious vehicles, which appear to 
be overwhelming in DPRK waters.  However, the CFC possesses technically superior 
weapon systems and it is postulated that they would enjoy a capability equivalent to three 
times greater than that of a technologically inferior foe, even considering asymmetric 
attack.  The CFC and DPRK air forces are at near parity in the category of combat 
aircraft.  However, the qualitative advantage is evident when factors of maintainability, 
reliability and technology influence the true war fighting capabilities and overall combat 
effectiveness of the CFC. Anecdotal evidence of the disparity between DPRK and CFC 
aircrew in annual flight time and training exercises is significant.  It is these measures of 
readiness that are critical to eventual CFC victory in the conflict.  
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6) Scenario One Conclusions   
 The bottom line is that “Not much has changed since epoch one” in an overland 
invasion scenario without external intervention.  In the ROK, the US withdrew ten 
percent of assigned personnel from non-mission essential billets, the ROK defense 
establishment continued unimpeded on a total force modernization roadmap, and is 
assessed to remain victorious in a conflict of this dimension.  Meanwhile, the DPRK 
demobilized twenty percent of their army as economic and social conditions caused 
defense programs to remain stagnant and technically inferior, and the regime to remain in 
the survival mode.  Excepting possibly artillery and missile attacks, the DPRK is yet 
unable to sustain any type of major offensive against the ROK as defended by the CFC. 
b. Scenario Two:  North Korea/China (Red Team) vs. South Korea/USFK (CFC). 
 Scenario Two is a hypothetical overland invasion by DPRK with the support of  coastal 
attacks by Chinese forces against the CFC.   In this scenario, China will assist in so far as much 
to bolster DPRK chances of victory without appearing as the aggressor in the global political 
realm.  This statement is tenuous, as we do not intend to say conflict with China, but rather 
conflict with a foe assisting DPRK with capabilities similar to that of the Chinese.  Or, in other 
words, some country is providing the DPRK with resources necessary for sustainment.   
1) Orders of Battle (DPRK/China vs. CFC)   
 Listed in the table are the complete combat units of all of the Chinese, DPRK, and 





Combat System PRC DPRK RED CFC ROK USFK 
Active Divisions 44 65 105 24 23 1 
# Personnel (K) 1983 813 2796 585 560 25 
Reserve Divisions 80 32 112 23 23 -- 
MBT 6750 2800 9550 2220 2100 120 
APC / AIFV 9060 2000 11060 2650 2500 150 
AH 500 40 540 165 100 65 
Gun Arty 14500 7325 21825 4575 4550 25 
Rocket Artillery 3800 2000 5800 205 180 25 
SSM ? 55 55+? 12 12 -- 
ADA 15000 8250 23250 600 600 -- 
SAM ? 3000 3000+? 1000 1000 -- 
Table 3-44.  Scenario Two Army Forces 
Combat System PRC DPRK RED CFC ROK USFK 
Maritime Patrol 30 12 42 20 20 -- 
Submarine 69 23 92 12 12 -- 
Destroyer 27 -- 27 13 13 -- 
Frigate 41 3 44 11 11 -- 
Patrol Boat 219 443 662 121 121 -- 
Amphibious 90 266 356 33 33 -- 
Mine warfare 83 24 107 20 20 -- 
Table 3-45.  Scenario Two Navy Forces 
Combat System PRC DPRK RED CFC ROK USFK 
Fighter 2851 217 3068 430 370 60 
Ground Attack -- 359 359 78 60 18 
Bomber 235 80 315 -- -- -- 
Air Refueling 10 -- 10 -- -- -- 
AEW / ESM 16 -- 16 3 3 -- 
Recce / UAV -- -- -- 139 138 1 
Trainer A/C -- 263 263 306 306 -- 
Transport 322 304 626 37 29 8 
Table 3-46.  Scenario Two Air Forces 
2) Scenario Description / Objectives   
 This overland invasion utilizes the same objectives and strategies as the first scenario.  
However, this scenario includes sustainment provision of POL, weapons, and food that 
the DPRK forces previously lacked.  Additionally, utilizing one-seventh of its overall 
naval assets, the PRC eastern fleet conducts a naval blockade of the entire peninsula that 
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impedes the passage of any US reinforcements.  The DPRK gains air superiority with 
covertly deployed PRC aircraft in DPRK territory.  The total asset support package 
approximates 90 ships, 500 fighters and 60 bombers.  PRC support essentially triples the 
DPRK ballistic missile capability. 
3) Committed Forces Comparison   
 For the DPRK, approximately sixty-seven percent of their forces are committed.  This 
is in addition to the proportions of PRC assets discussed in the scenario description 
paragraph.  Due to the proximity of CFC bases, one hundred percent of CFC forces are 
committed.  The overall threat numbers appear overwhelming for the CFC Army, Navy, 
and Air Forces.   
Combat System Red Team Red Team Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Active Divisions 105 80 24 24 
# Personnel (K) 2796 1000 588K 588K 
Reserve Divisions 112 37 23 23 
MBTs 9550 3500 2216 2216 
APC / AIFV 11060 2500 2637 2637 
AH 540 50 172 172 
Gun Artillery 21825 8200 4595 4595 
Rocket Artillery 5800 2300 180 180 
SSM 55 55 12 12 
ADA 23250 11000 600 600 
SAM 3000+ 3000 1000 1000 
Table 3-47.  Scenario Two Army Committed Forces  
Combat System Red Team Red Team Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Maritime Patrol 42 20 20 20 
Submarine 92 50 12 12 
Destroyer 27 27 13 13 
Frigate 44 13 11 11 
Coastal Patrol 662 296 121 121 
Amphibious 356 200 33 33 
Mine warfare 107 31 20 20 
Table 3-48.  Scenario Two Navy Committed Forces 
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Combat System Red Team Red Team Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Fighter 3068 717 430 430 
Ground Attack 359 321 78 78 
Bomber 315 113 -- -- 
Air Refueling 10 2 -- -- 
AEW / ESM 16 2 3 3 
Recce / UAV -- -- 8 8 
Trainer A/C -- -- 139 139 
Transport 263 263 306 306 
Table 3-49.  Scenario Two Committed Air Forces 
4) Results   
 The general results indicate that the CFC Army takes heavy casualties, the naval 
blockade is effective in delaying arrival of US reinforcements, and SOF again plays 
significant role.  The hostile takeover of the South would succeed if supported by the 
Chinese.   
5) Conclusions   
 ROK military deficiencies identified include: coastal defense, detection, targeting, 
and air defense.  These deficiencies will serve to focus the procurement and 
modernization roadmap for subsequent epochs.  US presence is required at least for now 
as the Seventh Fleet’s presence acts as a deterrent; and if hostilities break out, as a 
warfighting force to hasten or prevent  interdiction of reinforcements. The ROK is not 
capable of surviving a conflict of the size and scope represented by this scenario nor does 
it desire to embark upon an economically debilitating arms race to remedy quantitative 
and capability deficiencies.   
c. Overall Net Assessment Conclusions 
 The overall conclusion from both scenarios is that unless supported by some outside entity, 
an invasion of ROK by the DPRK is not sustainable, nor prudent on their part. 
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4. Technology Development for DPRK and ROK 
a. DPRK’s Technology Focus 
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology   
 North Korea’s quest for a credible nuclear ballistic missile capability continues 
through its cooperation with rogue states like Pakistan and Iran. 
2) Defense R&D Budget   
 The tables below summarize the epoch two defense and R&D budget breakdowns. 
 GDP 
Defense 
Budget O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 27.0% 18.9% 8.1% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 6.2%    
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2006 10.903 2.944 2.061 0.883 
2007 11.579 3.126 2.189 0.938 
2008 12.297 3.320 2.324 0.996 
2009 13.060 3.526 2.468 1.058 
2010 13.869 3.745 2.621 1.123 
Total 61.709 16.661 11.663 4.998 
Average 12.342 3.332 2.333 1.000 
Table 3-50.  DPRK Defense Budget Breakdown 
 Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
% 50.0% 20.0% 30.0% 5.0% 35.0% 
%Def Bud 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2006 $0.265  $0.106  $0.159  $0.044  $0.309  
2007 $0.281  $0.113  $0.169  $0.047  $0.328  
2008 $0.299  $0.120  $0.179  $0.050  $0.349  
2009 $0.317  $0.127  $0.190  $0.053  $0.370  
2010 $0.337  $0.135  $0.202  $0.056  $0.393  
Total $1.500  $0.600  $0.900  $0.250  $1.749  
Average $0.300  $0.120  $0.180  $0.050  $0.350  









%GDP 2.8% 2.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 
% 35.0% 70.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 
%Def Bud 10.5% 7.4% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2006 $0.309 $0.216 $0.046 $0.031 $0.015 
2007 $0.328 $0.230 $0.049 $0.033 $0.016 
2008 $0.349 $0.244 $0.052 $0.035 $0.017 
2009 $0.370 $0.259 $0.056 $0.037 $0.019 
2010 $0.393 $0.275 $0.059 $0.039 $0.020 
Total $1.749  $1.225 $0.262 0.175 0.087 
Average $0.350  0.24 0.05 0.035 0.017 
Table 3-52.  DPRK R&D Budget Breakdown 
b. DPRK’s Technology Investments   
 DPRK’s technological strength continues to reside in its ability to reverse-engineer major  
Soviet Union weapons systems.  The downsizing of the DPRK military has resulted in more 
funds being made available for the upgrade of its aging inventory of weapons.  This funds in turn 
have been channeled into improving the infrastructure to increase the rate at which upgrading 
was being performed.  Throughout epoch two, DPRK continued its emphasis on the nuclear BM 
and SOF enhancement programs as reflected in its R&D spending.   
c. DPRK’s R&D Program 
 From the table below, the second epoch witnessed the continued joint R&D efforts in BM 
with Iran and Pakistan.   The bulk of its technological investments were spent on investing and 
developing BM-related technologies, especially in the field of missile control guidance.  In spite 
of earlier US predictions that DPRK would have a credible nuclear BM threat by 2005, this has 
yet to materialize.  The latest estimates, however, place DPRK’s nuclear weapons program to be 
almost mature such that it could probably field up to 6 nuclear missiles within the next three 
years.  Also, as  part of its reunification agreement, DPRK discontinued its secret development of 
chemical and biological weapons at end 2010. 
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Small Naval Craft 
Small Arms 
Satellite(?) 
BM (Iran, Pakistan, 
Israel) 
 
Table 3-53.  DPRK Defense Systems Acquisition Method Summary 
d. ROK’s Technology Focus   
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology   
 ROK’s regional focus continued in this epoch as it focused on enhancing its blue 
water navy and advanced air combat capabilities.  Foremost priority for the ROK Navy 
continues to be the protection of ROK’s SLOCs, with an emphasis on the development of 
a sub-surface capability.   The ROK Air Force’s priority continues to be in the acquisition 
of air fighter assets.  The ROKA’s emphasis lies in the acquisition of night-fighting and 
coastal defense capabilities.  From ROK’s DBA requirements, MND maintains its need 
for space and maritime surveillance systems.   
 The strategy for the second epoch continued from that of the first epoch.  ROK 
continued to pursue joint developments with Israel, Russia, France, and Germany to 
effect the necessary technology transfers57.  These efforts were all in concurrence with 
the ROK efforts to reduce its dependence on US technology.  Incidentally, the 
availability of US technology also became more difficult to acquire as a result of the US 
withdrawal imposed as part of the reunification preconditions. 
2) Defense R&D Budget   
                                                 
57 ROK’s joint efforts with Israel focuses on its UAV and sensor technology, with Russia focuses on its missile, 
aircraft, high power microwave and space technology, with France focuses on its missile and fighter technologies, 
and with Germany focuses on its submarine and artillery technology. 
3-87 
 Maintaining the budget allocations defined earlier, the tables below summarize the 
epoch two defense and R&D budget breakdowns. 
 GDP 
Defense 
Budget O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.0% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 5.9%    
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2006 443.222 15.513 10.859 4.654 
2007 469.372 16.428 11.500 4.928 
2008 497.065 17.397 12.178 5.219 
2009 526.392 18.424 12.897 5.527 
2010 557.449 19.511 13.657 5.853 
Total 2,493.499 87.272 61.091 26.182 
Average 498.700 17.454 12.218 5.236 
Table 3-54.  ROK Defense Budget Breakdown 
 Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
% 50.0% 20.0% 30.0% 5.0% 35.0% 
%Def Bud 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2006 $1.159  $1.545  $1.159  $0.186  $0.605  
2007 $1.227  $1.636  $1.227  $0.197  $0.641  
2008 $1.300  $1.733  $1.300  $0.209  $0.678  
2009 $1.376  $1.835  $1.376  $0.221  $0.719  
2010 $1.457  $1.943  $1.457  $0.234  $0.761  
Total $6.519  $8.692  $6.519  $1.047  $3.404  
Average $1.304  $1.738  $1.304  $0.209  $0.681  
Table 3-55.  ROK FIP Budget Breakdown 
FDP (80% of R&D) ADD (20% of R&D)  
Army Navy AF EO MW AC UWA WS 
% R&D Budget 24.0 32.0 24.0 5.5 5.9 6.1 1.6 1.0 
Year US$ B US$ B US$ B US$ B US$ B US$ B US$ B US$ B 
2006 0.145 0.194 0.145 0.033 0.036 0.037 0.010 0.006 
2007 0.154 0.205 0.154 0.035 0.038 0.039 0.010 0.006 
2008 0.163 0.217 0.163 0.037 0.040 0.041 0.011 0.006 
2009 0.172 0.230 0.172 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.011 0.007 
2010 0.183 0.243 0.183 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.012 0.007 
Total 0.817 1.089 0.817 0.188 0.200 0.206 0.054 0.032 
Average 0.163 0.218 0.163 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.011 0.006 
Table 3-56.  ROK R&D Budget Breakdown 
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e. ROK’s Technology Investments 
1) National Defense Plan   
 From the 2006-2010 Mid-term Defense Plan, these were the weapon systems 
acquired by the three services by end 2010.  These procurements are categorized into 
DBA (which encompassed Information and Command/ DBA and Strategic Strike 
investments), the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
2006-2010 









1 Spy Satellite 
2 Comms Sat 
Joint C3I System 
GBR 
Strategic Strike Long Range Ballistic Delivery 
Capability < 300 km 
KSR-1 
Ground Operations Improved lethality, agility 





Naval Control Long range surveillance and 
Information Dominance 
Develop sub-surface combat 
capability 
Develop ocean going navy 
capability 
Strategic control of SLOCs 
4 P-3Xs 
3 Type 214  
3 KDX -III 
Air Operations Advanced Air Combat 
Precision Strike  
50 A-50 
15 FX 
2 E3 AWACS 
10 KOX-1 FAC 
94 T-50 Jet Tng 
94 KT-2 Woong 
50 KT-1 Tng 
50 AIM-9X 
100 Harm Blk 6  
50 AGM-130/142 
Table 3-57.  ROK Weapon Systems Acquisition 
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2) Existing Capabilities   
 At 2010, ROK has gained the ability to indigenously produce its own heavy 
torpedoes.  Additionally, ROK has embarked on projects focusing on micro and 
unmanned weapon systems.  ROK had already laid the groundwork during the earlier 
periods such that enable production of its own submarines, combat aircraft, attack 
helicopters and other major ground systems by 2015, with sustained production capability 
from 2020 onwards. 
 To acquire high-cost weapon systems or technologically advanced weapons, which 
the ROK is unable to produce locally, the country, cooperates to jointly procure such 
systems with other friendly nations. Such systems include:  HAE UAV, UCAV, Micro 
Air Vehicles (MAV), and satellites.  Also, as the production of missiles requires a 
technological infrastructure that ROK does not yet possess and that is not economical for 



















































Attack Helicopter   
(AH-64) 
Table 3-58.  ROK Defense Systems Acquisition Method Summary 
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f. Assessed Vulnerabilities and Deficiencies from Epoch Two 
 From the epoch two net assessment, ROK identified its two key weaknesses as that of 
maintaining air superiority and protecting its SLOCs (as per epoch one).  South Korea’s 
weakness of maintaining its air superiority arises from its lack of a long-range strike capability, 
its lack of DBA (especially with the USFK’s eventual withdrawal), and its perceived 
insufficiency of AAM/SAM.  Regarding the protection of SLOCs, this weakness arises from 
South Korea’s lack of anti-shipping/-submarine strike capability, and its lack of a sufficient blue-
water naval capability. 
 To embark on solutions for the vulnerabilities, ROK’s investment decisions for the second 
epoch was to acquire the following new technology systems.  For the army, it would continue 
acquiring the next generation of attack helicopters and improved SAMs.  For the navy, it would 
enhance its strike capability by acquiring SSMs and better torpedoes.  For the air force, it would 
also enhance its strike capability by acquiring ASMs and an air refueling capability.   Note that 
ROK’s industrial base has now shifted to include focus on building attack helicopter systems for 
the army; developing anti-shipping/-submarine missile capability to include developing deep sea 
and UUV capabilities for the navy; and maturing the submarine building industry. 
g. ROK’s R&D Programs 
 From the net assessments, ROK derived its long-term technology development needs to 
continue in the areas of miniaturization technology, sensor fusion technology, and long-range 
targeting technology.  These long-term R&D programs already started in the first epoch focuses 
on the following programs:  For DBA, ROK is working on projects employing micro air sensor 
networks, micro satellites, and next generation UAVs.  For air defense, ROK intends to continue 
to develop an aerial mine field system that takes the fight to the enemy.  It is also progressing 
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with projects on high power microwave weapons, advanced combat platforms and advanced 
munitions.  The table below summarizes the major R&D efforts for the second epoch. 
2006-2010 
Direction Items to procure 
Unmanned Vehicle/Weapons  
Miniaturized Systems 
Space Launch systems 
Directed Energy Technology 
UCAV 
JSTAR 
Air Mine Field 
KSR-1/2 
Micro Air Sensor 
HPM 
Table 3-59.  ROK Major R&D Emphasis 
 ROK’s current industrial base possesses the necessary technological knowledge and 
infrastructure to pursue these projects with moderate risks.  Consequently, ROK is already 
developing and eventually shaping its forces with an emphasis on introducing micro- and 
unmanned fighting and sensor platform systems, that with Moore’s Law, makes the fielding of 
such weapon systems a definite possibility in the 2020 timeframe. 












Bil R&D Program 
US$ 
Bil 
AH64D $0.080 SAM (SM-2) $0.070 FX $0.250 Communications Satellites $0.125 
KAH66 $0.200 Torpedoes $0.030 UCAV $0.050 Spy Satellites $0.260 
AGM-






(T-214) $0.200 Harm Blk 6 $0.060 Aerostat $0.080 
Tactical 





Others $0.317 UUV $0.020 Tanker $0.025 Defense Digitization $0.250 
  SS-N-26 Integration $0.025 MAV $0.055 Others $0.127 
  Others $0.264 Others $0.287   









Table 3-60.  ROK R&D Programs 
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 To address the deficiencies, however, the R&D focus for the upcoming epoch will continue 
to be on the acquisition of even better blue-water capabilities and even greater surveillance 
coverage capabilities and platforms started on the first epoch.  The significant point to note is 
that the focus on DBA and R&D spending on the space and defense digitization efforts 
continues. 
1) Defense Digitization/JC3IS Program Update 
 The first phase implementation of the defense digitization program was completed in 
2006 and the system is now fully operational.  The successful implementation of the 
JC3IS has thus enhanced ROK’s warfighting capability as its interoperability demand 
now allows the three Services to be linked via internet technology, making possible for 
combat leaders from the army, navy and air force to share a common and integrated 
operational and situational picture. 
2) Space Program Development Update 
 In this epoch, South Korea began to seek the participation of the Russians in its space 
program.  There were several reasons.  First, Russia was anxious to reassert its 
dominance in space technology and the measures implemented in 2001, by President 
Vladimir Putin58, were starting to raise Russia’s space program to eminence again 
beginning 2006.  Second, Russia wanted to exploit the export of its space technology as a 
means of repayment of its ballooning debt to South Korea.  Consequently, South Korea’s 
space program was able to make quantum progress in its military satellite and 
nanosatellite programs.  A joint R&D effort was made between Russia and South Korea 
to develop Korea’s first indigenous spy satellite.  With its own launch facilities in Woe 
                                                 
58 Putin stressed the importance of international cooperation in space, which promotes Russian technology on world 
markets and depends trust between partners at the Millennium Summit in New York.  “Putin Says Russia Must 
Maintain Space Prowess”, Spacemart, January 30, 2001. 
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Narodo, South Korea finally launches two of these indigenously produced spy satellites 
in end 2010/early 2011.  This brought the total number of spy satellites in space to four. 
3) Micro-Air Sensor Network (MASN) Update 
 Using commercially available CCD technology, ROK has managed to integrate and 
produce several sensor prototypes.  Through the packaging of the sensor to a super 
pressure balloon platform, developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) efforts thus began 
in earnest during this epoch.  
4) Air Mine Field System (AMFS) Update 
 Development in the MAV platform is still progressing as ROK restructures some of 
its semiconductor industry to actively support the R&D efforts.  The feasibility of the 
concept is approved and validated during simulation testing.  Concurrently, R&D work 
into the AMFS’s delivery and dispersion mechanism also began during this epoch. 
h. Technology Summary 
 In summary, MND believes that the key enabling technologies leading to ROK’s eventual 
successes are to be found in Microelectronic Mechanical Systems (MEMS) and Biotechnology.  
These two fields will support other developments in nanotechnology, artificial intelligence 
systems, neural networks, intensive data processing technology, and wireless internet 
technology.  And through these technologies, ROK will be able to create and produce the micro- 
and unmanned weapon systems that will give it the necessary parity if not superiority in future 
conflicts. 
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Epoch Two Summary    
 As grotesque images of famine and severe poverty in North Korea flooded the news 
networks, South Korean and the US statesmen completed a plan to rescue the North.  What 
began in epoch one as a soft landing was rapidly deteriorating into a hard landing, which is 
absorption of the North by the South following a total economic collapse.  The ROK contributed 
two percent of its GDP in the form of a $10 B(US) annual aid package targeting infrastructure 
improvements and social programs.  Although not specified by the South as a condition for the 
aid, the North agreed to launch comprehensive biological and chemical clean-up programs.  At 
the same time, the “Preconditions for Unification” which were drafted earlier in the epoch called 
for US forces to begin withdrawing from the peninsula.   
 In view of the departing US military, strategic military planners recognized that critical 
capabilities especially in the areas of early warning and intelligence had to be enhanced.  The 
ROK therefore focused on securing tactical early warning systems and other major 
improvements in current combat capabilities.  Korea moved away from preparing strictly for an 
inter-peninsular war to building a more strategic force with new subs, destroyers, and long-range 
aircraft.   
 North Korea continued to develop its ballistic missile program by expanding its collaboration 
efforts with Pakistan and Iran.  South Korea focused its long-term technology development needs 
in the areas of miniaturization, sensor fusion, and long-range targeting technologies.  The initial 
digitization of South Korea’s military was completed and the JC3IS was thus fully operational 
and interoperable.  Initial approval for its micro-air sensor network and air mine field system 
were also given, leading to greater R&D efforts in these developments.  
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C. Epoch Three (2011-2015) 
1. Strategy 
a. Introduction 
 Epoch three is the time period from January 2011 until December 2015.  Highlighted here are 
the significant events of this epoch. 
Epoch Three Events   2011 - 2015 
Declaration of unification 
Unified Korean team to 2012 Olympics 
Establishment of co federal council 
Beginnings of inter-ministerial meetings 
Merging of economies; Korean international currency 
Admission to UN Council 
US withdrawn to 50percent; collection of fissile materials 
Increased cooperation with ASEAN and EU 
Inter-Korean railway fully operational 
Table 3-61.  Epoch Three Significant Events 
 As the unification process continues, terminology within this analysis shifts from 
reference to North and South Korea as DPRK and ROK respectively, to K(N) and K(S) as a 
reflection of one country with two separate regions.  North and South from this point forward are 
regional distinctions. 
 The signing of the Panmunjom Treaty marking the formal declaration of unification and an 
end to the longest armistice in modern history marked this epoch’s dramatic beginning.  The 
stand-up of the co federal council in the previous epoch launched this epoch’s inter-ministerial 
meetings shaping policy for the unified nation.  The United Nations invited a single Korean 
statesman to represent the nation.  Although the US presence has shrunk to half of its 2005 size, 
it continued to provide a stabilizing element on the peninsula. The North offered up its fissile 
materials in a show of good faith and for the first time, the two Koreas fielded a single team in 
the 2012 Olympics.    
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b. Co Federal Council Acts 
 Epoch two witnessed the first official stage of unification beginning with the formation of a 
confederation and the activation of a co federal council addressing the larger policy issues in the 
unification of the two states.  Early in this epoch, world leaders applauded the efforts of the  
council for removing the political boundaries to allow the merger of the two economies as well 
as focusing on state-supported family reunions to reconnect long separated families.  Informal 
talks and discussions centered on foreign policy arrangements with the four powers as well as 
long-range defense planning by way of a joint military council.   
 In these final stages of unification, statesmen in the co federal council remained mostly 
aligned with Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” with one exception.  Instead of a federation, the 
council settled on a varied confederation characterized as one nation, one flag, one state, two 
separate systems, and two autonomous regional governments.59  The central government is 
responsible for foreign relations and matters of diplomacy while regional governments 
administer remaining internal matters. 
c. Economic Summary 
 The merging of the two economies signaled the unified Korea’s commitment to re-
establishing itself as an economic contender in world markets60.  The intra-Korean currency chi-
won (new-won) became internationally recognized and found its way onto international currency 
exchanges.  As the two Koreas merged in significant ways, social policies were emplaced to curb 
massive migration to the South.  While still receiving two percent of the South’s GDP in aid 
packages, the North’s economy began to show signs of life as evidenced by double-digit growth  
                                                 
59 As opposed to Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy Stage two calling for ONE SYSTEM as per section 3B1e of 
Epoch 1. 
60 Although the economies are merged, we have elected to keep growth and GDP calculations separate to illustrate 
relative trends.  
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(12 percent).  Economic experts however, suggested the North’s unprecedented growth is not 
sustainable.  The South’s GDP is roughly 33 times that of the North, and positive economic 
growth continued at 5.9 percent.   
d. Military Spending Factors 
 During the second half of the last decade, the two Koreas were focused internally on healing 
the broken economy of the North and building confident relations between the two nations.  As 
such, the North was no longer viewed as the primary threat to the former South Korea and the 
nation takes on a more global defensive posture, that is, a 360-degree view of the world 
characterized as a ”Useful Porcupine,” indicating the South’s peaceful but guarded security 
intent.   
 This posture witnessed the four powers jockeying for positions of favor with Korea.  Each 
has reasons beyond militarily strategic significance.  China is deeply interested in the commerce 
implications of railway access while Russia has her eye on the Korean Peninsula’s natural 
resources, technology transfer, and cash opportunities to the opening market.  Not unlike Russia, 
the United States too is interested in security matters, and technology transfer, as well as trade 
opportunities.  And Japan, still reeling from the 1990’s Asian economic crisis, is fixated on trade 
and investments on the Korean peninsula that promise high rates of return.   
 Military spending in the North averaged $4.8 B(US) annually during this epoch.  Almost 30 
percent or nearly $1.5 B(US) of that went to force improvement.  Further broken down, a third 
was devoted to R&D, over half to the services, and five percent to dominant battle space 
awareness programs.  Although nearly five times more, the South’s $23.2 B(US) annual defense 
expenditure is in comparable proportions with 30 percent to force improvement.  Of the force 
improvement slice, 13 percent went to R&D, four percent to dominant battle space awareness 
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projects, and the remaining 83 percent was divided among the services with 30 percent to the 
army, 40 percent to the navy, and 30 percent to the air force. 
e. Denuclearization 
 Following an agreement to halt its ballistic missile sales, Korea (N) also agreed to cap its 
nuclear development program and surrender fissile materials in the quantity equivalent to six 
nuclear warheads to the IAEC as a gesture of goodwill and sincerity towards unification and the 
end of hostilities. 
f. Unified Korean Strategy 
 The unified NSS is marked by a focus on the preservation of national sovereignty, 
independence, and protection of international trade.  This translates to a shift in the NMS from 
borders to a regional security posture.  Korea aims to be an independent and self-reliant state, 
protecting its major trade and capital flows since a healed economy is pivotal to the success of 
the country. 
 The NMS is an outward looking posture characterized as 360-degree defensive coverage with 
protection of the sea lines of communications vital to its survival.  Finally, the nation will 
capitalize on available technology transfers from the United States, China and Russia.
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2. National Defense 
 South Korea’s defense planning during the past ten years centered on how to deter and 
defend the South against the North’s formidable military threat.  With the declaration of 
unification and end of hostilities in 2011, Seoul and Pyongyang can now afford to adopt a 360-
degree outward looking posture in anticipation of a completely unified Korea. 
a. South Korea’s Force Improvement Plans  
 The ministry of defense looked beyond the immediate Korean (N) threat toward the 
development of operational capabilities relevant to contingencies that a unified Korea Might 
encounter in defending itself and it’s interests.  This is evident in a notable increase in naval and 
air capabilities in the past five years.  The vibrant economic growth has allowed the continued 
allocation of reasonable  amounts to defense.  Together with force modernization, Korea (S) 
aspires to take a more important role in defense as a result of the reduction of US forces in the 
peninsula.  Korea recognizes that it has to take the leading role in defending the homeland, while 
awaiting external intervention from the international observers.  To create a high-quality military 
force, Seoul and Pyongyang are restructuring with an emphasis on the creation of forces suitable 
for the information age.  Korea (S) is transforming its labor-intensive force structure into 
technology-intensive in an effort to meet requirements stemming from information warfare.  
Ground forces stress the importance of improving strategic and tactical intelligence to high-
speed, air-land battle capabilities.  The navy focused on improving joint operation capabilities in 
extension to its blue-water concept.  The air force concentrated on improving combat capabilities 
and early warning.  In anticipation of future unification, the force structure also underwent a 
change from a ground-centered to a more balanced force structure among the three services.  
This is because a ground-centered force structure alone cannot effectively attain defense goals 
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against future military threats.  Korea (S) intends to advance its information warfare capabilities 
with three principles in mind: find the enemy first, make a quicker decision, and attack the 
enemy before the enemy attacks.  In this regard, early modernization of command, control, 
communications, computer, and information (C4I) projects take priority.  Although South Korea 
has relied on the Combined Forces Command (CFC) for informational warfare technology, it 
now has systems to advance its self-reliant surveillance, early warning, and electronic combat 
capabilities as a part of the force improvement programs. 
1) Army    
 The mission is to deter any possible overland invasion and prevent coastal landings. FIP 
priorities focus on transforming the army into one that is lean and mean.  This is achieved 
through decommissioning of outdated equipment and replacing them with those that provide 
more lethality and requires lesser effort to maintain.  The army will continue to modernize so as 
to take out the enemy early.  Should deterrence fail, the army must be to be able to secure a swift 
and decisive victory. 
a) Major Acquisition / Upgrades 
Along with the move towards the end of hostilities between the two Koreas, a 
further personnel reduction of 30 percent was seen in the North with the 
decommissioning of fifteen more active divisions leaving it at 50 divisions strong.  
Older generations of T-54 battle tanks and equivalent combat inventory were retired. 
New Russian T-80 main battle tanks, attack helicopters and surface-to-air missiles 
were purchased.  In the South, the army continues to invest in the locally produced 
Type 88 (K-1) main battle tanks and KAH-66 “Comanche” helicopters so as to 
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enhance strike lethality.  The resulting force structure for the army in the year 2015 is 
as shown below: 
Combat System 2011 Procurement Demobilization 2015 
Active Divisions  23 - - 23 
Personnel (thousands) 560 - - 560 
Reserve Divisions  23 - - 23 
MBT 2100 100 100 2100 
APC / AIFV 2500 100 100 2500 
Attack Helicopters 123 96 - 218 
Gun Artillery 4300 - 250 4050 
Rocket Artillery 180 - - 180 
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 12 - - 12 
Air Defense Artillery 600 - - 600 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 978 48 50 976 
Table 3-62.  Korea (S) Army Force Structure 2015 
Combat System 2011 Procurement Demobilization 2015 
Active Divisions  65 - 15 50 
Personnel (thousands) 813 - 206 607 
Reserve Divisions  32 - 15 17 
MBTs 2,800 100 700 2,200 
APCs / AIFV 2,000 40 500 1,540 
Attack Helicopters 40 24 40 24 
Gun Artillery 7,325  875 6,450 
Rocket Artillery 2,000 - 300 1,700 
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 55 - - 55 
Air Defense Artillery 4,250 - 1750 2,500 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 3,000 48 2500 548 
Table 3-62.  Korea (N) Army Force Structure 2015 
2) Navy 
      The navy’s priorities fall essentially on the protection of vital sea lines of 
communications. The North actively retired ships greater than 35 years of age and 
leverage on its political friendship with Russia and China for technology transfers and 
weapons upgrades to its coastal patrol crafts and FFGs.  This manifested the early stages 
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with missile and torpedoes upgrades. In the South, the dream of having a navy capable of 
sea control and protection of critical sea lines of communications is in its infant stage. 
Korea (S) set a 12-mile zone of territorial sea and fielded an upgraded sea patrol to 
protect the territorial sea and sea-lanes of communication.  The long-term goal is to be 
able to effectively retain control of territorial waters in the East Sea and the Korean 
Straits where the major ports are located.  In the event of a naval blockade, the navy must 
be able to ensure the safe passage of commercial shipping through the waters, up to at 
least 600 nautical miles into the South China Sea. Information dominance and the ability 
to conduct aggressive underwater operations are vital so as to keep any aggressor at bay.  
a) Major Acquisition / Upgrades 
 Decommissioning continued in the North beginning with the huge inventory of 
coastal patrol crafts and amphibious ships.  Upgrading work was performed on 10 of 
the fleet of 21 Romeo submarines with the addition of new Russian torpedoes and 
weapon systems.  In the South, additional German Type 214 submarines were built 
and equipped.  Improved versions of the KDX destroyers are also configured to 
include the SM-3 surface-to-air missiles and extended range SS-N-21 surface-to-
surface missile61.  This boosted the destroyer and submarine fleet to 15 and 19 
respectively.  Improved maritime surveillance aircraft P-3X were also added to 
enhance situational awareness. 
b) Shkval / ‘Squall’ Torpedoes62   
 The major addition to the navy’s inventory includes the introduction of the 
Russian-made Shkval torpedoes. Fired from standard 533mm torpedo tubes, Shkval 
                                                 
61 Refer to Annex 3D3 for detailed description of SS-N-21 “Samson.” 
62 Details of the Shkval Torpedoes are excerpts from the Federation of American Scientist. 
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has a range of about 7,500 yards.  This weapon clears the tube at fifty knots, upon 
which its rocket fires, propelling the missile through the water at 360 km/h [about 100 
m/sec / 230 mph / 200-knots], three or four times as fast as conventional torpedoes.  
The solid-rocket propelled "torpedo" achieves high speeds by producing a high-
pressure stream of bubbles from its nose and skin, which coats the torpedo in a thin 
layer of gas and forms a local "envelope" of supercavitating bubbles. Carrying a 
possible  nuclear warhead initiated by a timer, it would destroy any hostile submarine.  
The Shkval high-speed underwater missile is guided by an autopilot rather than by a 
homing head as on most torpedoes.  Since there were no evident countermeasures to 
such a weapon, its employment could put adversary naval forces at a considerable 
disadvantage.  One such scenario is a rapid attack situation wherein a sudden 
detection of a threat submarine is made, perhaps at relatively short range, requiring an 
immediate response to achieve weapon on target and to ensure survival. 
c) SM-3 Upgrade 
 The K (S) Navy’s Theater Wide (NTW) TBMD or `upper tier' is planned to 
provide the new improved version of the KDX destroyers with vertical launch SM-3s 
to meet longer-range ballistic missile threats.  The SM-3 replaces the conventional 
warhead with a Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) kinetic warhead 
(formerly kinetic kill vehicle (KKV)) and a dual-pulse third-stage rocket motor.  The 
kinetic warhead weighs 18.2 kg and is ejected from the missile and then accelerates to 
an intercept velocity reported at 4,000 m/s.  There are separate Solid Divert and 
Attitude Control System (SDACS) for lateral movement that enable the kinetic 
warhead to strike the target's warhead with sufficient kinetic energy that even a 
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grazing hit will ensure destruction.  Acquisition and aim-point selection is performed 
by means of an IR seeker with a tracking accuracy measured in micro radians and 
employing a 256 x 256 element focal plane array in the long-range band.  The SM-3 
is 6.55m long with a diameter of 34.8cm (the booster having a diameter of 53.3 cm) 
and weighs 1,501 kg.  The resulting force structure for the navy in the year 2015 is as 
shown below: 
Combat System 2011 Procurement Demobilization 2015 
Maritime Patrol 20 8 - 28 
Submarines 12 3 - 15 
Destroyer 13 6 - 19 
Frigates 6 - 6 0 
Coastal Patrol 113 3 4 112 
Amphibious 33 - - 33 
Mine Warfare 12 - - 12 
Table 3-63.  Korea (S) Navy Structure 2015 
Combat System 2011 Procurement Demobilization 2015 
Maritime Patrol 12 - - 12 
Submarines 23 2 11 14 
Destroyer - - - - 
Frigates 3 - 1 2 
Coastal Patrol  448 - 107 341 
Amphibious 266 - 43 223 
Mine Warfare 24 - - 24 
Table 3-64.  Korea (N) Navy Structure 2015 
3) Air Force   
       The air force’s mission lies in defending Korea through control and exploitation of air 
and space.  In the North, air force modernization revolved around replacing and 
upgrading the aging equipment.  In the South, the air force brought three core 
competencies to the fight:  air, space and information superiority so as to maintain the 
 3-105 
tactical advantage in offensive and defensive counter air operations; agile combat support 
aircraft to extend the combat radius with longer loiter time over the target; and finally to 
possess the ability to deliver more lethal and accurate weapon systems autonomously. 
a) Major Acquisition / Upgrades 
 In the North, the old MIG 17, 19 and 21 fighters and ground attack Su-7 and Su-
25 aircraft were retired.  New unmanned aerial vehicles were introduced for 
surveillance and possible offensive actions.  Older generation trainer and transport 
aircraft were also replaced.  In the South, with the delivery of the new FX fighters, 
old F-5E aircraft were decommissioned together with the F-4 and F-5 reconnaissance 
aircraft.  Significant in this epoch is the introduction of KC-X (Variant) air-to-air 
refueling tanker that extended the range of air force operations. 
b) FX Fighters 
 The FX is the air force's top long-term modernization priority.  It is a truly 
revolutionary aircraft, a national asset that will allow military commanders to 
dominate friendly and enemy airspace early in a conflict.  Over the last decade, other 
nations have introduced a number of aircraft that are approximately equal or even 
superior to the F-16 in many respects.  This includes the Japanese version of the F-22.  
Foreign air-to-air missiles are improving, and some are as good or better than the 
Korean equivalents. Advanced surface-to-air missiles are improving and proliferating.  
Conceptually, the FX will meet and defeat these threats well into the future.   
 The FX will use a synergistic combination of stealth, super cruise (non-stealthy 
flying at supersonic speeds at military power), and advanced integrated avionics to 
achieve a level of technological and battlefield superiority unknown in previous 
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years.  Stealth will limit the range at which enemy radars can detect the FX, and 
disrupt enemy air defense through all phases of an engagement.  Super cruise flight 
further reduces enemy reaction time and will allow the pilot to fly at supersonic 
speeds efficiently, increasing his time on station, range, combat radius, and effective 
weapons range.  Advanced avionics, through a combination of on- and off-board 
sensors and integrated displays, will provide the FX pilot a comprehensive picture of 
the battlespace, identifying ground and air threats and friendly forces.  The pilot will 
be able to avoid enemy threats, and position his aircraft optimally for the coming 
battle.  
 The FX will also have a ground attack capability.  It will carry Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM) variant and Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW) equivalent that will 
allow it to strike targets with great accuracy, night or day, and in adverse weather.  In 
combination, these new enabling technologies will allow the FX pilot to detect and 
destroy ground and air threats long before the FX is detected.  It will be able to do 
this on the first day of conflict, over heavily defended enemy airspace, fighting with 
far fewer support assets than other fighters. In doing so, it will enable faster, safer 
deployment of naval and ground forces.  And it will allow Korean interdiction aircraft 
to more effectively attack enemy forces, infrastructure, and key military targets such 
as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons sites and production facilities.  It will 
also protect key surveillance, reconnaissance, and ballistic missile defense assets that 
must loiter near the theater to be effective.  The FX will be designed to carry with it 
the advantages of ease of maintenance, high reliability, reduced airlift support 
requirements (half that of the F-16), and higher sortie rates (at least twice that of the 
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F-16).  Each of these factors is a combat multiplier in itself, freeing critically needed 
air force assets to be used for other tasks.  
Combat System 2010 Procurement Demobilization 2015 
Fighter 370 55 100 325 
Ground Attack 60 100 - 160 
Bomber - - - - 
AEW / ESM 3 6 - 9 
ASW / Patrol 8 - - 8 
Reconnaissance /UAV 138 40 28 150 
Air Refueling - 5 - 5 
Trainer A/C 306 40 - 346 
Transport 12 50 - 62 
Table 3-65.  Korea (S) Air Force Structure 2015 
Combat System 2010 Procurement Demobilization 2015 
Fighter 241 - - 241 
Ground Attack 321 - 107 214 
Bomber 80 - - 80 
AEW / ESM - - - - 
ASW / Patrol - - - - 
Reconnaissance /UAV - 10 - 10 
Air Refueling - - - - 
Trainer A/C 263 30 98 195 
Transport 304 4 190 118 
Table 3-66.  Korea (N) Air Force Structure 2015 
b. Strategic Weapons Development.  
1) Nuclear 
 To reaffirm its sincerity towards a peaceful process of integration with the South and the 
rest of the world, the North agrees to give up an amount of weapons grade plutonium 
equivalent to six warheads to a UN inspection team during meetings with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Should the need arise, with the existing 
infrastructure, ballistic missile building capability, and the expertise of a future combined 
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nuclear development team, Korea possesses the capability to assemble nuclear weapons 
with considerable ease; especially with the aid of countries like France, Russia and even 
the Chinese in uranium refining. 
2) Ballistic Missiles 
      Ballistic missile program remains a top priority. Russian-made SS-n-21 Scarab short-
range ballistic missile and their TELs had been shipped from Syria to Korea (N) for 
reverse engineering.  This has provided Korea (N) with guidance and solid-propellant 
motor technologies that significantly improve the performance of the short-range missile.  
The development of Daepo-dong 2 rockets as part of the ongoing project to achieve a 
satellite launch capability continues to receive top priority.  The satellite is said to be part 
of an ongoing project aimed at promoting scientific research and peaceful use of outer 
space.  The Daepo-dong rockets are deemed to be fully operational. Full-scale production 
is on the way with the inventory stacking up to approximately 160 pieces each.  
Combat Systems Range (km) 2010 Add Minus 2015 
Scud B 300 100 - - 100 
HwaSong 5 330 150 - - 150 
HwaSong 6 500 250 - - 250 
Ro-dong 1 / 2 1,300 80 40 - 120 
Daepo-dong 1 2,000 75 30 - 105 
Daepo-dong 2 6,000 25 30 - 55 
KSR-1 180 25 50  25 
Hyon Mu 300 - 25 - 25 
Table 3-67.  Korea (N) and (S) Ballistic Missile Structure 
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3. Net Assessment 
a. Scenario One:  Korea (N) vs. Korea (S)   
 Scenario One is an overland invasion by North Korea (K(N)) against the South Korean 
(K(S)) forces and remainder of US Forces Korea.  While we believe that this scenario may not be 
entirely plausible, it serves as a final examination and validation of the South Korean 
procurement process through 2015. 
1) Orders Of Battle (K(N) vs. CFC) 
 For the OOB (Order of Battle) comparison, see annex 3D2.  Korea (N) has 
demobilized an additional 20 percent of the army, US Forces in Korea have withdrawn to 
fifty percent of their original year 2000 strength and Korea (S) has begun to field an 
extremely modernized force in each of the three services.  
2) Scenario Description 
 While both K(S) and K(N) remain fully engaged by unification issues, there is an 
attempt by hard-line loyalist remnants of the Kim Jung Il regime that secretly organize 
and initiate a coup d’ tat.  This movement is significant enough to gain control of the 
K(N) armed forces that subsequently launch a full scale invasion of K(S) in an attempt to 
takeover the Blue House in Seoul, facilitating  K(N)’s desire to become the senior partner 
in the unification process and ultimately perpetuate a socialist state.  The North agreed 
with the PRC that although China would not support an unprovoked attack on the South, 
it would take measures to ensure that the North would not get “steamrolled” in any 
subsequent South Korean counteroffensive.  This allowed the coup to proceed with a 
Northern assumption of status quo ante bellum.  As a deterrent to PRC involvement and 
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to reinforce fully participative USFK personnel, the 7th Fleet Battle Group and the 3rd 
US Marine Division were enroute at the onset of hostilities. 
3) Objectives 
 The objectives of this unprovoked and surprising attack include the occupation of the 
“Blue House” in Seoul to install a government sympathetic to loyalist beliefs.  The coup 
and subsequent military action are characterized by swift and decisive movement on the 
part of the K(N) with the element of surprise being vital.  The strategy includes an 
overland invasion accompanied by SOF insertion and heavy missile and artillery attacks 
against Korean (S) centers of gravity.   
4) Committed Forces Comparison 
 Although we believe that the loyalist faction could not garner the support of the entire 
military in a coup such as this, we have committed 100percent of Korean (N) forces to 
the conflict in order to validate the “worst case” boundary of the conflict scope and 
spectrum.   Based upon their proximity to the action, remaining USFK and 100percent of 
the Korean (S) forces are committed.   The USFK and K(S) personnel make up the 
Combined Forces Command (CFC). 
a) Army 
 For the Armies involved there is near parity in personnel, SAMs and MBT’s.  
North Korea has an advantage in ADA, SSM, and rocket artillery.  The CFC has an 





Combat System K (N) K (N) Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Active Divisions 50 50 23 23 
# Personnel (K) 617K 617K 573K 573K 
Reserve Divisions 17 17 23 23 
MBTs 2200 2200 2370 2370 
APC / AIFV 1500 1500 2590 2590 
AH 78 78 182 182 
Gun Artillery 6450 6450 4065 4065 
Rocket Artillery 1700 1700 195 195 
SSM 55 55 12 12 
ADA 5500 5500 600 600 
SAM 1006 1006 1018 1018 
Table 3-68.  Scenario one Army Committed Forces 
b) Navy 
 For the navies involved, there is now near parity in submarines.  Korea (N) has 
numerical advantage in patrol boats, amphibious vehicles and mine warfare assets.  
Korea (S) has a distinctive advantage in maritime patrol aircraft, and destroyers.   
Combat System K (N) K (N) Committed 
CFC 
Committed CFC 
Maritime Patrol 12 12 28 28 
Submarines 18 18 15 15 
Destroyers -- -- 19 19 
Frigates 3 3 -- -- 
Coastal Patrol  341 341 115 115 
Amphibious 223 223 33 33 
Mine warfare 24 24 15 15 
Table 3-69.  Scenario one Navy Committed Forces 
c) Air Force 
 The air forces show near quantitative parity when aggregating fighter, ground 
attack and bomber aircraft categories.  There is a definite numerical advantage for the 
Korean (S) Air Force with respect to fighter, AEW, reconnaissance, aerial refueling 
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aircraft and UAV platforms, which collectively offer a distinct warfighting advantage 
with respect to firepower and mobility.   
Combat System K (N) K (N) Committed 
K (S) 
Committed K (S) 
Fighter 201 201 355 355 
Ground Attack 214 214 169 169 
Bomber 40 40 -- -- 
Air Refueling -- -- 5 5 
AEW / ESM -- -- 9 9 
Recce / UAV 10 10 151 151 
Trainer A/C 195 195 346 346 
Transport 118 118 66 66 
Table 3-70.  Scenario one Committed Air Forces 
5) Results 
 The results conclude that the K(S) Army experienced heavy casualties from a massed 
infantry battle of annihilation.  Superiority on the ground was assured with supporting air 
and DBA assets.  K(N) SOF units continued to impact K(S) command and control 
functions, synchronization and the conduct of joint operations.  The South enjoyed a 
defenders advantage.  Sustainability was not on the side of K(N).  Korean (S) maritime 
patrol aircraft and destroyer advantages negated North Korean quantitative advantage in 
amphibious craft and patrol boats.  The K(S) Air Force (with USFK) showed a definite 
numerical advantage with respect to fighter, AEW, reconnaissance, air refueling aircraft 
and UAV platforms, which collectively contributed to superior mobility and firepower.   
6) Conclusion 
 The bottom line is not much has changed since 2001.  Korea (N) has demobilized an 
additional 20 percent of the Army, or nearly 40 percent since 2001. With this 
demobilization, the withdrawal of 50 percent of original US combat personnel and with 
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continued force modernization; Korea (S) is assured air, land, littoral, and at least 
regional sea supremacy. Land victory is aided by supporting air assets and DBA.  
However, casualties will be high. 
      Although some may argue the plausibility of this scenario, it serves to validate the 
strengths of a retrospectively inward looking national and military security strategy that 
established the requirements and procured the forces of today (2015).  Although not 
much has changed with respect to the outcome of an unprovoked invasion by the North, 
we are confident that the Korean (S) military can defend against such aggression and 
deliver a coup de gras to those instigating a conflict in scope similar to this.   
b. Scenario Two:  PRC vs. Korea   
 Scenario Two is a hypothetical invasion on a limited scale by the PRC against a unified 
Korean force.  The war is limited in the sense that PRC is not mounting a full-scale unlimited 
war.  An unlimited war is characterized by mobilization of the entire arsenal to include military 
force, reserves, and economy to support the war effort.    
 The purpose of this scenario is to illustrate military capabilities and highlight deficiencies of 
a now outwardly looking and unified Korean force structure when confronted with military 
aggression by China.  Some assumptions include that USFK (all combat forces) are now 
completely withdrawn, and the US 7th Fleet and 3rd US Marine Division are enroute at the 
outbreak of hostilities. There is an overwhelming potential for escalation of this conflict. The 
scenario is similar to the circumstances that characterized the 1950 Korean War.   
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1) Orders of Battle 
      What does China bring to the fight?  Listed below is their complete combat capability 
beginning with the PRC Army, then Navy and finally the Air Force.  Noteworthy is the 
significant modernization and accompanying demobilization of combat aircraft since the 
previous epochs.  
Combat System PRC Korea K(S) K(N) 
Active Divisions 44 73 23 50 
# Personnel (K) 1690 1167 560 607 
Reserve Divisions 80 40 23 17 
MBT 6750 4500 2300 2200 
APC / AIFV 9060 4000 2500 1500 
AH 500 224 146 78 
Gun Artillery 14500 10500 4050 6450 
Rocket Artillery 3800 1880 180 1700 
SSM 55 67 12 55 
ADA 15000 6100 600 5500 
SAM 3000+ 2024 1018 1006 
Table 3-71.  Scenario Two Army Forces 
Combat System PRC Korea K(S) K(N) 
Maritime Patrol 30 40 28 12 
Submarines 63 33 15 18 
Destroyers 36 19 19 -- 
Frigates 52 3 -- 3 
Coastal Patrol  229 451 115 336 
Amphibious 109 256 33 223 
Mine warfare 83 39 15 24 




Combat System PRC Korea K(S) K(N) 
Fighters 1080 523 325 201 
Ground Attack -- 272 60 212 
Bombers 50 40 -- 40 
Air Refueling 13 5 5 -- 
AEW / ESM 15 9 9 -- 
Recce / UAV 80 160 150 10 
Trainer A/C -- 546 346 200 
Transport 200 180 62 118 
Table 3-73.  Scenario Two Air Forces 
2) Objectives 
 The overall objective of the PRC is occupation of the Korean peninsula and control of the 
vital SLOC’s.  The military strategy includes a land invasion across the Yalu River and 
the northern border that extends for over 1450 
km.  This runs concurrent with a naval 
blockade by the Chinese eastern fleet 
extending from the littoral areas of the Yellow 
Sea and East China Sea eastward to Japanese 
territorial waters and southward from the 
Korean peninsula near Cheju-do Island to 
approximately 350 km north of Taiwan.  This area covers nearly 50,000 sq km and 
interdicts 80 percent of the Korean SLOC and maritime trade routes. Additionally, China 
will attempt to gain and maintain air superiority in support of the invasion and naval 
blockade.  Note that the East Sea is not a primary attack route and operations in this area 
would be challenged by the US.  
Figure 3-2.  Scenario Two Naval Blockade 
O i
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3) Committed Forces Comparison 
      Based upon the non-proximity of the entire Chinese order of battle to the Korean 
Peninsular, only a percentage will participate.  We have committed 50 percent of the PRC 
Air Force to OCA and Interdiction missions.  Nearly 67 percent of the PRC Army is 
committed to occupation and penetration of Korean territory.  Finally, 33 percent of the 
PRC Navy is committed to SLOC interdiction and littoral presence in the Yellow and 
East China seas.  The PRC will not use WMD in this scenario.  However, as will be seen, 
there is a significant capability with respect to cruise and ballistic missiles.   
a) Army 
 Again, with 67 percent of the PRC Army and 100 percent of Korean forces 
committed, the overall numbers show a credible Korean capability and near parity in 
most areas.  PRC shows a numerical advantage in the AH, APC, AIFV and ADA 
categories.  
Combat System PRC PRC Committed 
Korea 
Committed Korea 
Active Divisions 44 29 73 73 
# Personnel (k) 1690 1115 1167 1167 
Reserve Divisions 80 26 40 40 
MBTs 6750 4455 4500 4500 
APC / AIFV 9060 5980 4000 4000 
AH 500 330 224 224 
Gun Artillery 14500 9570 10500 10500 
Rocket Artillery 3800 2508 1880 1880 
SSM 55 36 67 67 
ADA 15000 9900 6100 6100 
SAM 3000+ 1980+ 2024 2024 
Table 3-74.  Scenario two Army Committed Forces 
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b) Navy 
 The Korean Navy shows an advantage in maritime patrol aircraft, patrol boats, 
amphibious and mine warfare assets.  Aggregation of the frigate and destroyer 
categories yields near parity.   
Combat System PRC  PRC Committed
Korea 
Committed Korea 
Maritime Patrol 30 10 40 40 
Submarines 63 21 33 33 
Destroyers 36 12 19 19 
Frigates 52 17 3 3 
Coastal Patrol  229 76 451 451 
Amphibious 109 36 256 256 
Mine warfare 83 27 39 39 
Table 3-75.  Scenario two Navy Committed Forces 
c) Air Force 
 The air forces show a distinctive advantage in favor of the Koreans, especially in 
the ground attack role.  Parity in fighter aircraft is assumed as both forces have 
modern and technologically advanced forces.   
Combat System PRC  PRC Committed 
Korea 
Committed Korea 
Fighters 1080 540 526 526 
Ground Attack - - 272 272 
Bombers 50 25 40 40 
Air Refueling 13 7 5 5 
AEW / ESM 15 8 9 9 
Recce / UAV 80 40 160 160 
Trainer A/C - - 546 546 
Transport 200 100 180 180 
Table 3-76.  Scenario two Committed Air Forces 
 
 3-118 
d) Cruise/Ballistic Missiles 
 The findings of a comparison of cruise and ballistic missile capabilities illustrate a 
distinctive mismatch of arrayed and committed missiles that can negate any apparent 
advantage of the Korean force structure. 
Combat System Range PRC Korea 
Ballistic Missiles Short 1125 700 
 Medium 90 195 
 Intermediate 32 75 
Cruise Missiles Land Attack 7800 - 
 Anti-Surface 7640 - 
Table 3-77.  Scenario Two Committed Ballistic Missile Forces 
4) Results 
      The general results indicate that both armies takes heavy casualties, the naval 
blockade is somewhat effective in interdicting the SLOC’s, and while air assets are 
formidable once airborne, peninsular aircraft remain at risk from cruise missile attacks 
while on the ground.  This mismatch in the area of cruise and ballistic missiles illustrates 
a war winning capability for the PRC and an obvious offensive deficiency and defensive 
vulnerability for Korea. 
5) Conclusions 
 The military deficiencies highlighted by this assessment include lack of an offensive 
long-range precision strike capability with cruise missiles, general ballistic missile 
defense and the detection and engagement of enemy cruise missiles.  Any conflict with 
the PRC will be prolonged, protracted, and bloody.  Korea remains a “Useful Porcupine.”  
The PRC, if they chose an aggressive course of action similar to this scenario would find 
that absent offensive cruise and ballistic missile capabilities, their fielded military forces 
would be challenged.  Additionally, the significant level of effort both militarily and in 
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the global political realm may deter Chinese aggression.  The debilitating effects on the 
infrastructure and eventually the economy are grave.    
c. Net Assessment Conclusions 
 In general, this assessment allowed us to turn our focus outward as a unified country and 
fighting force as we proceed forward with the unification.  It highlighted specific and serious 
deficiencies in the area of ballistic and cruise missiles while concurrently validating our 
credibility as a total force with capabilities on land, sea, and in the air.  It also highlights the 
question regarding ballistic and cruise missiles:  How do we catch up?  Some may suggest 
pursuit of technologies and programs to mitigate the cruise and ballistic missile threat, while 
others may argue for pursuit of an alternative deterrent.  This ultimately allows us to focus our 
efforts in epoch four (2016-2020) towards posturing our forces with capabilities to support 




4. Technology Development for Korea (N) and Korea (S) 
a. Korea (N) Technology Focus 
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology 
      At the end of 2015, Korea (N)’s technological goals continue to focus on its 
philosophy of juche, and to enhance its BM and SOF capabilities.  Nothing much has 
changed except that the North’s modernization effort has now shifted towards the reverse 
engineering of modern Russian weapons of the 1990s. 
2) Defense R&D Budget 
 Maintaining the budget allocations defined in earlier epochs, the tables below summarize 
the epoch three defense and R&D budget breakdowns. 
 GDP Defense Budget O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 27.0% 18.9% 8.1% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 12.0%    
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2011 15.534 4.194 2.936 1.258 
2012 17.398 4.697 3.288 1.409 
2013 19.486 5.261 3.683 1.578 
2014 21.824 5.892 4.125 1.768 
2015 24.443 6.600 4.620 1.980 
Total 98.684 26.645 18.651 7.993 
Average 19.737 5.329 3.730 1.599 
Table 3-78.  Korea (N) Defense Budget Breakdown 
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 Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
%Def Bud 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2011 $0.629 $0.151 $0.226 $0.063 $0.440 
2012 $0.705 $0.169 $0.254 $0.070 $0.493 
2013 $0.789 $0.189 $0.284 $0.079 $0.552 
2014 $0.884 $0.212 $0.318 $0.088 $0.619 
2015 $0.990 $0.238 $0.356 $0.099 $0.693 
Total $3.997 $0.959 $1.439 $0.400 $2.798 
Average $0.799 $0.192 $0.288 $0.080 $0.560 






%GDP 2.8% 2.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 
%Def Bud 10.5% 7.4% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2011 $0.440 $0.308 $0.066 $0.044 $0.022 
2012 $0.493 $0.345 $0.074 $0.049 $0.025 
2013 $0.552 $0.387 $0.083 $0.055 $0.028 
2014 $0.619 $0.433 $0.093 $0.062 $0.031 
2015 $0.693 $0.485 $0.104 $0.069 $0.035 
Total $2.798 $1.958 $0.420 0.280 0.140 
Average $0.560 0.39 0.08 0.056 0.028 
Table 3-80.  Korea (N) R&D Budget Breakdown 
b. Korea (N)’s Technology Investments 
 As in epoch two, nothing much has changed with its industrial base, other than the North’s 
economic growth has allowed dormant factories to be rebuilt, reopened and operated.  This has 
subsequently led to an increase in its rate of production of weapons.  Its technology investments 
continue to focus heavily on BM and SOF capability acquisitions. 
c. Korea (N)’s R&D Program 
 The most significant event is that Korea (N) finally attains a credible BM capability at the 
end of 2015.  Its collusion with Iran and Pakistan (and still unconfirmed Israel) has built a strong 
exchange such that the three countries have decided to embark on the development of a new 
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generation of BM that is MIRV-capable, with even greater range and more accuracy.  As part of 
the reunification process, an infant reunified Korea had declared the ending of its known nuclear 
weapons program.  Consequently, Korea (N)’s next generation BM R&D only focuses on 
enhancing its range and accuracy for the delivery of conventional warheads. 








Next Generation BM (Iran, Pakistan, Israel) 
Table 3-81.  Korea (N) Defense Systems Acquisition Method Summary 
d. Korea (S)’s Technology Focus 
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology 
 Korea (S)’s stated technological goals remain unchanged from earlier epochs.  Its 
intention to be a “Useful Porcupine” has however prompted a greater focus in increasing 
the lethality and combat power of its forces, as the march towards an information- and 
technology-centered force continued.  This shift in emphasis was reflected in the 
priorities for the various services.  Foremost priority for the K(S) Navy was the 
acquisition of an enhanced strike capability.   The K(S) Air Force also shared a similar 
priority for precision strike.  The K(S) Army’s emphasis lay in the acquisition of ground 
strike and tactical situational awareness capabilities.  From Korea (S)’s DBA 
requirements, MND maintains its need for early warning surveillance and identification 
systems.   
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2) Defense R&D Budget 
 GDP 
Defense 
Budget O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.1% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 5.9%    
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2011 590.338 20.662 14.463 6.199 
2012 625.168 21.881 15.317 6.564 
2013 662.053 23.172 16.220 6.952 
2014 701.114 24.539 17.177 7.362 
2015 742.480 25.987 18.191 7.796 
Total 3,321.154 116.240 81.368 34.872 
Average 664.231 23.248 16.274 6.974 
Table 3-82.  Korea (S) Defense Budget Breakdown 
 Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
%Def Bud 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2011 $1.159 $1.545 $1.159 $0.186 $0.605 
2012 $1.227 $1.636 $1.227 $0.197 $0.641 
2013 $1.300 $1.733 $1.300 $0.209 $0.678 
2014 $1.376 $1.835 $1.376 $0.221 $0.719 
2015 $1.457 $1.943 $1.457 $0.234 $0.761 
Total $6.519 $8.692 $6.519 $1.047 $3.404 
Average $1.304 $1.738 $1.304 $0.209 $0.681 
Table 3-83.  Korea (S) FIP Budget Breakdown 
FDP (80% of R&D) ADD (20% of R&D)  
Army Navy AF EO MW AC UWA WS 
% R&D Budget 24.0 32.0 24.0 5.5 5.9 6.1 1.6 1.0 
Year US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil
2011 0.193 0.258 0.193 0.045 0.047 0.049 0.013 0.008 
2012 0.205 0.273 0.205 0.047 0.050 0.052 0.014 0.008 
2013 0.217 0.289 0.217 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.014 0.009 
2014 0.230 0.306 0.230 0.053 0.056 0.058 0.015 0.009 
2015 0.243 0.324 0.243 0.056 0.060 0.061 0.016 0.010 
Total 1.088 1.451 1.088 0.250 0.266 0.275 0.072 0.043 
Average 0.218 0.290 0.218 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.014 0.009 
Table 3-84.  Korea (S) R&D Budget Breakdown 
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e. Korea (S)’s Technology Investments 
1) National Defense Plan   
      To embark on solutions for the vulnerabilities in epoch two, Korea (S)’s investment 
decisions from the second epoch resulted in the following new systems coming on line 
are summarized in the table below:  
2011-2015 
Capability/ Purpose 




Miniature space communications, warning 
& surveillance systems 
Self-command systems 
Defense Digitization 
10 Aerostats / 10 Microsats 
2 spy satellite 
10 Micro spy sats 
Joint C3I system 
GBR 
Strategic Strike Long range ballistic delivery capability 
<500 km 
KSR-1 
Ground Operations Improved lethality, agility 





Naval Control Improved C4ISR system 
Strategic control of SLOCs 
Improve ship building capacity 
Enhanced defensive/offensive combat 
capability 
8 P-3X / 3 Type 214 
4 KDX-III / 2 KDX-X 
SAMs / Torpedoes 
Air Operations Advanced air combat 
Enhanced AEW 
Precision strike 
100 A-50 / 50 FX 
5 UCAV / 40 KT-2 
4 AEW / 50 C-130 
5 KC-xxx / 2 JSTARSx 
40 UAV / 50 Harm Blk 6 
100 AA-X ERAAM 
100 AIM-9X 
50 JSOW / 50 JDAM 
Table 3-85.  Korea (S)’s Weapon Systems Acquisition 
      Korea (S)’s acquisition of AWACS and tankers has given the K(S)  Air Force an 
enhanced air situational awareness and a new air refueling capability.  Operationally, this 
translates to either increased hang time over an engagement or increased range at which 
the South can project its air influence. 
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      For the K(S) Navy, the addition of KDX-IIIs and the new generation KDX-X 
destroyers reflect the attention to address its blue-water naval deficiency.  Together with 
the acquisitions of submarines and P-3Xs, the Korea (S) Navy of 2015 does pack 
sufficient punch and a situational awareness capability.  Similarly for the Korea (S) 
Army, the country has also focused on improving its lethality and agility and tactical 
situational awareness. 
2) Existing Capabilities 
      At end 2015, Korea (S)’s aircraft industry has matured giving it the ability to 
indigenously design and build the next generation of advanced combat fighters.  This 
capability, however, has been a long and arduous path, with the experience gained 
through its licensed production experiences with the KFX and FX programs.  
Additionally, the South’s industrial base can now support the indigenous design and 
construction of conventional 1800-ton submarines, a new generation of tanks and 
artillery, and utility/scout helicopters.  The country has also acquired the capacity to 
perform its own indigenous production of advanced attack helicopters. 
 The defense industry base has also embarked on the joint R&D and production of the 
second generation of satellites and micro-/nano-satellites as well as High Altitude and 
Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (HAE UAVs), both for communications and 
surveillance purposes.  MEMS and miniaturization technological advances have also 
resulted in numerous breakthroughs for our joint R&D on the MASN and AMFS 
concepts. 
 Reiterating that missile production is neither economical nor supportable by the 
South’s technological infrastructure, Korea (S) will continue to depend on external allies 
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for supplying its missiles.  The country has, however, already negotiated for existing 
agreements to allow for the licensed production of SAMs, AAMs, and ASMs.  Korea (S) 
begins its quest to attain full self-sufficiency in its defense production capability to 
perform R&D and production of weapon platforms and systems. 
Indigenous R&D 
and Production 





Major Surface Ships 
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Table 3-86.  Korea (S) Defense Systems Acquisition Method Summary 
f. Assessed Vulnerabilities and Deficiencies from Epoch Three 
 From the epoch three net assessment, MND identified the need to continue increasing its 
blue-water naval capability to ensure the protection of Korea’s territorial SLOCs, the need for a 
long-range precision strike capability, and the need to defend against CM and BM attacks.  More 
specifically, Korea (S)’s need for a long-range precision strike capability forces the military to 
examine the purchase of either bombers or cruise missiles, both weapons of which are not in its 
present inventory.  Based on cost and utility considerations, MND has decided that the purchase 
of cruise missiles is more prudent and economical.63  Against both CM and BM attacks, Korea’s 
key weaknesses were its lack of a sufficient detection capability and an effective strike capability 
to take out the BMs in the event of an attack.  
                                                 
63 The purchase of bombers as a long-range precision strike system encompasses costs such as the acquisition of 
aircrews and pilots and their training, in addition to the acquisition and life cycle costs of the weapon platform and 
ordnance.  This contrasts with the direct purchase of cruise missiles.  With the present level of technology, 
maintainability and reliability the cruise missile acquisition requires a large up front acquisition cost commitment, 
but subsequent O&M costs are minimal. 
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g. Korea (S)’s R&D Programs 
 MND continues to focus on investing heavily in the development of high-tech weapons and 
securing the ability to develop core technologies suitable for the Korean military environment.  
The table below thus summarizes the major R&D efforts for the third epoch. 
2011-2015 
Capability/ Purpose 
Direction Items to procure 
R&D Air Defense Miniaturized System 
Strategic Surveillance Systems 
Directed Energy Beam Technology 
High Altitude Flight Technology 
Air Mine Field 
Micro Air Sensor 
KLENS 
KSR-2 
Table 3-87.  Korea (S) Major R&D Emphasis 
 To address the deficiencies in this epoch, the R&D focus shifted to finding technological 
solutions to the urgent needs for CM and BM defenses, and also for a precision strike capability.  
Beginning with the detection problem for CM, Korea (S)’s present network of ground-based 
radars was deemed insufficient for the task.  Thus, MND immediately pursued the study of 
suitable detection alternatives.  At the same time, MND also studied the feasibility of employing 
the AMFS as a suitable CM defense.  To meet the urgent need of dealing with the CM threat, 
MND decided that the fastest way was to acquire through direct import of a tactical high-energy 
laser system (THEL), which was already available in the military export market.  The 
employment of high power microwave weapons was also deemed a suitable technological 
solution, with the assumption that Korea was willing to absorb the impact of CM “duds”.  To 
respond to the BM threat, Korea (S) assessed that it probably had the capability to detect regional 
BM launches but that the technological solution to overcoming the vulnerability was to acquire 
an advanced SAM defense as the employment of a high energy laser defense system like the US 
BMD concept was economically unfeasible.  Based on the FDP allocations, the table below 
summarizes the services and DBA R&D investments. 
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KAH66 $0.250 MSO/MHO $0.070 FX $0.275
Micro-
satellite $0.125
AGM-11 $0.050 Mine Layer $0.080 HAE UAV $0.150
Micro Spy 
Sat $0.150
SAM(S400) $0.180 SAM (SM-3) $0.100 UCAV $0.080 Spy Sat $0.250
Tac Radar  $0.050 KDX-X $0.325 MAV $0.055  (KSR-2) $0.155
THEL $0.020 HPM $0.325 AAM $0.040 KLENS $0.100





(Squall) $0.050   
Defense 
Digitization $0.285
  Others $0.421 Others $0.338 Others $0.150









Table 3-88.  Korea (S) R&D Programs 
1) Defense Digitization/JC3IS Program Update 
      The first phase implementation of the defense digitization program was completed in 
2006 and the system is now fully operational.  The successful implementation of the 
JC3IS has enhanced Korea (S)’s warfighting capability as its interoperability demand 
now allows the three Services to be linked via internet technology, making possible for 
combat leaders from the Services to share a common and integrated operational and 
situational picture. 
2) Space Program Development Update 
 Recapping the development of the micro-satellite program and for purpose of 
prediction in this study, Korea (S)’s was assumed to be technologically behind the US by 
ten years.  Consequently, Korea (S)’s R&D results of developing such satellite 
technology only began to appear in the third epoch.  As such, between 2011 and 2015, 
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Korea had already launched and maintained several micro-, nano-64 and pico-satellites65 
in LEO through Russian and Israel’s help.  The purpose was to test out such systems in 
terms of detection and sense resolution of a military nature.  A key feature of pico-sats 
and of planned mass-producible nano-satellites is the use of MEMS for miniature 
integrated space systems.66  Also of interest, is the characterization of nano-satellite 
architecture and assembly employing mass production using semiconductor technology 
and incorporating high-level building blocks called application-specific integrated micro-
instruments (or ASIMs).67  Additionally, Korea (S) also launched another two spy and 
communications satellites each to complete its constellation network of satellites in 
support of its MASN concept. 
3) Micro-Air Sensor Network (MASN) Update 
 As of end 2015, Korea (S) possesses the ability to produce its own line of MAVs to 
support the MASN concept, namely a “hovering spy craft only 23 centimeters across” 
adapted from the US.68  Additionally, several other prototypes are developed and tested, 
together with integration studies pursued of merging sensors onto the MAV platform.  
                                                 
64 Nanosatellites would provide low-cost, rapidly deployable, innovative systems well suited to commercial, 
scientific and/or military ventures.  “AeroAstro Wins Air Force Contract to Study Tactical Nanosatellites”, 
Spacedaily, September 13, 1999. 
65 In 2000, the US already demonstrated the feasibility of picosatellites affected through MEMS.  This mission was 
the first-ever to demonstrate the principles of miniature satellites released from a “mother ship” flying in concert and 
communicating via a local network as nanosatellites .  “PicoSat Constellations Debuts November”, Spacedaily, 
October 11, 1999.  The picosatellites  (measuring 4-by-3-by-1 inches and weighing less than one-half pound each) 
were released by a “mother” satellite in orbit, combined proven missile technology with pioneering satellite 
technology.  Also the picosatellites communicated with its ground station via a microwave radio, accomplished on 
chip-based digital cordless telephone technology (Low-Power Wireless Integrated Microsensors program).  The 
signals were received on Earth by a 50-meter dish antenna.  “Smallest Satellites Ever Await Critical Moment”, 
Spacedaily, January 29, 2000. 
66 “Smallest Satellites Ever Await Critical Moment”, Spacedaily, January 29, 2000. 
67 In epoch three, Korea (S) would have also looked at cooperative constellations, sparse aperture antennas, local 
swarms of nanosatellites, and extremely flexible launch-on-demand options, which include gun and balloon-assisted 
launches.  “PicoSat Technology Gets Serious”, Spacedaily, October 11, 1999. 
68 The hovering craft weighed 1.4 kilograms and managed to takeoff, hover, and move around in at slow and 
medium speeds, with an endurance of about an hour on the 200 grams of fuel it carried.  This craft was built and 
tested by Micro Craft, a US aerospace company.  K. Kleiner, “Backpack Drone Peers Behind Enemy Lines”, 
Spacewar, October 21,2000. 
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The tests with the balloon-platform have been successful and MND is now in the process 
of reviewing the MASN’s employment concepts. 
4) Air Mine Field System (AMFS) Update 
      The restructuring of the semiconductor industry to actively support the AMFS R&D 
efforts was completed in 2014.  Concurrently, R&D breakthroughs also take place in the 
AMFS’s delivery and dispersion mechanism.  And so, the AMFS begins limited 
production at end 2015 to allow for further tests and evaluation.  Also in response to the 
CM threat, MND began exploring the possibility of modifying the AMFS as a suitable 
CM defense. 
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Epoch Three Summary     
 Ending the longest armistice in modern history, the Pamunjon Treaty marked the formal 
declaration of unification.  Although remaining US forces continued to provide a stabilizing 
influence, the nation began learning how maintain current military operations without the US.  
The merging of the two economies signaled the unified Korea’s commitment to re-establishing 
itself as an economic contender in world markets and the intra-Korean currency chi-won became 
an international denomination.  While still receiving two percent of the South’s GDP in aid 
packages, the North’s economy began to show signs of life as evidenced by double-digit growth 
(12 percent).   
 The ministry of defense could now look beyond the old threat to the north and toward the 
development of operational capabilities relevant to contingencies that a unified Korea Might 
face.  This was evident in a notable increase in naval and air capabilities in the five years.  Net 
assessments highlighted specific and serious deficiencies in the area of ballistic and cruise 
missiles while concurrently validating our credibility as a total force with capabilities on land, 
sea, and in the air. 
 The rate of production of indigenous weapon systems increased in the north as technological 
breakthroughs gave the country a credible ballistic missile capability.  Efforts in the south focus 
on defense digitization and the launch of micro, nano, and pico-satellites with Israel and Russia’s 
help.  To attain full self-sufficiency, Korea also re-negotiated existing agreements to allow for 
the licensed productions of missile weaponry.  This epoch’s deficiencies, however, forced 
military planners to urgently seek out technological solutions to deal with the cruise and ballistic 
missile threats. 
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D. Epoch Four (2016 – 2020) 
1. Strategy 
a. Introduction  
 Epoch four is the time period from January 2016 until December 2020. Highlighted here are 
the significant events of this epoch. 
Epoch Four Events   2016 - 2020 
Korean (Democratic) Federation formed 
Korean prefectural elections 2018 
Complete withdrawal of US military forces 
US calls for Japan to leadership in region 
Siberian pipeline complete 
China replaces US as #1 trading partner 
Competition for scarce resources; tensions between Japan and Korea at 
all time high 
Strategic and economic alliance with China 
Table 3-89.  Epoch Four Significant Events 
 Early in the epoch, Korea transitioned from a varied confederation to a federation setting the 
stage for the first prefectural elections in 2018.  The year 2024 was set as the target date for a 
Korean national presidential election.  The United States held closing ceremonies at the US 
Army Base in Yeongsan signifying the formal end to US military presence.  In a curious and 
unsettling foreign policy maneuver, the US called upon Japan to take the lead in ensuring 
regional stability.  Korean statesmen, in turn, urged US leadership to continue in their role as 
senior partner in the region to keep Japan and others “in check”.  This and several additional 
events increased tensions between Korea and Japan and raised concerns about the United State’s 
commitment to regional stability. First, the completion of the Siberian pipeline under Korea’s 
ultimate control, with Japan afraid they would be excluded from the benefits.  Second, several 
territorial skirmishes including an illegal mining operation near the Korean territorial Tok-Do 
Island.  Finally, China’s move into the place of Korea’s top trading partner, which pushed Japan 
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further down the trade billing.  This long line of destabilizing events led ultimately to Korea’s 
unilateral strategic and economic lean toward the PRC. 
b. Federation Formed 
 The only significant difference between the third epoch’s confederation and  fourth’s 
federation is a move from two systems to a single system.  In this case, the system is a  
democratic form of government modeled closely after the former South Korea.  As in the varied 
confederation, the central government is responsible for foreign relations, defense, and matters of 
diplomacy while regional governments administer remaining internal matters.  Prefectural 
elections marked the first democratically elected leaders in the North. The activation of a unified 
military command marked the final stage in the reorganization efforts of Korea’s military forces.  
Even today, the command continues to focus on sealing the gaps left by retreating US Forces and 
the redistribution of war fighting equipment throughout the peninsula. 


































Figure 3-3.  US Withdrawal #2 
2005:  North and South formally agree 
to pursue unification options 
2006: “Preconditions for unification” 
agreed upon by  North and 
South  
2006-2012:  US makes “Big Show” of 
withdrawal; US must be <,= 
50% by 2015 
2011:  Formal declaration of 
unification, US must be out by 
2020 
2018:  Small US security force and 
advisory staff only. 
2020:  No US military presence on 
Peninsula 
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 Figure 3-3 provides a retrospective look at the United States’ withdrawal from the peninsula.  
Although Korea continues to adjust in several important ways to the loss of direct US support 
and the inherent security it offered, the Korean people offered a bittersweet, if not melancholy 
farewell and celebrated their independence from their US benefactors.  Korean statesmen were 
surprised by the United States’ apparent abandonment of previously assured security and 
stability provisions when the US called for Japan to take the lead in ensuring regional stability.  
With over a century of distrust fueled by poignant memories of Japanese occupation, the stories 
of which have been kept alive and passed from generation to generation, the peaceful people of 
Korea felt especially vulnerable despite their strength and independence. 
d. Territorial Disputes – The Final Straw 
 Several significant events 
contributed to renewed fear and 
distrust of the Japanese.  Not least of 
which is the 2019 Tok-Do Island 
incident.  The tiny Island of Tok-Do, 
measuring approximately 1600 square 
meters of uninhabitable rock is 
approximately 200 nautical miles off 
of Korea’s central East Coast.  It has 
been the source of a long-standing 
territorial dispute between Japan and Korea dating back to the Shilla Dynasty in 500 AD.  But as 
early as 1667, Japan admitted that Tok-Do was a Korean territory.  The island is a known golden 
fishing zone, provides a strategic over-watch of the East Sea and is known to be a source of 
Figure 3-4.  Tok Do Island 
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hydrate and natural gas reserves.  Korea has held Tok-Do as a radar site since the late 20th 
century.   
 In 1998, in an effort to ease tensions over rights to waters around the disputed islands, South 
Korea and Japan signed an agreement which set new fishing boundaries and quotas but preserved 
Korea’s ultimate territorial rights.  A significant increase in activities in and around the protected 
island raised Korean suspicions, and in 2019, Japanese hydrate prospectors posing as fishermen 
were discovered to be drilling off Tok-Do.  A hostile exchange ensued when the “fishermen” 
were challenged by Korean coastal authorities, and although no one was seriously injured during 
the incident, it served to raise suspicions and distrust for the Japanese by Koreans to an all-time 
high.   
e. Korea – China Alignment 
 Although Korea welcomed independence from the United States, its historic and ethnic ties 
to China proved a powerful lure to her protective embrace.  Adding to substantial trade relations 
and growing concerns over Japanese militarism while devoid of the stabilizing force of the 
United States, Korean leaders welcomed China’s invitation to political alignment.  Where once 
during this epoch Korea’s policy was characterized by benevolent neutrality, it is now explicitly 
bilateral.   
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f. Economic Review 
(US$ bil)  2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Average 
N 27.4 30.3 33.2 36.0 38.6 33.1 GDP 
S 786.3 832.7 881.8 933.8 988.9 884.7 
N 12.0 10.8 9.5 8.0 7.2 9.5 GDP Growth  
S 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 
N 7.4 8.2 9.0 9.7 10.4 8.9 Defense 
S 27.5 29.1 30.1 32.7 34.6 31.0 
Table 3-89.  Economic Summary 
 A summary of the economic data is shown in Table 3-89 above.  In order to highlight the 
continuing disparity in scale of GDP between the northern and southern regions, the figures are 
broken down by region.  The former South Korean  economy  sustained an average GDP growth 
rate of 5.9 percent.  Their partners in the North began to return to a steady-state GDP growth rate 
as unsustainable double-digit growth in the third epoch waned from 12 percent to 7.2 percent by 
the end of the year 2020.  The region enjoyed a significantly optimistic economic outlook 
brought about by the resurgence of global confidence in regional economic growth and perceived 
stability. 
g. Unified Korean Strategy (NSS and NMS) 
Korea’s NSS remained largely unchanged with a focus on protection of national sovereignty, 
trade routes, and all commerce activities.  However, Korea’s alignment with China ensured 
increased security especially from an overland invasion, which in turn translated to a 
significantly more focused and lethal NMS aimed at deterring an adversary’s use of cruise or 
ballistic missiles against Korean territories, protection from sea invasion, and a direct defense 
against SLOC blockages or disruption.  
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 2.  National Defense 
a. Force Improvement Plans 
 With the prefectural elections in 2018, Korea saw a shift in the priorities and role of the 
unified defense force. The ministry of defense anticipated that it had to prepare for possible 
social unrest or even military provocation in the region.  Consequently, the Korean military must 
support the government's peaceful reunification policy, and conscientiously prepare to meet the 
prospective changes in the future strategic environments.  The top priority for national defense 
was to develop a future-oriented high-quality modern military force. 
b. Army  
 With unification, the army’s mission shifted to include assisting the authorities in 
maintaining social order in a unified Korea.  Force improvement priorities now centered on 
transforming the Korean Army into one that was versatile and able to deal with a variety of 
situations as well as keeping the lethal punch to serve as a deterrent to potential aggressor.  The 
Korean Army also continued to streamline and upgrade its forces so as to keep it lean and mean.  
Major issues concerning integration of doctrine and equipment became pivotal to the success of a 
unified army.  Due to changes in the security environment as well as the nature of future war, 
Korea’s ground force modernization focused on improving its mobility.   
 The army reorganized its corps, infantry divisions and brigades (mostly for the front-line 
units) into mechanized ones and increased the unit combat effectiveness with new weapons and 
equipment.  The decrease in cross border threats arising from unification allowed the army to 
rapidly downsize its force bringing it to about 860,000 strong.  Outdated equipment and 
inventory, especially those from the North were retired and replaced with indigenous production 
units to reduce the effects of integration.  Armor forces, to improve its three-dimensional high-
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speed mobile combat capability, received new Korean-designed tanks and armored vehicles with 
excellent firepower mobility and survivability characteristics.  With these improvements, the 
army thus enhanced the lethality of each unit and established a basis for successful mobile 
warfare operations.  The standing armored and mechanized divisions were also gradually 
equipped with self-propelled howitzers to improve fire support capability, to enhance mobility, 
and to shorten operational reaction time.  Artillery firing accuracy was being enhanced through 
computerization of fire control systems, modernization of target acquisition systems, and 
positioning equipment.  To help ensure the mobility and survivability of self-propelled artillery, 
fire direction centers and armored ammunition carriers were acquired as well.   
 With its diverse functions, air-mobile combat will play a leading role in future warfare.  The 
army continues to introduce new models of next-generation attack helicopters, multi-purpose 
helicopters and scout helicopters.  At the same time, to enhance survivability and operational 
effectiveness, avionics equipment is improving night operations capability and precision firing 
capability.  
Combat System 2015 Procurement Demobilization 2020 
Active Divisions 73 - 20 53 
Personnel (thousands) 1167 - 304 863 
Reserve Divisions 40 - 15 25 
MBT 4300 430 1850 2880 
APC / AIFV 4040 230 1230 3040 
Attack Helicopter 242 144 - 386 
Gun Artillery 10500 - 2250 8250 
Rocket Artillery 1880 - 500 1380 
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 67 - - 67 
Air Defense Artillery 3100 - 1950 1100 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 1524 114 500 1138 
Table 3-90.  Korean (N and S) Army Force Structure 2020 
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c. Navy  
 Korea’s desire for sea power was not one of solely military power play, but part of a broad 
maritime agenda based on national growth and resource needs linked to a growing Korean 
coastal economy. Korea sits on the doorstep to a maritime environment.  With the imminent rise 
of two maritime powers in the region, namely Japan and China, Korea’s maritime mission had 
never been more important and significant.  The navy must modernize quickly so as to keep up 
with those in the region who might threaten Korea’s strategic lines of communications.  Naval 
combat power was enhanced to adjust to three-dimensional warfare, following the global trend 
and the changing strategic environment around the Korean peninsula.  
 For the fourth epoch, the navy’s modernization saw the balanced improvement of its surface, 
underwater, and air capabilities and the acquisition of a strategic strike capability. Besides being 
able to operate in the littoral and blue waters, the navy also had to influence land battles.  This 
shift from littoral protection to projection of power in the blue water is best observed by the 
increase procurement of advanced Aegis-class destroyers and submarines.  To establish an early 
warning system and obtain long-range surface patrol capability, new model surface patrol 
aircraft were procured to replace outdated models.  
 For the improvement of underwater combat power, a procurement program for submarines 
had been started since the late 1980s.  In May 1994, then Defense Minister Lee Chun Ham 
launched the first submarine built with domestic technology that provided the initial momentum 
for development of underwater operations.  Korea thus continued to acquire new-model 
submarines equipped with advanced weapon systems to establish a basis for its underwater 
combat capability.  Improvements to surface combatants were enhanced with the surface 
reconnaissance and surveillance capability of the new Korean-designed Aegis class destroyers. 
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These ships, designed to carry state of the art weapon systems like the improved SM-2x and SM-
3x anti-air guided missiles, new light and heavy torpedoes and extended range anti-ship cruise 
missiles, were modeled after the US and Russian systems.  New model helicopters were also 
acquired in accordance with the naval force improvement plans.  In addition, submarines and 
surface combatants were also upgraded to provide a missile-launch capability for use with land 
attack cruise missiles (SS-N-21 “Samson”69) to negate the vulnerability from the loss of the 
nuclear deterrent in epoch three and provide an alternative platform for strike.  The resulting 
force structure at the year 2020 is shown below. 
Combat System 2016 Procurement Demobilization 2020 
Maritime Patrol 40 12 - 52 
Submarine 29 8 - 37 
Destroyer 19 6 - 25 
Frigate 2 - 2 0 
Coastal Patrol 450 - 93 357 
Amphibious 256 - 158 98 
Mine Warfare 42 - - 42 
Table 3-91.  Korean (N and S) Navy Force Structure 2020 
d. Air Force  
 Air combat is one of the most powerful forces for modern warfare.  The Korean Air Force’s 
mission lies in defending Korea through control and exploitation of air and space.  Korea will 
continue to develop a future-oriented advanced air combat power, aimed at increased war-
deterrence and successful defense of Korea’s territorial airspace.  Efforts continued to focus on 
improving Korea’s tactical and support air assets and various operations systems for better 
response and flexibility.  These included the gradual acquisition of advanced aircraft that were 
suitable for a future operational environment.  The resulting force structure was qualitatively far 
more superior even though the quantity remained relatively unchanged.   
                                                 
69 Refer to Annex for detailed description of SS-N-21 “Samson.” 
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 These aircraft possessed the capabilities for rendering prompt fire support to the ground and 
naval forces.  Complementing the capabilities of these advanced aircraft were  arming with air-
to-air missiles for extended-range attacks and of air-to-surface missiles for strategic and 
precision strikes on ground and surface targets.  An increasing number of UAVs with greater 
range and endurance capabilities were deployed for intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance. Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV), capable of operating autonomously 
or in cooperation with manned aircraft, will soon lead to increased operational flexibility and 
reduced aircrew exposure during high risk missions.  The air force’s main challenge lay in the 
search for the best combined force mix of manned aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and 
conventional long-range stand –off strike missile aircraft.  The resulting force structure at the 
year 2020 is shown below. 
Combat System 2015 Procurement Demobilization 2020 
Fighter 566 118 216 468 
Ground Attack 374 118 156 336 
Bomber 80 - 40 40 
Air Refueling 5 5 - 10 
AEW / ESM 9 4 - 13 
ASW / Patrol 8 - - 8 
Reconnaissance /UAV 160 90 - 250 
Trainer A/C 541 80 140 481 
Transport 180 8 - 188 
Table 3-92.  Korean (N and S) Air Force Structure 2020 
e. Strategic Weapons Development 
1) Ballistic Missiles 
 SSMs are not only a force equalizer, but also a means of striking at distant targets and 
of offsetting the enemy’s qualitative advantage.  Improved SSMs gave Korea greater 
flexibility of action as well as the ability to threaten the enemy’s sensitive military targets 
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such as airfields, headquarters and war reserve storage units, especially in the initial 
hours of a war.  With the diminished cross border threat, the emphasis thus centered on 
protecting the region around Korea against players in the region.  Korea’s ballistic force 
of approximately 1000 is primarily dedicated to a strategy of minimum deterrence, which 
means that no potential enemy would launch a strike against Korea without suffering 
retaliation from Korea’s second strike capability.  Priority for this epoch was given to the 
development of long-range missiles by a combined Korean development team.  Short-
range Scud B missiles were retired and replaced with the more accurate Ro-dong 3.  
Combat Systems Range (km) 2016 Add Minus 2020 
KSR-1 180 50 - - 75 
Scud B 300 50 - 50 0 
Hyon Mu 300 0 25 - 25 
Hwasong 5 330 150 - 50 100 
Hwasong 6 500 250 - - 250 
Ro-dong 1 / 2 1,300 216 - - 216 
Ro-dong 3 1,300 - 80 - 80 
Daepo-dong 1 2,000 105 30 - 135 
Daepo-dong 2 6,000 55 30 - 85 
Table 3-93.  Korean (N and S) Ballistic Missile Force Structure 2020 
2) WMD 
 Despite the surrendering of fissile materials in epoch three and the chemical and 
biological clean up in epoch two, Korea (N) retains the capabilities to reassemble WMD, 
not least of which are nuclear weapons.  This is made especially possible by the readily 





3. Net Assessment 
a. Introduction 
 As part of the introduction to this section, it is helpful to keep in mind that all previous net 
assessment scenarios were seen from the perspective of the South Korean military.  This is the 
first time a unified Korea assesses capabilities as an integrated and joint force.  It is recognized 
that the military services are at varied stages of integration.  Additionally, previous net 
assessments inwardly focused on confrontation between the former North and South Koreas, and 
outwardly on aggression of forces from countries such as Japan and China.  This epoch focused 
on an internal debate regarding the correct size of the integrated military of a unified Korea and 
the balance of capabilities within each service against a regional foe.   
 A number of scenarios were considered for their ability to provide meaningful insights. The 
initial consideration was a Chinese invasion and blockade.  This scenario was, however, 
dismissed because of Korea’s newly fostered strategic ties with China, and the fact that Korean 
procurement did not mitigate the cruise and ballistic missile threats seen in a similar scenario 
from the previous epoch . That is, Korean and Chinese force structures have not changed 
appreciably since the previous epoch and Korea remains a “useful porcupine.”   
 Next, a Japanese amphibious invasion was considered.  However, it was found that if Japan 
could gain air and sea superiority and conduct the invasion, they would still be outnumbered by 
an 8:1 ratio when they reached Korean shores.  This disparity in personnel exacerbated by a 
Korean defensive advantage, would not allow the Japanese to occupy any portion of the Korean 
peninsula.  Although Japan possessed the capability to transport their forces to the Korean 
Peninsula, their force structure was not optimized to conduct an operation of this nature.  This 
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scenario was thus dismissed as well.  The bottom line was that neither scenario provided any 
additional insight about the aggregate Korean force structure.   
b. Scenario:  Japanese Naval Blockade of Korea’s SLOCs 
 The sole scenario settled upon to conduct the net assessment for this epoch was a naval 
blockade and a sea line of communication interdiction effort by Japan that significantly affected 
Korea’s trade in the region.  The purpose of this scenario was to evaluate the capability of 
existing forces to protect Korea’s maritime trade routes and sea lines of communication.  Based 
on this scenario, a seemingly endless list of circumstances could precipitate the blockade, such as 
disturbed oil flow to Japan from the Korean pipeline, trade competition, or territorial island 
disputes.  
 The real issue attendant to the assessment scenario remained the determination of Korea’s 
military force balance: how much and of what flavors?  This scenario allowed a first-order 
approximation of the Korean capabilities, deficiencies and vulnerabilities given the limited force 
structure information available from the Japan team with respect to number and capabilities of 
weapons.  As such, doctrine, reliability, survivability and some specific system performance 
measures were not included.  The effects of cruise and ballistic missiles used during the conflict 
were analyzed separately.  The potential for escalation of this conflict to include the participation 
of the United States and China was strong, but for simplicity, their involvement was not included 
in the assessment.   
c. Concept of Operations / Objectives  
 The Japanese objective of conducting the naval blockade was to interdict maritime trade 
routes and sea lines of communication.  Japanese strategy was to ensure naval presence in 
support of the blockade by intercepting, escorting, influencing and if required, destroying any 
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shipping which was either Korean flagged, or enroute to or proceeding from Korea, with the air 
force providing necessary air support.  The blockade took place within an area bounded by the 
following:  100 nm NE of Tsushima Straits to 200 nm NE of Taiwan and the leeward side of the 
Japanese Ryukyu Islands to include the Korean territorial portion of Yellow Sea.   
 The Korean objective was the restoration of its maritime trade routes and SLOCs by gaining 
air superiority, and employing a joint operational concept in confronting JMSDF vessels with air 
assets and surface units.  Korea’s strategy would only be limited to attacks on Japanese sea or 
airborne military assets.  The Japanese mainland would not be struck. 
d. Orders of Battle: Japan vs. Korea (Unified) 
 Comparison of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force with the unified Korean Army was 
not germane to this scenario and the army order of battle comparison was thus omitted. 
 Japan brought capable naval assets to the fight, as highlighted by its Kongo and DD-21 variant 
destroyers, P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and submarines.   
Combat System Japan Korea 
Maritime Patrol 55 52 
Submarines 22 37 
Destroyers 60 25 
Coastal Patrol  -- 357 
Amphibious 42 98 
Mine warfare 47 42 
Table 3-94.  Japan vs. Korea Naval Forces Order of Battle 
 Japan and Korea showed near qualitative and quantitative parity with respect to their air 
forces.  For air assets, Japan touted its F-22 variant fighter while Korea had a similar FX variant 
equipped with new extended-range air-to-air missiles.  Because of speed and agility, Japanese 
UAV assets appeared qualitatively more capable than those of Korea.  Both countries had a small  
UCAV strike capability.   
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Combat System Japan Korea 
Fighters 450 468 
Ground Attack 150 336 
Bombers -- 40 
Air Refueling 60 10 
AEW / ESM 17 13 
Recce / UAV 300 250 
Trainer A/C -- 481 
Transports 44 188 
Table 3-95.  Japan vs. Korea Air Forces Order of Battle 
e. Committed Forces Comparison 
 The calculations of the forces committed to the engagements were broken down into sea, air, 
and land.  
1) Sea 
 Due to proximity and other operational constraints the Japanese Navy committed 80 
percent of its fleet to the conflict while Korea committed 90 percent.  Both forces were 
supported by a robust underway replenishment force that had the capability to re-supply 
with fuel, food, weapons and repair assets.  While it was assumed that the preponderance 
of the Japanese Navy vessels were already positioned to act, a finite amount of time 
(approximated at 42 to 48 hours) did, however, exist until the Korean Navy was able to 
fully engage.  
2) Air 
 Japan, due to readiness, proximity and other operational issues, only devoted 75 
percent of its air assets to the conflict.  Of these, assuming a 1.5-hour mission time and 2-
hour ground turn time, approximately 25 percent of their assets devoted to the conflict 
were airborne at any one time.  Korean air assets shared similar readiness and operational 
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issues, but with varying proximity and operational constraints, devoted 80 percent of its 
assets to the conflict and similarly, 25 percent of those were airborne at any one time.   
3) Land 
 Both countries will utilize their armies for coastal defense.  Other than for surface-to-
air, cruise and ballistic missile capabilities, a study of the armies is not germane.  
 
 The net assessment began with the committed forces of each navy.  For the assets relevant to 
this scenario, Korea appeared to have a slight numerical advantage in maritime patrol aircraft.  
Additionally, while qualitatively similar, Korea enjoyed a definite numerical advantage with 
respect to submarines.  Japan has a quantitative advantage in the destroyer category.  Together, 
these generalizations showed that each naval force had some distinct numerical advantages and 
disadvantages.  The way that these manifest themselves in actual conflict was dependent on the 
concept of operations and doctrine.  
Combat System Japan Japan Committed 
Korea 
Committed Korea 
Maritime Patrol 55 44 48 52 
Submarines 22 18 30 33 
Destroyers 60 48 23 25 
Coastal Patrol  -- -- 321 357 
Amphibious 42 34 88 98 
Mine warfare 47 38 38 42 
Table 3-96.  Japan vs. Korea  Committed Naval Forces 
 For the air force assets, Korea and Japan are at near parity in the number of fighters.  Korea 
has a numerical advantage in the ground attack category.  This is significant when comparing the 
Korea air force’s anti-shipping missile capability against Japanese navy vessels.  Japan may 
enjoy more mobility with the availability of air refueling assets.   
3-149 
 
Combat System Japan Japan Committed 
Korea 
Committed Korea 
Fighters 450 84 94 468 
Ground Attack 150 28 67 336 
Bombers -- -- 8 470 
Air Refueling 60 11 2 10 
AEW / ESM 17 3 3 13 
Recce / UAV 300 56 50 250 
Trainer A/C -- -- 96 481 
Transports 44 8 38 188 
Table 3-97.  Japan vs. Korea  Committed Air Forces 
 Comparison of air power versus surface vessels shows that Korean KDX destroyers with 608 
SM-2x long-range variant missiles have an advantage in range by over 50 percent.  The JASDF 
ground attack aircraft will be engaged prior to release range of their air to surface missiles at 80 
nautical miles.  Conversely, the Korean air force and its investment in long-range standoff anti-
shipping missiles possess the capability to deliver those missiles from outside maximum 
effective engagement range of the Japanese destroyer SM-2 variant missiles, which allow 
Korea’s aircraft to retire after launching their weapons without being engaged.  Some specific 
firepower calculations are included below to illustrate the advantage of the Korean firepower.  
Although an attrition rate of 10 percent would be considered unacceptable, consider it for the 
following illustration.   
Assuming a 10 percent attrition per mission cycle and a 0.2 (low by most 
standards) probability of firepower kill given release of those missiles, 
Korea’s Air Force could “kill” 54 surface vessels from a standoff range of 
over 150 nautical miles (assuming that targeting is solved) by expending 
260 missiles in 7.5-hours of continuous coverage.  In this time, Korea 
would lose 60 aircraft or 23 percent of their ground attack fleet while 
decimating the entire Japanese destroyer fleet.  Moreover, the Korean Air 
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Force slightly outnumbered the Japanese Air Force in numbers of 
aggregate combat aircraft.  Additionally, when factoring in the 300 AA-x 
missiles (Extended Range AMRAAM’s), deployed on the FX, F-16 and 
even unmanned combat aircraft, Korea also enjoyed an advantage of over 
25 nm in employment range.  Depending on the aggressiveness, tempo 
and timing of Japanese air operations, these firepower advantages could 
make the battle for air supremacy costly for both sides.  Consideration for 
including a discussion on response times and airborne combat air patrols 
quickly became mired in an infinite number of “what ifs” that confused 
the larger picture. 
4) Ballistic Missiles 
 Here is a quick-look at the ballistic missile capabilities of both countries.  The Korean 
descriptions are listed with only the number of Japanese equivalent weapons.   
Cruise Missile Range Korea Japanese Equivalent 
KSR-1 180 km 75 -- 
Hyon Mu 300 km 25 -- 
HwaSong 5 330 km 100 -- 
HwaSong 6 500 km 250 -- 
Ro-dong 1 /2 1300 km 216 -- 
Daepo-dong 1 2000 km 135 -- 
Daepo-dong 2 6000 km 85 10 
SS-N-21 Surface Launch 2750 km 500 -- 
SS-N-21 Sub Launch 2750 km 200 -- 
Type-03 2750 km -- 20,000 
Total  1666 20,010 
Table 3-98.  Japan vs. Korea  Committed Ballistic Missile Forces 
 The Japanese had an aggregate offensive cruise / ballistic missile strike capability that 
was numerically superior to that of Korea.  Korean cruise missile procurement has 
concentrated on mobility on sea vessels while Japan has concentrated on mobile land 
launch capability for cruise missiles.  Ultimately, Japan enjoyed an overwhelming 
3-151 
advantage in the aggregate cruise / ballistic missile category.  Defensively, Korea 
possesses a credible detection capability, but its ability to engage cruise missiles is not as 
robust.  This was especially alarming with the significant mismatch in quantity of 
offensive missiles possessed by the Japanese.   
f. Results   
 Absent the use of cruise and ballistic missiles by Japan, Korea possesses the capability to 
defeat the effort and re-open the SLOC.  This essentially is a war of attrition with firepower and 
range being the discriminator.  The use of offensive cruise and ballistic missiles by the Japanese 
would disrupt Korean military operations and defensive capabilities.  Escalation to these 
weapons would necessitate use of Korean air assets against Japanese military bases.  Depending 
on the degree of disruption, some ground attack aircraft would be able strike a blow to the 
Japanese military establishment as the Japanese do not possess a robust defensive capability 
against aircraft armed with stand-off precision weapons.   The Koreans may give consideration 
to an attack on enemy land bases from the first sign of Japanese offensive cruise and ballistic 
missile use.  An assessment considering air attack on Japanese soil may require a dynamic 
analysis and modeling and simulation.  Doctrine along with other operational factors needs to be 
considered.  The potential for escalation is strong.  Korea could expect some form of US and 
Chinese involvement by default.  Due to seemingly bi-polar regional relationships between 
China/Korea and the US/Japan, one may expect a quid pro quo involvement from China and the 
US that may bring about a conflict of grand scale.  The conditions would be much like the pre-




g. Net Assessment Conclusions 
 Militarily, Korea requires a better defensive cruise missile capability.  The representative 
threat-based capabilities required by Korea will be realized with a realignment and balance of 
individual service priorities and funding.  This may include a decrease in army ground forces, 
increase in the navy with steady levels in the air force.  Offensive cruise missile along with 
defensive cruise and ballistic missile capabilities should remain high on the priority list. 
 The instability and conflict in the region would dampen investment and continued trade.  As 
coined in “The Lexus and the Olive Tree”70 a book on globalization, the “electronic herd” would 
flee and cause economic devastation to both Korea and Japan, sending associated shockwaves to 
others in the region and around the globe.  
                                                 
70 The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman, Thomas L., Anchor Books, New York, 2000. 
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4. Technology Development for Reunified Korea  
a. Korea’s Technology Focus 
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology 
 The merger of the two former Korean militaries in epoch four into a unified command 
has resulted in a shift in Korea’s technological goals.  To assimilate the ex-North’s 
military into the existing ex-South’s structure, the focus has been the continued 
modernization of the entire military into a high-technology force able to exploit 
information technology.  Additionally, cruise and ballistic missile defense development 
continue to be a high priority based on the lack of satisfactory solutions to these 
vulnerabilities. 
2) Defense R&D Budget 
 The unification of Korea has brought together the two military’s R&D 
establishments.  Consequently, Korea’s R&D budget (combined) for epoch four 
amounted to $10.7 B(US)71.  Of this sum, the same proportional funds allocation72 
remained as from previous epochs.  The South’s defense and R&D budget breakdown are 
presented below. 
                                                 
71 The contributions are $6.04B(US) from the ex-South and US$4.7B(US) from the ex-North. 
72 This 80/20allocation is for Force Development Programs and ADD Programs respectively. 
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 GDP Defense Budget O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.1% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 5.9%       
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2016 786.286 27.520 19.264 8.256 
2017 832.677 29.144 20.401 8.743 
2018 881.805 30.863 21.604 9.259 
2019 933.832 32.684 22.879 9.805 
2020 988.928 34.612 24.229 10.384 
Total 4,423.528 154.823 108.376 46.447 
Average 884.706 30.965 21.675 9.289 
Table 3-99.  ROK Defense Budget Breakdown 
 Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
      
%Def Budget 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2016 $2.031 $2.708  $2.031  $0.330 $1.073  
2017 $2.151 $2.868  $2.151  $0.350 $1.137  
2018 $2.278 $3.037  $2.278  $0.370 $1.204  
2019 $2.412 $3.216  $2.412  $0.392 $1.275  
2020 $2.554 $3.406  $2.554  $0.415 $1.350  
Total $11.426 $15.235 $11.426 $1.858 $6.038  
Average $2.285 $3.047  $2.285  $0.372 $1.208  
Table 3-100.  ROK FIP Budget Breakdown 
FDP (80% of R&D) ADD (20% of R&D)  
Army Navy AF EO MW AC UWA WS 
% R&D Budget 24.0 32.0 24.0 5.5 5.9 6.1 1.6 1.0 
Year US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil US$ bil
2016 0.258 0.343 0.258 0.059 0.063 0.065 0.017 0.010 
2017 0.273 0.364 0.273 0.063 0.067 0.069 0.018 0.011 
2018 0.289 0.385 0.289 0.066 0.071 0.073 0.019 0.011 
2019 0.306 0.408 0.306 0.070 0.075 0.077 0.020 0.012 
2020 0.324 0.432 0.324 0.075 0.079 0.082 0.021 0.013 
Total 1.449 1.932 1.449 0.334 0.355 0.366 0.096 0.058 
Average 0.290 0.386 0.290 0.067 0.071 0.073 0.019 0.012 
Table 3-101.  ROK R&D Budget Breakdown 
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b. Korea’s Technology Investments 
1) National Defense Plan 
 To embark on solutions for the vulnerabilities identified in the third epoch, Korea’s 
investment decisions has resulted in the following new systems coming on line in this 
epoch and are summarized in the table below: 
2016-2020 Capability/ Purpose 









10 Micro spy sats 
Micro Air Sensor 
Joint C3I System 
GBR 
Strategic Strike Long-range precision strike 




Ground Operations Improved lethality, agility 





Naval Control Improved C4ISR system 
Strategic control of SLOCs 
Superior underwater capability 
Enhance Defensive/Offensive combat 
capability 
Improve ship building capacity  
12 P-3Xs 
4 Type 214  
6 KDX-X 




SAMs / Torpedoes 
upgrades 
Air Operations Advanced air combat 
Enhanced AEW 
Anti-shipping strike 
50 FX / 50 UCAV 
4 AEW / 5 KC-xxx 
100 A-50 / 40 UAV 
20 KT-2 / 8 C-130 
100 Harm Block 6 
100 JSOW 
100 JDAM 
150 ASM-xx Anti-ship 
150 AGM-x JASSM 
100 AIM-9x 
200 AA-x ERAAM 
Table 3-102.  Korea Weapon Systems Acquisition 
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 Korea’s emphasis in its acquisition this epoch reflects its commitment to overcome its 
deficiencies in dealing with the CM and BM threats.  As had been highlighted in the last 
epoch, Korea recognizes that a US-type National Missile Defense (NMD) is beyond the 
economic and (in a limited way) technological means of the country.  It simply cannot 
commit sufficient resources and talent towards that attainment of such a lofty goal.  
Consequently, MND had made a conscious decision that Korea would instead pursue a 
BM defense comprising two main SAM umbrellas.  For sense, Korea will employ its spy 
satellites and GBR network.  Once a BM launch is detected, the data is then passed on to 
the JC3IS where the information is processed and disseminated.  Simultaneously, Korea’s 
sense assets will continue to track the trajectory of the incoming BM and provide an 
intercept course.   
Figure 3-5.  Korea’s BMD Umbrella in 2020 
 The point of intercept is then sent down to the various action assets, comprising the 
SM-3, S-400, and S-300 systems.  The acquisition of the SM-3s and the S-400 system 
thus constitutes the outer umbrella, with the inner umbrella formed by the earlier S-300 
systems.  As a desperate last line of defense, tactical high energy lasers (THELs) and 
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land- and ship-based high power microwave (HPM) weapons urgently acquired to 
provide CM defense, could also be used.  This use is, however, a misuse of the weapon 
systems since the BM warheads would be too close to the ground to effectively prevent 
any casualties or collateral damage. 
 For CM defense, which incidentally also enhances Korea’s air defense capability, this 
epoch witnessed the acquisition and employment of THELs and HPM weapons.  To 
detect CM attacks, Korea has indigenously produced the Korean Land Attack Cruise 
Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensors (KLENS), which integrates into Korea’s air 
defense network via the JC3IS (see under R&D Programs for a more detailed 
description).  KLENS was also acquired to complement the indigenously R&D and 
produced Air Mine Field (AMF) concept (see Annex 3E4).  As part of its efforts to 
enhance Korea’s DBA capability, the network of ground-based radars (GBRs) located 
along Korea’s coast were also upgraded to a mixture of phased array and bi-static 
systems, utilizing the latest reconfigurable antenna technology.  
Figure 3-6.  Korea’s Air Defense Umbrella in 2020 
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 To take out the incoming CMs and air threats, Korea will employ three lines of 
defense.  The outer most umbrella will be provided by the FX and UCAV fighters, as 
well as the SM-3 and S-400 SAMs.  The middle layer will be provided by the S-300 and 
the deployment of the AMFS.  Finally, the last line close-in defense will be provided by 
Korea’s latest directed energy weapons (DEW) – Korea’s THEL and HPM weapons.  
2) Existing Capabilities 
 One of the most significant consequences of Korean unification has been the 
convergence of ballistic missile (BM) technology from the ex-North and guidance and 
semiconductor technology from the ex-South.  Hence, this epoch has witnessed the 
quantum leap in Korea’s indigenous capability to produce its own nuclear-capable BMs 
with an accuracy  (CEP 150 m) not previously possible during the North Korean 
program.  An unintended consequence has also been the leap in launch and delivery 
capacity in the ex-South’s space program. 
 The industrial focus has also shifted in this epoch.  Korea has now focused on 
acquiring miniaturized weapon systems and directed energy weapons.  In greater 
cooperative efforts with Israel in these two areas, and also with China and France, Korea 
now has several programs jointly researching and developing HPM weapons for use in 
the air defense role.  We have also collaborated with Israel to jointly produce our first 
Korean Tactical High Energy Laser (KTHEL) – a field deployable tactical laser. 
 The efforts made in the licensed production of SAMs, AAMs, and ASMs from the 
last epoch are beginning to show results.  Korea has also begun the full-scale production 
of the various missiles in its inventory.  This effort, though unprofitable due to Korea’s 
lack of industrial maturity is, however, necessary for self-reliance purposes.  From the 
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Russians, Korea has obtained the technical knowledge to license produce its own rocket-
propelled Squall torpedoes.  Coupled with technological advances, Korea has 
successfully extended the range of this weapon from five to ten nautical miles.   
 To meet Korea’s urgent need to possess an effective countermeasure against the CM 
and BM threats, the military has purchased several US-Israel Tactical High Energy 
Systems (THELs) from Israel.  This initial acquisition is intended to support the efforts in 
jointly producing the KTHEL system.  To address Korea’s identified need for a long-
range precision strike capability, the military has decided to import the SS-N-21 cruise 
missiles from the Russians. 
Indigenous R&D and 
Production 
Joint R&D and 
Production Licensed Production Import 
Major Surface Ships 
Minor Surface Ships 
Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (FX) 





























Table 3-103.  ROK Defense Systems Acquisition Method Summary 
c. Assessed Vulnerabilities and Deficiencies from Epoch Four. 
 The epoch four net assessment bore out the requirement for a better CM defense.  
Additionally, based on Japan’s quantitative superiority in CMs, Korea recognizes that it would 
need greater numbers of cruise missiles to hit the enemy with a long-range precision strike 
capability.  The point to highlight is that defensively, Korea possesses a credible detection 
capability, but their ability to engage cruise missiles is not as robust, especially with the 
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significant mismatch in quantity.  Also identified from epoch two but not adequately addressed 
so far is Korea’s need for BM Defense.  
d. Korea’s R&D Programs.   
 MND continues to focus on investing heavily in the development of high-tech weapons and 
securing the ability to develop core technologies suitable for the Korean military environment.  
The table below thus summarizes the major R&D efforts for the fourth epoch. 
2016-2020 
Direction Items to procure 
Miniaturized systems 
Ballistic & cruise missile detection & 
defense systems 
Directed energy beam technology 
High-altitude flight technology 
Air Mine Field (AMF) 
KSR-3 
KLENS 
Table 3-104.  ROK Major R&D Emphasis 
 To address the deficiencies in this epoch, the R&D focus continued to look for technological 
solutions provided by directed energy weapons (DEW).  Besides providing an effective means of 
negating the incoming enemy threats, tactical DEWs are also relatively affordable.  An added 
point is that DEW technology at 2020 is sufficiently mature that Korea should not face 
significant problems in developing its own systems, based on its self-reliance philosophy.  
Consequently, Korea’s subsequent R&D investments will aim towards building better tactical 
DEWs by incrementally increasing their ranges.  Based on the FDP allocations, the table below 
summarizes the services and DBA R&D investments. 
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Army Navy Air Force DBA 
R&D 




Program US$ Bil R&D Program 
US$ 
Bil 






HAE $0.100 Micro spy sats $0.360
SAM(A-




Tac Radar  $0.050 SSM/CM $0.200 MAV $0.100 KLENS $0.150
THEL $0.500 ASW $0.200 AAM $0.040 
Micro Air 
Sensor $0.280
Others $0.619 UUV $0.125 ABL $0.300 
Defense 
Digitization $0.355





Minefield $0.175 Others $0.238
    Others $0.542 Others $0.459     









Table 3-105.  ROK R&D Programs 
1) Defense Digitization/JC3IS Program Update 
 Based on the increased demand for information, the existing framework became 
unable to adequately support user needs.  Consequently, MND decided at end 2015 that it 
would implement phase two of the defense digitization program.  For phase two, this 
entailed embarking on an upgrade of the existing network to identify the critical data 
chokepoints and replace them where possible with a higher bandwidth communications 
system. 
 From the available market technology73, MND identified that it would adopt laser 
communications processes into the existing networks to boost its capacity to a high 
                                                 
73 A US BMDO-funded program begun in 1995 demonstrated the ability of using lasers to transmit data at high rates 
(>1.2 Gbps) with low-bit error rates at ranges up to 150 km between two mountaintops.  From a late 1999 
experiment using Lasercom technology, it was established that it was possible to establish a laser communication 
link, using imagery and video data, between a low earth satellite (TSX-5) and two portable ground stations with 
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bandwidth system capable of two Gbps data transfer rates.  The laser source utilized is a 
solid-state laser diode operated at 60 mW optical power, with direct intensity modulation 
as the applied modulation scheme.  The links are operated at optical frequencies at a 
wavelength of 800 to 860 nm.74  To communicate with satellites from the ground, the 
laser light will be transmitted via a 25-cm aperture telescope providing a beam width of 
10 µrad.75  As of 2020, MND’s utilization of new network technologies has resulted in 
the JC3IS possessing the capacity to meet the high bandwidth demands of the modern 
battlefield.   
2) Space Program Development Update 
 Continuing Korea’s policy of exploiting space as the next dimension of warfare, 
MND continued its improvements in its space surveillance capabilities by launching an 
additional 20 micro-satellites and 10 micro spy satellites.  Subsequent R&D efforts were 
also made to improve the capabilities of its nano- and pico-sats according to the 
technological advances in MEMS.   
3) Micro-Air Sensor Network (MASN) Update 
 As of end 2020, the MASN is now fully operational and thus affords Korea an 
affordable and almost continuous daytime maritime surveillance.  The MASN is also at 
times employed for secret reconnaissance missions of its regional neighbors according to 
the wind patterns.  MAV technology has also matured sufficiently that Korea now 
possesses the option of mounting its miniaturized sensor payload onto either a balloon- or 
                                                                                                                                                             
ranges up to 2000 km and data rates up to 1 Gbps.  “Laser Communications:  The Answer to High Data Rate 
Communications”, http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/Laser.html.  
74 Adapted from the SILEX system.  “ESA launches laser comms system”,  SpaceDaily, March 25, 1998. 
  http://www.spacedaily.com/spacecast/news/laser-98b.html.  
75 Adapted from the SILEX system.  “ESA launches laser comms system”,  SpaceDaily, March 25, 1998. 
  http://www.spacedaily.com/spacecast/news/laser-98b.html. 
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MAV-platform.  In concert with Korea’s nano- and pico-sat sensor payload 
developments, Korea has also begun exploring the possible use of these micro sensors  to 
exploit the IR wavelength region.  The ultimate aim here is that the successful 
miniaturized sensor fusion of an infrared sensor (IR) sensor together with the existing 
optical wavelength sensors would provide a truly continuous airborne and space 
surveillance capability.  The present limitation using optical sensors only allows for 
daytime surveillance.  A successful sensor fusion effort would also allow Korea to 
expand the employment of its suite of MAS and miniature satellites. 
4) Aerial Mine Field System (AMFS) Update 
 The AMFS has also attained full operational capability having successfully 
undergone an extremely stringent operational test and evaluation program that lasted over 
two years.  Korea’s indigenous acquisition of the AMFS thus provides its air defense 
with a revolutionary capability that should allow it to enjoy some distinct advantages 
over its enemy in a conflict. 
5) Korean Land Attack CM Defense Elevated Netted Sensors (KLENS) 
 The Korean Land Attack CM Defense Elevated Netted Sensors (KLENS) is a cost-
effective, airborne sensor platform for providing over-the-horizon cruise missile defense, 
modeled after the US JLENS system.  This system enhances cruise missile detection and 
engagement ranges with Korea’s existing air defense weapons.  The system consists of 
the platform subsystem (aerostat bag, tether and mooring station), the payload subsystem 
(a precision track-illumination radar and surveillance radar) and the processing station, 
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which gathers the payload radar data and processes the radar track information for 
passage to friendly weapon engagement systems.76  
 Following the identification of a deficiency in cruise missile detection in 2015, MND 
directed the army to take the lead in establishing the KLENS program office.  Concept 
studies were initiated in early 2016 and based on a comparison made on existing and 
available systems in the market, the KLENS program office decided that it was feasible 
for Korea to design and produce its own airborne-based cruise missile detection system.  
Total program value, including options for system development/demonstration and 
operation and sustainment was estimated at $300 M(US).  Acquisition requirements for 
the KLENS was determined to be 20 complete systems at a value of $600 M(US).77  
Initial delivery of the first 
KLENS was accepted in 2018 
with final delivery expected in 
2022. 
 The KLENS is a land- or 
sea-based tethered aerostat78 
about 80 m long, and filled 
with about 22,000 cubic meters 
                                                 
76 KLENS could provide friendly units up to 10 minutes additional warning of the approach of hostile aircraft and 
cruise missiles before any blue ground-based radar can acquire the enemy’s air tracks.  Adapted from “JLENS”, 
Soldier Armed, December 1999.  http://www.ausa.org/armyzine/soldierDEC99.html.   
77 A reason for its low acquisition cost is that the aerostat and radar employed are of the COTS variety.  The KLENS 
program is merely an integration of the suitable radar of choice with its existing aerostat platforms. 
78 Aerostats differ from blimps in that blimps are powered while aerostats are tethered or anchored to the ground.  
This tether also serves as a connection to the power source which may be positioned on the ground rather than 
within the aerostat. 
Figure 3-7.  Picture of KLENS in Static Deployment 
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of non-explosive, non-flammable helium.79  The aerostat can stay aloft up to 30 days at a 
time and provides 24-hour per day coverage over extended areas.80  Deployable at up to 
5,000 m (or 15,000 ft), the KLENS sensor provides an all-round sense capability that can 
locate and track terrain masked targets up to 320 km, and provide an effective fire-control 
solution for joint theater air and missile defense weapon systems up to 250 km, through 
its interoperability with Korea’s existing JC3IS.81  Incidentally, KLENS addition to the 
JC3IS provides Korea’s air defense network with a Cooperative Engagement Capability 
(CEC).  Its low maintenance also provides the system with an operational availability rate 
greater than 90 percent.82 
 The use of elevated surveillance and precision tracking sensors, and the combination 
of all surface and air based sensor data into a single integrated air picture allows over-the-
horizon detection, classification, identification tracking and engagement of threat cruise 
missiles. Achieving an elevated fire control quality sensor also allows the conduct of air 
directed missile engagements and the opportunity to achieve intercepts at the maximum 
effective kinematic range of these interceptors.  This was not previously possible due to 
line-of-sight constraints created by terrain masking and the earth’s curvature. 
6) Korean Tactical High Energy Laser (KTHEL) 
 MND’s decision to venture into the DEWs arose from an urgent need to provide an 
effective counter to the cruise missile threat identified in epoch three’s net assessment 
and also in the air defense role.  Based on its technology maturity and affordability in 
2016, MND decided that it would be an economical technology investment to pursue.  
                                                 
79 Adapted from JLENS pamphlet http://www.smdc.army.mil/JLENS/JLENS_Office.htm.  
80 Adapted from Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor [JLENS].   
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/jlens.htm.  
81 Information adapted from JLENS (to get website address). 
82 Information adapted from JLENS (to get website address). 
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Concept studies undertaken by the army had already been initiated as early as 2010 and 
supported by indigenous R&D into laser weapons, MND agreed that the military would 
acquire the US-Israel Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) 83 system from Israel.   
 The ultimate goal was set for the joint R&D and production with Israel of a Korean-
variant, known as KTHEL, short for the Korean Tactical High Energy Laser.  It would 
essentially be a THEL system integrated onto the indigenously produced K-200 tracked 
platform.  Korea’s joint efforts with Israel are keyed towards the acquisition of its beam 
director technology and chemical laser production unit.   
  As a historical reference, the THEL demonstrated in 2000 that it was able to 
detect, track and destroy multiple Katyushas in a single engagement when it twice 
successfully shot down a series of two-rocket salvo tests.84  The THEL utilizes a 
Deutirium-Flouride Laser 
capable of producing up to 
several tens of MW of laser 
power.  KTHEL’s goal is 
for its system to engage 
targets between 25-50 km. 
                                                 
83 THEL, was originally developed under Project Nautilus, and its purpose was to detect and intercept 122mm 
Katyusha and other short-range rocket attacks against civilian and military sites in northern Israel.  “THEL 
approaches crucial tests”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 18, 2000. 
84 “Ray Gun Shoots Down Multi Targets”, SpaceDaily, September 22, 2000.   
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/laser-001.html.   
Figure 3-8.  Conceptual Drawings of KTHEL
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Epoch Four Summary     
 At the same time the gates are permanently closed at the US Army Base in Yeongsan, US 
leaders call on Japan to lead the way in ensuring regional stability.  This unsettling maneuver left 
Korea feeling especially vulnerable and triggered a sequence of events, which lead ultimately to 
Korea’s bilateral alignment with the PRC.  The region enjoyed a significantly optimistic 
economic outlook brought about by the resurgence of global confidence in regional economic 
growth and perceived stability. 
 Korea recognizes a shift in the priorities and roles of the unified defense force.  The ministry 
of defense prepared plans to counter violent social outbreaks and any rogue military 
provocations.  With the imminent rise of Japanese and Chinese maritime powers in the region, 
Korea’s defense spending followed suit with an increased share of the budget to the Navy and 
the air force.  The army continued to streamline and upgrade its forces to keep it lean but mean. 
Major integrating issues between the North and South remained a key issue for force structure 
planners. 
 The reunification of the two Korean militaries brought together missile delivery technology 
(North) and guidance technology (South), thus giving a unified Korea the capability to possess a 
credible nuclear-capable ballistic missile.  However, a unified Korea has not, by the end of the 
epoch, fielded nuclear weapons.  From its urgent need to deal with the cruise missile threat, 
Korea started to look at directed energy weapons to provide the technological solutions to 
meeting its deficiency.  Given advances in communications technology, Korea also upgraded its 
JC3IS with laser communications to meet the high bandwidth demands of the modern battlefield.  
Finally, the country’s efforts in developing its micro-air sensor network and air minefield system 
succeeds as the end of the epoch also signals the systems’ fielding into Korea’s military. 
 Korea stands unified with a strong economy, a capable conventional military force, 
strategically aligned with China, and feeling the need to possess a second strike nuclear 
deterrent.   
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1. Strategy 
 The reunification of North and South Korea will be a decisive strategic change in Northeast 
Asia during the next 20 years.   In 1999, the United States Army Sponsored the RAND 
Corporation’s study of Korean reunification scenarios and the operational implications for the 
US Army.  The study entitled, Preparing for Korean Unification, Scenarios and Implications 
was adopted as the baseline for this work’s unification themes.  The 14 pages that follow are 
summaries and paraphrased portions of the RAND study which apply specifically to the initial 
conditions of  this work.    
a. The Korean Crisis 
 More than 46 years of fragile peace have marked the history of “post-war” Korea, where the 
longest armistice remains in force.  Called the final Cold War frontier, South and North Korea 
are in a technical state of war with the military confrontation between the two states constituting 
the most heavily armed face-off on the globe.  An outbreak of hostilities on the peninsula carries 
potentially catastrophic consequences given North Korea’s ballistic missile, artillery, and 
chemical weapons capabilities.  
 Not unlike the reunification of Germany a decade before, inter-Korean dynamics will shift 
fundamentally over the next decade.  Economic and political instability will lead the list of 
causes for this potential change.  Among the consequences of this vulnerability is the changing 
character of North Korea’s alliance with Russia and China.  With an economic output roughly 
half of what it was in 1990, Pyongyang’s long-term viability is specifically challenged by the 
fragility of subsidies from Moscow and Beijing.  The defining imperative of the North Korean 
state is no longer to present itself as an alternative model for Korean unification, but to avoid 
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extinction as a political, economic, and social system. Regime survival has superseded all other 
national goals.1  
 Notwithstanding the periodic military excursions undertaken by the North against the South, 
peace has been maintained in Korea for nearly five decades.  But North Korea’s increasing 
vulnerabilities create a growing likelihood of major change.  Though it is impossible to predict 
with confidence the timing and dimensions of such change, it will entail major strategic and 
operational consequences for the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, and for the 
military forces of both countries.  
b. Security Environment 
 The near-certain probability of major political-military change in the North is the key 
strategic driver for security planning on the peninsula.  Despite the downward spiral of 
Pyongyang’s economic posture over the past decade, the North has been able to leverage its  
growing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities for political and economic gain.  
And while the likelihood of a major conventional conflict has declined in recent years, the range 
and spectrum of conflict possibilities on the peninsula has expanded markedly, from WMD use 
on one end to military operations other than war (MOOTW) on the other.2 
 US and ROK defense planners are challenged in their planning assumptions by the 
possibility of state or regime collapse in the North.  Certainly no one would disagree that the 
most preferable outcome of the political and economical instability in the North is a gradual 
reformation absent of violence and upheaval.  Apart from being remote, such an outcome would 
enable incremental steps towards unification and a diminishing threat of military confrontation.  
                                                           
1 Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification; Scenarios and Implications (Washington: 
RAND, 1999), Pg.xi. 
2 Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification; Scenarios and Implications (Washington: 
RAND, 1999), Pg.xii. 
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However, even in the face of Kim Dae Jung’s major initiatives, Pyongyang is holding steadfast 
to its juche or self-reliance ideology and appears uninterested in pursuing meaningful political 
accommodations with Seoul.  
 In his February 1998 inaugural address, President Kim put forward three basic principles that 
would govern the promotion of  “peace, reconciliation, and cooperation” in South-North 
relations:  no armed provocation by North Korea will be tolerated; a takeover or absorption of 
North Korea will not be attempted; reconciliation and cooperation will be expanded.”3  
 South Korea was impacted by the 1997 East Asian economic crisis.  Entrenched in economic 
preoccupations and given the extraordinary costs  of the unification process, South Korea is 
content to avoid abrupt change in the North. However  despite President Kim Dae Jung’s 
declaration that the ROK does not seek to absorb North Korea or to hasten unification, such 
policies could easily be overtaken by events.   
 The North Korean military of the early 21st Century presents a different threat than that of the 
pervious two decades.  This is particularly true with respect to North Korea as allied with the 
PRC and Russia.  Russia is no longer committed to automatic military involvement in a crisis 
and China has conveyed that it is not prepared to come to North Korea’s defense should 
Pyongyang launch an unprovoked attack on the ROK.  As will be demonstrated during the Net 
Assessment segment of this study, North Korea is simply incapable of launching a sustained 
decisive campaign without the explicit support of China and/or Russia.  Further evidence of this 
is Pyongyang’s increased exploitation of WMD as a source of political and economic leverage.  
Although the possibility of a full-scale conventional war including the use of WMD can never be 
ruled out, that particular military threat has diminished appreciably since the late 1980s.  Though 
                                                           
3 Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification; Scenarios and Implications (Washington: 
RAND, 1999), P.7. 
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Russian and Chinese behavior might prove different in a crisis, their policy declarations are a 
testimony to an appreciably diminished security relationship between Pyongyang and its 
erstwhile allies.   
 Despite more than a decade of economic decline, acute food shortages, and steep reductions 
in industrial production, North Korea continued to allocate more than 25 percent of its shrinking 
GDP to military expenditure into the early 21st Century.  The number of people serving in the 
armed forces remained largely constant.4  Major fuel shortages, reduced defense industrial 
output, limitations on spare parts availability, and non-combat military assignments undertaken 
by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) have almost certainly impinged on war readiness.  
 The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) continues to plan for a full range of 
contingencies on the peninsula, including major theater war.  Though the near-term nuclear 
threat was ostensibly contained through the U.S.–North Korean Agreed Framework accord of 
October 1994, there is no assurance that North Korea has ceased work on a clandestine nuclear 
program.  This is  partly evidenced by the North’s periodic threats to restart its nuclear weapons 
program which, no doubt, is further designed to elicit economic and energy assistance from the 
United States and others.5  Intelligence estimates suggest that nuclear weapons development 
could be resumed at a major underground site at Kumchang-ri.  According to the congressional 
testimony of General John Tilelli, Jr., (Commander in Chief of the Combined Forces Command 
and of United States Forces Korea (USFK) from July 1996 until December 1999), the 
intelligence community judges the Kumchang-ri construction effort “large enough to house a 
plutonium production facility and possibly a reprocessing plant.” Although the project remains 
                                                           
4 Defense White Paper, 1997–1998 (Seoul: The Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1998), pp. 55–56 
5 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “North Korea Says It Will Unseal Reactor,” The New York Times, May 13, 1998; Kevin 
Sullivan, “North Korea Threatens Revival of Its Nuclear Program,” Washington Post, May 15, 1998. 
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years from completion, General Tilelli expressed “deep concern that the North is continuing a 
covert nuclear weapons program.”6    
 The pivotal assumption governing the reformulation of ROK strategy toward the North is the 
belief that, over the longer run, North Korea will have no alternative but to undertake reform and 
accommodation with the South.  In the words of the Council on Foreign Relations report, “It is 
clear that Pyongyang has lost the competition between the two Koreas.  Though the North 
remains stubbornly resistant to change and the opening of its system, reform is now its only 
escape from continued erosion and eventual collapse.”7  By this logic, an incremental transition 
in the North will enable the regime to avoid extinction, ultimately permitting a meaningful, 
longer-term process of reconciliation with the South.  
 The North Korean leadership also recognizes that there is leverage in its acute economic 
vulnerabilities and pervasive shortages of energy, food, and related essentials. International  aid 
that seeks to prevent a major humanitarian crisis in the North has increased markedly, helping to 
compensate Pyongyang for the loss of external assistance from Russia and China.  An “aid-
based” foreign policy strategy may be judged essential to North Korea’s prospects for near-to-
midterm survival, especially with respect to provision of energy supplies and foodstuffs.  In 
essence, such a life-support strategy(which the ROK government estimates totaled nearly $1 
billion between 1995 and 1998) has saved the leadership from having to make larger adaptations 
in its domestic or external strategies.8  Such calculations have also been abundantly evident in the 
negotiations over U.S. access to the suspect nuclear site at Kumchang-ri.  For example, the 
                                                           
6 Statement of General John H. Tilelli, Jr., to the House National Security Committee, March 3, 1999. In mid-March 
1999, the United States and North Korea reached an agreement allowing U.S. inspectors access to the suspect site, 
with the initial inspection in May 1999. David E. Sanger, “U.S. Aides in Pact with North Korea on a Suspect Site,” 
The New York Times, March 17, 1999. 
7 Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula, p. 5. Emphasis added. 
Annex 3A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2000 and prior) 
3A - 6 
March 1999 agreement stipulated that, in return for access to the site, North Korea will receive 
600,000 tons of grain from the United States and various non-governmental organizations. 
c. North Korea 
 North Korea’s prospects and capabilities must be understood in terms of the country’s 
internal dynamics and the decisions of its supreme leader, Kim Jong Il.  The extreme 
personalization of political power in the North will largely determine North Korea’s responses to 
four key policy dilemmas which, in turn, may decide regime survival:  reversing the decline of a 
hardening command economy while continuing to spend 30  percent of a shrinking gross 
domestic product (GDP) on defense;  attempting to overcome acute structural problems in the 
economy without introducing major reforms that could erode central political control and trigger 
larger internal consequences;  continuing to participate in bilateral and multilateral accords and 
negotiations, gaining additional international assistance, while avoiding concessions that would 
undermine Pyongyang’s larger diplomatic and military strategies;  maintaining its foreign policy 
opening with the United States while avoiding full-scale relations with South Korea that could 
undermine the North’s national sovereignty and claims of legitimacy.9 
1) North Korea’s Economic Decline 
 The Kim Jung Il regime has three alternatives to reverse the erosion of the North’s economy.  
First, it can implement major economic reforms, beginning with the introduction of more market 
oriented policies.  Second, it can permit piecemeal cosmetic changes, including the solicitation of 
foreign investment for special economic zones.  And third, it can seek to “muddle through” by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 The Unification Ministry estimates the total assistance between 1995 and 1998 from the United States, ROK, 
United Nations, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to be $950.98 million. “North Korea Receives 
$950 Million in International Aid,” Korea Times, October 7, 1998. 
9 Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification; Scenarios and Implications (Washington: 
RAND, 1999), P.xiv. 
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tactical economic adjustments and expectations of international provision of foodstuffs, energy, 
and various forms of humanitarian assistance.   
 Drawing from the lessons of the former Soviet Union, if the North Korean regime launched 
major market-oriented economic reforms, the country would likely face massive socioeconomic 
disruption and a challenge to its political legitimacy.  But if the leadership resists major change, 
the  economy will decline further, ultimately threatening the regime’s viability.  This is a 
dilemma for which the North Korean leadership has no long-term answer, though it will seek to 
delay a major reckoning as long as possible.  Pyongyang will therefore likely pursue a “muddling 
along” strategy for the present, since this could yield critical infusions of external assistance 
without requiring major internal changes.  But this alternative cannot be considered a long-term 
solution.  However, a larger shift in economic policy would entail substantial political risks to 
the Kim Jong Il regime, since Kim’s political legitimacy rests on loyalty to juche strategies 
established by his father, Kim Il Sung.  
 Absent an appreciable economic recovery, the regime’s longer-term prospects seem 
increasingly grim. This progressive decline can be characterized as a descending spiral in which 
the North’s prospects for survival steadily narrow through six potential stages: 
a) Economic and political atrophy 
b) Economic breakdown 
c) Political instability 
d) Regime breakdown 
e) Regime and/or state collapse 
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 The first three stages constitute characteristics of overall strategic decay, whereas the second 
three stages are manifestations of accelerated strategic decay.   
d. The roles of Japan, China, and Russia 
 The possibility of destabilizing change in the North is increasingly recognized by Japan, 
China, and Russia, the other major powers with major strategic interests on the Korean 
peninsula.  All three states have repositioned their national strategies and policies, including 
increased attention to crisis-management requirements as well as planning for longer-term 
peninsular dynamics.  Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow all offer lip service to the goal of unification, 
but it is doubtful that any are eager for it.  Each concurs with the predominant goals of U.S. 
policy on the peninsula: deterrence and defense, preventing WMD proliferation, and avoiding an 
acute humanitarian crisis or abrupt collapse.  In the near-to-middle term, each shares a common 
interest in maintaining stability, as seen from their separate vantage points.  But the interests and 
potential response options of all three powers vary considerably, and warrant separate discussion. 
1) Japan 
 As the cornerstone U.S. ally in Northeast Asia, Japan will play a crucial role in a major 
peninsular crisis. The Japanese are clearly worried about the implications of pronounced 
instability on the peninsula, but they are also acutely concerned about the security 
implications of North Korean missile development. The three-stage Daepo-dong 1 missile 
launched on August 31, 1998, ostensibly in an effort to place a North Korean satellite in 
orbit, directly over-flew Japanese territory and underscored Pyongyang’s ability to put 
Japanese targets at risk.  It generated support within Japan for more active exploration of 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) options and it reinforced Tokyo’s incentives to remain 
closely aligned with the United States. 
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 At the same time, Japan remains highly constrained in its potential crisis response options 
especially with respect to its constitutional limitations on defense.  An equally important 
factor is Japan’s history of occupation and colonialism in Korea and profound sensitivities 
within Korea concerning overt Japanese involvement in any future crisis.  For all these 
reasons, Japan has been largely content to follow rather than lead with respect to planning for 
peninsular instability.   
 The inescapable reality is that Japan could find itself drawn into a future Korean crisis, 
though not in a direct combat role.  In a range of scenarios, internal developments in the 
North could have pronounced spillover consequences: a major humanitarian or refugee crisis; 
the need for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) of Japanese nationals residing on 
the peninsula; logistics and related support functions for U.S. forces in Japan; and U.S. use of 
Japanese bases in a crisis.  These considerations have all been raised in deliberations over 
revisions of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines and in U.S. encouragement for a heightened 
ROK-Japanese bilateral defense dialogue.  Thus, despite Japan’s preferences for gradual 
transition paths in the North,10 there is a need to prepare for an array of internal scenarios 
with respect to North Korea and the potential repercussions.  A major crisis on the peninsula 
therefore represents one of the touchstone contingencies underlying U.S.-Japan relations and 
the internal security debate within Japan.   
2) China.   
 If China decides to substantially augment its assistance to the North, the regime’s chances 
for survival would be considerably enhanced.  Though the Chinese have increased their 
energy and food aid in recent years, leaders in Beijing seem disinclined to undertake heroic 
                                                           
10 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japanese Policy and the North Korean ‘Soft Landing,’” The Pacific Review, Vol. 11, 
No. 3, 1998, pp. 389–415. 
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measures on behalf of the North.  But there appear to be three circumstances under which the 
Chinese might weigh such a course of action:  
a) If the North (despite a clear aversion to dependence on China) signals its readiness to 
“tilt” toward Beijing in exchange for enhanced economic and political support. 
b) If the indicators of instability in the North and its repercussions for stability and 
security in contiguous border areas convince the Chinese that they need to act to manage 
the risks to their security and ensure their long-term interests. 
c) If the ROK and the United States embark on unilateral actions to counter instability in 
the North that China believes would undermine its long-term political and security 
interests.   
 However, the prospect of such major shifts in Chinese policy seems unlikely.  Should the 
signs of an impending crisis in the North begin to mount, Beijing might well opt to heighten 
its consultations with Washington and with Seoul, even while also enhancing its capacity to 
act unilaterally.  The Chinese clearly retain a substantial capability to shape longer-term 
peninsular outcomes But such possibilities underscore the additional need for much closer 
consultations among the United States, ROK, and China. 
 Chinese interests on the peninsula, while having some similarities with those in Japan, 
place it in a potentially pivotal position.  Like Tokyo, Beijing has a predominant interest in 
sustaining the status quo, with most Chinese observers uneasy about the prospect of rapid 
unification.  Unlike Tokyo, the Chinese maintain substantial equities with both Koreas, and if 
the peninsula unifies, they would immediately encounter substantial political and security 
consequences.  The Chinese have begun to acknowledge (albeit circumspectly) signs of 
instability in the North, and their economic support to Pyongyang (primarily in terms of grain 
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supplies and crude oil) has increased from its lower levels during the first half of the decade.  
Moreover, Beijing and Pyongyang both make explicit reference to this assistance.11  Some 
Chinese analysts voice (also quietly) increased worry about North Korean WMD activities, 
though nearly all-public statements remain unusually circumspect.  Indeed, Chinese 
statements assert that the United States and Japan are using the “pretext” of the North Korean 
missile test as a justification for enhancing TMD development.  
 At the same time, even as China has steadily expanded its economic and political ties 
with the ROK (two-way trade at present approaches $25 billion, with China now the ROK’s 
third largest trading partner), Chinese wariness persists over various Seoul-centered 
unification scenarios.  Given that China’s links to both Koreas afford it substantial leverage 
in relation to future outcomes on the peninsula, there is still ample uncertainty and evident 
internal debate over its preferred strategy under more stressful circumstances.  
 Thus, future Chinese behavior (i.e., Beijing’s incentives and readiness to cooperate with 
caution, or alternatively to oppose U.S. and ROK actions in a severe crisis) remains uncertain  
The Chinese have reason to pursue loose diplomatic coordination with the United States and 
ROK and this might extend to consultations over humanitarian assistance in the absence of 
major crisis.  But Chinese responses to internal upheaval in the North that threatened to spill 
outward could prove highly “scenario dependent.” For example, though the Chinese would 
seem to have ample reason to avoid direct embroilment in North Korean internal affairs, their 
incentives to control and contain a potential humanitarian crisis near their border with the 
                                                           
11 See, for example, Xinhua, October 15, 1998, in BBC Selected World Broadcasts—Far East, No. 3366, October 
29, 1998, p. D6. According to a Chinese military analyst, China’s gratis assistance to the North in 1998 included 
100,000 tons of grain, 20,000 tons of chemical fertilizers, and 80,000 tons of crude oil. Zhang Jinbao, “An Important 
Year in the Development of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula in 1998,” International Strategic Studies, No. 1, 
1999, p. 41. Aggregate Chinese assistance levels to the North are in all likelihood much higher. 
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North seem self-evident.  Increased refugee flows into China have led to crackdowns by 
Chinese security personnel against some of these refugees.   
3) Russia  
 For much of the Cold War, Moscow was Pyongyang’s largest benefactor.  With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Moscow became progressively marginalized in its 
peninsular role.  Indeed, given the substantial ROK economic interactions with China, Russia 
is no longer able to compete credibly with its neighbor for the attention of the South.  Russia 
feels excluded from policy developments on the peninsula in a number of realms: the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) process has blocked possible Russian 
reactor sales to the North; Moscow (as well as Tokyo) has no seat at the four-party talks; and 
Russia’s economic and security linkages with the North have clearly diminished. This said, 
Russia may well retain some historical linkages to senior North Korean officials, though 
these could prove a diminishing asset.  But Russian assertions indicate a continued strategic 
interest in regional security and in the context of how the unification process might unfold.12 
The more immediate issue, however, is whether and how Russia could be credibly involved 
in future peninsular outcomes.  Unlike the 1961 treaty of alliance and mutual assistance, the 
new treaty on interstate relations initialed in March 1999 commits Russia to consultations 
with the North in the event of a crisis, but it does not obligate Russia to automatic military 
involvement.13 Thus, it is far from certain that major internal change in the North—especially 
if it produced larger external repercussions—would appreciably increase Russia’s leverage 
and involvement, given Moscow’s own internal preoccupations.  But a surviving and 
                                                           
12 “The Consequences of Korea’s Unification for Russia and Security in Northeast Asia,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 4, 
1997, pp. 23–40. 
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recovering North could well see opportunities to strengthen its links to Russia, suggesting 
one means by which Moscow could reemerge as a more credible actor on the peninsula. 
e. Implications for Defense Planners 
 Preferred outcomes such as a significant reduction in the military threat, stabilization and 
reform in North Korea, major gains in South-North relations, and improved ties between North 
Korea and the United States are self-evident.  But movement towards an endgame in which all 
sides achieve an acceptable outcome at tolerable levels of political, military, and economic risk 
and commitment cannot preclude the need for planning against very divergent possibilities.  
Three challenges in particular warrant closer attention. 
 First, future defense planning has to assess how current deterrence and defense capabilities 
need to be reconfigured in response to unconventional scenarios or to major deviations within 
familiar scenarios.  
 Second, a triggering event or series of events could begin a chain reaction that expedites 
unification.  The experiences in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the late 
1980s and early 1990s are a possible guide in this respect.  An incremental transformation 
remains unlikely in North Korea, and a process of compressed change on the peninsula could 
result in abrupt unification.  Even though all external actors clearly prefer a gradual reduction of 
tensions leading to integration and a political modus vivendi, the latent possibility of rapid 
unification remains.  
 Third, the United States and South Korea will confront new alliance management 
requirements, including political and military responses if and when peninsular stability is 
seriously threatened. The concerns of various regional powers would increase substantially in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 ItarTass, March 17, 1999, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, No. 3486, March 18, 1999, p. D2; see also the 
remarks of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin, Kyoto, April 2, 1999, in BBC Summary of World 
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severe crisis, depending on the depth and speed of change in the North.  This is particularly true 
for China, given its shared border and its longstanding historical ties with North Korea.  If a 
crisis should escalate into a military clash or expand into a major conflict, Japan’s role will also 
be critical in the context of a range of support requirements for U.S. forces.  Despite Russia’s 
limited political or military roles at present, Moscow also continues to maintain ties with the 
North and may feel compelled to react in order to secure its own interests in a major Korean 
crisis.  
 Thus, U.S.-South Korean joint planning and coordination may be insufficient to address a 
range of potential outcomes that are now much more plausible than in the past.  The alliance 
must therefore be prepared to cope with rapid unification and a spectrum of new issues that will 
surface in the post-unification era.  A host of factors—the size, composition, and location of U.S. 
forces in a unified Korea; future political and command arrangements; strategic and operational 
adjustments for U.S. forces in Korea and elsewhere in the region; managing rapid demobilization 
in the North; dismantling North Korea’s WMD infrastructure; and many other pressing military 
and security issues—will have to be addressed between the United States and a unified Korea.  
 The unification of Korea could also emerge as a pivotal geopolitical factor in the strategic 
equation of Northeast Asia in the early 21st century.  If Korea is unified in the near future, it will 
be the first time in nearly one hundred years that it has been a single, independent actor.   A 
unified Korea may become more nationalistic and could pursue a more diversified national 
strategy.  For example, owing to historical, strategic, and economic considerations, a unified 
Korea might pursue a closer relationship with China, even if it maintains a primary affiliation 
with the United States. 
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Figure 3-8.   Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Region 
East 
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Annex 3A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2000 and prior) 
3A - 16 
f. Geography 
The following table highlights the key geographical characteristics of the Korean Peninsula. 
 ROK DPRK 
Area (square km) Total:            98,480 
Land:            98,190 
Water:                290   
Total:             120,540 
Land:             120,410 
Water:                   130 
Boundaries (km) Total:                 238 (N. Korea) Total:                1,673 
China:               1,416 
So Korea:             238 
Russia:                   19 
Coastline (km) 2,413  2,495 
Climate Temperate with rainfall heaviest in Summer 
Terrain Mostly hills and mountains; wide 
coastal plains in West and South 
Mostly hills and mountains 
separated by deep, narrow 
valleys; coastal plains wide in 
West, discontinuous in East 
Natural Resources Coal, tungsten, graphite, 
molybdenum, lead, hydropower 
Coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, 
graphite, magnetite, iron ore, 
copper, gold, pyrites, salt, 
fluorspar, hydropower 
Land Use Arable Land:            19 % 
Permanent Crops:       2 % 
Permanent Pastures:   1 % 
Forests/woodland:    65 % 
Other:                       13 % 
Arable Land:            14 % 
Permanent Crops:       2 % 
Permanent Pastures:   0 % 
Forests/woodland:    61 % 
Other:                       23 % 
Irrigated Land (Sq km) 13,350 14,600 
Note  Strategic location bordering 
China, South Korea, and Russia.  
Mountainous interior is isolated, 
nearly inaccessible, and sparsely 
populated 
Table 3-106.   North and South Korea Geography 
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g. Demographics 
The following table highlights the key demographic characteristics of the Korean Peninsula. 
 ROK DPRK 
Population 47,470,969 21,386,109 
Age Structure 0-14 years:        22 %  
15-64:                71 % 
Over 65:              7 % 
Nearly even split between sexes  
0-14 years:          26 %  
15-64:                  68 % 
Over 65:               6 % 
Nearly even split between sexes 
Population growth rate  0.93% 1.45% 
Birth rate 15.12 births/1,000 21.37 births/1,000 
Death rate 5.85 deaths/1,000 6.92 deaths/1,000 
Migration rate 0/1,000 0/1,000 
Sex ratio At birth: 1.13 male/female 
Under 15: 1.12 male/female 
15-64: 1.03 male/female 
> 65: 0.63 male/female 
At birth: 1.05 male/female 
Under 15: 1.05 male/female 
15-64: 0.96 male/female 
> 65: 0.45 male/female 
Infant mortality rate 7.85 deaths/1,000 live births 25.52 deaths/1,000 live births 






Total fertility 1.72 children born/woman 2.3 children born/woman 
Ethnic groups At birth: 1.13 male/female 
Under 15: 1.12 male/female 
15-64: 1.03 male/female 
> 65: 0.63 male/female 
At birth: 1.05 male/female 
Under 15: 1.05 male/female 
15-64: 0.96 male/female 
> 65: 0.45 male/female 
Religions 49 % Christian 
47 % Buddhist 
 3 % Confucianism 
 1 % other 
Buddhism and Confucianism, 
some Christianity and syncretic 
Chondogyo.  Note: Autonomous 
religious activities now almost 
nonexistent; government-
sponsored religious groups exist 
to provide illusion of religious 
freedom. 
Table 3-107.   North and South Korea Demographics 
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h. Economics 
 The uncertainties on the Korean peninsula have been compounded by the East Asian 
financial and economic crisis.  As the world’s 11th largest economy, South Korea was the most 
industrialized of East Asia’s “Four Tigers,” and it had continued to register GDP growth rates 
averaging 6 to 7 percent throughout the early and middle 1990s. Notwithstanding Korea’s highly 
credible macroeconomic performance, a surge in short-term international debt, estimated by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) at $157 billion, triggered a major crisis.  South Korea’s 
backward financial and banking systems, political corruption, bankruptcies among several 
leading chaebols (conglomerates), and rising wages (the second highest in East Asia after Japan) 
all contributed to a rapid deterioration in economic conditions during 1997.  
 Indeed, many telling indications of the looming crisis were evident months before the onset 
of the larger East Asian crisis triggered by the collapse of the Thai currency in July 1997.  The 
bankruptcy of the Hanbo Group in January 1997, as described by one well-informed economic 
observer, “revealed many weaknesses of the Korean economic system to the international 
financial community, such as excessive reliance on bank borrowing by conglomerates, political 
collusion between conglomerates and politicians, lack of transparency in business accounts, and 
ineffective bank supervisory mechanisms.”14  The critical issues over the longer run are twofold: 
first, the rate of recovery in the economy as a whole (unemployment is approaching 2 million 
workers, its highest level in over three decades, with the economy contracting by 5.8 percent 
during 1998 15), and the capability of the ROK’s political leadership to address the deeper 
maladies affecting the business climate.  Despite unexpectedly robust economic growth during 
                                                           
14 SungMok Suh, The Korean Economic Crisis: What Can We Learn From It? (Stanford: Asia/Pacific Research 
Center, Stanford University, May 1998), p. 12. Suh’s reconstruction of the crisis and its consequences is first-rate. 
15 Michael Schuman, “South Korea’s Economy May Have Turned a Corner,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 
24, 1999. 
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early 1999, fueled by strong export performance and major increases in foreign direct 
investment, the longer-term economic challenges remain substantial.   
 The economic crisis also entailed substantial national security implications.  The government 
has deferred a number of force modernization programs, and additional cutbacks are likely for at 
least the next two years.  The ROK Ministry of National Defense has also announced cuts in the 
planned acquisition of AWACS early-warning aircraft for the air force and next-generation 
submarines for the navy.16  Indeed, the defense ministry’s budget plan for 1999 shows a 0.4 
percent decrease in defense spending, the first decrease ever recorded in the ROK’s fifty-year 
history.  Though Korean defense planners project renewed budgetary growth in the five-year 
plan that begins in the year 2000, these outcomes will remain contingent on future economic 
performance.17  Thus, if South Korea’s economic recovery proceeds more slowly than is 
currently anticipated, there could be longer-term security repercussions. 
  The ROK’s current economic preoccupations have reinforced widespread unease about 
“unification through absorption.” Even before the outbreak of the economic crisis, there was a 
growing internal consensus that unification costs could prove prohibitive for South Korea. In the 
aftermath of the crisis and the significant financial burden posed by South Korea’s need to pay 
back loans to the IMF and other agencies, it remains doubtful that South Korea could afford to 
absorb the North solely on the basis of its own resources.  In this respect, President Kim’s policy 
initiatives toward the North have made a virtue out of necessity. Thus, the strategy of 
engagement, including support for a “soft landing” in the North, could gain additional political 
                                                           
16 Chosun Ilbo, January 12, 1998. 
17 “Defense Ministry Proposes First-Ever Budget Cuts,” The Korea Herald, September 22, 1998. The annual 
increases in defense expenditure in the past had ranged between 9.3 percent to 12.6 percent. The growth in 1998 was 
0.1 percent. The budget for the year 2000 projects an increase of 5.5 percent with an average annual increase over 
the full five-year defense plan between 4 and 5 percent. Yonhap, February 12, 1999, in BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, No. 3458, February 13, 1999, p. D4. 
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momentum in the United States and South Korea, even as it rests on highly problematic 
assumptions. 
 The full impact of the economic crisis on longer term defense modernization goals for South 
Korea is still difficult to determine, given that most ongoing force upgrade programs were 
decided before the crisis.   
 South Korea’s economic setbacks also have ramifications for the U.S.-ROK alliance. On the 
one hand, the level of defense cooperation is unlikely to change and could even be enhanced, 
given uncertainties in North Korea.  
2. National Defense18 
a. Military Preparedness  
 To achieve the defense objectives, the ROK armed forces have made concerted efforts to 
deter enemy provocation in peacetime, while developing contingency plans to prepare for any 
form of enemy provocation. The armed forces have also promulgated combat readiness through 
combined exercises and trainings (Team Spirit and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)), joint 
exercises and training , as well as specific army, naval, and air force training. 
b. Military Strategy 
 The military strategy was devised with two objectives; first to guarantee national security and 
prosperity in peacetime by deterring external military threat and armed attack, and second 
deterrence fail, the ministry of defense would be engaged in the active defense strategy of the 
ROK-US   to defeat the enemy and thus establish the foundation for national unification. Not 
withstanding the efforts to deter war on the peninsula, if the North were to provoke a war, the 
ROK would employ the strategic concept of active defense giving priority to the security of the 
                                                           
18 Information contained in this section is excerpted from the “Defense White Paper 1999”, Ministry of Defense, 
Republic of Korea.   
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Seoul metropolitan area, try to undermine the enemy's will to continue the war, destroy the 
enemy main force and create a basis for national unification. To safeguard lasting peace and 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, the ROK will gradually promote and develop all-
directional military cooperation with surrounding countries. By gradually weeding out causes of 
conflict and disputes in advance, the ROK will actively contribute to the establishment of a 
peaceful and stable security environment in the region. Furthermore, ROK will actively 
participate in the peacekeeping activities of the UN to contribute to lasting world peace and co-
prosperity for all mankind. 
c. Operational Posture  
 In the event of an all-out offensive by North Korea, it is anticipated that they would try to 
conquer the entire peninsula in the shortest time possible by simultaneously attacking both the 
front and rear areas in a combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare. To prepare for the 
eventuality, early warning systems had been improved and quick-response posture enhanced.  
South Korea’s strategic response is to intercept and repel an attack at the front line and to strike a 
severe blow to an incoming enemy during the initial stages of war.  In addition, thorough 
operational preparations have been made to prevent North Korean troops infiltrating the front 
and rear areas from linking up with each other. Their operational objectives would be frustrated 
early so that a full-scale counterattack could be staged.  
d. Quick-Response Posture  
 In light of the formidable destructive power of modern weapons and considering North 
Korea's blitzkrieg war plans the outcome of any future war on the Korean peninsula would be 
determined during the first days of engagement. Based on the principles of ROK’s active defense 
strategy, the armed forces have focused on the improvement of quick-response.  
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 First, with respect to operational command and control (C2), an integrated operational 
command system has become a crucial factor in modern warfare. Second, North Korea has since 
the early 1990's concentrated its efforts on developing a variety of long-range missiles and has 
already deployed some of these missiles. The ROK has increased the defensive capabilities 
against this type of threat, in the main forces and at important facilities of the nation located 
within enemy missile range. The ROK is pushing to obtain requisite weapons and equipment for 
surveillance activities on North Korean guided missile sites, and for intercepting the missiles.  
 Third, to wage a successful blitzkrieg, the North has continued to expand its mechanized 
units numerically. To prepare for a concentrated attack of these mechanized units, the ROK has 
employed an integrated management of the available ground, sea and air combat resources, 
including a variety of different kinds of firepower as well as anti-tank barriers, along the major 
avenues of approach. Fourth, North Korea has forward-deployed advanced night-time and all-
weather fighter aircraft and low-altitude, low-speed aircraft for infiltrating commando troops. 
High-speed landing craft are also deployed at forward sectors near the DMZ. To counteract this 
threat, the armed forces have reinforced the air and sea defense through integration of our air 
defense capabilities, including improvements in our air interception and maritime strike 
capabilities, joint-operations posture of the ground, sea and air forces, and air and sea early 
warning system.  
 Fifth, contrary to the international efforts for nonproliferation of chemical weapons, North 
Korea has not only refused to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention, but has also continuously 
reinforced its chemical warfare capabilities by increasing its massive stockpile of chemical 
weapons. To prepare for a possible North Korean chemical attack, an early-warning system has 
also been established to detect chemical attacks in both front and rear areas. Equipment and 
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materials have also been secured to protect civilians and military personnel and regular anti-
chemical warfare defense drills at all levels of the ROK armed forces have been implemented. 
Sixth, to overcome the panic at the initial stage of war and to carry out effective operations, an 
integrated operational command system is very crucial. The armed forces, therefore, have 
established an efficient operational command system for joint operations and for dealing with 
integrated movement of civilians, government personnel, and the military. Seventh, the 
operational posture of reserve forces is also important to mobilize the required forces at the 
preliminary and initial stages of a war and to increase war sustainability. The military has 
established an effective operational reserve forces posture and has improved the quality of 
reserve forces by developing a national mobilization system, by promoting the efficient resource 
management of reserve forces and by developing the management of mobilization affairs. 
e. Defense of the Capital and Rear Areas  
 South Korea’s capital city of Seoul, located about 40 km south of the DMZ, is the weakest 
point in the ROK defense. Because a large portion of the population and national wealth is 
concentrated in the Seoul metropolitan area, the defense of Seoul is critical. For the defense of 
the capital area, the incoming enemy main force would have to be intercepted and blocked near 
the DMZ, thereby alleviating the immediate threat to the capital area. At the same time, the 
armed forces must be prepared for deceptive attacks or irregular warfare by enemy SOF units, air 
assaults, and long-range artillery units. In addition to the preparations by the military, civil 
defense capabilities are bolstered in such functional areas as medical treatment, water and food 
supplies, and evacuation of residents by activating civil defense organizations through individual 
administrative units.  Considering North Korea's basic strategy of combining regular and 
irregular warfare, it is expected that special commando units would infiltrate on a large scale into 
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the rear areas by land, sea and air, trying to incapacitate the ROK’s military operations. To 
counter any North Korean attack at the rear area, the ROK armed forces have constructed a 
multi-layered defense system. They have also developed the operational concepts of waging 
regular war in the rear areas to counter a simultaneous attack on front and rear areas. 
f. Territorial Sea and Air Defense  
 Geopolitically, the Korean peninsula is a bridge between the continental and maritime 
powers. It is bordered by the sea on three sides: east, west and south. The ROK depends almost 
completely on the sea for transportation of exports and imports.  With these unique conditions in 
mind, the armed forces are upgrading their sea patrol operations to maintain tight control over 
South Korea’s territorial waters and to protect its sea lines of communication (SLOCs). For this 
purpose, the Joint Operation Sea Areas (JOSAs) were established for the early detection, 
identification, and control of enemy vessels intruding into South Korea’s territorial waters.  
 To prevent unnecessary friction with North Korea, the ROK armed forces have established 
and managed the Northern Boundary Line (NBL) in the East Sea and the Northern Limit Line 
(NLL) in the Yellow Sea, based on the same concept as the Military Demarcation Line (DML) 
on the land. Since the truce was declared in 1953, however, North Korea has frequently 
penetrated the NLL near the five northernmost islands, thereby heightening tensions between 
North and South Korea.  To deal with such provocations, the armed forces have taken measures 
in coordination with relevant government agencies to control fishing activities in the sensitive 
zones and to counter territorial violations by North Korea with firm military response.  
 On the other hand, with the Third UN Agreement on the Law of the Sea having come into 
effect as of November 16, 1994, many nations have been proclaiming Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ's). In relation to this, the ROK military has been conducting continuous maritime 
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operations to maintain the sea control authorized by this agreement.  Considering the importance 
of air superiority in modern warfare it should be recognized that the effective defense of the 
territorial airspace is directly connected with the survival of the nation. The Korea Air Defense 
Identification Zone (KADIZ) and the Korea Air Defense Area (KADA) had been established to 
defend the territorial airspace. KADIZ is created to identify and control aircraft quickly, while 
the KADA is for identifying, placing under constant surveillance, and controlling any flights in 
the area by enemy aircraft. The geographical boundary of the KADA over the water is the same 
as that of the JOSAs. To identify aircraft entering the airspace and to intercept enemy aircraft, 
the ROK air force operates a 24-hour surveillance and early warning system, combat air 
reconnaissance flights, ground alert aircraft, and maintains a high level of air defense readiness.  
The Flight Information Region (FIR) is also operational for flight safety.  Within this zone, 
authorized aircraft are provided with the necessary air traffic control.  In addition, help and 
assistance are provided for search and rescue. 
g. Countermeasures against Localized Armed Provocation  
 Since the armistice in July 1953, North Korea has made repeated provocations against the 
South. Their aborted raid on the presidential Blue House in 1968, the 1976 ax-murder incident at 
Panmunjom, the hijacking of many of our fishing boats on the East Sea and the Yellow Sea, 
intrusion of armed troops into the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the DMZ, and frequent 
penetrations across the NLL are typical examples of North Korean provocation., It is quite 
possible that North Korea will attempt local provocations to reduce visibility of current 
difficulties such as their regime crisis, economic struggle, and isolation from the international 
community.  In attempting such provocations, they would expect to create political, economic, 
and social disorder in the South by making a tense situation, testing the operational posture of 
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our forces, securing the pretext for an all-out war, or attempting to secure advantage in political 
negotiations.  Examples of this kind of provocation may include a violation of the Korean 
Armistice Agreement which is a valid international agreement; and various provocations in other 
specific areas, including northwest islands belonging to the ROK that are near the Northern 
territory.  With respect to these provocations by Pyongyang, the ROK Armed Forces have 
enhanced the surveillance and warning posture, established countermeasures against possible 
types of provocations, and strengthened operational exercises. 
h. Countermeasures against Infiltration and Terrorism 
 North Korea has executed provocations and terrorist activites such as the Ulchin and 
Samchok commando infiltration in 1968, the bombing at the Aungsan Cemetery in Rangoon, 
Burma, in 1983, the bombing of KE 858 in 1987.. With respect to the infiltration, the ROK has 
maintained a 24-hour surveillance and warning system comprised of new radar systems and 
various surveillance equipment.  A locally integrated civilian-government-military defense 
system has been established to detect and destroy enemy units of inland infiltration at an early 
stage.  Countermeasures have been prepared against indirect infiltrations through airports and 
harbors.  Additionally. comprehensive countermeasures against terrorism are denying 
international terrorists penetration inland and the capabilities of our special counter-terrorist units 
has been improved with modern counter-terrorism equipment. 
i. Countermeasures against Psychological Warfare  
 To build a favorable atmosphere of unifying the entire peninsula on its own terms, North 
Korea has waged psychological warfare largely through the launching of political and 
ideological offensives.  In recent years, it has intensified self-praise propaganda activities in the 
hopes of overcoming its political crisis, utilizing all available means of psychological warfare.  
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j. South Korea’s Force Improvement Plans  
 The United States has been largely responsible for the Korean Nuclear Framework 
Agreement and it is the prime force behind the Four Way Talks.   The United States has provided 
US$8 billion in economic assistance to South Korea, and 640,000 American troops would be 
sent to the peninsula in the event of a major attack.  The most significant new military 
development appears to be the "Sunshine Policy" announced by President Kim in his inaugural 
address.   This policy is designed to relax tensions between North and South Korea.   The 
President is calling for "a new chapter of reconciliation, exchanges and cooperation.   Let us 
initiate a good relationship for mutual prosperity and coexistence."  The danger of the "sunshine 
policy" is that the President does not appear to be a vigorous proponent of the strong defense 
policies advocated by all of his predecessors.  
 A major decision confronting President Kim is the future of South Korea's military 
modernization program.   This involves key decisions such as what to do when the ROK's aging 
270 F-4 and F-5 jet fighters need to be replaced.   A Korea Fighter Program already exists and 
the ROK Air Force will receive the final delivery of 120 KF-16 jet fighters in the year 2000.  
Samsung Aerospace is manufacturing them under U.S. license.   However, the Kim 
Administration is in the process of deciding which aircraft to select for the next generation.  
From 1995 through 1997 the South Korean government imported military items from the United 
States worth more than US$4.7 billion.   This has led to significant criticism within President 
Kim's ruling National Congress for New Politics.   Key lawmakers such as Rep. Lim Bok-jin are 
now publicly saying the ROK government is far too dependent on American defense 
manufacturers.  “Our domestic arms market is now characterized by an oligopoly of U.S. arms 
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companies.   Five U.S. companies supplied 62 percent of our defense items during this period 
and we definitely need to diversify our suppliers.   A major priority should be developing our 
own weapons or at least weapons parts,"  the Congressman said recently. Other lawmakers and 
officials associated with the President are now complaining about American export policies.  
They say the United States is hindering ROK manufacturers because they need U.S. government 
approval to export weapons made with American technology to a third country.   Since 1996, 
South Korean defense companies have not received a single U.S. government approval to sell 
weapons to third countries. Kim's military posture is particularly surprising in light of North 
Korea's continued aggression.   However, an ambitious 5-year defense plan announced in 1999 
called for defense budget increases of between 4-6% between 2000-2004.  
k. Republic of Korea Army (ROKA)  
 The ROK Army makes up the core of the South’s national defense. Its mission in peacetime 
is deterring war with the help of the Navy and the Air force; its wartime mission is to bring all 
ground combat to victory.  
1) Organization  
 Organized into the ROK Army Headquarters, three field army commands, the Aviation 
Operations Command, the Special Warfare Command, and units to support these commands, 
the ROK Army consists of 11 corps (Capital Defense Command included), and 
Figure 3-9.  Organization of the ROK Army. 
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approximately 50 divisions and 20 brigades. Approximately five hundred sixty thousand 
troops make up the army, and its core equipment include some 2,250 tanks, 4,850 pieces of 
field artillery, and 2,300 armored vehicles.  Figure 3-9 shows the main components of the 
army. 
2) Mission Assignment  
 Two of the three field army commands have the mission to defend the region that ranges 
from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to the Seoul area.  Each army command consists 
of several corps commands, divisions and brigades. The troops under these two commands, 
in response to surprise attacks or high-speed mobile warfare launched by North Korea, have 
deployed tanks developed especially for Korea's mountainous terrain, various sorts of 
artillery, anti-tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles along the major avenues of approach 
that connect Seoul to North Korea.  The other field army command is responsible for 
defending the entire rear area, including the coastline that starts from the rear of the two 
aforementioned forward-area army commands.  Several corps commands, divisions, or 
brigades make up this command.  The core tasks of this army are designed to repel North 
Korean infiltration by land, sea and air, and should the North successfully conduct an 
infiltration, annihilate the infiltration force.  These tasks include guarding the coastline, 
defending major facilities and sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and managing reserve 
forces and materiel for wartime mobilization.  Organized into one aviation brigade and 
several battalions, the Aviation Operations Command possesses various types of helicopters 
equipped with rockets, TOWs, Vulcan guns, and machine guns.  The command provides 
maneuver forces with fire support, airlift and reconnaissance support, and if necessary, 
moves into the enemy's rear area to conduct timely fire support and air strikes. The Special 
Annex 3A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2000 and prior) 
3A - 30 
Warfare Command consists of several brigades.  Its main tasks include collecting 
intelligence, and locating enemy targets.  The Capital Defense Command consists of several 
divisions, and focuses on the mission of maintaining the security of Seoul as well as 
protecting the infrastructure of the city.  One reconnaissance and one decontamination 
battalion, and the Chemical Defense Research Institute make up the CBR (chemical, 
biological, and radiological) Defense Command.  The command supports CBR operations, 
and conducts research and evaluates issues related to chemical warfare agents.  
l. Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN).  
 Aside from war deterrence in peacetime, the ROK Navy's missions include upholding 
national sovereignty by protecting maritime rights, supporting government foreign policies, and 
enhancing national prestige.  The navy, during war, exercises control over the sea and the SLOCs 
that will ensure the safety of maritime activities, prevents the enemy from exercising its own 
maritime operations, and carries out surprise landing operations on the enemy's flanks and in rear 
areas. 
1) Organization.  
 The ROK Navy Headquarters, Operations Command, Marine Corps Headquarters, and 
support units make up the ROK Navy. The navy has 67,000 troops including marines, and it 
operates approximately 200 vessels including submarines and 60 aircraft. 
Figure 3-10.  Organization of the ROK Navy 
Annex 3A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2000 and prior) 
3A - 31 
2) Mission Assignment 
 Under the ROK Navy Operations Command, three fleets are based in the East Sea, the 
Yellow Sea and the Korea Strait, respectively.  To guard its operational zone of 
responsibility, each fleet possesses combatants or combat vessels, e.g., destroyers, escorts, 
high-speed boats, etc.  The Operational Command also has its own vessels and aircraft to 
conduct major naval component operations such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine 
operations, landing, salvage, and special operations. 
3) Marine Corps 
 The Marine Corps Headquarters is organized into two divisions and one brigade.  For 
amphibious landing operations, the marines possess a wide range of landing equipment, such 
as amphibious tanks, and their own of fire support.  
m. Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF)   
 The air force constantly keeps a watchful eye on the enemy while at the same time 
maintaining a firm combat readiness posture, which will enable immediate retaliation, should the 
enemy attempt any provocation.  The mission of the air force during war is to achieve air 
superiority so as to prevent the enemy from having access to our air space, to neutralize the 
enemy's will by destroying its principal and potential warfighting capability, and finally, to give 
full support to ground and naval operations. 
1) Organization 
 The ROK Air Force Headquarters, Operations Command, Logistics Command, Training 
Command, and two wings constitute the ROK Air Force.  The two aforementioned wings are 
directly subordinate to the headquarters; the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command, Air Traffic 
Center, and nine tactical fighter wings come under the Operations Command.  The command 
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currently operates one training wing as well. Air force personnel number 63,000 and the air 
force possess more than 780 aircraft including KF-16 fighters. 
2) Mission Assignment   
 Air operations are under direct control of the Theater Air Control Center.  At present, the 
air force operates aircraft that can carry precision-guided munitions, long-range air-to-air 
missiles.  It can provide support to ground and naval forces with close air support as part of 
joint air-ground-sea operations.  The ROKAF received its first F-16 aircraft in 1986-88.  
Deliveries of the second ROKAF buy of F-16s, known as the Korean Fighter Program, began 
in 1994.  The first few were built at LMTAS, and the remaining are being produced under 
license at Samsung Aerospace in Sachon, Korea.  The F-16 is the world's most sought-after 
fighter. Over 3,800 have been delivered to the air forces of 19 countries from assembly lines 
in five countries. Major upgrades are being incorporated, or in development, for all F-16 
versions to keep the fleet modern and fully supportable well into the next century. Additional 
F-16 sales are anticipated to be finalized later in the epoch. Lockheed Martin Tactical 
Aircraft Systems (LMTAS) has modified the first Korean F-16 with the AN/ALQ-165 
Figure 3-11.  Organization of the ROK Air Force. 
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Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) 19.  The aircraft was accepted on February 26, 1999, 
on schedule.  
n. United States Forces in Korea (USFK). 20  
 The ROK-US security relationship continues to be viable, and has been the main factor 
contributing to peace and stability in maintaining the cease-fire on the peninsula and Northeast 
Asia for over forty-six years.  The relationship is based on the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty 
signed on October 1, 1953, and is backed up by the Status of Forces Agreement of July 1966, 
and the Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement signed in November 1991.  The ROK-US 
security relationship, based on a strong military posture, deters North Korean aggression and 
serves as a cornerstone of US presence in this very important region.  The US 2nd Infantry 
Division (-) has two ground maneuver brigades (one heavy and one light), an aviation brigade, 
and its organic divisional artillery.  
 Major US ground weapons systems currently deployed in the ROK include: M-1A1 Main 
Battle tanks, M-2A2 and M-3A2 Bradley fighting vehicles, 155MM self-propelled howitzers, 
Multiple Rocket Launchers (MLRS), a PATRIOT battalion and a two-squadron AH-64 Brigade. 
Additionally, there is a pre-positioned heavy brigade set of equipment.  The US 7th Air Force, 
headquartered at Osan Air Base, consists of the 51st Fighter Wing and the 8th Fighter Wing.  
Squadrons within the 51st Fighter Wing, also at Osan, are equipped with 24 F-16C/D 
LANTIRN, and 22 A-10s. Also stationed at Osan are U-2s from the 9th Reconnaissance Wing, 
Beale AFB, California.  At Kunsan, the 8th Fighter Wing is equipped with 42 F-16Cs. As of 29 
March 29, 2000, there were 35,584 US troops assigned to in the ROK: Army (26,782), Air Force 
(8,305), Navy (407) and Marines (90).  
                                                           
19 Refer to Annex for detail description of the ASPJ 
20 Reference: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html &  
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 Key US capabilities would play essential roles throughout all phases of operations. The US 
would enhance or provide the following critical capabilities to the combined war effort: a) airlift 
and sealift, b) pre-positioned heavy equipment and supplies, c) battlefield command, control and 
communications, d) advanced munitions, d) aerial refueling, e) intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, and f) counter-fire against the massive North Korean artillery barrage. The US 
Forces Korea (USFK) is the symbol of ROK-US alliance and it is organized as follows: 
 
o. North Korea’s Force Improvement Plans  
 North Korea remains the major threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia and could 
potentially involve the United States in a large-scale war.  
 To secure an independent war execution capability when the crucial moment arrives, the 
"Four-Point Military Guidelines" were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth Korean 
Workers' Party Central Committee in December 1962.  Excerpt from the Chosun Rodongdang 
(Korean Workers' Party) Regulations: “The immediate goal of the Chosun Rodongdang is 
achieving a complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the republic, thereby 
successfully accomplishing its revolutionary mission of liberating the Korean people and 
Figure 3-12.  Organization of the USFK 
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establishing people's democracy.  The ultimate goal of the party is to spread ‘Juche Thought’ and 
construct a communist society throughout the world.” The contents of the Four-Point Military 
Guidelines include instilling cadre potential in every soldier, modernizing the entire military, 
arming the entire population, and turning the whole territory into a fortress.  These guidelines 
reflect the idea of turning the entire North Korean society into one gigantic military system.  
 North Korea's military strategy toward the South is a short-term blitzkrieg aimed at creating 
great panic in the South in the early stages of a war. The organization of North Korea’s People’s 
Armed Forces is as shown: 
p. Korea’s People Army (KPA) 
 North Korean ground forces are composed of 20 corps including four corps in the forward 
area, four mechanized, one tank and two artillery corps, as well as the Light Infantry Training 
Guidance Bureau (LITGB) supervising the SOF.  A total of 176 divisions and brigades make up 
the major combat units, including 33 infantry divisions/ brigades, 10 security brigades, 37 
Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU) divisions, one missile division, etc.  Figure 3-14 shows 
the composition of North Korean ground force combat units.  
Figure 3-13.  North Korea’s Military Command System 
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 The old-model T-54/55/59 tanks still 
comprise the majority of its tanks. Recently, 
however, the North has domestically produced 
Chonmaho tanks and T-62 tanks with enlarged 
calibers.  These tanks have been deployed 
extensively in forward areas and around 
Pyongyang.  The T-62 and Chonmaho tanks are equipped with snorkels that enable them to cross 
a river up to 5.5 meters deep.  North Korea possesses BTR-series and type M-1973 armored 
vehicles, but recently, it has added to its collection the BMP series vehicles with the capabilities 
of a light tank. North Korean ground forces also possess artillery of various calibers and ranges; 
more than half of the North's artillery is self-propelled. Most of all, the North has a large number 
of multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) ranging from 107mm to 240mm, which could shower 
rounds over the Seoul area in a short time. For air defense weapons, North Korea possesses 
diverse anti-aircraft artillery ranging from 14.5mm to 100mm, as well as SA-7 anti-air missiles.  
Forward area forces and the Engineering Forces Bureau, in particular, possess river-crossing 
equipment such as K-61 amphibious vehicles and sectional S-shape pontoon bridges, thus 
enabling the military to rapidly cross most rivers.  
 North Korea has deployed approximately 10 corps and some 60 divisions and brigades in the 
forward area south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and is prepared to launch a surprise attack 
and invade the South without redeploying its units.  Deployment are as follows: four corps in the 
forward area from the eastern to the western fronts; five corps in the central and Pyongyang 
areas; and four in the rear area. A total of five mobile corps, one tank, two mechanized infantry 
and two artillery corps are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Mechanized infantry 
Fig 3-14. Composition of Major Ground Units 
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and tank units, organized from corps to brigade, are positioned in depth along the major avenues 
of attack.  
 It is estimated that these units would be employed as the core mobile/operational units for 
exploiting a breakthrough and penetrating into the heart of the ROK military's rear area.  
Artillery units are capable of providing in-depth fire support from hardened underground sites.  
Also, these units possess mobile fire support capability.  Self-propelled MRLs enable massive 
concentrated strikes to be launched from various locations.  By operating amphibious vehicles 
and sectional pontoons, river-crossing engineering forces can support rapid operations for units 
with troops and weapons.  It is estimated that North Korea will infiltrate approximately 100,000 
SOF troops into the forward and rear areas of the ROK. In addition, the North is estimated to 
have built underground tunnels along the front line.  It can insert massive units into the South 
through these tunnels avoiding the obstacles positioned along the DMZ before launching an all-
out surprise attack against the South.  Some twenty tunnels are suspected to be built under the 
DMZ by the North Koreans; the four that have been discovered thus far are all situated under the 
major corridors of approach into South Korea's forward area. North Korea's Special Operations 
Forces are the largest in the world.  They consist of over 100,000 elite personnel and are 
significant force multipliers providing the capability to simultaneously attack both our forward 
and rear forces. 
q. Korea’s People Navy (KPN).  
 The East Sea Fleet, with 10 battle groups and some 570 vessels, and the Yellow Sea Fleet, 
with six battle groups and approximately 420 vessels, are under the direct control of the North 
Korean navy.  Most North Korean combat vessels, such as light destroyers, patrol ships, guided 
missile boats, torpedo boats, and fire support boats are small.  Some 40 guided missile boats pose 
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a substantial threat as they have the capability of launching missile attacks against our large 
vessels and are equipped with two to four 46-km-range Styx anti-ship missiles.  At present, over 
60% of North Korean combat vessels are deployed to forward bases.  Submarines (20-some), 
most of which are of the Romeo-class, are outdated and slow, but they are sufficiently capable of 
blocking sea lanes.  These vessels could attack ROK surface vessels, emplace mines anywhere 
within the ROK maritime territory, or secretly infiltrate commandos into the South.  
 Support vessels are composed of amphibious vessels including personnel landing craft, 
landing craft air cushion (LCAC), surface patrol boats and mine countermeasure vessels.  These 
support vessels, however, have a limited role in long-distance operations.  Also operated by the 
navy are two amphibious surface sniper brigades and some 140 LCACs. One of these 
domestically produced LCACs can land armed troops equivalent to the size of a platoon on a 
specific target.  Because LCACs can be operated on tidal flats, they can land in most parts of the 
east and west coasts.  With high-speed mobility of 50 nautical miles per hour or more, these 
vessels are effective in the simultaneous launch of multi-dimensional surprise attacks in the early 
stage of a war.  
 North Korea also deploys eighty 95 km-range ground-to-ship Samlet and Silkworm missiles 
on both east and west coasts. Silkworm missiles, deployed in the forward area, are able to launch 
anti-ship attacks as far as Tokjok-do in the Yellow Sea and Sokcho and Yangyang on the east 
coast. 
r. Korea’s People Air Force (KPAF).  
 There are six air divisions under direct control of the Air Command, one per military district: 
three fighter and bomber divisions, two support aircraft divisions, and one training division.  
Over 50% of North Korean aircraft aged models such as MiG-15s/17s and Il-28s. The core of the 
Annex 3A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2000 and prior) 
3A - 39 
air fleet is made up of slightly more capable MiG-19s and 21s.  The North is also equipped with 
highly advanced fighters such as MiG-23s and 29s as well as Su-25s.  According to the 
Pyongyang government's policy of fostering the aircraft industry, some fighter spare parts are 
domestically produced.  In the early 1990s it assembled modern MiG-29s domestically with 
Russian technological support.  
 Two air force sniper brigades are organized under the air force, and they have approximately 
300 An-2s capable of flying slowly at low altitudes.  An-2s can easily deliver SOF troops deep 
into the South's rear areas.  Fighter planes are deployed at bases where they can launch surprise 
attacks throughout the entirety of South Korea in a short period of time.  Taking into account 
wartime sustainability and the construction of forward bases, approximately 70 air bases 
including reserve and emergency runways are built throughout various areas of the North.  A 
strong air defense network has been built and is maintained over the Pyongyang area and around 
major nuclear facilities, including early-warning systems, air defense surveillance radars, low-
altitude anti-aircraft artillery, and mid/high-altitude missiles.  
s. Strategic Weapons Development. 
1) Nuclear Developments 
 Pyongyang has exerted full efforts in nuclear development since the 1950s for two 
purposes: to communize the entire peninsula and to strengthen its international influence.  
North Korea has mines containing four million tons of uranium ore. In the 1960s, it 
established a large nuclear research complex in Yongbyon, imported an atomic reactor for 
research purposes from the Soviet Union, and has since been accumulating nuclear weapons 
technology and training nuclear specialists.  In the 1970s Pyongyang concentrated its nuclear 
research on the nuclear fuel cycle refining, conversion and processing technologies. It 
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successfully enlarged the power generation capacity of its research atomic reactor through its 
own technology, and in 1980 started the construction of a 5Mw-level research reactor, the so-
called "second reactor.  
 In the 1980s the North focused on the practical uses of atomic energy and the completion 
of a nuclear research and development infrastructure. Thus, it began to operate uranium 
refining and conversion facilities. In 1989 Pyongyang embarked upon the construction of a 
200Mw-atomic energy power plant and large reprocessing facilities, in Taechon and 
Yongbyon, respectively.  Additionally, the North conducted detonations to test triggering 
devices with high explosives.  It was estimated that by the 1990s, North Korea completed the 
entire nuclear fuel cycle from the acquisition of nuclear fuel to its reprocessing.  
Nevertheless, due to difficulties in developing detonation devices and delivery systems that 
require advanced, precision technologies, it is doubtful whether Pyongyang has actually 
finished producing or possesses usable nuclear weaponry.  Considering its capability to 
extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, North Korea is estimated to be capable of 
assembling and producing approximately six crude nuclear weapons. 
 To freeze North Korea's nuclear weapons development program, the United States and 
North Korea signed the Geneva Agreed Framework in October 1994.  The US agreed to 
build two light-water reactors for the North, and provide it with 500,000 tons of heavy oil 
each year until the completion of the first reactor.  Under the agreement, the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea went on to sign the 
Light-Water Reactor Supply Agreement in December 1995, a tangible benefit for 
Pyongyang.  The construction of the reactor site kicked off in August 1997 and is in its last 
stage of completion.  In January 1996, North Korea officially announced it would allow the 
Annex 3A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2000 and prior) 
3A - 41 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make regular and ad hoc inspections.  It still 
prohibits, however, IAEA inspection of undeclared facilities, refuses to submit records of its 
5Mw atomic reactor to be examined, and does not allow the IAEA inspection team to collect 
samples of materials for examination nor to examine spent fuel rods.  
 On February 11, 1997, Pyongyang refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
and did not participate in the UN annual nuclear and arms reduction conference held on 
February 25, 1997.  Furthermore, Pyongyang announced in April 1998 that it would stop the 
process of sealing spent nuclear fuel rods because of the delay in the light-water reactor 
construction and deliveries of the heavy oil. Despite this, the sealing process of spent nuclear 
fuel rods from its 5Mw atomic reactor had already finished by the end of March 1998.  The 
world has kept wary eyes on the Kumchang-ri area since mid-1998, but the US on-site 
inspections in May 1999 showed that what had previously been suspected of containing 
nuclear underground facilities was nothing but a large empty cave. 
2) Chemical and Biological Weapons.   
 According to the directives of Kim Il Sung since the early 1960s, North Korea has 
established chemical and biological (CB) weapon research institutes and production 
facilities, and has exerted its utmost efforts to produce CB weapons.  As a result, the North 
has maintained the capability to mass-produce and attack with chemical weapons since the 
1980s. By 1980, it had succeeded in its experiments in bacteria and virus cultivation for 
biological weapons, and by the late 1980s completed live experiments with such weapons.  
At present, North Korea maintains eight chemical factories, four research facilities, and six 
storage facilities for mass-producing chemical agents. It also possesses a large quantity of 
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poison agents such as blister, nerve, blood and tear gas.  The North is also suspected of 
maintaining many facilities for cultivating and producing biological weapons.  
 To enhance its nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) operations, the North Korean 
military has organized chemical platoons down to the regiment level.  Furthermore, 
following Kim Il Sung's directives in February 1992, North Korea has provided protective 
masks to the entire population.  Not only military personnel, but also paramilitary personnel 
and civilians must participate in regular NBC defense drills.  In addition, the North possesses 
various vehicles and equipment for launching chemical munitions.  Using mortars, field 
artillery, MRLs, and Frog, Scud and Rodong-1 missiles on land, fire support vessels at sea, 
and fighters, bombers and transport aircraft in the air, the North has the capability of 
launching chemical munitions into  forward areas and as far south as Pusan and Mokpo. The 
North may also dare to launch such an attack through its SOF troops armed with chemical 
weapons.  North Korea will attempt to maintain its CB production capabilities despite its 
serious economic difficulties and the global movement to ban CB weapons. North Korea will 
continue this policy because these weapons can be produced at a low cost, they are effective, 
and it is relatively easy to destroy the evidence of such programs. 
3) Mid- and Long-range Guided Weapons.   
 Since the early 1980s, North Korea has embarked on the development of ballistic 
missiles.  It has already domestically produced and deployed 500 km-range Scud-Cs by 
upgrading Soviet Scud-Bs.  In 1993 it succeeded in test-firing a 1,300-km-range Rodong-1 
missile.  Rodong-1 missiles are now deployed for operational purposes.  In August 1998 
Pyongyang attempted to launch a small satellite into orbit using the transformed launch 
system of a Daepo-dong missile.  Although the attempt failed, the missile's engine 
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combustion, body separation, and guidance systems functioned without problems.  From the 
test, it can be inferred that North Korea does have the capability to develop mid- and long-
range missiles.  
 The maximum ranges of Daepo-dong 1 and Daepo-dong 2, which the North Korea is 
feverishly developing at the moment, are estimated to reach 2,500km and 6,700km 
respectively. Such a capability poses a great threat not only to South Korea but also to 
neighboring countries in Northeast Asia.  Pyongyang is currently under scathing criticism 
from the international community for exporting the missiles to the Middle East and 
Southwest Asia.  
 Since 1996, the US and North Korea have proceeded with missile talks concerning North 
Korean participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). During the talks, 
the US has pressured the North to suspend its production and export of missiles with ranges 
over 300km.  The talks, however, still have not produced any significant results.  Pyongyang 
recently deployed in the forward area twenty SA-5 surface-to-air missiles with a range of 
250km; enough to reach the central region of the South.  In addition, it possesses Frog-5/7 
ground-to-ground free rockets with ranges from 50km to 70km, 170mm self-propelled 
artillery pieces, and 240mm MRLs. When launched near the DMZ, these rockets and guns 
can strike as far south as a line linking Seoul, Chunchon and Sokcho.  
 The reasons for producing and possessing mid- and long-range missiles with CB weapons 
are simple: they provide the means for North Korea to respond to the expanding military 
influence of the US and Japan, and to use them as a bargaining chip at negotiation talks for 
regime survival.  These weapons can also be used to conduct decisive tactical and operational 
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roles to simultaneously attack major cities and strategic targets in the South, as the North 
attempts to realize its military blitzkrieg strategy. 
3. Technology Development for DPRK and ROK  
a. DPRK’s Technology Focus 
1) Goals and Strategy for Defense Technology. 
   North Korea’s technological goals essentially focused on its philosophy of juche – that of 
achieving a self-reliant production capability of major weaponry.  To this end, the country 
aimed to achieve a credible Ballistic Missile (BM) capability, to build upon its nuclear, 
biological, and chemical stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and to enhance 
its SOF insertion capability.  Thus, the DPRK’s goals were three-fold.   
2)  Defense R&D Budget.    
 As no available sources were available for providing the actual budget figures, it was 
assumed that the DPRK’s defense budget would be pegged at a constant 27% of the 
country’s GDP as discussed in the section on Economy.  The defense budget was divided 
according to the ROK model (for the entire study) following a 70/30 allocation for 
Operational and Maintenance (O&M) costs and Force Improvement Plans (FIP) respectively.   
 GDP Defense Budget O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 27.0% 18.9% 8.1% 
% 100.0% 27.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
%Growth 6.2%       
2000 7.600 2.052 1.436 0.616 
Table 3-108.  Year 2000 DPRK Defense Budget Breakdown 
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 From the FIP allocation, the budget was further broken down with 60% going towards 
the services’ procurements21, 5% towards Dominant Battlespace Awareness (DBA) 
procurements, and the remaining 35% towards Research and Development (R&D) programs.  
For the study’s baseline, Table 3-109 summarizes the 2000 defense budget breakdown. 
 FIP Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 8.1% 4.1% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 2.8% 
% 30.0% 50.0% 20.0% 30.0% 5.0% 35.0% 
%Def Bud 30.0% 9.0% 3.6% 5.4% 1.5% 10.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2000 $0.616  $0.185 $0.074 $0.111  $0.031 $0.215  
Table 3-109.  Year 2000 DPRK FIP Budget Allocation 
 For DPRK’s R&D budget allocation, Team Korea assumed that its defense R&D budget 
would be a constant 10.5% of the total national defense budget.  For the 2000 DPRK R&D 
budget, this amounted to US$0.215 billion.  From this allocation, 70% was spent on its 
Ballistic Missile/ Nuclear Weapons Program22, 15% for SOF capability research, 10% for 
reverse engineering of weapons, and 5% for others (which includes chemical and biological 
warfare research). 
 R&D BM/Nuclear Program SOF Program Reverse Engineering Others 
%GDP 2.8% 2.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 
% 35.0% 70.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 
%Def Bud 10.5% 7.4% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil
2000 $0.215 $0.151 $0.032 $0.022 $0.011 
Table 3-110.  Year 2000 DPRK R&D Budget Breakdown 
                                                           
21 Team Korea further divided the services’ FIP budget into a 50/20/30 percent allocation to the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force respectively. 
22 Apart from its nuclear and ballistic missile research programs, North Korea is not known to be engaged in 
significant research efforts in advanced technology programs with military applications.  North Korea is 
concentrating on acquiring technology from foreign suppliers and is especially interested in obtaining nuclear-
related equipment and advanced missile, chemical warfare, and biological warfare technologies.  “North Korea:  The 
Foundations for Military Strength – Update 1995”, December 1995.   
http://libweb.uoregon.edu/asia/nk/nk1995/1510-101_chp3.html.  
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b. DPRK’s Technology Policies 
1) DPRK’s Defense Development/International Cooperation  
 Since the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, the DPRK had depended heavily on the 
Russians and Chinese for its defense development.  This trend, however, became less and 
less realizable as the DPRK progressed into the 1990s. This situation was a consequence of 
the US-led economic sanctions imposed on the country as a result of its nuclear program and 
the occurrence of natural calamities like drought and famine during the mid to late 1990s.  
This  drove the DPRK to solicit cooperation with “rogue” nations like Syria, Iran, and 
Pakistan in its pursuit of a credible nuclear ballistic missile capability.  
2) DPRK’s Education Policies in Support of Defense Technology 
 From DPRK’s propaganda, there has been a movement in place since the 1990s, 
consisting of a 3-Year Plan to develop science and technology.23  This responsibility rests 
with the National Academy of Sciences.  DPRK boasted that it “possessed a firm foundation 
and a well-established national structure to develop its science and technology.”24  At the end 
of 2000, this program is currently in place, training young scientists and engineers to be 
excellent specialists.   
c. DPRK’s Technology Investments 
1) Existing Capabilities 
 The DPRK has an extensive defense production capability that reflected its commitment 
to self-reliance.  Since the 1970s, DPRK has been developing variants of standard Soviet and 
Chinese equipment, as well as indigenously designed versions of APCs, SP Arty, light tanks, 
                                                           
23 PK Interview with Dr Chang Byong-Tae on DPRK’s Scientific and Technological Development.  
http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/144th_issue/2000072504.htm.  
24 PK Interview with Dr Chang Byong-Tae on DPRK’s Scientific and Technological Development.  
http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/144th_issue/2000072504.htm. 
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high-speed landing craft and submarines.  For the Navy, the Sango submarine and hovercraft 
remain priority projects.  For the Air Force, DPRK possesses a small-scale aircraft 
production and assembly capability limited to tactical transports and helicopters for the Air 
Force.25  A continuing priority in recent years has been the increased production of 
ammunition for the offensive weapons it has produced.26  It has been estimated that North 
Korea operates 134 arms factories that are either completely or partially concealed 
underground and also 115 nonmilitary factories with a dedicated wartime material production 
mission.  The hardening of its critical defense industries meant that DPRK should be capable 
of significant production output even during conflict.  
 DPRK’s technological strength resides in its ability to reverse engineer major former 
Soviet Union weapons systems.  With regards to DPRK’s BM-related technologies, it was 
assessed to be using 1980s level of technology.  Due to the DPRK’s use of older generation 
technology (of at least two generations behind ROK), the country’s present inventory of 
missiles are not very accurate.  Consequently, the bulk of its technological investments will 
be spent on  developing BM-related technologies, especially in the field of missile control 
and guidance.  According to US estimates, North Korea will possess an accurate nuclear BM 
capability by 2005.27   
2) Defense Acquisition Roadmap 
 Based on the DPRK’s technological strengths and R&D emphasis, the long-term plan for 
weapons acquisition is presented below. 
 
                                                           
25 “North Korea:  The Foundations for Military Strength – Update 1995”, December 1995.   
http://libweb.uoregon.edu/asia/nk/nk1995/1510-101_chp4.html. 
26 “North Korea:  The Foundations for Military Strength – Update 1995”, December 1995.   
http://libweb.uoregon.edu/asia/nk/nk1995/1510-101_chp4.html. 
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Acquisition. 
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Table 3-111.  DPRK Defense Acquisition Roadmap 
d.  ROK’s Technology Focus 
1) Goals for Defense Technology 
 In the 1999 ROK White Paper 1999, ROK’s stated technological goals was, foremost, to 
achieve an indigenous production capability of major weaponry.28.  Second, the ROK would 
apply technology towards transforming the present manpower-centered force structure into a 
technology-centered force.  Third, ROK would adopt a “Use Domestic Weapons First” 
policy in support of its domestic defense industry.  Additionally, the long-term force 
improvement is based on 2 systems: focusing on Basic Force Capability System and Core 
Force Capability.29  Consequently, ROK’s pursuit of defense acquisition serves two goals.  
First is the acquiring and fielding high performance weapon systems at a reasonable cost 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 This date of 2005 is the original milestone pegged to the National Missile Defense to be operational. 
28 Key lawmakers such as Rep. Lim Bok-jin are now publicly saying (in 1998) the ROK government is far to 
dependent on American defense manufacturers.  “Our domestic arms market is now characterized by an oligopoly of 
US arms companies.  Five US companies supplied 62 percent of our defense items during this period and we 
definitely need to diversify our suppliers.  A major priority should be developing our own weapons or at least 
weapons parts.”  NSCF Task Force on Korean Security, “South Korea’s Modernization Program and North Korea’s 
Military Strategy”, 1998.  http://www.nscf.net/South%20Korean%20Modernization %20Program.htm.   
29 White Paper 1998.  168.  The Basic Force Capability System is the concept of achieving perfect combat readiness 
to deter North Korean provocations, while the Core Force Capability focuses on coping with uncertain future 
threats. 
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within the requested time frame.  Second is the obtaining of R&D capabilities for certain key 
weapon systems. 
2) Defense Technology Acquisition Strategy 
 There are essentially four different paths that ROK can pursue the development and 
buildup of its indigenous defense capability to affect the necessary technology transfer as 
discussed above for DPRK.30  For South Korea, the following policies apply: 
 The adoption of a “Use Domestic Weapons First” policy was in line with the National 
Security Strategy of self-reliance.  To support such a policy, the ROK military pursued an 
economical acquisition process of weapon systems through the adoption of eight acquisition 
and development principles31, and a reformation of its acquisition process.  Ultimately, the 
ROK also improved its domestic R&D capability, decreased its dependence on foreign 
countries in acquiring weapon systems, and bred an internationally and domestically 
competitive defense industry to realize its “Use Domestic Weapons First” policy. 
 The modernization and development strategy of the ROK’s defense technology program 
began in the mid-1970s.  Back then, the force improvement programs (FIPs)32 comprised 
building quantity-based defense capability against the DPRK, with the weapons mostly 
imported and about 31.4% of total defense spending invested in building military 
capability.33  During the 1980s, FIPs focus shifted to achieving qualitative superiority over 
North Korea.  This then began South Korea’s accumulation of advanced technology, 
                                                           
30 Methods of arms acquisition in South Korea, 1970.  Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume 1: China, India, 
Israel, Japan, South Korea and Thailand. Ravinder Pal Singh ed. SIPRI, Oxford University Press. 1998. 200. Tbl 6.8 
31 White Paper 1998.  160. 
32 FIPs are often long-term and continuous programs that take ten to fifteen years for acquisition. 
33 White Paper 1998.  157. 
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enlargement of its defense industry, and expansion of its domestic production of major 
combat equipment and weapon systems.34   
 Following the Gulf War in the 1990s, where the US clearly demonstrated its 
technological dominance and impact on the battlefield, ROK’s focus promptly shifted to the 
development of a future-oriented military force.  Exploiting the ROK-US alliance, the ROK 
was thus able to directly purchase technologically advanced weapons systems and to secure 
technology transfer for defense expenditures greater than 10 million won.35. 
3) Defense R&D Budget   
 The two goals of the FIP budget are to establish the foundation for deterrence against 
DPRK and to negate the current weakness of the ROK military.36  Concurrently, the ROK 
military would concentrate on developing its own weapon systems to replace imported 
onesIAs assumed above the ROK’s defense budget would be pegged at a constant 3.5%37 of 
the country’s GDP.  the defense budget was divided according to a 70/30 allocation for O&M 
and FIP costs respectively.   
 GDP Defense Budget O&M FIP 
%GDP 100.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.1% 
%Def Bud - 100.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
%Growth 4.0%       
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2000 344.000 12.040 8.428 3.612 
Table 3-112.  Year 2000 ROK Defense Budget Breakdown 
                                                           
34 White Paper 1998.  158. 
35 White Paper 1998.  161-62. 
36 White Paper 1999.  133. 
37 The proportion of defense outlay to GNP has decreased sharply from 4.7% in 1985 to 3.1% in 1998.  Proportion 
of defense budget to the total government budget has consistently decreased.  The South Korean government, 
however, acknowledges that two tasks of utmost priority in preparation for future war are rapid progress in Military 
Science and Defense Digitization.  Based on these requirements, the estimated required defense budget will have to 
maintain at least 3% of GDP in order for the military to construct and maintain a force capability able to respond 
effectively to external threats.  White Paper 1999.  132-33. 
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 From the FIP allocation, the budget was further broken down with 83% going towards 
the services’ procurements38, 4% towards Dominant Battlespace Awareness (DBA) 
procurements, and the remaining 13% towards Research and Development (R&D) programs.  
For the study’s baseline, Table 3-113 summarizes the 2000 defense budget breakdown. 
 FIP Army Navy Air Force DBA R&D 
%GDP 1.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.04% 0.1% 
% 30.0% 30.0% 40.0% 30.0% 4.0% 13.0% 
%Def Bud 30.0% 7.4% 9.8% 7.4% 1.2% 3.9% 
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil 
2000 $3.612  $0.899 $1.199 $0.899  $0.144 $0.470  
Table 3-113.  Year 2000 ROK FIP Budget Allocation 
 For ROK’s R&D budget allocation, Team Korea assumed that its defense R&D budget 
would be a constant 3.9% of the total national defense budget.  For the 2000 ROK R&D 
budget, this amounted to $470 M(US).  From this allocation, the funds were further broken 
down into a fixed 80/20 allocation between Force Development Programs39 and Agency for 
Defense Development (ADD) Operation Programs40.  This translates to US$0.376 billion 
spent on R&D that enhanced current force capabilities and US$0.094 billion on R&D that 
would provide South Korea’s military with new capabilities. 
 
                                                           
38 We further divided the services’ FIP budget into a 50/20/30 allocation to the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
respectively. 
39 Force Development Programs are programs that look into system upgrades through the substitution of 
component(s) with newer technology thereby enhancing the system’s performance or capability.  In such programs, 
no new system is produced; the shell essentially remains the same though the contents may have changed.  An 
example of a Force Development Program is the replacement of an aircraft with a more powerful radar which either 
enhances its detection range, increases its reliability or reduces its maintenance efforts.  The R&D here deals with 
existing technology inventions and the risk of success is low to moderate.  For this study, we employed the same 
proportional allocation as that used in the FIP allocation for the three services. 
40 ADD Programs essentially focus on programs embarked by the five specialized research centers (electro-optics, 
microwave, underwater acoustics, automatic controls, and weapon systems).  These programs focus on R&D that 
would eventually lead to breakthroughs that provides either a quantum leap in existing capabilities or an innovative 
synergy of applying technology to provide new capabilities.  The R&D here deals with more current or future 
technology and the risk of success is moderate to high.  The allocations were derived from the budget figures found 
in the White Paper 1999. 
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2000 ROK R&D Budget:  US$ 0.215 bil 
FDP (80% of R&D) ADD (20% of R&D)  
Army Navy AF EO MW AC UWA WS 
% R&D Budget 24.0 32.0 24.0 5.5 5.9 6.1 1.6 1.0 
US$ bil 0.113 0.150 0.113 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.007 0.005 
Table 3-114.  Year 2000 ROK R&D Budget Breakdown 
 
e. ROK’s Technology Policies. 
 Generous legislation has passed in recent years to support and promote ROK’s defense 
technology capability build-up.  These include: Special Law for Science and Technology 
Innovation; Formation of 5-year Plan for Science and Technology Innovation (1997-2002); 
Highly Advanced National (HAN) Project; Creative Research Initiative; National Long-Term 
Plan for Science and Technology Committee formed in Mar 99; Post HAN Projects (21st Century 
Frontier R&D Program); and Brain Korea 21 (BK 21). 
1) Establishment of Ministry of National Defense (MND)41 
 Examining its march towards nationhood since 1953, the ROK had paid less attention to 
the development of defense science and technology, which demanded long-term investment.  
A policy reversal first occurred in the 1990s.  Since then, the ROK government had 
recognized the importance of defense science and technology.  Consequently, the MND was 
established and charged with the primary task of “modernization of defense science and 
technology”.   
 Since its establishment, MND has implemented development of advanced, Korean-model 
weapon systems like the KF-16, K-1 MBT.  During the mid-1990s, MND selected 14 main 
weapon systems that South Korea should concentrate its resources on to develop.  
Additionally, the essential technologies pertaining to developing these systems were 
                                                           
41 White Paper 1998.  164-67. 
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classified into 11 fundamental technologies with the intention of developing them intensively 
under a mid- to long-term schedule.  This also forms part of MND’s policy guidelines of 
developing defense science and technology, pursuing cost-effective defense acquisition42, 
ensuring high performance of weapon systems and combat effectiveness of integrated 
systems, promoting acquisition projects in line with national industrial development, and 
enhancing efficiency, professionalism, and transparency in acquisition procedures. 
Classification Locus Establish Date 
Automatic Controls Seoul National University December 1994 
Electro-Optics Korea Advanced Institute for 
Science and Technology 
December 1994 
Microwave Pohang University of Science 
and Technology 
December 1994 
Weapon Systems Advanced Institute for 
Military Science and 
Technology 
January 1997 
Underwater Acoustics Seoul National University February 1997 
Source:  Korea White Paper 1998 
Table 3-115.  Establishment of Specialized Research Centers 
 Expanding support for R&D of high-tech weapons suited for the Korean Military, MND 
established the R&D Office in Dec 1998 to assist with the national defense R&D effort.  
Additionally, a Law on Expediting Dual-Use Technology Program was enacted in Apr 1998 
to promote defense science and technology in connection with progress of national science 
and technology.  Institutionally, defense R&D was to be conducted through a cooperative 
research system among industry, academies, and research centers with the designation of five 
research centers43 and the creation of Agency for Defense Development (ADD)44.  To 
                                                           
42 White Paper 1999.  137.  Cost effective acquisition will be sought by diversifying the sources of weapon systems 
and broadening international cooperation in defense industry and technology. 
43 These were the Electro-Optics, Microwave, Automatic Research Control, Underwater Acoustic, and Weapon 
Systems Research Centers. 
44 The ADD serves to develop core weapon systems and key technologies and parts through applied research and 
test development.   
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complement these efforts, MND also encouraged civilian industrial sector to execute R&D in 
fields where it had accumulated a certain level of technology, thus fostering and developing a 
civilian-led defense industry centered on technology development. 
Sector Functions and Roles 
Academia Specialized university research institutes lead the development of basic 
technologies which the military is expected to employ 
Research calling for urgent development of weapon systems 
Industry Developing and enhancing performance of conventional and general 
precision weapons 
Developing general technologies and parts 




Developing dual-use technologies 
Establishing a system in which research projects can be commissioned 
to government-funded science and technology research institutes which 
can execute the functions of ADD technical research offices 
Source:  White Paper 1998 
Table 3-116.  Functions and Roles in R&D 
2) Improving 1997 Acquisition Management45   
 To streamline and reduce wastage in the acquisition process, MND improved the 
acquisition management process by reducing the nine-step acquisition procedure to six-steps 
in 1997.  This reduced the decision-making process and shortened the entire acquisition 
cycle.  Additionally, MND passed new regulations to ensure that long-term requirement 
projects demanding domestic R&D would be determined first. 
 Development of First- and Second-Tier Defense Companies.  In Jan 1999, the Special 
Law on the Defense Industry was enacted to provide more opportunities for qualified firms 
with advanced technologies to participate.46  At the same time, efforts were also made to 
encourage contractors to consolidate the defense industrial infrastructure.  Further, with the 
                                                           
45 White Paper 1998.  167-68. 
46 As an example, a Special consumption tax exemption system pertaining to the imported raw materials for 
producing defense equipment lasting till 2004 was put into effect 
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enactment of the Foreign Investment Encouragement Law in Sep 1998, MND has allowed 
foreigners to acquire and merge with some of the domestic companies. 
3) ROK’s International Defense Industry Cooperation 
 MND’s ultimate goal is to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic defense industry.  
Through the devising of institutional methods for fostering assurance of quality, and the 
devising of exchanges of scientists and data technologies, these were just some of the 
positive steps taken by MND to develop and mature the local defense industry.  MND also 
hosted the Seoul International Air Show in 1996 and 1998 to foster the domestic aerospace 
industry. 
f. Technology-Related Projects 
 At the national level, ROK decided in the investment of technology projects in four areas.  
These were the G7 Projects, strategic national R&D projects, giant scientific R&D projects, and 
the creative research promotion projects. 
1) G7 Projects47 
 This program, initiated in 1992, has as its goal of bringing up the level of South Korean 
technology to those of G7 countries by the year 2001.  To attain this goal, the government 
selects target strategic technologies and provides substantial long-term supports for R&D 
activities in industries, universities, and national labs.  The total estimated costs for G7 
projects from 1992 to 2001 are about 4.7 trillion won (~US$4.7 B).  There are currently 16 
R&D topics under G7 Projects.  These are:  New drugs and agro-chemicals, Broadband 
integrated services and Data network (B-ISDN), Next-Generation Vehicle Technology, 
Advanced Manufacturing Systems, Advanced Materials for Information, Electronics and 
                                                           
47 ATIP97.034:  Update on Status of Science and Technology in Korea.  10 Apr 1997.  
http://www.atip.or.jp/public/atip.reports.97/atip97.034r.html.  
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Energy, New Functional Biological Materials, Environmental Engineering, New Energy, 
Next-Generation Nuclear Reactor, ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuits), Next-
Generation Flat Panel Display Devices, Medical Engineering, Micro Precision Machinery, 
Next-Generation Super-Conducting Nuclear Fusion Reactor Development, Human 
Ergonomics Engineering, and High-Speed Electric Railway System. 
2) Strategic National R&D Projects 
 Under this category, the government selects R&D topics and directs R&D activities in 
order to solve urgent technology problems.  There are at present more than 15 such 
projects48, and are as follows:  Life Engineering Technology (10 billion won), Disaster-
Prevention Technology (5 billion won), and CFC Substitution Materials (900 million won). 
3) Giant Scientific R&D Projects   
 These are projects that entail enormous commitments and two fields of R&D currently 
focus the pursuit of technologies for space and deep-sea developments. 
1) Creative Research Promotion Projects.   
This national project aims at encouraging creative basic research, especially among 
young scientists and engineers.  Such projects tie in with the Brain Korea 21 (BK21) 
program. 
g. ROK’s Technology Investments 
1) 2001-2005 Mid-term Defense Program (MDP)49   
 According to the MDP published in 1999, the foremost goal was laying “the foundation 
for a self-reliant defense capability.”  Based on the reforms stated earlier that were taken, the 
2001-2005 MDP was the first mid-term defense program to be backed by an actual 
                                                           
48 8 such projects (in 1994) with 7 added in 1997. 
49 White Paper 1999.  130-31. 
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government-approved budget.50  From the 2001-2005 Mid-term Defense Program, it was 
decided that weapon systems acquisition include large attack helicopters, unmanned 
reconnaissance planes, KDX-III, next-generation fighters51, SAM-X52, etc., whereas the 
acquisition of high-tech equipment such as early-warning systems would be postponed. 
Ground Ops Naval Control Air Ops 
• Chonma, Piho – Next 
generation anti-aircraft 
system  
• Domestically build UH-60 
and BO-105 
• Upgrade night vision 
capability for attack 
helicopters 
• Upgrade of K-1 tanks 
• Secure additional 230 mm 
multiple launching rocket 
system (MLRS) 
• Purchase portable anti-air 
guided missiles 
• Plans to procure thermal 
surveillance radars to attain an 
all-weather surveillance and 
fire control capability 
• MND promoting the 
acquisition of large landing 
ships and high speed 
landing craft,  
• Finalization of design for 
10000 ton cargo ship 
• Annually acquiring 3000 
ton KDX-I multi-purpose 
battleships 
• Domestically build 4200 
ton KDX-II destroyers 
• Domestically build next 
generation submarine and 
minesweeper 
• Deploy new long-range 
radars 
• Secure new AWACS 
variant systems 
• Domestically develop KT-
1 training aircraft 
• Next-generation Fighter 
(F-X) Program – MND 
intends to purchase a total 
of 40 F-Xs 
Table 3-117. Status of FIPs in 2000 
2) Existing Capabilities  
 ROK has been developing its defense industry since the early 1980s.  As of 2000, there 
are almost 80 companies in the defense industry producing 350 odd defense items.  The 
                                                           
50 The MDP actually covers the period 2000 to 2004.  The MDP used in this study has been modified to fit in nicely 
with the epoch timeframes of the study.   
51 A major decision confronting the future of South Korea’s military modernization program involves key decisions 
on what to do when the ROK’s F-4 and F-5 jet fighters need to be replaced in a few years.  A Korean Fighter 
Program already exists and the ROK Air Force will receive the final delivery of 120 KF-16 jet fighters next year.  
They are being manufactured under US license by Samsung Aerospace.  NSCF Task Force on Korean Security.  
South Korea’s Modernization Program and North Korea’s Military Strategy.  1998. 
http://www.nscf.net/South%20Korean%20Modernization %20Program.htm.    
52 President Kim has “instructed the ROK’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD) to accelerate work on a 
medium-range surface-to-air missile which will have a range of 40 km.  It is being designed to intercept invading 
North Korean military aircraft and Scud-type missiles.  The system will not be operational until 2008.  NSCF Task 
Force on Korean Security.  South Korea’s Modernization Program and North Korea’s Military Strategy.  1998. 
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operation rate of the domestic defense industrial firms stands at just 51%, aggravating the 
difficulties the companies are already experiencing.  The ground weapons industry is the 
most mature, especially when supported by a strong and developed automotive industry.  As 
for the defense shipbuilding industry, it has been cultivated since the 1990s and currently has 
the indigenous capability to build major and minor surface ships.  The aerospace industry, 
still on its march towards maturity, was cultivated since late-1980s.  More recently, the 
industry was consolidated into the Korean Aerospace Industry (KAI) 53, a single entity, as a 
result of the Asian financial crisis.  An interesting note is that South Korea’s defense 
industrial capacity makes it possible to field a new system from program commencement on 
an average of 7 years. 
Acquisition Method Average Time Span 
Direct Foreign Purchase 4 years 10 months 
Domestic Production with Foreign Technology 5 years 5 months 
Production through Domestic R&D 7 years 1 month 
Average Time Span for Acquisition 6 years 9 months 
Source:  South Korean Ministry of National Defense, [The Yulgok Project: Yesterday, Today, 
and Tomorrow] (MND:Seoul, 1994), p95. 
Table 3-118. Technology Acquisition Timelines 
 Based on the present infrastructure, the strength of the ROK defense industry is its highly 
developed semiconductor and information technology (IT) industry.  From its experience in 
performing licensed and joint productions of various military and civilian programs, ROK 
also has a strong reverse engineering capability and the development of platforms for 
weapons systems capability, especially from the US.  The industry has not demonstrated 
much creativity or originality in its indigenous defense products.  In essence, the South 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.nscf.net/South%20Korean%20Modernization %20Program.htm.    
53 KAI aims to be among the world’s top 10 aerospace companies by 2010 with approximately $600 million in 
aerospace sales, one third of which will be defense-related.  Defence Production and R&D, South Korea.  10 May 
2000.  Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia – Update 6. 
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Koreans have been copying US technology by adopting a strategy of first co-producing the 
weapon systems through licensed production and then performing the system integration in-
country. Such a strategy has allowed South Korea’s defense industry to mature.  But this 
process has been long and arduous and one such cycle takes at least ten years.  Accordingly, 
the ROK defense acquisition roadmap is summarized in Table 3-119. 














































































Micro Air Vehicle 
Comm Satellite (2d 
Gen) 








Micro Air Vehicle 
UUV 
BMD 















































Annex 3A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2000 and prior) 
3A - 60 































Table 3-119.  ROK Defense Acquisition Roadmap 
 A crucial weakness is ROK’s lack of capacity to develop and produce missiles.  As of 
2000, the assessment is “ROK possesses the ability to produce its own weapons systems by 
integrating locally produced platforms with imported commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
technologies.” 
 More specifically, for the army, ROK has the capacity to build major platform-centric 
systems and to develop and manufacture night vision capability.  For the navy, ROK can 
build the platforms for and perform assembly of KDX-class destroyers, build and develop 
indigenous heavy torpedoes, and its defense shipbuilding industry limited to building surface 
combatants up to 10000 tons. ROK has the capacity to build airframes and perform local 
assembly of advanced combat aircraft like the KF-16.  ROK does not, however, yet possess 
an indigenous capability to produce high technology armaments like AAM, ASM, or SAM.  
An exception is the ROK’s development (with French missile technology) of its Chonma 
SAM with a range of 10 km. 
h. ROK’s R&D Programs 
 Foremost, R&D would be pursued under the principle of “priority to domestically produced 
weapons.”  Next, cost-effective acquisitions would be sought by diversifying the sources of 
weapon systems and broadening international cooperation in defense industry and technology.  
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This also meant the acquisition of integrated systems and the promotion of dual-use technology.  
Based on assessments of ROK’s industrial development and infrastructure, the country decided 
that technological investments in MEMS and biotechnology would be the key technologies for 
enhancing the military’s capabilities. 
1) Defense Digitization for the New Millennium Developments 
 The idea for the Joint C3I System (JC3IS) was first implemented in early 1998 as part of 
the ROK’s military’s efforts to transform the military from a manpower- to technology-
centered force.  The two goals were: first, to focus on constructing a C4I system and a 
resource management system, and two, to establish an infrastructure that makes it possible to 
operate these systems.  The main roles of JC3IS were to direct national war performance and 
secure the joint operation of the three services.   
 The JC3IS consists of the Joint Information Fusion System (JIFS) that integrates and 
analyzes military information from various collecting channels; the Joint Operation Planning 
and Execution System(JOPS) that draws up and evaluates operation plans while distributing 
timely information necessary to plan and execute joint operations; and the Joint Combat 
Service Support System (JCSSS) that tackles the logistics requirements pertinent for the 
successful conduct of joint operations.54  Before elaborating further, some background 
information laying the groundwork for the realization of this concept is necessary.  In 1995, 
MND created the Information Systems Bureau to conduct feasibility studies for defense 
digitization.  Concurrently, MND also enacted the Provision on Defense Information 
Systems Management.  Then in Dec 1996, MND established the Defense Information 
Development Plan for policy directions and mid- and long-term development plan for 
defense digitization.  
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 In Nov 1998, MND introduced the Chief Information Officer (CIO) system to plan and 
coordinate a vast sea of information resources.  Assisting the CIO was the Defense CIO 
Council whose mission was to proliferate the spirit of digitization throughout the entire 
defense sector.  The Council had the MND vice minister for its Chairman and comprised 
members who were the Vice Chairman of JCS and each service.  The following month, 
MND reorganized the Information Systems Bureau into the Information Planning Office to 
concentrate the functions of establishing and coordinating defense digitization policies.  
Through the recommendations of the Council, MND standardized the Defense Information 
Technical Architecture (DITA) with the ROK military subsequently formulating its Defense 
Information Infrastructure Master Plan (DIMP).  From the DIMP, it identified that the 
foremost goal of the ROK military was to establish an integrated information network that 
guaranteed the dissemination of information per battlefield function.  An added goal was the 
automation of the battlefield functions of tactical echelons below the corps-level and 
establishment of an integrated combat management system. 
In Mar 1999, the ROK government proclaimed its vision of “Cyber Korea 21” which 
envisioned national digitization.  To support this vision, the MND set the goal that it would 
install office automation systems in all parts of the military and systems providing services to 
civilians by end 2001.  Additionally, the military established approximately 150 digitization 
training centers with government funds between 1998 and 2002 to nurture the necessary 
qualified manpower for digitization, specifically targeted at the officers and men at the 
brigade-level units or higher. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
54 White Paper 1998. 
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2) Development of Space Program  
 ROK had realized prior to 2000 that numerous future developments would hinge on 
technological solutions.  Thus, in concert with the MND’s ADD, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) and the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) cooperated with 
the MND to embark on a space development program.  The realization by MND was that 
developments in space technology and the exploitation of space55 would hold the key to 
future R&D opportunities affording ROK’s military to make the quantum leap in acquiring 
new capabilities.  With this fundamental thrust, the pursuit of space development became a 
national priority, and was reflected in ROK’s national policies.   
a) Korean Multipurpose Satellite (KOMPSAT) Program.56  
 Prior to KOMPSAT, South Korea had launched its first satellite in 1992, a 50-kg 
microsat known variously as Kitsat 1, Oscar 23, and Uribyol 1.  Its orbit was a 1,300 km 
by 1,400 km orbit inclined at 66 degrees to the equator.57  The satellite was created with 
the help of the University of Surrey, England, which specializes in micro satellites.  Also, 
South Korea being unable to construct its own geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) 
communications spacecraft, it contracted with Lockheed-Martin to launch two 3000 
series satellites in 1995, each carrying 15 Ku-band transponders of which three are high 
powered (120 W). 
                                                           
55 Control of Earth Space not only guarantees long-term control of the outer reaches of space, it provides a near-term 
advantage on the terrestrial battlefield.  From early warning and detection of missile and force movements to target 
planning and battle damage assessment, space-based intelligence gathering assets have already proven themselves 
legitimate combat force multipliers.  In future wars involving at least one major military power, space-support will 
be the decisive factor as nations rely ever more heavily on the force multiplying effect of ‘the new ground’.  Everett 
C. Dolman, ‘Geostrategy in the Space Age:  An Astropolitical Analysis,’ Geopolitics:  Geography and Strategy.  
Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, ed.  Great Britain:  Frank Cass Publishers, 1999.  93. 
56 “TRW Delivers Korean Multipurpose Satellite”, Spacedaily, April 22, 1998. 
57 Kitsat 2 was launched in 1993 and inserted into an orbit of 795 km by 805 km at an inclination of 98.7 degrees.  
“South Korea and Earth Observation Systems”, FAS Space Policy Project World Space Guide.   
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 In 1998, TRW delivered the first of two spacecraft comprising the Korean 
Multipurpose Satellite (KOMPSAT) program to the Republic of Korea’s space agency, 
the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI).  KOMPSAT was seen to enhance 
Korea’s space development infrastructure and was a key component of its 20-year plan.  
The KOMPSAT flight model was assembled , integrated and tested at KARI facilities by 
Korean engineers with support from TRW.   
 In 1999, a Taurus booster launched the first KOMPSAT into a low-Earth-orbit at an 
altitude of 685 km58.  KOMPSAT’s scientific payloads were for ocean color imaging, 
multi-spectral sensing and space physics measurements.  The satellites also included an 
electro-optical camera with seven-meter resolution built by TRW.  This camera provided 
the cartography data for developing digital elevation maps of the Korean peninsula for 
land use and planning purposes.59  More importantly, KOMPSAT represented the first 
joint satellite development undertaken by KARI.  KOMPSAT’s development saw the 
close effort Korean Industrial companies60 had with TRW to build high-reliability, space-
qualified hardware for KOMPSAT. 
b) Development of Space Launch Facilities.61  
 In 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding between the two nations was signed 
between the US and South Korea that set forth the developmental guidelines for both 
launch vehicles that would be used for commercial purposes as well as new generations 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://sun00781.dn.net/spp/guide/skorea/earth/.  Both satellites were placed in sun-synchronous orbits.  “South 
Korea and Satellite Communication Systems”, FAS Space Policy Project World Space Guide.  
http://sun00781.dn.net/spp/guide/skorea/comm/ 
58 “South Korea and Earth Observation Systems”, FAS Space Policy Project World Space Guide. 
http://sun00781.dn.net/spp/guide/skorea/earth/.  
59 This capability is dual-use as the cartographic data can also be used for creating digital maps for military use. 
60 Daewoo provided the attitude and orbit control subsystem; Halla and Hanwah, the propulsion subsystem; 
Hyundai, electrical power system components; Korean Air and Doowon, the structural and thermal subsystem; and 
Samsung, the on-board computer and satellite system test equipment. 
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of ballistic missiles.  This agreement took off all restrictions on the range and payload 
capability of “commercial launch vehicles” and allowed the range limit for military 
ballistic missiles to increase to 300 kilometers.62  Also, in response to North Korea’s 
missile launch attempt in 1998, President Kim Dae Jung announced at end-1999 a five-
year initiative to design, build and launch a commercial space cargo rocket, and to use the 
launcher to create a commercial launch business for the country, with the goal of using 
only South Korean industries and engineering expertise.63 
c) Spy Satellite Program  
 In 2000, South Korea began plans laying the foundation for its spy satellite program.  
Based on its requirements, the South Korean military predicted that it would require a 
constellation of four spy satellites flying in a LEO.  Due to the infancy of its satellite 
industry, ROK decided that it would solicit US assistance.  The projected cost of ROK’s 
first spy satellite was estimated (in 2000) at between US$190-285 million if purchased 
from the US or around US$500 million to indigenously develop, build and launch.64  
Korea planned to buy from US the instruments to control the direction of the optical 
sensors and to send and analyze images taken by the planned satellites.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
61Frank Sietzen, Jr,  “US/South Korea To Sign Launch Agreement”, Spacedaily, April 29, 1999. 
62 The reason for South Korea’s enhanced missile performance points to the incorporation of French rocket 
technology.  This cooperation is supported by French assistance in South Korea’s development of the Chonma 
ground-to-air missile.  In the joint-venture accord between Samsung Electronics and Thomson, both companies 
agreed to provide a complete range of systems and equipment in electronic imagery, military communications, naval 
combat and ground-to-air missiles.  C.W. Lim, “France Helps South Korea Build New Missiles”, Spacedaily, 
November 15, 1999. 
63 Jescovon Puttkamer, “Space Flight 1999 - Asian Space Activities”.   
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/osf/1999/yearinrev/99asia.html.  See also, Frank Sietzen, “A New Asian Space Race 
Emerges”, Space.com, January 25, 2000.   
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/business/korea_space_000124.html.  
64 “Japan To Use US SpySat Technology”, Spacedaily, September 24, 1999.  The costs for South Korea’s program 
uses Japan’s spy satellite program as an estimate. 
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i. Enabling Technology - Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI).65 
 To support the satellite program as an effective space-based surveillance system, R&D 
investments were made to understand the potential applications of hyperspectral imaging into 
ROK’s satellites.  A brief description of this technology thus follows below. 
Hyperspectral imaging is a satellite-based technology that uses hundreds of very narrow 
wavelengths to “see” reflected energy from objects on the ground.  This energy appears in the 
form of “spectral fingerprints” across the light spectrum and enables the collection of much more 
detailed data and produce a much higher spectral resolution of a scene than possible using other 
remote sensing technologies.  Once these fingerprints are detected, special algorithms then assess 
them to differentiate various natural and manmade substances from one another.  Ultimately, 
“signature” libraries would be used to identify specific materials. 
 Image processing equipment then portrays the various types of terrain and objects upon it in 
different colors forming a “color cube,” each based on the wavelength of the reflected energy 
captured by the image.  These colors are subsequently “translated” into maps that correspond to 
certain types of material or objects to detect or identify military targets such as a tank or a mobile 
missile launcher.  Algorithms can also categorize types of terrain and vegetation detecting 
features such as disturbed soil, stressed vegetation, and whether the ground will support the 
movement of military vehicles.  Upon maturity of this technology, theater commanders will be 
able to use mobile ground stations to process in real-time information transmitted by the 
satellites. 
 HSI, like Multispectral Imaging (MSI), is a passive technique, but unlike MSI, HSI creates a large number of 
images from contiguous, rather than disjoint, regions of the spectrum, typically with much finer resolution.66
                                                           
65 “The Warfighter’s Edge:  First Hyperspectral Images From Space”, Spacedaily, September 8, 2000.    
66 In MSI, multiple images of a scene or object are created using light from known parts of the spectrum.  
“Hyperspectral Imaging”, FAS Intelligence Resource Program.  http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/hyper.html 
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• US engages 
in Nuclear NPT 
talks 
• Policy of 
National Self-
Preservation 
• ROK agrees 
to make US 
withdraw half of 
its troops for 





















• Declaration of Unification 
and end of hostilities between the 
two Koreas (2011) 
• Establishment of Confederal 
Council 
• Admission to UN seat 
• Beginning of Inter-
Ministerial Meetings 
• Unified Korean Team to 
Olympics (2012) and World Cup 
(2014) 
• Increased cooperation with 
ASEAN and EU (ARF & ASEM) 
• US begins to withdraw up to 
half of its forces in Korea by 
2015 
• Rise of Japan militarism 
• Korea Federation formed 
• First Unified Korean 
Prefecture elections in 2018 
• Complete withdrawal of US 
troops from Korea.  10% left 
(2018); 0% (2020) 
• Tok-do Island dispute 
• Korea leans closer to China 
• US calls on Japan to play a 









• 4% GDP 
growth 








9 B GDP/yr 




• 2% GDP/yr 
to K(N)  
• 5.9% GDP 
growth/yr 
498 B GDP/yr 
 
• Building of 
Oil pipeline 
from Siberia to 




9 B GDP/yr 
10 B AID 
Package/yr 
• Merging of Economies – 
single Korean Chwon currency 
(2011) 
• Trans-Korea Railway fully 
operational (2015) 
• 2% GDP to K(N)/yr    
• +5.9%/yr +12%/yr 
• 660 B/yr 18 B/yr 
           13 B AID Package/yr  
• China replaces US as #1 
trading partner 
• Oil pipeline construction 
complete 
2% GDP to K(N)/yr    
 
+5.9%/yr  +12-7%/yr 
884 B/yr 29 B/yr 
          18 B AID Package/yr 
Policy: Mass Migration South? 
Welfare? 
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Use economy to 
drive unification 
effort 




• Preserve National 
Sovereignty 
• Independent, self-reliant 
Korea  
• Protection of Capital Flows 
ie. ship, rail, pipeline 
 
• Maintain sovereignty 
• Strategic agreement with 
China to overcome weakness in 
repelling overland invasion  
• Benevolent Neutrality 
• Economic Revival – 
protection of commerce/SLOCs 
National 











military ties  
 
• To unite 
















• 360-degrees coverage 
• Protection of SLOCs 
• Technology Transfer 
• Deterrence from cruise and 
ballistic missiles 
• Protection from sea invasion 
• Protection from SLOC 
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30% of 83% 
(1.013 B/yr) 
 
40% of 83% 
(1.351 B/yr) 
 






50% of 60% 
(0.222 B/yr) 
 
20% of 60% 
(0.089 B/yr) 
 






30% of 83% 
(1.304 B/yr) 
 
40% of 83% 
(1.738 B/yr) 
 






50% of 60% 
(0.300 B/yr) 
 
20% of 60% 
(0.120 B/yr) 
 






30% of 83% 
(1.716 B/yr) 
 
40% of 83% 
(2.228 B/yr) 
 






50% of 60% 
(0.799 B/yr) 
 
20% of 60% 
(0.192 B/yr) 
 






30% of 83% 
(2.285 B/yr) 
 
40% of 83% 
(3.047 B/yr) 
 






50% of 60% 
(1.342 B/yr) 
 
20% of 60% 
(0.322 B/yr) 
 






































Net          
Assessment 
• Overland invasion between 
ROK/USFK and DPRK 
• Overland invasion between 
ROK/USFK and DPRK/PRC 
• Overland invasion between 
ROK/USFK and DPRK 
• Overland invasion between 
ROK/USFK and DPRK/PRC 
• Overland Invasion by Korea 
(N) 
• Overland invasion with Sea 
Blockade by China 
 
• SLOC Blockade with Air 
Interdiction by Japan 
 
Deficiencies • Coastal Defense 
• Maintaining Air Superiority 
 
• Coastal Defense 
• Maintaining Air Superiority 
• Protection of SLOCs 
 
• Need for Long Range 
Precision Strike Capability 
• Defense Against Ballistic 
Missile Attacks 
• Defense Against Cruise 
Missile Attacks 
 
• Require a Better CM Defense 
• Need for Long Range 
Precision Strike 
• Need for BM Defense 
Annex 3C:  ECONOMICS; Appendix 1: GDP / DEFENSE BREAKDOWN 
3C - 1 
 
ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK
%GDP 3.5% 27.0% 2.5% 18.9% 1.1% 8.1%
% 3.5% 27.0% 70.0% 70.0% 30.0% 30.0%
%Def Bud 100.0% 100.0% 70.0% 70.0% 30.0% 30.0%
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil
%Growth 4.0% 6.2%
2000 344.000 7.600 12.040 2.052 8.428 1.436 3.612 0.616
2001 357.760 8.071 12.522 2.179 8.765 1.525 3.756 0.654
2002 372.070 8.572 13.022 2.314 9.116 1.620 3.907 0.694
2003 386.953 9.103 13.543 2.458 9.480 1.720 4.063 0.737
2004 402.431 9.667 14.085 2.610 9.860 1.827 4.226 0.783
2005 418.529 10.267 14.649 2.772 10.254 1.940 4.395 0.832
Total 1,937.744 45.680 67.821 12.334 47.475 8.634 20.346 3.700
Avg 387.549 9.136 13.564 2.467 9.495 1.727 4.069 0.740
%Growth 0.059 0.062
2006 443.222 10.903 15.513 2.944 10.859 2.061 4.654 0.883
2007 469.372 11.579 16.428 3.126 11.500 2.189 4.928 0.938
2008 497.065 12.297 17.397 3.320 12.178 2.324 5.219 0.996
2009 526.392 13.060 18.424 3.526 12.897 2.468 5.527 1.058
2010 557.449 13.869 19.511 3.745 13.657 2.621 5.853 1.123
Total 2,493.499 61.709 87.272 16.661 61.091 11.663 26.182 4.998
Avg 498.700 12.342 17.454 3.332 12.218 2.333 5.236 1.000
%Growth 0.059 0.120
2011 590.338 15.534 20.662 4.194 14.463 2.936 6.199 1.258
2012 625.168 17.398 21.881 4.697 15.317 3.288 6.564 1.409
2013 662.053 19.486 23.172 5.261 16.220 3.683 6.952 1.578
2014 701.114 21.824 24.539 5.892 17.177 4.125 7.362 1.768
2015 742.480 24.443 25.987 6.600 18.191 4.620 7.796 1.980
Total 3,321.154 98.684 116.240 26.645 81.368 18.651 34.872 7.993
Avg 664.231 19.737 23.248 5.329 16.274 3.730 6.974 1.599
%Growth 0.059 12.0 - 7.2%
2016 786.286 27.376 27.520 7.391 19.264 5.174 8.256 2.217
2017 832.677 30.332 29.144 8.190 20.401 5.733 8.743 2.457
2018 881.805 33.244 30.863 8.976 21.604 6.283 9.259 2.693
2019 933.832 36.037 32.684 9.730 22.879 6.811 9.805 2.919
2020 988.928 38.631 34.612 10.430 24.229 7.301 10.384 3.129
Total 4,423.528 165.621 154.823 44.718 108.376 31.302 46.447 13.415
Avg 884.706 33.124 30.965 8.944 21.675 6.260 9.289 2.683
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ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK ROK DPRK
%GDP 1.1% 8.1% 0.3% 4.1% 0.4% 1.6% 0.3% 2.4% 0.0% 0.4%
% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 50.0% 40.0% 20.0% 30.0% 30.0% 4.0% 5.0%
%Def Bud 30.0% 30.0% 7.4% 9.0% 9.8% 3.6% 7.4% 5.4% 1.2% 1.5%
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil
%Growth
2000 $3.612 $0.616 $0.899 $0.185 $1.199 $0.074 $0.899 $0.111 $0.144 $0.031
2001 $3.756 $0.654 $0.935 $0.196 $1.247 $0.078 $0.935 $0.118 $0.150 $0.033
2002 $3.907 $0.694 $0.973 $0.208 $1.297 $0.083 $0.973 $0.125 $0.156 $0.035
2003 $4.063 $0.737 $1.012 $0.221 $1.349 $0.088 $1.012 $0.133 $0.163 $0.037
2004 $4.226 $0.783 $1.052 $0.235 $1.403 $0.094 $1.052 $0.141 $0.169 $0.039
2005 $4.395 $0.832 $1.094 $0.249 $1.459 $0.100 $1.094 $0.150 $0.176 $0.042
Total $20.346 $3.700 $5.066 $1.110 $6.755 $0.444 $5.066 $0.666 $0.814 $0.185
Avg $4.069 $0.740 $1.013 $0.222 $1.351 $0.089 $1.013 $0.133 $0.163 $0.037
%Growth
2006 $4.654 $0.883 $1.159 $0.265 $1.545 $0.106 $1.159 $0.159 $0.186 $0.044
2007 $4.928 $0.938 $1.227 $0.281 $1.636 $0.113 $1.227 $0.169 $0.197 $0.047
2008 $5.219 $0.996 $1.300 $0.299 $1.733 $0.120 $1.300 $0.179 $0.209 $0.050
2009 $5.527 $1.058 $1.376 $0.317 $1.835 $0.127 $1.376 $0.190 $0.221 $0.053
2010 $5.853 $1.123 $1.457 $0.337 $1.943 $0.135 $1.457 $0.202 $0.234 $0.056
Total $26.182 $4.998 $6.519 $1.500 $8.692 $0.600 $6.519 $0.900 $1.047 $0.250
Avg $5.236 $1.000 $1.304 $0.300 $1.738 $0.120 $1.304 $0.180 $0.209 $0.050
%Growth
2011 $6.199 $1.258 $1.525 $0.629 $2.033 $0.151 $1.525 $0.226 $0.248 $0.063
2012 $6.564 $1.409 $1.615 $0.705 $2.153 $0.169 $1.615 $0.254 $0.263 $0.070
2013 $6.952 $1.578 $1.710 $0.789 $2.280 $0.189 $1.710 $0.284 $0.278 $0.079
2014 $7.362 $1.768 $1.811 $0.884 $2.415 $0.212 $1.811 $0.318 $0.294 $0.088
2015 $7.796 $1.980 $1.918 $0.990 $2.557 $0.238 $1.918 $0.356 $0.312 $0.099
Total $34.872 $7.993 $8.579 $3.997 $11.438 $0.959 $8.579 $1.439 $1.395 $0.400
Avg $6.974 $1.599 $1.716 $0.799 $2.288 $0.192 $1.716 $0.288 $0.279 $0.080
%Growth
2016 $8.256 $2.217 $2.031 $1.109 $2.708 $0.266 $2.031 $0.399 $0.330 $0.111
2017 $8.743 $2.457 $2.151 $1.228 $2.868 $0.295 $2.151 $0.442 $0.350 $0.123
2018 $9.259 $2.693 $2.278 $1.346 $3.037 $0.323 $2.278 $0.485 $0.370 $0.135
2019 $9.805 $2.400 $2.412 $1.459 $3.216 $0.350 $2.412 $0.525 $0.392 $0.146
2020 $10.384 $2.400 $2.554 $1.565 $3.406 $0.375 $2.554 $0.563 $0.415 $0.156
Total $46.447 $12.167 $11.426 $6.708 $15.235 $1.610 $11.426 $2.415 $1.858 $0.671
Avg $9.289 $2.433 $2.285 $1.342 $3.047 $0.322 $2.285 $0.483 $0.372 $0.134
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ROK DPRK ROK Force Development ADD Operation Army Navy Air Force
Electro-optics 
RC Microwave RC
%GDP 1.1% 8.1% 0.14% 0.11% 0.03%
% 30.0% 30.0% 13.0% 80.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 30.0% 27.6% 29.4%
%Def Bud 30.0% 30.0% 3.9% 3.1% 0.8%
Year US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil
%Growth
2000 $3.61 $0.62 $0.470 $0.376 $0.094 0.113 0.150 0.113 0.026 0.028
2001 $3.76 $0.65 $0.488 $0.391 $0.098 0.117 0.156 0.117 0.027 0.029
2002 $3.91 $0.69 $0.508 $0.406 $0.102 0.122 0.163 0.122 0.028 0.030
2003 $4.06 $0.74 $0.528 $0.423 $0.106 0.127 0.169 0.127 0.029 0.031
2004 $4.23 $0.78 $0.549 $0.439 $0.110 0.132 0.176 0.132 0.030 0.032
2005 $4.39 $0.83 $0.571 $0.457 $0.114 0.137 0.183 0.137 0.032 0.034
Total $20.35 $3.70 $2.645 $2.116 $0.529 0.635 0.846 0.635 0.146 0.155
Avg 3.39 0.62 0.44 0.35 0.09 0.106 0.141 0.106 0.024 0.026
%Growth
2006 $4.7 $0.9 $0.605 $0.484 $0.121 0.145 0.194 0.145 0.033 0.036
2007 $4.9 $0.9 $0.641 $0.513 $0.128 0.154 0.205 0.154 0.035 0.038
2008 $5.2 $1.0 $0.678 $0.543 $0.136 0.163 0.217 0.163 0.037 0.040
2009 $5.5 $1.1 $0.719 $0.575 $0.144 0.172 0.230 0.172 0.040 0.042
2010 $5.9 $1.1 $0.761 $0.609 $0.152 0.183 0.243 0.183 0.042 0.045
Total $26.2 $5.0 $3.404 $2.723 $0.681 0.817 1.089 0.817 0.188 0.200
Avg $5.2 $1.0 0.68 0.54 0.14 0.163 0.218 0.163 0.038 0.040
%Growth
2011 $6.2 $1.3 $0.806 $0.645 $0.161 0.193 0.258 0.193 0.045 0.047
2012 $6.6 $1.4 $0.853 $0.683 $0.171 0.205 0.273 0.205 0.047 0.050
2013 $7.0 $1.6 $0.904 $0.723 $0.181 0.217 0.289 0.217 0.050 0.053
2014 $7.4 $1.8 $0.957 $0.766 $0.191 0.230 0.306 0.230 0.053 0.056
2015 $7.8 $2.0 $1.013 $0.811 $0.203 0.243 0.324 0.243 0.056 0.060
Total $34.9 $8.0 $4.533 $3.627 $0.907 1.088 1.451 1.088 0.250 0.266
Avg $7.0 $1.6 0.91 0.73 0.18 0.218 0.290 0.218 0.050 0.053
%Growth
2016 $8.3 $2.2 $1.073 $0.859 $0.215 0.258 0.343 0.258 0.059 0.063
2017 $8.7 $2.5 $1.137 $0.909 $0.227 0.273 0.364 0.273 0.063 0.067
2018 $9.3 $2.7 $1.204 $0.963 $0.241 0.289 0.385 0.289 0.066 0.071
2019 $9.8 $2.4 $1.275 $1.020 $0.255 0.306 0.408 0.306 0.070 0.075
2020 $10.4 $2.4 $1.350 $1.080 $0.270 0.324 0.432 0.324 0.075 0.079
Total $46.4 $12.2 $6.038 $4.830 $1.208 1.449 1.932 1.449 0.334 0.355
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Designation Unit QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total Comments Total
NEW CAPABILITY
Attack Helo 18 0 0 0 0 24 432 48 864 AH64D 72
Missiles 0.2 0 0 0 0 1500 300 2500 500 AGM11X 4000
Ballistic Missiles 1 100 100 200 200 200 200
SAM 35 0 0 0 0 48 1680 66 2310 A300V/400 114
REPLACEMENTS
Miscelaneous 1010 1300
MBT 7 0 0 100 700 100 700 K1? 200
APCs 4 0 0 40 160 200 800 M2/M3 240
Soldier Systems 0.01 0 0 0 0 52500 525 150000 1500 Various 202500
Total Obligated 1110 1500 3997 6674
Available in Epoch 1110 1500 3997 6708
Remaining 0 0 0 34
South Korea Unit
Designation (M$US) QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total Comments Total
NEW CAPABILITY
Attack Helo 18 48 864 48 864 48 864 0 0 AH64D 144
Scout/Atk Helo 35 0 0 24 840 48 1680 96 3360 RAH66 168
Missiles 0.2 2500 500 2500 500 2500 500 2500 500 AGM 11X 10000
Ballistic Missiles 1 0 0 25 25 75 75 200 200 300
Tactical DBA 5 20 100 28 140 48 240 48 240 GBS 144
SAM 35 20 700 28 980 0 0 0 0 A300V 48
SAM 55 0 0 0 0 48 2640 48 2640 A400V 96
DBA Interfaces 10 100 1000 50 500 50 500 10 100 FAAD C2I, MCS 210
Night Vision Dev ices 0.01 20000 200 20000 200 10000 100 10000 100 60000
Navy Cruise Missiles 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000 1000 1000
REPLACEMENTS 0
MBT 7 66 462 100 700 100 700 230 1610 K1/M1 496
APCs 4 66 264 100 400 100 400 230 920 M2/M3 496
Soldier Systems 0.01 75000 750 75000 750 75000 750 75000 750 Various 300000
Total Obligated 4840 5899 8449 11420
Available in Epoch 5066 6519 8579 11426
Remaining 226 620 130 6
Epoch 4Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4
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Cost QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total Comment Total
NEW 
CAPABILITYType 214 1120 0 0 3 3360 3 3360 4 4480 9
Chang Bogo 
S
1000 2 0 0 0 0 3
ubmarine 400 0 0 0 2 800
KDX - 900 0 0 2 1800 6 5400 Indigeniou 7
KDX III 1000 3 3000 4 4000 4 4000 0 KDX III 12
KDX II 400 1 0 0 0 0 KDX II 1
MSC / 
C
500 3 1500 0 0 0 Kang 6
MSO / 500 0 0 0 3 1500
Mine 500 2 1000 0 0 3 1500 Won 5
Alligator 400 3 1200 0 0 0 Alligator 3
Amphibious 300 3 900 0 0 3
UnRep 200 1 200 0 2 400 0 4
Patrol 
C f
400 0 3 1200 0 6
Super 25 13 325 0 6 150 0 13
P-3C 
( )
30 8 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
P-3X 
( )
30 0 0 4 120 8 240 12 360 8
UWAV 
(O )
200 0 0 0 4 800 Technology 5
Upgrade
Chang Bogo 50 3 150 0 0 0 Equip 
SSM 0.8 150 120 140 112 0 0 0
SSM (SS-N- 0.7 0 0 0 0 150 105 500 350
SS-N-
21 S
0.7 0 0 0 0 200 140
SS-N-21 0.7 0 0 0 0 500 350
SAM (SM-
2)
0.2 500 100 500 100 0 0
SAM (SM-
3)
1 0 0 200 200 500 500
ASW 
( )
0.1 1000 100 1000 100 700 70 700 70
ASW 
(S )




1 0 0 -1000 -1000
Air Force 
f
1 -1200 -1200 -125 -125 -225 -225
Total 
Obli t d
6735 8692 11435 15060
Availa le in Epoch 
1
6755 8692 11438 15235








30 12 360 0 0 6 180 6 180 Ilyushin II-20 Coot 
/Patrol 
S
300 0 0 2 600 2 600 4 1200 Russia
UPGRADE
SPatrol 4 14 56 0 0 6 24 0 0
Corvette 5 5 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romeo 5 0 0 0 0 10 50 0 0
SSM (SS-N- 0.7 0 0 0 0 150 105 0 0
SS-N- 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 89.6
SS-N-21 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 140
Total 
Obli t d
441 600 959 1609.6
Available in 
E h
$444 $600 959 1,610
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Air Force 
 
Epoch 1 Air Force Procurement    
     
South Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Unit Cost 67 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
A-50 10 45 450 New Ground Attack 
E-3 / AWACS 1 150 150 New AEW 
KOX-1 10 10 100 Fwd Air Control (FAC) 
KT-1 45 6 270 Trainer - Prop 
UAV 80 10 800 Israeli Pioneer 
KOX/KT-1 Program 1 300 300 T&E/DIB Improve 
FX-x Program 1 1400 1400 T&E/DIB Improve 
UAV Program 1 200 200 T&E//Integrate 
AA/AG Missiles 1 20 20 Program $$ 
NAVY Integration 1 1200 1200 Navy Shortfall 
       
Upgrades:      
AIM-120A/B/C 150 0.5 75 New Missiles 
          
  Total Obligated $4,965  
  Available in Epoch 1 $5,066  
  Remaining $101  
     
North Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Unit Cost 67 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
AS-x Missile 50 0.8 40 Air-Surface Missile 
       
Upgrades:      
Mig-29 Fleet 35 5.71 200 Radar/Avionics 
Su-25 Fleet 36 5.56 200 Radar/Avionics 
          
  Total Obligated $440  
  Available in Epoch 1 $666  




                                                           
67 Weapons Systems Costs, Nicholas, Ted and Rossi, Rita. Data Research Associates, Fountain Valley, CA.  April 
2000.  Figures in the table are based upon actual cost data of US representative systems with some adjustments for 
producibility improvements, incentives, and learning curves in future programs. 
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Epoch 2 Air Force Procurement Proposal   
     
South Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Unit Cost 68 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
A-50 50 30 1500 New Ground Attack 
E-3/AWACS 2 150 300 New AEW 
KOX-1 10 8 80 FAC 
KT-1 50 6 300 Trainer-Prop 
KT-2 94 8 752 Trainer-Woong Bee 
T-50 94 20 1880 Trainer-Jet 
FX-x 15 45 675 F-22 variant 
Harm Block 6 100 0.5 50 SEAD  
Aim-9x 50 0.4 20 High Off-boresight IR 
AGM-130/142 50 0.8 40 Air-SFC Missile 
A-50 (E-3Delivery) 30 30 900 Epoch3-Delivery 
      
Upgrades:      
          
  Total Obligated $6,497  
  Available in Epoch 2 $6,519  
  Remaining $22  
     
North Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Unit Cost 68 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
    0   
Upgrades:      
Miscellaneous* 10 80 800 Parts/Readiness  
      0   
  Total Obligated $800  
  Available in Epoch 2 $900  
  Remaining $100  
*  Miscellaneous is allocated to programs for parts support in any major readiness degradation category.  This 
placeholder is intended to signify the dire condition of the DPRK Air Force assets.  They cannot afford anything 
else. 
 
                                                           
68 Weapons Systems Costs, Nicholas, Ted and Rossi, Rita. Data Research Associates, Fountain Valley, CA.  April 
2000. Figures in the table are based upon actual cost data of US representative systems with some adjustments for 
producibility improvements, incentives, and learning curves in future programs.  
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Epoch 3 Air Force Procurement Proposal   
     
South Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Cost 69 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
Air Refueling A/C 5 60 300 KC-7xx 
UAV 40 15 600 UAV- HAE 
E-3/AWACS 4 150 600 New AWACS 
C-130x 50 40 2000 SOF Capable 
JDAM/JSOW Derivative 100 0.25 25   
UCAV 5 15 75   
HARM Block 6 50 0.35 17.5 SEAD 
AIM-9x 100 0.35 35 HOBS 
KF-X   50 45 2250 F-X Variant 
KT-2 40 20 800   
A-50 10 30 300   
E/RC/JSTARS 2 200 400 US J-8 Variant 
Upgrades:      
Air-to-Air Upgrade 1 500 500   
DBA 1 500 500   
AA-x Missiles 100 0.5 50   
Navy Integration 1 125 125 Navy Shortfall 
          
  Total Obligated $8,578  
  Available Epoch 3 $8,579  
  Remaining $1  
     
North Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Unit Cost 69 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
UAV/Recce 10 10 100 UAV Assets 
KT-2 30 10 300 Primary -KT-2 
C-130 4 40 160 SOF Capable 
Helo 15 20 300 SOF Capable 
Upgrades:      
M-23/29 Upgrade 1 500 500 Performance+Rdr 
     
  Total Obligated $1,360  
  Available Epoch 3 $1,439  
  Remaining $79  
                                                           
69 Weapons Systems Costs, Nicholas, Ted and Rossi, Rita. Data Research Associates, Fountain Valley, CA.  April 
2000.  Figures in the table are based upon actual cost data of US representative systems with some adjustments for 
producibility improvements, incentives, and learning curves in future programs. 
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Epoch 4 Air Force Procurement     
     
South Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Cost 70 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
Air Refueling A/C 5 55 275 KC-7xx 
UAV 40 15 600 HAE 
E-3/AWACS 4 180 720   
C-130x 8 45 360 SOF Capable 
JDAM/JSOW Derivative 200 0.25 50   
UCAV 50 20 1000   
F-X  50 40 2000   
AGM-x ASM 150 0.5 75 Anti-Shipping w/ATR 
AA-x Missiles 200 0.4 80 AIM-xx ERAAM 
KT-2 20 8 160 KT-2 
A-50 100 28 2800   
A-50 (E3 Delivery) 60 28 1680 Epoch 3 Delivery 
Upgrades:      
Air-to-Air Upgrade 1 550 550 F-16 / A-50 / FX-x 
DBA Integration 1 450 450   
AIM-9x 100 0.4 40   
AGM-88 Harm 100 0.5 50 Block 6 
Navy Cruise Missile 1 225 225 Cruise Missile Integrate 
AGM-xx JASSM 150 0.8 120 ER Stand-off Weapon 
  Total Obligated $11,235  
  Available in Epoch 4 $11,426  
  Remaining $191  
North Korea   MIL US $ MIL US $   
Designation Quantity Cost 70 Total Comments 
New Capability:      
UAV 50 8 400 UAV HAE 
FX-x 18 30 540 New Fighter 
A-50 18 30 540 New Ground Attack 
KT-1 30 6 180 Primary- Prop 
T-50 30 20 600 Trainer - Jet 
Upgrades:   0   
     
  Total Obligated $2,260  
  Available in Epoch 4 $2,415  
  Remaining $155  
                                                           
70  Weapons Systems Costs, Nicholas, Ted and Rossi, Rita. Data Research Associates, Fountain Valley, CA.  April 
2000.  Figures in the table are based upon actual cost data of US representative systems with some adjustments for 
producibility improvements, incentives, and learning curves in future programs. 
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Designation (mil) QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total QTY Total Comment Total
North Korea
No-Dong 1 50 50 50 50 80 80 80 80 260
Taepo-Dong 2 25 50 75 150 60 120 60 120 220
0 0 0 0 0
Total Obligated 100 200 200 200
Available in North Korea 100 200 200 0
Remaining 0 0 0
South Korea
KSR-1 1 0 25 25 50 50 0 75
Hyon Mu 1 0 0 25 25 0 25
0 0 0 0 0
Total Obligated 0 25 75 0
Available in South Korea 0 25 75
Available in Unified Korea 200
Remaining 0 0 0 0
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4
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DBA Programs Amount DBA Programs Amount DBA Programs Amount DBA Programs Amount
US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil US$ Bil
Communications Satellites $0.100 Communications Satellites $0.125 Microsatellites $0.200 Microsatellites $0.250
Spy Satellites $0.200 Spy Satellites $0.260 Micro Spy Satellites $0.300 Micro Spy Satellites $0.360
Launch Vehicle $0.100 Launch Vehicle $0.125 Launch Vehicle $0.125 Launch Vehicle $0.175
Aerostat $0.080 Aerostat $0.080 JLENS $0.080 JLENS $0.150
Micro Air Sensor $0.120 Micro Air Sensor $0.150 Micro Air Sensor $0.180 Micro Air Sensor $0.280
Defense Digitization $0.035 Defense Digitization $0.060 Defense Digitization $0.125 Defense Digitization $0.145
Others $0.179 Others $0.247 Others $0.385 Others $0.498
Total $0.814 Total $1.047 Total $1.395 Total $1.858
2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020
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Combat System Start Procure Demob End/Start Procure Demob End/Start Procure Demob End/Start Procure Demob End EndState
Active Divisions 80 80 15 65 15 50 15 35 53
# Personnel (K) 1000 1000 187 813 206 607 182 425 863
Res Divisions 37 37 5 32 15 17 4 13 25
MBTs 3500 3500 700 2800 100 700 2200 200 900 1500 2880
APCs / AIFVs 2500 2500 500 2000 40 500 1540 1540 3040
AHs 50 50 10 40 24 40 24 48 72 386
Gun Arty 8200 8200 875 7325 875 6450 1750 4700 8250
Rkt Arty 2300 2300 300 2000 300 1700 500 1200 1380
SSMs 55 55 55 55 55 67
ADA 6000 6000 1750 4250 1750 2500 1750 750 1100
SAM 5500 5500 2500 3000 48 2500 548 66 614 1138
South Korea
Combat System Start Procure Demob End/Start Procure Demob End/Start Procure Demob End/Start Procure Demob End
Active Divisions 23 23 23 23 5 18
# Personnel (K) 560 560 560 560 122 438
Res Divisions 23 23 23 23 11 12
MBTs 2100 66 66 2100 100 100 2100 100 100 2100 230 950 1380
APCs / AIFVs 2500 66 66 2500 100 100 2500 100 100 2500 230 1230 1500
AHs 100 48 48 100 72 50 122 96 218 96 314
Gun Arty 4550 4550 250 4300 250 4050 500 3550
Rkt Arty 180 180 180 180 180
SSMs 12 12 12 12 12
ADA 600 600 600 600 250 350
SAM 1000 20 35 985 28 35 978 48 50 976 48 500 524
Epoch 4
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3
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Korea (N) Navy 
 
 
Category Specific Begin "+ / -" Begin "+ / -" Begin "+ / -" Begin "+ / -"
Submarines Romeo 21 21 21 -11 10 10 Romeo
Kilo 0 0 2 2 2 4 4 8 Kilo
Whisky 4 4 -4 0 0 0 Whisky
Total 25 0 25 -2 23 -9 14 4 18 Total Submarines
Sumersible Sang-O 31 31 31 31 31 Sang-O
Yugo / P-4 36 36 36 -16 20 -20 0 Yugo / P-4
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Total 67 0 67 0 67 -16 51 -20 31 Submersible
Frigates Soho 1 1 -1 0 0 0
Nanjing 2 2 2 -2 0 0
Total 3 3 3 0 0
0 0 0
Corvettes Sariwon 3 3 3 3 3 Sariwon
Tral 2
Total 5 5 5 5 5 Total  Corvettes
Coastal Patrol Osa 1 8 8 8 8 8 Osa 1
Huangfen 4 4 4 4 4 Huangfen
Soju 15 15 15 15 15 Soju
Komar 6 6 6 6 6 Komar
Sohung 6 6 6 6 6 Sohung
Hainan 6 6 6 6 6 Hainan
SO 1 19 19 19 19 19 SO 1
Taechong I 7 7 7 7 7 Taechong I
Taechoong II 5 5 5 5 5 Taechoong II
Shang Hai II 12 12 12 12 12 Shang Hai II
Chong Ju 6 6 6 6 6 Chong Ju
Chaho 62 62 62 62 62 Chaho
Chong Jin 48 48 48 48 -48 0 Chong Jin
Sinpo / Sinnam 24 24 24 24 24 Sinpo / Sinnam
P6 Shantou 15 15 15 -15 0 0 P6 Shantou
Ku Song 92 92 92 -92 0 0 Ku Song
KimJin 63 63 63 63 63 KimJin
YongDo 45 45 45 45 -45 0 YongDo
0 0 0 0
Total 443 0 443 0 443 -107 336 -93 243 Total Coastal Patrol
Aircraft Maritime Patrol 0 12 12 12 12 12 Total MPA
0 0 0 0
Amphibious Hantae 10 10 10 10 10 Hantae 
Nampo D 5 5 5 5 5 Nampo D
Nampo B 73 73 73 73 -73 0 Nampo B 
Nampo A 18 18 18 -18 0 0 Nampo A 
Hanchon 7 7 7 -7 0 0 Hanchon 
Hungnam 18 18 18 -18 0 0 Hungnam 
KongBang 135 135 135 135 -85 50 KongBang 
Total 266 0 266 0 266 -43 223 -158 65 Total Amphibious
Mine Warfare Yukto 2 5 5 5 5 5 Yukto 2
Yukto 1 19 19 19 19 19 Yukto 1
Total 24 0 24 0 24 0 24 0 24 Total Mine Warfare
Force 2020
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4
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Category Specific Begin "+ / -" Begin "+ / -" Begin "+ / -" Begin "+ / -"
Submarines Tolograe 2 -2 0 0 0 0 Tolograe
Dolphin 9 -3 6 -6 0 0 0 Dolphin
Chang Bogo 7 2 9 9 9 9
Type 214 0 0 3 3 3 6 4 10
Total 18 -3 15 -3 12 3 15 4 19 Total Patrol Subs
Destroyers KDX-1 3 3 3 3 3 KDX-1
KDX-2 2 1 3 3 3 3 KDX-2
KDX-3 0 3 3 4 7 4 11 11 KDX-3
KDX-X 0 0 0 2 2 6 8 KDX-X
Total 5 4 9 4 13 6 19 6 25 Total Destroyers
Frigates Ulsan 9 -3 6 6 -6 0 0
Gearing F1 5 5 -5 0 0
Gearing F2 2 -2 0 0 0 0
Total 16 11 6 0 0
0 0 0
Corvettes Po Hang 24 24 24 -6 18 18 Po Hang
Dong Hae 4 4 -4 0 0
Total 28 0 28 -4 24 -6 18 0 18 Total  Corvettes
Coastal Patrol Pae Ku 5 5 -5 0 0 0 Pae Ku
Sea Dolphins 85 85 85 85 85 Sea Dolphins
Dolphin-X 0 0 3 3 3 6 6 Dolphin-X
Total 90 0 90 -2 88 3 91 0 91 Total Coastal Patrol
Aircraft Super Lynx 11 13 24 24 6 30 30 Total MPA
P-3C 8 8 16 16 16 16
P-3X 0 0 4 4 8 12 12 24
Total 19 40 44 58 70 Total
Amphibious Alligator 4 3 7 7 7 7 Alligator
Pung To 3 3 3 3 3 Pung To
LCVPs 20 20 20 20 20 LCVPs
Uh Bong 6 -6 0 0 0 0 Uh Bong
New 0 0 3 3 3 3 New
Total 33 -3 30 3 33 0 33 0 33 Total Amphibious
Mine Warfare Kang Keong 6 3 9 9 3 12 12 Kang Keong
MSC 268 3 -3 0 0 0
MSC 289 5 5 -5 0 0
Won San 1 2 3 3 3 6 6 Won San
Total 15 2 17 -5 12 6 18 0 18 Total Mine Warfare
Force 2020
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4
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Korea (N) Air Force 
 
Category Specific Begin + / - Begin + / - Begin + / - Begin + / -
Fighter Mig-29 35 35 35 35 -15 20 Mig-29
Mig-23 46 46 46 46 -26 20 Mig-23
Mig-21 160 160 160 160 -60 100 Mig-21
F-X 0 0 0 18 18 F-X
Total 241 0 241 0 241 0 241 -83 158 Total Fighter
Ground Attack Su-7 18 18 18 18 18 Su-7
Su-25 36 36 36 36 -16 20 Su-25
A-5 40 40 40 40 -20 20 A-5
F-6(Mig-19) 120 120 120 120 -120 0 F-6(Mig-19)
F-5(Mig-17) 107 107 107 -107 0 0 F-5(Mig-17)
A-50 0 0 0 18 18 A-50 P3I
Total 321 321 321 -107 214 -138 76 Total Ground Attack
Bomber H-5/Il-28 80 80 80 80 -40 40 H-5/Il-28
80 0 80 0 80 0 80 -40 40 Total Bomber
0 0 0
AEW/ESM 0 0 0 0
Recce/FAC/UAV UAV 0 0 0 10 10 50 60 UAV
0 0 0 10 10 50 60 Total Recce/FAC/UAV
Air Refuel 0 0 0 0
Trainer Mig-29 5 5 5 5 5 Mig-29
Mig 21/23 40 40 40 40 -20 20 Mig 21/23
F-5(Mig-17) 25 25 25 -25 0 0 F-5(Mig-17)
Yak-18 158 158 158 -73 85 -85 0 Yak-18
Mig-15 35 35 35 35 -35 0 Mig-15
KT-2 0 0 30 30 30 KT-2
KT-1 0 0 0 30 30 KT-1
T-50 0 0 0 30 30 T-50
263 0 263 0 263 -68 195 -80 115 Total Trainer
Transport Y-5 120 120 120 -60 60 60 Y-5
An-2 162 162 162 -130 32 32 An-2
An-24 Coke 6 6 6 6 6 An-24 Coke
Tu-76 Candid 3 3 3 3 3 Tu-76 Candid
Il-62 Classic 1 1 1 1 1 Il-62 Classic
IL/Tu-14/18/134/154 12 12 12 12 12 IL/Tu-14/18/134/154
C-130 0 0 4 4 4 C-130
304 0 304 0 304 -186 118 0 118 Total Transport
Helo Transport Helo 275 275 275 15 290 290 Helo
275 275 275 15 290 290 Total Helo
Air-Air Missiles AA-2 Atoll 0 0 0 0 AA-2 Atoll
AA-7 Apex 0 0 0 0 AA-7 Apex
AA-11 Archer 0 0 0 0 AA-11 Archer
AA-10 Alamo 0 0 0 0 AA-10 Alamo
AA-xx 0 0 0 0 AA-xx
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Air-Ground Missiles 0 0 0 0
AS-x 50 50 50 50 50 AS-x
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 50 50 0 50 0 50 0 50
Force 2020
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4
Accurate data unavailable.
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Korea (S) Air Force 
 
Category Specific Begin + / - Begin + / - Begin + / - Begin + / -
Fighter F-5E 195 195 195 -100 95 -95 0 F-5E
F-4D 130 130 -130 0 0 0 F-4D
F-16C/D 160 160 160 160 -20 140 F-16C/D
F-X 0 15 15 50 65 50 115 F-X
UCAV 0 0 5 5 50 55 UCAV
Total 485 0 485 -115 370 -45 325 -15 310 Total Fighter
Ground Attack A-50 0 10 10 50 60 100 160 100 260 A-50
Total 0 10 10 50 60 100 160 100 260 Total Ground Attack
Bomber 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
AEW/ESM E-3 AWACS 0 1 1 2 3 4 7 4 11 E-3 AWACS
E/RC-767 0 0 2 2 2 E/RC-767
Recce/FAC/UAV RF-4/RF-5 28 28 28 -18 10 10 RF-4/RF-5
OV-2 10 10 10 -10 0 0 OV-2
KOX-1 0 10 10 10 20 20 20 KOX-1
UAV 0 80 80 80 40 120 40 160 UAV
38 90 128 10 138 12 150 40 190
Air Refuel KC-7xx 0 0 5 5 5 10 KC-7xx
Trainer Hawk 18 18 -10 8 8 8 Hawk
T-41 25 25 -25 0 0 0 T-41
T-37 50 50 -50 0 0 0 T-37
T-38 30 30 -30 0 0 0 T-38
F-5 25 25 -15 10 10 10 F-5
KT-1 5 45 50 50 100 100 100 KT-1
KT-2 0 94 94 40 134 20 154 KT-2
T-50 0 94 94 94 94 T-50
153 45 198 108 306 40 346 20 366 Total Trainer
Transport C-130 12 12 12 50 62 8 70 C-130
Misc VIP 0 0 0 0 Misc VIP
12 0 12 0 12 50 62 8 70 Total Transport
Helo Transport Helo 30 30 30 30 30 Helo
Air-Air Missiles AIM-7 Sparrow 200 200 200 200 200 AIM-7 Sparrow
AIM-9 S-winder 250 250 250 250 250 AIM-9 S-winder
AIM-120 AMRAAM 150 150 300 300 300 300 AIM-120 AMRAAM
AA-x ER Rdr/IR 0 0 100 100 200 300 AA-x ERAAM Rdr/IR
Aim-9x 0 50 50 100 150 100 250 Aim-9x
600 150 750 50 800 200 1000 300 1300 Air-Air Missiles
Air-Ground Missiles AGM-88 Harm 100 100 100 200 50 250 100 350 AGM-88 Harm
Harpoon 100 100 100 100 100 Harpoon
AGM-65 Maverick 150 150 150 150 150 AGM-65 Maverick
AGM-130/142 100 100 50 150 150 150 AGM-130/142
JSOW 0 0 50 50 100 150 JSOW
JDAM 0 0 50 50 100 150 JDAM
ASM-xx  Anti-Ship 150 150 ASM-xx  Anti-Ship
AGM-xx JASSM 0 0 0 150 150 AGM-xx JASSM
450 0 450 150 600 150 750 600 1350 Total Air-Ground Missiles
Force 2020
Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4
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Army 
 
HYUNDAI K1 MAIN BATTLE TANKS  
 
 
Development.  Following proposals from a number of armored fighting vehicle 
manufacturers, in 1980 the South Korean government selected the now General Dynamics Land 
Systems of the United States to design and build two prototypes of a new MBT to meet its own 
specific requirements.     The first of two prototypes of the XK-1 MBT was completed in 1983, 
the Automotive Test Rig (ATR). It was shipped to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in November 
1983 for automotive performance, endurance and reliability testing. The ATR was a fully 
payloaded tank fitted with a non-operational turret. The second prototype, called the Fire-Control 
Test Rig (FCTR), was rolled out at a ceremony at Selfridge Air National Guard base in 
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December 1983 and shipped to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in February 1984 to begin fire-
control tests. Production of the XK-1 began in South Korea in 1984 and first production vehicles 
were completed in 1985. The vehicle was subsequently type-classified as the K1 MBT and the 
tank made its first appearance in September 1987, by which time several battalions had been 
equipped with it. The first production batch of 210 vehicles was completed in 1987 with the 
second batch consisting of 325 vehicles. Many key components of the K1, such as the 
Computing Devices Company (now owned by General Dynamics Land Systems) ballistic 
computer, MTU diesel engine, Renk transmission and SFIM roof-mounted sight are now being 
manufactured in country. By 1999, total production of the K1 MBTs and variants amounted to 
just over 1,000 units with production still under way. As of 1999, the K1 MBT and its variants 
had not been exported. A variant of the vehicle, designated the K1-M, has been designed and 
manufactured to meet the future Malaysian MBT requirement. This has a number of 
modifications to satisfy the Malaysian Army requirement including the installation of an air 
conditioning system, NBC system, laser warning system and explosive reactive armor as well as 
a reduction in the combat weight of the vehicle to less than 50 tonnes As one of its marketing 
efforts, Hyundai exhibited the K1 MBT, K1 ARV and K1 AVLB at the DSA '96 show in 
Malaysia in 1996. Following the exhibition Hyundai carried out an operation and mobility 
performance in front of the Malaysian Army officers at the Malaysian Armour School located on 
Port Dickson.   
Description. The layout of the K1 MBT is conventional, with the driver's compartment at the 
front, fighting compartment in the center and engine and transmission at the rear. Over the 
frontal arc of the K1 MBT, including the nose, turret front and sides, advanced armor of the 
Chobham type is fitted, which is manufactured in the US; this provides protection from both 
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kinetic and chemical energy attack. The driver is seated front left and is provided with a single-
piece hatch cover pivoted on the left that lifts upwards to open. This has three integral day 
periscopes, the center one of which can be replaced by a passive night driving periscope. The 
commander is seated on the right of the turret with the gunner below and forward of his position 
and the loader on the left. The commander has a French SFIM (now part of the SAGEM group) 
two-axis independent stabilized panoramic sight, which has a magnification of ×3 and ×10, 
periscopes for all-round observation, and a single-piece hatch cover that opens to the rear. This is 
manufactured in South Korea by Samsung Electronics Co Ltd, under license from SFIM. The 
gunner's two-axis stabilized day/night sight device incorporates a laser range finder and thermal 
imaging system which is similar to that installed in the M1A1 MBT and has magnifications of 
×1 and ×10 (day) and ×3 and ×10 (night). The gunner's articulated auxiliary sight is provided by 
the Electro-Optical Division of the Kollmorgen Corporation and Opto Mechanik Inc (OMI). This 
has a magnification of ×8. The latest Texas Instruments (now part of the Raytheon Systems 
Company) Gunner's Primary Tank Thermal Sight incorporates an eye-safe carbon dioxide laser 
range finder with final integration and testing taking place in South Korea. Turret drive and 
weapon elevation is electrohydraulic with manual controls for emergency use. Stabilization is 
provided in both elevation and traverse. The fire-control system includes a Computing Devices 
Company digital ballistic computer with a number of sensors including crosswind and allows the 
tank to engage both stationary and moving targets while it is stationary or moving itself. Main 
armament comprises a US-designed 105 mm M68A1 rifled gun which is also fitted on many 
South Korean M48A5 MBTs and for which ammunition is made in South Korea, including 
APFSDS. The barrel has a fume extractor, thermal sleeve and a muzzle reference system. A 7.62 
mm M60E2 machine gun is mounted coaxially with the main armament. The loader has a 7.62 
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mm M60D roof-mounted machine gun while the commander has a 12.7 mm K6 roof-mounted 
machine gun. Mounted either side of the forward part of the turret is a bank of six electrically 
operated smoke grenade dischargers. An unusual feature of the K1 is the hybrid suspension 
system with improved torsion bars in the center and hydropneumatic suspension units at each 
end. This allows the tank to kneel so that the main armament can be depressed to -10º. The 
remote track adjusting system has two mode settings. The drive sprocket is at the rear, idler at 
the front, with six dual rubber-tyred road wheels, track-return rollers with the upper part of the 
track being covered by an armored skirt. For the track, either the replaceable or integral rubber 
pad can be fitted. The rear-mounted power pack consists of a German MTU MB 871 Ka-501 
1,200 hp diesel coupled to a German Renk LSG 3000 fully automatic transmission with 
acceleration from 0 to 32 km/h in 9.4 seconds. Standard equipment includes a passive image 
intensification periscope for the driver, hydraulic bilge pump, heater, automatic Halon fire 
detection and suppression system for both crew and engine compartments and a VRC-947K 
and/or VRC-964K and a VIC-7K for intercom system. The NBC system consists of an M8A1 
alarm system and an M13A1 gas particle filter.  
K1A1 MBT. In 1996, Hyundai completed two prototypes of the K1A1 MBT based on the 
proven mobility and fire-control system of the earlier M1 MBT. These two prototype vehicles 
successfully passed all severe testing conducted through February 1997. These trials were carried 
out by the Republic of Korea government under a variety of weather and terrain conditions. The 
K1A1 MBT has an increased firepower performance over the earlier K1 MBT owing to the 
adoption of a Korean Commander's Panoramic Sight (KCPS), which has been locally developed. 
This has a greatly improved performance and function compared with the existing Commander's 
Panoramic Sight (CPS) for the K1. The K1A1 is also armed with the 120 mm M256 smoothbore 
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gun which is also installed in the General Dynamics Land Systems M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams 
MBTs. The main characteristics of the K1A1 MBT have been summarized by the manufacturer 
as follows: (a). The significantly enhanced armor penetration power and combat firing range due 
to the installation of a 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun instead of the 105 mm M68A1 rifled gun 
of the earlier K1. (b). Improved performance in the driving and stabilization of the gun and turret 
by improving the gun/turret drive system for the 120 mm gun. (c). Enhanced processing speed 
and capability of the ballistic computer. (d). Enhanced night combat and operation capability by 
adding a thermal imaging capability to the commander's panoramic sight. (e). Improved sealing 
capability in fording operations and the turret slewing characteristics during moving by 
improvement of the race ring (or turret bearing) as well as enhanced survivability for the crew by 
adoption of the improved fire suppression system including thermal wire sensor for the engine 
bay. (f). Easier maintainability and lowered maintenance cost by utilizing a track with 
replaceable pads.  
Future MBT. It is understood that based upon the capability and experience of research and 
development for the development of the K1 and K1A1 MBTs, Korea is now developing a new 
concept MBT taking into account the 21st century battlefield environment. While no 
characteristics of this new MBT have been officially disclosed, it is assumed that the following 
factors have been considered: (a). Significantly enhanced firepower with the main gun utilizing 
the latest gun technology. (b). Significantly enhanced crew survivability by adoption of special 
armor utilizing new materials and active defense system. (c). Automated and intelligent fire-
control system and other control systems. (d). Maximized combat efficiency by adoption of 
vetronics and battlefield management system. (e). It is understood that ADD, an agency of the 
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Korean government and Hyundai, prime contractor of the M1 and M1A1 MBTs, undertook the 
concept study and funding for the Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) for the Korean government.  
Armored vehicle-launched bridge. Early in 1989, Vickers Defense Systems of the UK was 
awarded a contract by Hyundai Precision and Industry Co Ltd to design and build the prototype 
of an Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge (AVLB) system and bridge. The AVLB will launch a 
scissors-type bridge similar to the British No 8 tank bridge that is carried and launched over the 
front of a Chieftain. This bridge has an overall length of 22 m and can span a gap up to 20.5 m 
depending on the firmness of the bank. The bridge and its associated launching system was built 
at Vickers Defense Systems' Newcastle-upon-Tyne facility and shipped to South Korea in 1990 
where it was integrated with the chassis, based on the K1 MBT, designed and built by Hyundai 
Precision and Industry Co Ltd. Late in 1993, Hyundai awarded Vickers Defense Systems a 
contract worth £23 million to supply the bridges for the K1 AVLB. The contract covers the 
manufacture of eight bridges and 41 launching mechanisms in the UK that will be installed on 
the K1 AVLB chassis by Hyundai. The total South Korea requirement is for 56 K1 AVLBs and 
the balance of the bridges and launching mechanisms will be built in South Korea by Hyundai 
under a technology transfer agreement. The bridge takes 3 minutes to be launched and 10 
minutes to be recovered, with maximum bank height differences being 2.4 m. The K1 AVLB has 
a total weight of 54.70 tonnes and in traveling configuration are 12.56 m long, 4.0 m wide and 
4.0 m high. The bridge itself weighs 12.9 tonnes and is MLC 66 (this means that it can take 
AFVs to a maximum combat weight of 60 tonnes). It has a crew of two and is armed with a 7.62 
mm M60D machine gun. Full details of this are given in Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics 
1999-2000, page 123.  
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Armored recovery vehicle.  Hyundai Precision and Industry Co Ltd has developed an ARV 
based on the chassis of the K1 in co-operation with the German company MaK. In appearance it 
is similar to the ARV based on the Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 MBT chassis that MaK developed 
to meet the requirements of the German Army. Standard equipment includes a front-mounted 
dozer/stabilizer blade, main winch with a maximum capacity of 35 tonnes (70 tonnes with 
pulley) and 150 m of cable, with a crane being mounted at the front right side of the hull. When 
traveling this is stowed alongside the right side of the hull. It can be traversed through 270º and 
has a maximum lifting weight of 25 tonnes. An auxiliary winch, auxiliary power unit, electric 
impact wrench and welding equipment are also provided. In November 1991, Hyundai of South 
Korea, prime contractor for the K1 family of MBTs, awarded MaK System Gesellschaft mbH a 
production contract for subsystems for the K1 ARV. Following extensive trials of a prototype K1 
ARV using MaK System Gesellschaft mbH-designed recovery equipment, MaK was awarded a 
production contract for recovery equipment except for some localized components. Production of 
these is undertaken at MaK System Gesellschaft mbH's Kiel facility, with first deliveries 
completed late in 1993. This vehicle is now in service, with the first order being for 90 vehicles 
followed by a second order for 59. The recovery equipment is integrated into the chassis by 
Hyundai that then delivers the complete vehicle to the South Korean Army. Hyundai is building 
the remainder of the recovery equipment such as dozer, winch and crane system in South Korea 
as part of a technology transfer from MaK System Gesellschaft mbH. The K1 ARV has a crew of 
four and weighs 52 tonnes, or 57 tonnes when carrying a spare power pack. It is armed with a 
12.7 mm machine gun operated by the vehicle commander. Full details of this are given in Jane's 
Military Vehicles and Logistics 1999-2000, page 41.  
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K1 mine clearing vehicle. For trials purposes the K1 MBT has been fitted with a roller type 
mineclearing system at the front of the hull.  
K1 Combat mobility vehicle.  Studies are already under way on a combat mobility version of 
the K1 that would use a similar hull to that of the K1 ARV previously described but would carry 
special equipment to undertake the engineer role.  
Specifications 
K1 
Crew:      4  
Combat weight:    51,100 kg 
Power-to-weight ratio:  23.48 hp/t 
Ground pressure:   0.87 kg/cm2 
Length: 
(gun forward)    9.672 m 
(hull)      7.477 m 
Width: (over skirts)   3.594 m 
Height: (to turret top)  2.248 m 
Ground clearance:   0.46 m 
Max road speed:   65 km/h 
Average cross-country speed:  40 km/h 
Speed on 60% gradient:   8 km/h 
Cruising range:    437 km 
Fording: 
(without kit)     1.2 m 
(with kit)     2.20 m 
Gradient:     60% 
Side slope:     30% 
Vertical obstacle:   1 m 
Trench:     2.74 m 
Engine: MTU MB 871 Ka-501 diesel developing 1,200 
hp at 2,600 rpm 
Transmission: Renk LSG 3000 automatic with 
mechanical lock-up, 4 forward and 2 reverse gears 
Braking: hydraulic and mechanical, two circuits 
Suspension: torsion bar/hydropneumatic 
Electrical system:   24 V 
Batteries:     6 × 12 V, 100 Ah 
Generator:     23 hp 
Armament: 
(main)   1 × 105 mm M68A1 rifled gun 
(coaxial)   1 × 7.62 mm M60E2 MG 
(commander)   1 × 12.7 mm K6 MG 
(loader)    1 × 7.62 mm M60D MG 
Smoke-laying equipment:  2 × 6 smoke 
grenade dischargers 
Ammunition: 
(105 mm)      47 
(12.7 mm)      1,000 
(7.62 mm coaxial)    7,200 
(7.62 mm loaders)    1,400 
Gun control equipment 
Turret power control:  electrohydraulic/manual 
(by commander)     yes 
(by gunner)      yes 
Commander's fire-control override:  yes 
Turret traverse:    360º 
Gun elevation/depression:  +20º/-10º 
Gun stabilizer: 
(vertical)      yes 
(horizontal)      yes 
NBC system:     yes 
Night vision equipment:   yes  
Manufacturer 
Hyundai Precision & Industry Co Ltd. 
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DAEWOO KOREAN INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE 
 
Development.  In 1981, the Korean Army issued a request for proposals for a new Korean 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (KIFV) and Daewoo Heavy Industries was subsequently awarded a 
contract for development and production of this vehicle. The KIFV entered production in 1985 
and is sometimes referred to as the Type K200 and by 2000 it is estimated that over 2,000 
vehicles, including variants, had been built for the home and export markets with production still 
under way. Based on the experience in the development and production of the KIFV, in 1994, 
Daewoo Heavy Industries developed a further model called the KIFV (K200A1). This has a 
number of improvements over the earlier vehicle including the installation of a 350 hp 
turbocharged MAN diesel engine and a new fully automatic Allison X200 transmission. It is 
expected that earlier K200 vehicles will be brought up to the K200A1 standard as the new power 
pack gives an improved power-to-weight ratio and greater acceleration. In the earlier K200 the 
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driver used sticks to steer the vehicle but in the K200A1 he uses a steering handle, which reduces 
driver fatigue.  
Description. The hull of the KIFV is of all-welded aluminum armor with an additional layer of 
spaced laminate steel armor bolted to it. This composite armor provides better protection for less 
weight. According to the manufacturer, protection from small arms fire is provided up to 12.7 
mm piercing-piercing rounds fired from the front and flanks. The engine compartment is located 
at the front right of the vehicle and is separated from the remainder of the KIFV by a bulkhead. 
The engine compartment is fitted with a fire extinguishing system that can be operated by the 
driver or from outside the vehicle. The air inlet, air outlet louvres and the exhaust pipe are 
located on the roof of the vehicle. The complete power pack consists of the engine, transmission 
with integrated hydrostatic steering system and hydraulic service and multidisc friction brake, 
final drives and associated drive shaft and universal joint. Power is transmitted through two 
shafts to the final drives that can be disconnected to remove the power pack. The latest 
KA200A1 is powered by the German MAN D2848T V-8 water-cooled direct injection 
turbocharged diesel engine that develops 350 hp at 2,300 rpm. This is manufactured under 
license by Daewoo Heavy Industries. The latest KA200A1 has the US Allison X200-5K 
transmission, which is an automatic shift and steering transmission with four forward and one 
reverse gears and a hydrostatic steering system. The driver is seated at the front of the vehicle on 
the left side and has a single-piece hatch cover that can be opened upwards by means of a 
locking hook placed on the hatch ring. Four M17 day periscopes are used for forward 
observation and a locally produced KAN/VVS-2 passive periscope can be installed in his roof 
hatch for driving at night. The gunner is seated behind the engine compartment and the cupola 
for the gunner can be traversed smoothly through 360º even on a slope. The gunner is provided 
with five M17 day periscopes and a single-piece hatch cover that opens to the rear and forward 
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mounted on his cupola is a 12.7 mm M2 machine gun. The gunner is provided with front, side 
and rear protection. For operations in Bosnia, a number of Malaysian KIFV have had their 12.7 
mm M2 machine guns replaced by a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher with the gun shield 
being retained. To the rear of the driver is another gunner's position armed with a 7.62 mm 
machine gun, the cupola is similar to that fitted to the M113 series and has five M17 day 
periscopes and a single-piece hatch cover that opens to the rear. The troop compartment is at the 
rear of the KIFV and the troops enter and leave via a hydraulically operated downward-opening 
ramp in the rear; this is also provided with a ramp door in the left side. There is a roof hatch over 
the troop compartment that opens to the rear and in either side are two firing ports with a vision 
block above. There are also two firing ports in the rear ramp. Torsion bar suspension either side 
consists of five dual rubber-tyred roadwheels with the drive sprocket at the front and idler at the 
rear, which is connected to the tension adjuster to maintain track tension. There are no track-
return rollers. The first, second and last roadwheel stations are provided with a telescopic shock 
absorber and the steel tracks have replaceable pads. The vehicle is fully amphibious, being 
propelled in the water by its tracks. Before entering the water a trim vane is erected at the front 
of the vehicle and the two bilge pumps are switched on. The two bilge pumps are located in the 
bottom of the hull, below the floor level, one in the rear of the personnel compartment and the 
other in the front of the engine compartment. These have a total discharge capacity of 348 
litres/min. Mounted on the forward part of the hull above the trim vane is a bank of six 
electrically operated smoke grenade launchers that fire forwards.  
Specifications 
Model K200 K200A1 
Crew 3 + 9 3 + 9 
Combat weight 12,900 kg 13,200 kg 
Unloaded weight 10,700 kg 11,000 kg 
Power-to-weight ratio 21.7 hp/t 26.5 hp/t 
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Model K200 K200A1 
Ground pressure 0.63 kg/cm2 0.64 kg/cm2 
Length     
    (overall) 5.486 m 5.486 m 
    (hull) 5.345 m 5.345 m 
Width     
    (overall) 2.846 m 2.846 m 
    (over tracks) 2.540 m 2.540 m 
Height     
    (hull top) 1.93 m 1.93 m 
    (MG shield) 2.518 m 2.518 m 
Ground clearance 0.41 m 0.41 m 
Track width 381 mm 381 mm 
Angle of approach/departure 68º/45º 68º/45º 
Max speed     
    (road) 74 km/h 70 km/h 
    (water) 6 km/h 7 km/h 
Fuel capacity 400 litres 400 litres 
Cruising range 480 km 480 km 
Fording amphibious amphibious 
Gradient 60% 60% 
Side slope 30% 30% 
Vertical obstacle 0.64 m 0.64 m 
Trench 1.68 m 1.68 m 
Engine MAN D 2848T MAN D 2848T 
  V-8 diesel 280 hp V-8 diesel 350 hp 
  at 2,300 rpm at 2,300 rpm 
Transmission T-300 semi-automatic X200-5K full-automatic 
  7 forward, 7 reverse hydrodynamic mechanical, 
    4 forward, 1 reverse 
Suspension torsion bar in tube torsion bar in tube 
Electrical system 28 V 28 V 
Batteries 2 × 6TN, 100 Ah 2 × 6TN, 100 Ah 
Armament     
    (main) 1 × 12.7 mm M2 MG 1 × 12.7 mm M2 MG 
    (secondary) 1 × 7.62 mm M60 MG 1 × 7.62 mm M60 MG 
Smoke-laying equipment 1 × 6 smoke grenade launchers 1 × 6 smoke grenade launchers 
NBC system optional optional 
Night vision equipment yes yes 
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DAEWOO CHUN MA (PEGASUS) SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM  
 
Development.  Early in 1996, details were released of the Chun Ma (Pegasus-Winged Horse) 
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system for which the prime contractor is the Special Products 
Division of Daewoo Heavy Industries. The system was developed in combination with the state-
run Agency for Defense Development and some 12 locally based subcontractors and Thomson-
CSF of France. Development of the missile for the Chun Ma system began in 1987 to meet the 
operational requirements of the Republic of Korea Army for a self-propelled all-weather SAM 
system to protect its mechanized forces. At present, the main self-propelled air defense system in 
service is the 20 mm Vulcan system based on the full tracked locally built KIFV chassis. This is 
a clear weather system only and has an effective range of around 2,000 to 2,500 m. Details of 
this system are given in the Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns section. The full-tracked chassis 
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used for the Chun Ma SAM system is the latest in a long line of chassis developed by Daewoo to 
meet the operational requirements of the Republic of Korea Army. So far the company has built 
over 2,000 Korean Infantry Fighting Vehicles (KIFV) and variants for the Republic of Korea 
Army and for export to Malaysia for deployment in Bosnia as part of United Nations forces. The 
full tracked chassis used for the Chun Ma SAM system is much larger than that of the KIFV and 
is being used for a number of other applications including an ammunition resupply vehicle and 
as the basis for the Flying Tiger twin 30 mm self-propelled air defense gun system now in 
production. Details of the Flying Tiger are given in the Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns section 
earlier in this volume. By early 1996, two prototypes of the complete Chun Ma SAM system had 
been completed and firing trials were begun in 1997. Low rate preproduction of the system is 
believed to have started in late 1997 with some subsystems being imported. The first production 
of Pegasus began in early 1999 for operational deployment with the South Korean Army in late 
1999. Cost of an individual Chun Ma is 15 billion won and of a missile 280 million won (at 1999 
prices).  
Description. The Chun Ma chassis is of all-welded armor construction that provides the 
occupants with protection from small arms fire and shell splinters. The driver is seated front left 
with the powerpack to the right and this leaves the rear two-thirds of the vehicle clear for the 
missile system. The powerpack consists of a 520 hp Daewoo D2840L 10 V 4-cycle, turbo-inter-
cooled diesel engine coupled to a fully automatic transmission that gives a maximum road speed 
of 60 km/h and acceleration from 0 to 32 km/h in around 10 seconds. Total weight of the system 
is 26 tonnes. The crew is three. It is believed that a 43 hp auxiliary power unit is fitted and 
standard equipment includes an NBC system and an automatic fire detection and suppression for 
the engine and crew compartments. Mounted on top of the chassis is an electro-hydraulically 
power-operated unmanned turret with two banks of four SAM each side. In the center of the 
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turret is the sensor package that consists of the E/F-band solid-state pulse-Doppler surveillance 
radar with a range of 20 km. This has a track-while-scan capability and can track eight targets at 
once with automatic threat evaluation. Mounted below the surveillance radar is the circular Ku-
band TWT pulse-Doppler tracking radar with a range of 16 km. This has been designed to track 
hovering helicopters, fighters and other aircraft traveling at a maximum speed of M2.6. Both 
radars are of the frequency agility pulse compression type and, when traveling, the surveillance 
radar is lowered to the rear to reduce the overall height of the system. To the left of the tracking 
radar is the FLIR (Forward Looking Infra-Red) camera with two fields of view and a range of 15 
km. To the right is the daylight TV camera with a range of 10 km, with the IR goniometer below 
used for initial gathering of the missile following launch. The latter has a 10º field of view. 
According to Daewoo, the Chun Ma system can engage targets under day and night conditions 
regardless of battlefield clutter and hostile ECM conditions. The whole turret, sensor package 
and the internal components were supplied by Thomson-CSF Airsys of France and are virtually 
identical to that used by the Crotale NG SAM that is in service with Finland (on a 6 × 6 Patria 
chassis) and France (shelter-mounted). The missile used in the South Korean Chun Ma is of a 
different design to those used in the Crotale NG and has been developed in South Korea. The 
86.2 kg launch weight missile is in a sealed tube and is fitted with a laser proximity fuse and a 12 
kg focused fragment warhead, which is claimed to give a high kill probability. Maximum speed 
of the missile is asserted to be M2.6, effective range 10 km with a maneuverability of 30 g. It has 
four fixed-wings two-thirds of the way from the nose and four control fins at the rear. Guidance 
is command-to-line of sight with maximum effective range quoted as 10 km, this being shorter 
than that of the French Crotale NG. Once expended, missiles are reloaded manually there being 
no provision for automatic loading of new missiles. The turret has 360º continuous traverse 
capability and elevation limits of -1 to +65º. The missile operator is provided with a full color 
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multiwindow display console and the software allows the Chun Ma to be integrated with other 
battlefield air defense assets and command systems. Mounted at the front of the hull are two 
banks of four electrically operated smoke grenade launchers that fire over the frontal arc.  
Status. Low-rate preproduction began in 1997 with six systems delivered by early 1999. 
Entered operational service in December 1999.  
Manufacturer. Daewoo Heavy Industries, Special Products Division.  
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ALMAZ S-300 (SA-10 ‘GRUMBLE’) FAMILY OF LOW-TO-HIGH ALTITUDE SURFACE-
TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS71 
 
 
Development/Description. The Russian `Almaz' Scientific Industrial Corporation (also known 
as the Almaz Central Design Bureau) S-300 designated (US/NATO codenamed SA-10 
`Grumble') missile system began development in 1967. It was specifically designed as a semi-
mobile all-weather strategic air defense system to replace the obsolete S-25 Berkut (US/NATO 
codenamed SA-1 `Guild') missile network around Moscow and for use against low-altitude air 
breathing threats such as cruise missiles. The system development was assigned to Boris V 
Bunkin, the Almaz general designer, whilst development of the accompanying missile was 
allocated to the `Fakel MKB' (formerly the `Grushin') missile design bureau. By 2000, there 
were some 1,900 plus SA-10 launchers in service with the Russian air defense force. These had 
not only replaced the S-25 system but had basically supplanted the S-75 (US/NATO codenamed 
SA-2 `Guideline') and S-125 (US/NATO codenamed SA-3 `Goa') static SAM systems. Over the 
years a number of S-300 developments have been made. These include the following:  
                                                           
71 Descriptions of the Russian S-300 missile systems are borrowed from Jane’s Missiles and Rockets. 
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S-300P (US/NATO codenamed SA-10a `Grumble').  The S-300P system (P = podvizhnyi, 
Russian for mobile) used towed semi-trailer erector-launchers with four missiles mounted in 
pairs and erected towards the semi-trailer's front for launching. A set of outriggers at the front of 
the semi-trailer were erected to stabilize the platform before a launch could occur. Emplacement 
time was stated to be over 30 minutes. The engagement radar used was the 30N6 (NATO 
codenamed `Flap Lid') I/J-band phased-array set. The usual battery configuration was three semi-
trailer launchers and a single `Flap Lid' radar. The battery could simultaneously engage up to a 
maximum of three targets with six missiles under command guidance. The radar was designed 
specifically for low altitude performance against air breathing targets. As a result, the antenna 
could be mounted on a mobile tower that consisted of a 15 m long elevating mast on a ChMAP 
semi-trailer. The radar/engagement operators were located in an F-9 shelter unit that was located 
away from the radar mast. The F-9 served as the equivalent to the American Patriot system's 
Engagement Control Station (ECS). The original missile used with the S-300P was the Fakel 
5V55K, which was the first Russian missile to incorporate a significant level of solid-state 
electronics in its guidance system. The command guidance flight data was received from the 
battery's engagement radar. Maximum effective engagement range was 47,000 m with the single-
stage missile using a solid propellant rocket motor. The weapon was ejected from its container-
launcher to a height of 25 m before the rocket motor fired. At regimental and brigade level the 
PO Iskra manufactured 36D6 (NATO codenamed `Tin Shield') 3-D S-band surveillance radar 
was used. This was available in two versions: the basic system mounted on a semi-trailer unit; 
and the enhanced low altitude capability 40V6M1 tower assembly built specifically for use with 
the S-300P system. Operational parameters were: (a). against a B-1 sized bomber with 1 m2 radar 
cross section at 100 m altitude - basic version detection range 45,000 m, mast version detection 
range 52,000 m (b). against a cruise missile type target with 0.1 m2 radar cross section at 50 m 
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altitude - basic version detection range 28,000 m, mast version detection range 38,000 m. The S-
300P units, which entered service in 1980, were integrated into the national Russian PVO air 
defense network fixed command and control system. Co-ordination of multiple static S-300P 
brigades is undertaken by the Proton NPO Universal-1E C3I system. However, due to inadequate 
range problems the S-300P system was rapidly upgraded to a later longer-range missile standard 
and supplemented by more modern mobile versions.   
S-300PM (US/NATO codenamed SA-10b `Grumble').  This was the standard production 
version and accepted for operational service around 1982. Designated by the Russians S-300PM 
(M = modifikatsionniy, Russian for modified) this utilized the definitive 5P85T semi-trailer 
launcher with KRAZ-260 (6 × 6) heavy truck tractors. The 5P85T erects its four paired missile 
container-launchers to the rear of the semi-trailer thus avoiding the need to uncouple the tractor 
unit, hence considerably reducing the time needed to deploy the system. The 5P85T launchers 
remain an option for use with the later S-300PMU and S-300PMU-1 systems. Two new missiles 
were developed for the S-300PM system, the Fakel 5V55R with a 133 kg conventional HE-
fragmentation warhead and the 5V55V with a nuclear warhead (no longer deployed). Missile 
guidance was changed to the Track-Via-Missile (TVM) radar type using a modified `Flap Lid' 
engagement radar for control. An uprated rocket motor was used to increase the effective missile 
engagement range to a more acceptable 75,000 m.  
S-300PMU (US/NATO codenamed SA-10c `Grumble').  The S-300PMU (U = 
usovershstvovanniy or `improved') system entered service in 1985 and was the third generation 
version of the S-300 family. It was specifically designed to improve system mobility and is 
basically the key elements of the S-300 system repackaged to fit on modified MAZ-543 (8 × 8) 
cross-country truck chassis. By employing these vehicles, emplacement time on an unsurveyed 
site is reduced to about 5 minutes. The firing battery is preceded into its launch area by a 1T12-
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2M survey vehicle that prepares the site for battery occupation. The self-propelled 5P85 series 
launchers are accompanied by the self-propelled 30N6 engagement radar, which is also mounted 
on a MAZ-543 chassis derivative. Supporting elements for the battery include 5T58 missile 
transport vehicles and 22T6 missile reloading vehicles. A full range of training facilities can also 
be provided. The engagement radar has been modified for the S-300PMU system to permit it to 
control enlarged batteries of up to 12 launcher vehicles. This has increased the simultaneous 
engagement capability to six targets with up to two missiles per target allowed. As a result the S-
300PMU brigade was reorganized to have six batteries, each with two-three launcher vehicles 
and an engagement radar. Each reorganized battery has one 5P85SU launcher vehicle (identified 
by the presence of a command shelter located behind the vehicle cab) and one or two simplified 
5P58DU launcher vehicles (identified by the absence of the command shelter behind the cab). 
The Front level command element of S-300 mobile brigades was formed around either the 
Proton NPO Baikal-1 command vehicle system or the Belarus Agat NPO originated D4M 
Polyana C3I system, which co-coordinated the actions of the brigades and interfaced with higher 
PVO echelon and other missile assets. The Baikal-1 is the equivalent of the American Patriot 
system's Information Co-ordination Center (ICC). The regimental/brigade level 30D6 
surveillance radar is supplemented by the LEMZ manufactured 76N6 (NATO codenamed `Clam 
Shell') low-altitude detection radar. This was made in two versions for the S-300PMU system: 
the 23.8 m high 40V6M mast assembly which takes 1 hour to deploy; or the 38.8 m high 
40V6M2 mast assembly which takes 2 hours to deploy. The `Clam Shell' radar has a detection 
range of 90,000 m against targets flying at 500 m altitude. It can also track up to a maximum of 
180 targets. The missile used is the Fakel 5V55RUD (UD = usovershstvovanaya dalnost, 
Russian for improved range) which had further rocket motor improvements to increase the 
maximum effective engagement range to 90,000 m. The minimum effective range is 5,000 m. 
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Altitude limits are 10 to 27,000 m with target velocity up to 1,200 m/s. The system is capable of 
defeating tactical missiles with ranges of up to 300 km at distances of up to 30,000 m. The rate 
of fire is one missile every 3 to 5 seconds.  
S-300PMU1 (US/NATO codenamed SA-10d `Grumble').  The S-300PMU1 was 
developed from 1985-89 and was first shown at the 1992 Moscow Air Show. It had previously 
been accepted for operational service in 1992. It differs from the earlier system in having more 
modern technology integrated into its various elements and by a major update of the software 
used in the high-speed computers. The principal improvements over the S-300PMU include:  (a). 
the use of the 7.5 m long, 1,800 kg weight 48N6 (SA-10d) missile variant with a 143 kg HE 
fragmentation warhead that increases the maximum effective intercept range of aircraft type 
targets to 150,000 m and reduces the minimum effective intercept altitude to 10 m. Minimum 
engagement range is 3,000 m. Missile diameter is increased to 0.515 m. Maximum missile 
velocity attained is 1,900 m/s within 12 seconds of launch. The weapon can withstand lateral g-
loads amounting to 20 units. The missile in its container-launcher weighs 2,580 kg. (b). the 
successful engagement of ballistic type targets launched at ranges of up to 1,000 km at distances 
up to 40,000 m using target designation from the 83M6E2 command and control system. (c). 
increasing the maximum target velocity capability from 1,167 m/s (4,200 km/h) to 2,788 m/s 
(10,000 km/h). (d). increasing the sector-scan radar coverage limits to improve the system's 
autonomous engagement capabilities. (f). adding extra crew training equipment to improve the 
level and standard of training. (g).the use of an improved 45,500 kg vehicle mounted 
engagement radar, the 36N85 (also known by export designation 30N6E1). This has many 
improvements including a new-generation fire-control computer. There are three scan modes 
available: a 1º elevation × 90º azimuth for low altitude targets; a 13º elevation × 64º azimuth and 
5º elevation × 64º azimuth for medium and high altitude targets; and 10º elevation × 32º azimuth 
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for ballistic missile direction. Once the target is acquired the radar can be switched to either 4º 
elevation × 4º azimuth or 2º elevation × 2º azimuth sectors for automatic tracking and missile 
guidance. The radar is connected to the launchers by landlines, radio links or both. The radar 
antenna can also be mounted on the 40V6M tower if required. The maximum number of targets 
engaged by an enhanced battery remains at six with up to a maximum of 12 missiles at any one 
time being guided simultaneously. The battery deployment time remains the same at 5 minutes 
as does the firing rate of one missile every 3 seconds from a launcher. The maximum total of 
missiles available in the S-300PMU1 battery is 32 rounds. The S-300 PMU1 system and its 
86M6 command post can be upgraded to the S-300 PMU2 capability through use of software 
upgrades as a field modification kit.  
96L6 3D Low-altitude detection, surveillance and command post system.   The Lianozovo 
electromechanical plant and the Lira KB design bureau displayed a model of their 96L6 radar 
vehicle at the IDEX `97 exhibition. The phased-array centrimetric system is mounted on a MAZ-
7930 (8 × 8) truck chassis and is intended for use with the S-300PMU and S-300PMU1 air 
defense systems as an upgrade to replace several existing radars with a single, more capable 
system. The 96L6 can function as a low-altitude detection set, surveillance radar and as the 
battery command post. The maximum detection range is 300 km and it can track up to 100 
targets simultaneously at speeds between 30 to 2,750 m/s. If required, the radar antenna 
assembly can be fitted to a 40 V6M tower unit for better low-altitude coverage. The 96L3 is 
considered an all-weather all-altitude radar system.  
Almaz 83M6 Brigade command and control system.  The command and control system used 
at brigade level with the S-300PMU missile battery system is designated the 83M6 and it is also 
designed to be used with the S-300PMU series, S-200DE and S-200VE air defense systems. A 
typical Russian brigade has an 83M6 system with up to six batteries. Deployment time is said to 
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be 5 minutes. Two variants of the 83M6 are available: (a). a mobile system mounted on MAZ-
543 cross-country chassis. (b). a semi-mobile system mounted on transportable shelters for use at 
static sites. The six-man 83M6 comprises two elements: (a) the 54K6 command post, which 
provides the command and control functions for a group of up to six launcher batteries. The 
control of the group is based on the data obtained from its associated radar and the airspace 
management information from the batteries under its control, the command and control systems 
of adjacent groups and from higher echelon air defense command and control networks. The 
54K6 automatically performs the following functions: control of the associated 64N6 radar 
system; the acquisition, identification and tracking of up to 100 targets; Identification Friend or 
Foe (IFF) interrogation; prioritization of target threats and selection of the most dangerous to 
hand-off to the individual batteries under its control; command and control of group's ECCM 
subsystems in a heavy ECM environment; co-ordination of the batteries' autonomous actions; 
and co-coordinating the group's actions with adjacent and higher echelon command and control 
centers. The command post is fitted with operator consoles, a multiprocessor computer system 
and the various communication and monitoring systems to manage an air defense battle with the 
group's available assets. Full crew training software and hardware is also fitted to train the 
command post crew in autonomous group and combined battle management protocols. (b). a 
64N6 (NATO designation `Tombstone') 3-D long-range surveillance radar, which comprises a 
hydraulically raised antenna assembly and radar shelter mounted on a common semi-trailer. The 
phased-array antenna set has a double-sided antenna aperture. Its 3-D performance is obtained by 
rotation of the antenna once every 12 seconds and electronically scanning the antenna beam in 
both azimuth and elevation. Scan sector capability for detecting tactical ballistic missiles is also 
provided. This can detect aircraft and cruise missile type targets at ranges of up to 300 km and 
ballistic missiles with launching ranges of up to 1,000 km using the sector scan facility. An IFF 
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transponder subsystem is fitted. The radar is used for target detection and tracking in normal, 
clutter and severe ECM environments. The data obtained are relayed to the command post for 
processing and assessment. The radar can detect targets with speeds of up to 2,788 m/s (10,000 
km/h). The export designation of the system is 83M6E. The S-300PMU-2 system designation is 
83M6E2.  
S-300PMU-2 Favorit (believed to be NATO/US designation SA-10e `Grumble'). A further 
modification of the S-300 system was revealed at the 1997 MAKS air show in Zhukovsky. The 
third-generation S-300PMU-2 Favorit uses an improved missile round, the 48N6E2 with 
increased ballistic target interception capability and a maximum engagement range of 200,000 
m. The warhead weighs 180 kg with each fragment produced having 40 kJ of destructive energy. 
The missile is optimized for intercepting tactical and ballistic missiles with a radar cross section 
of approximately 0.002 m2. Target speed can be up to 2,800 m/s and can consist of ballistic 
missile type targets launched from ranges of up to 1,000 km away. The 48N6E2 missile warhead 
is designed to destroy the missile warhead at ranges up to 40,000 m. Minimum missile range 
remains 3,000 m and altitude limits 10 to 27,000 m. Existing 48N6E missiles can be used. 
System tests were successfully conducted in 1995 against `Scud' type targets. The PMU-2 uses 
the 83M6E2 command and control system, with a 56K6E2 battle management center, up to six 
S-300PMU-2 air defense launcher units (each with a 30N6E2 multifunctional illumination and 
guidance radar and up to 12 5P85SE or 5P85TE launchers), and a 300 km range 64N6E2 3D 
acquisition radar or a 96L6E 3D radar command post system.  
Missile upgrade. Almaz in conjunction with the Fakel missile design bureau has developed a 
missile upgrade package suitable for the S-300 family (see separate entry).  
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Mobile repair base.  Antey also market a mobile repair base facility comprising trailer mounted 
(4 × 4) workshops - a checkout and diagnostic workshop, a technological workshop, a machine 
workshop, a spare parts, tools and accessories facility, a communications facilities checkout and 
diagnostics workshop and power generating units with their own tractor trucks. The checkout 
and diagnostics workshop uses the AS5-2 automated system to check and diagnose at least 90 
per cent of the systems electronic components.  
Variants.  The `Altair' Research and Development Corporation as prime naval contractor, 
initiated in 1969 a joint development program with the Almaz design bureau for a navalised 
version of the S-300 system called the S-300F Fort. This uses the 3M41 missile (alternative 
designation 5V55RM, a navalised counterpart to the land based 75 km range 5V55R missile), the 
3S41 vertical launcher system with either 6-round B-203 or 8-round B-204 launcher units and 
the 3R41 `Volna' (NATO codename `Top Dome') I/J-band fire-control radar. The system is 
designated SA-N-6 `Grumble' in the US/NATO series and is fitted to the first three Project 1144 
`Orlan' (NATO `Kirov' class) nuclear-powered missile cruisers and the four Project 1164 `Atlant' 
(NATO `Slava' class) conventionally powered cruisers. The system was originally trialled on the 
single Project 1134BE `Berkut' (NATO `Kara' class) cruiser named Azov over a six-year period 
from December 1977. The Azov was fitted with four B-204 vertical launcher assemblies and a 
single `Top Dome' radar. Final Russian naval service acceptance came in 1984. 
    The export version of the Fort system was first shown in 1993 and is named by the Russians 
Rif (Russian for coral reef). The equivalent naval version to the S-300PMU-1 system is the S-
300FM Fort-M system. This uses the latest 48N6 missile and a navalised version of the 
`Tombstone' fire control radar. The Fort-M has been seen fitted to the fourth and final Project 
1144 cruiser, the Petr Vealiky.  
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Specifications 
5V55K missile  
Length:    7.25 m  
Diameter:    0.507 m  
Wing span:    1 m  
Launch weight:   1,640 kg  
Propulsion:  solid fuel rocket motor  
Guidance:  command  
Warhead:  133 kg HE fragmentation with proximity and contact fuses  
Max speed:    M6  
Max effective range:  
(target altitude 2,000 m plus) 47,000 m  
(target altitude 25 m and below) 25,000 m  
Min effective range:   n/avail  
Max effective altitude:  30,000 m  
Min effective altitude:  25 m  
Max target speed:   1,167 m/s  
Rate of fire:   1 missile/3 s   
Provisional 9P85S TEL  
Crew:    4  
Chassis:   MAZ-543 (8 × 8)  
Combat weight:  42,150 kg  
Length:   9.4 m  
Width:   3.1 m  
Height:   3.7 m  
Max speed:   (road) 60 km/h  
Max range:   (road) 650 km  
Engine:   D12A-525 V-12 water-cooled diesel developing 525 hp at 2,100 rpm  
Armor:   none  
Unit of fire:   4 × SA-10 missiles  
Manufacturer 
Almaz Scientific Industrial Corporation.  
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ALMAZ MISSILE UPGRADE FOR THE S-300PMU MISSILE FAMILY SYSTEMS 
 Development/Description. Almaz, the designers of the S-300PMU missile system, released 
details at the 1998 Athens-based Defendory Exhibition of a new family of Fakel design bureau 
missiles aimed at the Greek requirement for a new long surface-to-air missile system. Flight 
trials took place in 1999 with production started in 2000. The missiles can be used with the 
existing S-300PMU series of launchers and the Almaz S-400 Trioumf (Triumph) system and are 
designated the 9M96E and the 9M96E2. They are identical except in the amount of solid 
propellant rocket fuel they carry. Both weapons are cold-launched and after reaching an altitude 
of 30 m ignite their main sustainer rocket motor. The weapons have a full 360º capability and are 
smaller and lighter than the existing S-300PMU weapons. They also have a number of new 
features including a new high energy solid propellant fuel and upgraded guidance system (that 
includes a transverse guidance engine unit which is used to ensure the missile hits the designated 
target in its terminal guidance phase) and enhanced control software. Flight control is by four 
rear fins that unfold on launch and four moveable control surfaces towards the nose. Four 
weapons are carried in a standard sealed S-300 missile cylindrical container-launcher, which is 
then discarded after all have been fired. Weight of the canister with four 9M96E missiles is 2,300 
kg and with four 9M96E2 missiles 2,700 kg. In addition to engaging aircraft, the missiles are 
claimed to be highly effective against ballistic and tactical type missile targets. The hit 
probability against aircraft is said to be at least 90 per cent, while against ballistic missiles it is at 
least 80 per cent and against parts of missiles such as warheads at least 70 per cent. The high hit 
rate is due to the transverse guidance engine that reduces the chance of missing a target in the 
final stage of the missile's terminal homing phase to zero. In many respects the missiles are 
similar to the Lockheed Martin PAC-3 extended range interceptor weapon. The 9M96E2 is 0.9 m 
longer than the 9M96E.  
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Variants.  The missile can also be used in the naval versions of the S-300 system, for example, 
the S-300F Fort and S-300FM Fort-M.  
Specifications  
Weight:  
(9M96E)  333 kg 
(9M96E2) 420 kg  
Warhead:  24 kg HE fragmentation  
Max engagement range:  
(9M96E)  40,000 m  
(9M96E2)  120,000 m  
Min engagement range:  1,000 m 
Max altitude limit:  
(9M96E)  25,000 m  
(9M98E2)  30,000 m  
Min altitude limit:  5 m  
Status  
Trial firing phase in 1999 took place with elements of both the S-300PMU-1 and S-400 systems. 
Entered production in 2000. Offered for export.  
Manufacturers  
Almaz Central Design Bureau (modification package).  
Fakel Design Bureau (missiles).  
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ALMAZ S-400 TRIEUMF (TRIUMPH) (SA-20) LOW- TO HIGH-ALTITUDE 
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM  
Development/Description. The fourth-generation S-400 Triumph system (US designation SA-
20) is being developed by the prime contractor Almaz Central Design Bureau in conjunction 
with a number of other Russian manufacturers, including the Fakel Machine Building Design 
Bureau (missiles), the Novosibirsk Research Institute of Measuring Instruments and the St 
Petersburg Special Machine Design Bureau. The S-400 is designed for use against all envisaged 
existing and future air threat systems including cruise missiles, tactical and strategic missiles, 
low-signature stealth aircraft, AWACs type aircraft and standoff jammers. The system employs a 
multimode phased-array radar and signal processor system, advanced highly automated crew 
stations and highly advanced target engagement algorithms together with a variety of missile 
types to create a multilayered defense. For use with the system, Fakel has developed the active 
radar seeker equipped 9M96E family of missiles, which use a gas dynamic flight control system 
for improved maneuverability and were publicly revealed in 1998.  There is also a further long-
range missile family under advanced development by Fakel. These are to have an engagement 
range of up to 400 km and both semi-active and active engagement modes. The seeker can be 
switched to a search mode by ground command and can home onto a target independently. At 
least one version will have an Over-the-Horizon (OTH) capability against jamming 
aircraft/airborne early warning aircraft. The S-400 can also use the 48N6E missiles of the S-
300PMU-1 and the 48N6E2 missile of the S-300PMU-2 Favorit missile systems. An S-400 
system uses a central command and control vehicle with the multimode radar assembly and eight 
launcher units. A launcher can carry either four of the standard 48N6/48N6E2 missile container 
launchers (with one missile each), four of the 9M96 missile container launchers (with four 
missiles each) or a mixture of both. In all cases a cold launch sequence ejects the weapon to a 
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safe height whereupon the main solid propellant rocket motor ignites. At the initial and middle 
flight phases, inertial guidance with radio command corrections is used. For the final phase the 
appropriate terminal guidance for the missile type is activated.  
Status.  Initial manufacturer's trials started in early 1999 and were completed in January 2000 at 
the Kasputin Yar missile range in Southern Russia. Pre-series production systems were delivered 
to the Russian Air Forces air defense units in late 2000 for troop trials using missiles of the 
available S-300 systems. When funding permits, full operational deployment will begin - 
projected to be not before the end of 2002 when the new 400 km range missile and further long 
range target acquisition radars of 600 km range are expected to become operational. The first 
squadron to be equipped with the pre-series model is due to defend the Moscow area.  
Manufacturer. Almaz Central Design Bureau.  
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NAVY  
`Kilo' class72  
 
Type. Diesel electric patrol submarine.  
Description. The `Kilo' class design dates back to the 1970s and the first vessel, for the then 
Soviet Navy, was launched in 1979. Since then it has undergone continual improvements. The 
`Kilo' has been developed from the previous `Foxtrot' and `Tango' designs, but shows an 
improved hull form. However, it is still fairly basic compared to its modern Western 
counterparts. The basic variant is the Project 877; the Project 877K has an improved fire-control 
system; while the Project 877M is fitted to fire wire-guided torpedoes from two tubes. The latest 
variant is the Project 636, which is available for export. This model is 1.2 m longer than previous 
variants and features improved stealth technology with a redesigned propulsion system that is 
claimed to generate half the noise of its earlier variants. Capability has been improved with an 
                                                           
72 Description of ‘Kilo’ class submarine obtained from Jane’s Defense 
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automated combat information system that can track up to six targets simultaneously and provide 
simultaneous fire-control data on two targets. The forward hydroplanes are mounted on the hull 
just forward of the fin. The pressure hull is divided into six compartments separated by pressure 
bulkheads and has a reserve of buoyancy of 32 per cent at normal load and is heavily 
compartmented, the boat remaining buoyant with any compartment flooded. Normal diving 
depth is 240 m and maximum depth is 350 m. 
    Electronic equipment is all of Russian manufacture, the sonar suite comprising the hull-
mounted, low-/medium-frequency passive search and attack Shark Teeth (MGK-400EM), and 
the hull-mounted, high-frequency active search/attack sonar Mouse Roar. The Shark Teeth, 
although primarily a passive search and attack sonar, also has some active capability. The Indian 
boats are additionally fitted with the low-/medium-frequency, passive search Whale series. The 
electronic warfare suite consists of either the Brick Group, Stop Light or Squid Head radar 
warning system and Quad Loop D/F. For navigation the ships are fitted with the I-band Snoop 
Tray radar. Standard armament comprises six torpedo tubes firing a mixture of TEST-
71ME/TEST 71/96 wire-guided ASW active/passive homing and Type 53-65 ASV passive wake 
homing torpedoes with a total of 18 weapons being carried. At least two torpedo tubes are 
equipped to fire wire-guided anti-submarine weapons. As with most submarines, mines can be 
carried in lieu of the torpedoes, up to a total of 24. In addition, some vessels are fitted to carry an 
SA-N-5/8/10 shoulder-held SAM launcher with 6-8 missiles. The containerized portable missile 
launcher is carried in a well between the snort and communications masts.     Propulsion is 
provided by two 4-2AA-42M diesels (in the export variants and the latest variant the Type 636 in 
service with the Russian Navy) developing 2.68 MW powering two generators. The single shaft 
is driven by a single electric motor developing 4.34 MW and powering a slow turning seven-
bladed propeller. In addition, two small MT-168 auxiliary motors developing 150 kW are fitted 
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and a low powered electric motor of 95 kW for economic running and slow speed operations (6 
kt) in ultra quiet mode. Two 120 cell storage batteries are accommodated in the first and third 
compartments. Battery capacity is 9,700 kWh. Fuel reserves total 51.6 tonnes normal and 172 
tonnes maximum. The Iranians experienced difficulties with their batteries that, having been 
designed for operation in cold water regions, suffered from overheating in the warm waters of 
the Gulf. The Indians are said to have suffered similar problems with their `Kilos' and from their 
experience, have assisted the Iranians to overcome their difficulties with modifications to the 
battery cooling system. The Indians are also said to be considering changing the diesels in their 
boats.  
Specifications 
Displacement:  2,356/3,076 t 
Length:   72.6 m (73.8 m in some E and EKM variants and some boats in Russian Navy) 
Beam:   9.9 m 
Draught:   6.6 m  
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The U212 submarine is capable of long distance submerged passage to the area of operation. The 
German Navy have ordered four of the submarines, the first ship will be commissioned in the 
year 2003. The Type 212 is being constructed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH 
(HDW) of Kiel and Thyssen Nordseewerke GmbH (TNSW) of Enden. Two U212 submarines 
are being built by Fincantieri for the Italian Navy. The first is expected to launch in 2002 and 
commission in 2005.  
COMMAND SYSTEM.  The Type 212 is equipped with a highly integrated command and 
control system that interfaces with sensors, weapons and navigation system. The system is based 
on a high performance data bus and a centralized computer, the Basic Command and Weapons 
Control System (BCWCS).  
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TORPEDOES.  There are six torpedo tubes in two groups of three. Type 212 is equipped with a 
water ram expulsion system for torpedo launch. The submarine is equipped with the DM2A4 
heavyweight torpedo weapon system from STN Atlas Elektronik.  
COUNTERMEASURES. DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (now merged with Aeropsatiale-Matra 
of France and CASA of Spain to form the EADS company) and Racal Thorn Defense have been 
awarded a contract to develop the FL1800U electronic warfare system for the German and Italian 
navies' U212 submarines. The 1800U is a submarine version of the FL1800 S-II that is in service 
on the Brandenburg and Bremen class frigates. A consortium lead by STN ATLAS Elektronik 
and Allied Signal ELAC are responsible for the development of the TAU 2000 torpedo 
countermeasures system. TAU 2000 has four launch containers each with up to ten discharge 
tubes equipped with effectors. The effectors are small underwater vehicles, similar in appearance 
to a torpedo. The effectors are jammers and decoys with hydrophones and acoustic emitters. 
Multiple effectors are deployed in order to counter torpedoes in re-attack mode.  
SENSORS. The submarine is equipped with an integrated DBQS sonar system which has: 
cylindrical array for passive medium frequency detection; a TAS-3 low frequency towed array 
sonar; FAS-3 flank array sonar for low/medium frequency detection; passive ranging sonar; and 
hostile sonar intercept system. The active high frequency mine detection sonar is the STN Atlas 
Elektronik MOA 3070. The search periscope is the Zeiss-Eltro Optronic (ZEO) SERO 14 with 
optical rangefinder, thermal imager and global positioning system. The ZEO SERO 15 attack 
periscope is equipped with laser rangefinder.  
PROPULSION.  The propulsion system combines a conventional system consisting of a diesel 
generator with a lead acid battery, and an air independent propulsion (AIP) system, used for 
silent slow cruising, with a fuel cell equipped with oxygen and hydrogen storage. The system 
consists of nine PEM (polymer electrolyte membrane) fuel cells, providing between 30 and 50 
Annex 3D:  NATIONAL DEFENSE; Appendix 3:  KEY WEAPON SYSTEMS 
3D - 49 
kW each. For higher speeds, connection is made to the high performance lead acid battery. An 
MTU 16 V- 396 diesel engine powers the generator from Piller GmbH for charging the battery 
installed on the lower of the two decks at the forward section of the submarine. The diesel 
generator plant is mounted on a swinging deck platform with double elastic mounts for noise and 
vibration isolation. The propeller motor is directly coupled to the seven bladed screwback 
propeller. 
 TYPE 214  
HDW is developing the Type 214 submarine, which is a further improvement on the Type 212. 
The Greek Navy has ordered three Type 214 submarines, the first to be delivered in 2005. The 
first vessel will be built at the HDW Kiel shipyard, while Hellenic Shipyards will build the 
second and third vessels at Skaramanga. South Korea has also ordered three Type 214, to enter 
service in 2007, 2008 and 2009. These will be built by Hyundai Heavy Industries. The Type 214 
will have an increased diving depth of over 400 m, due to improvements in the pressure hull 
materials. Hull length is 65 m and displacement 1700 tons. Four of the eight torpedo tubes will 
be capable of firing missiles. Performance of the AIP system has been increased with two 
Siemens PEM fuel cells that produce 120 kW per module and will give the submarine an 
underwater endurance of two weeks. A hull shape that has been further optimized for 
hydrodynamic and stealth characteristics and a low noise propeller combine to decrease the 
submarine's acoustic signature. The Integrated Sensor Underwater System ISUS, from STN 
ATLAS Elektronik integrates all sensors, command and control functions on board the 
submarine. The sensor suite of the U214 submarine consists of the sonar systems, an attack 
periscope and an optronic mast. The submarine's electronic support measures system and Global 
Positioning System sensors are also installed on the optronic mast. 
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KDX DESTROYERS73 
The 3,900-ton King Kwang-Gae-to-dae-wang was commissioned in 1998, and is the first of the 
KDX-1 class FFGs. It is fitted with 8 Block 1C Harpoons, and RIM-7P Sea Sparrow in Mk 48 
VLS. The 2nd of the class was commissioned in 1999, and according to Jane’s, the 3rd of the 
KDX-1 class ships Xangmanchae was commissioned by the end of 1999. They have apparently 
being designated DD types. By the year 2006 the ROK navy would possess at least 9 KDX 
destroyers inclusive of the KDX-3 that are Aegis class destroyers. They represent a major leap 
forward for the ROK navy in providing a modern fighting capability, and indeed the KDX-2 and 
KDX-3 will have a comprehensive area defense SAM system fitted (using SM-2MR), and 
apparently the KDX-3 will be a 7,000-9,000 ton class vessel fitted with the Aegis combat system 
and radar. Up to 9 hulls are planned for the KDX program, 3 of each type, and when complete 
will rival the latest from China and probably Japan in modern war fighting capability. It was 
announced recently that the American Mk 45 Mod 4 5"/62 lightweight gun system has been 
chosen for the KDX-2 DDG, and it will be co-produced under license in South Korea. RAM has 
also been chosen for the KDX-2. Service date for the first KDX-2 is expected to be late 2005.  
Update. The Republic of Korea Navy (RoKN) has selected the Mk 31 Mod 1 rolling airframe 
missile (RAM) guided missile weapon system for its KDX Batch 2 destroyer program. Hyundai 
Heavy Industries in Ulsan is under contract to build an initial three destroyers. Raytheon Systems 
Company of the USA will provide the RoKN with three 21-round Mk 49 Guided Missile 
Launching Systems as a direct commercial sale under a firm fixed-price contract worth $24.9 
million. The contract also covers logistical, technical and integration support services. The first 
launcher is due for delivery next year. The RIM-116B missiles are to be procured under a 
separate Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract from fiscal year 2001 (FY01). The RoKN last 
                                                           
73Reference:  http://warships1.com/index_ships_Asia99-00.htm  
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year requested the sale of 64 Mk 44 Guided Missile Round Packs and RIM-116B missiles under 
FMS. RAM was selected over the Israel Aircraft Industries/Rafael Barak-1 and France's 
Thomson-CSF Crotale-NG point defense missile systems following a multiple-stage competitive 
selection process. The RoKN will be the third customer for the RAM weapon system after the 
US and German navies. Developed and produced co-operatively by Raytheon and the German 
RAM-System GmbH consortium, which comprises Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace, Diehl and 
BGT, RAM is a lightweight, rapid-reaction, ship self-defense missile deployed on more than 30 
US Navy and 25 German Navy ships to date. Over 60 more US and German installations are 
planned. RAM uses a dual-mode infrared/ radio-frequency passive seeker. The new Block 1 
version selected by the RoKN employs an improved 'home all the way' wide-field-of-view 
infrared seeker. This improved variant recently completed its US Navy operational evaluation 
and has received Milestone III approval for full-rate production. During development and 
operational testing, 23 target kills were achieved from 24 missiles launched. Both Harpoon and 
Exocet missiles featured as targets during the live-fire tests. RAM is the third KDX-2 weapon 
system to be contracted in recent months. Late last year it was announced that the three ships 
would each be fitted with the United Defense LP Mk 45 Mod 4 5in/62-calibre gun system, built 
under license by local prime contractor Kia Heavy Industries Corporation. A $22 million co 
production deal was signed last December covering the manufacture of three Mk 45 Mod 4 
systems, plus associated spares, technical assistance and training. KDX-2 ships will also be fitted 
with one Signaal Goalkeeper 30mm close-in weapon system. A contract for three Goalkeepers 
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KDX-II  
 
Displacement, tons: 4,800 full load  
Dimensions, feet (meters): 506.6 × 55.5 × 14.1    (154.4 × 16.9 × 4.3) 
Main machinery: CODOG; 2 GE LM 2500 gas turbines; 58,200 hp (43.42 MW) sustained; 2 
MTU 20V 956 TB92 diesels; 8,000 hp (m) (5.88 MW); 2 shafts 
Speed, knots:  29.   Range, miles:  4,000 at 18 kt 
Complement:  200 (18 officers)  
Missiles:  SSM: 8 Harpoon (Block 1C) (2 quad). 
SAM: Standard SM-2 MR (Block IIIA); Lockheed Martin Mk 41 32 cell VLS 
launcher; Raytheon RAM Mk 31 Mk 1 with Mk 116 Block I missiles. 
A/S: ASROC VLS Mk 48. 
Guns:   1 United Defense 5 in (127 mm)/62 Mk 45 Mod 4 [Ref 3]. 
      1 OTOBreda 3 in (76 mm)/62 [Ref 4]. 
      1 Signaal Goalkeeper 30 mm [Ref 5]; 7 barrels per mounting. 
Countermeasures:   4 chaff launchers [Ref 6]. ESM/ECM. 
Combat data systems:  BAeSema/Samsung KD COM-2; Link 11. 
Weapons control:   Marconi Mk 14 weapons direction system. 
Radars:  Air search: Raytheon SPS-49(V)5 [Ref 7]; C/D-band. 
  Surface search: Signaal MW08 [Ref 8]; G-band. 
  Fire control: 2 Signaal STIR 240 [Ref 9]; I/J/K-band. 
Sonar:  DSQS-23; hull-mounted; active search; medium frequency. Daewoo Telecom towed 
array; passive low frequency.  
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Helicopters:  1 Westland Super Lynx Mk 99 [Ref 10].  
Programs: Approval for first three given in late 1996 but the final decision was not taken until 
1998. Contract to design and build the first of class won by Daewoo in November 1999. A 
second batch of three ships is expected.  
Structure: The drawing shows a larger version of 'Okpo' class incorporating SM-2 missiles but 
retaining the same command systems. Some details are still speculative as Daewoo is reworking 
the original Hyundai design.  
KDX-III 
The KDX-3 project is a program for large destroyers (9-10,000 ton) equipped with a phased-
array radar and capable of operating helicopters. The details of the requirement are not known 
but the three-year design process, which is to start in 2001, is likely to include consideration of 
the Japanese `Kongou' class. In-service date of the first ship is not expected before 2009. 
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SS-N-21 `SAMPSON' (P-1000 3M70 VULKAN/3M10/3M54 GRANAT)/SS-N-27 (3M51 
BIRYUZA/ALFA)  
Type 
Long-range land attack and anti-ship missile.  
Development 
Probably aware of development of the United States' Tomahawk land-attack/long range anti-ship 
missile and seeking a replacement for the Ametist/Malakhit systems the Politburo authorized on 
15 May 1979 development of a new submarine-launched land-attack missile system. The task 
was apparently handed to the Chelomey Design Bureau who began designing a system 
designated 3M70 or P-1000 Vulkan (Vulcan). 
    Land-based trials of the system began in July 1982 and the first submarine-launched trial was 
conducted on 22 December 1983 from a Project 675 MKV Atomic-Powered Cruise Missile 
Submarine ('Echo II' class) with the 3K70 missile replacing the 4K80 of the P-500 Bazal't 
system. Trials appear to have been successful and the system was formally accepted into service 
by the Politburo on 18 December 1987. It was designed specifically for the new classes of 
nuclear-powered attack submarines (known as Atomic-Powered Submarine in Soviet 
terminology) and can be launched from torpedo tubes, as with Tomahawk, and it appears it is 
this system which has received the NATO designation SS-N-21 'Sampson', a ground-launched 
version (RK-55) being designated SCC-4 'Slingshot'. Initially 'Sampson' equipped the Project 
971 Shchuka-B ('Akula' class) submarines, of which the first ship Delfin, was commissioned in 
September 1986, these ships having to be redesigned to operate the Vulkan system. They were 
later fitted into the Project 945/945A Barracuda/Kondor (`Sierra I/II' class) and eight Project 671 
RTM ('Victor III' class) while seven Project 667 ('Yankee' class) ballistic missile submarines 
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were rebuilt to take this system as Project 667AT Grusha ('Yankee Notch' class). 
    The nuclear-tipped versions were withdrawn under American-Russian agreements for nuclear 
disarmament but it appears the missile has been adapted for the anti-ship and/or land-attack role 
with a conventional warhead as 3M10 Granat (Grenade), the missiles probably being simply 
converted. The weapon is extensively used by the Russian Navy and is now being exported as 
3M54 Granat with the first customer being India for use in Project 887/636 ('Kilo' class) diesel 
electric submarines Sindhuvir and Sindhuraj being refitted in Russian yards from 1997 and 1999 
respectively. India is also the first customer for surface-launched versions of this system with 
'Krivak III' class frigates. The original conventional version (reportedly 3K54E1) had a unitary 
warhead but a new version was developed for the Russian Navy during the 1990s in which the 
front of the weapon became a rocket-propelled pay-load stage (reportedly 3K45E) and this 
system apparently completed development circa 1998. 
    It is reported that a successor system to 'Sampson' has been under development from the same 
design bureau since circa 1985 and is known as 3M51 Biryuza or Alfa (not to be confused with 
another project called Alpha). This appears to be based upon an air-launched weapon but there 
are few details and some skepticism about the system's status although it has been given the 
NATO designation SS-N-27. It is reported to have been selected for the new Project 885 Atomic-
Powered Cruise Missile Submarines ('Yansen' class) and that it may later be issued to the Type 
877 diesel-electric submarines ('Kilo' class). Indian sources suggested late in 1998 that SS-N-27 
rather than SS-N-21 would be selected for the 'Krivak' class and that the export version was 
designated Klub or Klab-N.  
Description 
The SS-N-21 `Sampson' systems (3M70; 3M10/3M54) consist of the 3K70 or 3K10/3K54 
missile, a weapon direction system and launchers. Externally the missile is a long, slim, cylinder 
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with a rounded nose that tapers towards the rear. Along each side is a cable conduit and midway 
along the body are two narrow chord wings which fold away into the fuselage. At the end are 
four small, folding, tail surfaces. At the rear is a rocket booster and underneath is a retractable air 
scoop. Internally there is an ARGS-54 radar homing seeker in the nose with the payload section 
behind it. The guidance compartment appears to be behind the payload and features inertial 
guidance unit, a computer that may also be used for radar terrain comparison, and a radar 
altimeter. The fuel tanks are behind this compartment and in the rear is the jet engine, reported to 
be a TRDD-50 turbofan, and the actuation system. 
    The payload varies and detailed data is available only for the export versions, although this 
undoubtedly reflects the Russian versions. The 3K54E1 has a 450 kg high explosive warhead 
and may based upon the 3K70 while the 3K54E has a rocket-powered guided payload with 200 
kg warhead and may be based upon the 3K10. A 200 kT nuclear warhead was carried in the 
3K70 but has been withdrawn from service. The missile is usually launched from a 533 mm 
(53.3 cm) torpedo tube with the missile inserted into the tube like a torpedo. The tube is flooded 
and the weapon may be pushed out of the tube by a pulse of water and then rises to the surface 
igniting the booster as it breaches or nears the surface. No information is yet available about the 
surface-ship launcher but the missile is compatible with both angled and vertical versions. The 
weapon direction system is probably a console in which platform and target location and 
movement data are inserted into the missile inertial navigation system before launch. It is 
possible that target radar characteristics may also be inserted before launch of the anti-ship 
version. 
    Upon launch the booster carries the missile to an altitude of 150 meter where it is jettisoned as 
the turbofan is started and the aerodynamic surfaces are deployed. In anti-ship operations the 
missile then enters the cruise phase descending to 10-15 meters above the sea. At a distance of 
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16-21.5 n miles (30-40 km) the missile climbs and the ARGS-54 radar seeker begins searching 
for the target. The seeker is effective in conditions up to Sea State 5-6 and has a maximum range 
of 32 n miles (60 km) scanning from +/-45° in azimuth and +10 to -20° in elevation. Once 
acquired the 3K54E1 locks onto the target and guides the missile into a dive attack. In the 3K54E 
after the seeker has locked on the payload is released and the rocket takes it to a speed of some 
Mach 3.25 until it is some 10.75 n miles (20 km) from the target at which point it descends to 3-5 
meters altitude for the terminal phase. No information is currently available about the guidance 
used in the payload that may simply be the front-end of the missile. The land-attack version 
reportedly uses radar comparison and inertial navigation to reach its target but it is unclear 
whether the cruising phase is at high or low altitude but it has been reported that the radar 
altimeter allows the missile to fly as low as 200 m. 
 The 3K51 missile in SS-N-27 Alfa is externally also a slim cylinder but with pointed nose and a 
projecting section which houses the wings when they are folded. The rear of the missile is 
similar to 3K54 but there is a shaped air scoop on the underside. It would appear that this 
weapon might have the same rocket-propelled payload as 3K54 and possibly a similar seeker.  
Operational status 
Some 45 SS-N-21 systems and 300 missiles have been produced and it remains in production for 
both domestic and export customers. About half-a-dozen SS-N-27 systems may be in production 
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Specifications 
  3K54E 3K54E1 3K51 
Length (m) 8.09 6.2 8.5 
Diameter (cm) 51 51 N/k 
Wing span (m) 3.1 m 3.1 m 3.1 m 
Weight (kg) 1,750 1,750 2,000 
Range in nm (km) 1,600 (3,000) *  160 n miles (300 
km) 
108 (200) 
Speed Mach 3.25 Mach 0.7 Mach 2 
Guidance Inertial with active radar 
homing 
    
Note:* Land attack version  
   
Contractor 
Novatar Design Bureau 
Annex 3D:  NATIONAL DEFENSE; Appendix 3:  KEY WEAPON SYSTEMS 
3D - 59 
AIR FORCE 
KAI T-50 and A-50 GOLDEN EAGLE  
 
 
Type. Advanced jet trainer/light attack jet.  
Program. Begun by Samsung Aerospace (SSA) in 1992 under designation KTX-2 (Korean 
Trainer, Experimental); initial design assistance to Samsung by Lockheed Martin Tactical 
Aircraft Systems as offset in F-16 Korean Fighter Program; early design (see 1994-95 Jane's) 
featured shoulder-mounted wings and twin tail unit; revised later to present configuration; basic 
configuration established mid-1995; full-scale development originally planned to begin in 1997, 
subject to finding risk-sharing partner; government go-ahead given on 3 July 1997; 
Samsung/Lockheed Martin agreement September 1997 to continue joint development until 2005; 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics at Fort Worth responsible for wings, flight control system and 
avionics; development phase funded 70 per cent by South Korean government, 17 per cent by 
Samsung/KAI and 13 per cent by Lockheed Martin. FSD contract, signed 24 October 1997, calls 
for two static/fatigue test and four flying prototypes (two T-50A and two T-50B; roll-out targeted 
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for October 2001 and first flight in June 2002); production aircraft to begin manufacture in 
August 2003. Work split 55 per cent in USA, 44 per cent in South Korea and 1 per cent 
elsewhere. Preliminary design review (PDR) completed 12 to 16 July 1999; wind tunnel testing 
completed (4,800 hours) and aerodynamic design frozen November 1999. Critical design review 
(CDR) passed in August 2000.  KTX-2 was redesignated T-50 and A-50 in early 2000. T-50 
International Company (TFIC) established September 2000 (following July MoU) by KAI and 
LMAS to market aircraft outside South Korea. Deliveries to RoKAF planned to begin in October 
2005 and be completed in 2009.   
Current Versions (planned)   
T-50A: Advanced trainer.  
T-50B: Lead-in fighter trainer.  
A-50: Proposed light combat version.  
Customers. Initial RoKAF requirement for 94 T-50s (50 T-50s and 44 A-50s), with options 
for up to 100 more, including further A-50s. Aimed also at F-5 replacement market. Exports 
(from 2006) estimated potentially at 600 to 800.  
Costs. Development program cost estimated at US$2,000 million (1995); but re-assessed in 
1996 as US$1,500 million, and only US$1,200 million by early 1997. Initial October 1997 FSD 
contract valued at approximately US$1,270 million. Development phase re-estimated at US$1.8 
billion to US$2.1 billion in mid-2000; unit cost US$18 million to US$20 million for trainer, 
US$20 million to US$22 million for attack version (2000).  
Design Features.  Mid-mounted, variable camber wings, swept back on leading edges only; 
leading-edge root extensions (LERX); all-moving tail plane; sweptback fin leading edge. Single 
turbofan engine, with twin side-mounted intakes. KIAT developing fuselage and tail unit. 
Avionics to include HUD and color MFDs. Designed for service life of more than 8,000 hours.   
Annex 3D:  NATIONAL DEFENSE; Appendix 3:  KEY WEAPON SYSTEMS 
3D - 61 
Flying Controls.  Digital fly-by-wire control of elevons, tail plane and rudder. Moog actuators.  
Structure.  Lockheed Martin, wings; KAI, fuselage, tail unit and final assembly.  
Landing Gear.  Messier-Dowty KIA retractable tricycle type, with single wheel and oleo-
pneumatic shock absorber on each unit. Main wheels retract into engine intake trunks, nose 
wheel forward.  
Power Plant.  One General Electric F404-GE-402 turbofan (78.7 kN; 17,700 lb st with 
afterburning), equipped with FADEC.  
Accommodation.  Crew of two in tandem; stepped cockpits; Martin-Baker ejection seats.  
Systems.  Onboard oxygen generating system. Hamilton Sundstrand power generation system. 
Argo-Tech fuel system.   
Avionics.  Comms: UHF/VHF radio; IFF. Radar: Lockheed Martin AN/APG-67 in T-50B and 
A-50. Flight: Digital fly-by-wire flight controls; nav/attack system for fighter lead-in training; 
ring laser gyro INS; radar altimeter.   Instrumentation: BAE Systems HUD; two 127 mm (5 in) 
color MFDs; Honeywell instrumentation displays (eight 76 mm; 3 in displays, including HSI, 
attitude indicator, electronic altimeter and Mach speed indicator). Self-defense: A-50 provision 
for EW pods and RWR.  
Armament (T-50B and A-50).  Internal 20 mm M61 Vulcan cannon with 208 rounds (port 
LERX). Seven external stations (one on centerline, two under each wing and AAM rail at each 
wingtip) for AAMs, ASMs, gun pods, rocket pods or bombs. Expected to include AIM-9 
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Dimensions, External 
Wing span: over missiles 9.17 m (30 ft 1 in) 
    excl missiles 9.11 m (29 ft 10½ in) 
Length overall  12.98 m (42 ft 7 in) 
Height overall  4.78 m (15 ft 8¼ in) 
 
Weights and Loadings 
 
Weight empty  6,263 kg (13,808 lb) 
Max T-O weight: clean  8,890 kg (19,600 lb) 




Max level speed  M1.4 
Max rate of climb at S/L  10,058 m (33,000 ft)/min 
Service ceiling  14,500 m (47,570 ft) 
g limits  +8/-3 
Annex 3D:  NATIONAL DEFENSE; Appendix 3:  KEY WEAPON SYSTEMS 
3D - 63 
AIRBORNE SELF-PROTECTION JAMMER (ASPJ).   
 ASPJ is a state-of-the-art internal electronic countermeasures system used to defeat or 
degrade tracking by threat radar systems and will enhance the survivability of the F-16 in 
combat. The system is built by a team of Northrop Grumman and ITT and is currently in service 
with some fighters in the U.S Navy, Marine Corps and several international customers' versions 
of similar fighters.  Korea is the first international customer to incorporate ASPJ on the F-16s. 
ASPJ is the fourth type of internal electronic countermeasures equipment that has been 
integrated into the F-16. Addition of the ASPJ countermeasures set will give the Republic of 
Korea Air Force (ROKAF) F-16s a robust self-protection capability. These aircraft also have the 
ALR-56M radar warning receiver and the ALE-47 chaff/flare dispenser.  The current program to 
install the ASPJ in ROKAF F-16s began in April 1997. The modified aircraft is the ROKAF's 
latest version of the F-16, which was delivered in late 1994 and was flown back to the United 
States for modification and testing. This aircraft was modified at Fort Worth, will undergo 
testing in the anechoic chamber, and will then be ferried to Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., for 
several months of flight testing. The remainder of the F-16s scheduled for the ASPJ upgrade will 
be modified in Korea by the ROKAF beginning in mid-2000.  
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Acquisition  2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
Indigenous R&D 
and Production 
Major Surface Ships (KDX) 
Minor Surface Ships 
(Minesweepers) 
Armored Vehicles (KIFV) 
Trainer Aircraft (KT-1) 
Small Naval Craft 
Small Arms 
Major Surface Ships (KDX) 
Minor Surface Ships 
(Minesweepers) 
Torpedoes 
Armored Vehicles (KIFV) 
Trainer Aircraft (KT-1) 
Small Naval Craft 
Small Arms 
Major Surface Ships 
Minor Surface Ships 
Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (FX) 





Major Surface Ships 
Minor Surface Ships 
Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (FX) 





Joint R&D and 
Production 
Combat Aircraft (KF-16) 
Tanks (K1 MBT) 
Helicopter 
Artillery (K-200) 




Combat Aircraft (KF-16) 
Tanks (K1 MBT) 
Helicopters 
Artillery (K-200) 





Micro Air Vehicle 
Comms Satellite (2d Gen) 






Micro Air Vehicle 
UUV 
BMD 
Micro Spy Satellite 
Attack Helicopter(KAH) 









































Maritime Surveillance (P3) 






Maritime Surveillance (P3) 
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 2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
Major Capability/ 
Purpose 
Direction Items to procure Direction Items to procure Direction Items to procure Direction Items to procure 
Information & 
Command 







• 2 Comms Satellites 
• 1 Spy Satellite 













• 10 Aerostats 
• 1 Spy Satellite 
• 2 Comms Sat 
• Joint C3I System 
• GBR 
• Miniature space 
communications, 




• Defense Digitization 
• 10 Aerostats 
• 2 Spy Satellite 
• 10 Microsats 
• 10 Micro spy sats 
• Joint C3I System 
• GBR 






• 20 JLENS 
• 20 Microsats 
• 10 Micro spy sats 
• Micro Air Sensor 
• Joint C3I System 
• GBR 
Strategic Strike • Space Launch 
Capablity 
• Space Launch Platform • Long Range 
Ballistic 
Delivery 
Capability < 300 
km 
• KSR-1 • Long Range 
Ballistic Delivery 
Capability <500 km 
• KSR-1 • Long Range 
Precision Strike 
• Long Range 
Ballistic Delivery 




• Cruise Missiles 





• K1 MBT 
• AH-X 
• SAM-X 






• K1 MBT 
• AH-X 
• SAM-X 
• Q37-type radar 
• Improved lethality, 
agility 




• Q37-type radar 








• Q37-type radar 
• Multi-sensor array 





• Coastal defense 
• Develop surface 
combat capability  
• Protection of 
SLOCs 
• 8 P-3Cs 
• 13 Super Lynx 
• 3 K. Keong MHC  
• 3 Chang Bogo  
• 4 KDX 















• 4 P-3Cs 
• 3 K. Keong MHC  
• 3 Type 214  
• 3 KDX -III 
• Improved C4ISR 
system 
• Strategic control of 
SLOCs 
• Improve ship 




• 8 P-3Cs 
• 3 Type 214  
• 4 KDX-III 
• 2 KDX-X 











e combat capability 
• Improve ship 
building capacity  
• 12 P-3Cs 
• 6 super Lynx 
• 4 Type 214  
• 6 KDX-X 
• 2 Submarine rescue 
• 10 UWAV 
• 3 MHO 
• 2 ML 
• SAMs / Torpedoes 
upgrades 





• Coastal defense 
• Develop surface 
combat capability  
• Protection of 
SLOCs 
• 8 P-3Cs 
• 13 Super Lynx 
• 3 K. Keong MHC  
• 3 Chang Bogo  
• 4 KDX 













• 4 P-3Cs 
• 3 K. Keong MHC  
• 3 Type 214  
• 3 KDX -III 
• Improved C4ISR 
system 
• Strategic control of 
SLOCs 
• Improve ship 




• 8 P-3Cs 
• 3 Type 214  
• 4 KDX-III 
• 2 KDX-X 











e combat capability 
• Improve ship 
building capacity  
• 12 P-3Cs 
• 6 super Lynx 
• 4 Type 214  
• 6 KDX-X 
• 2 Submarine rescue 
• 10 UWAV 
• 3 MHO 
• 2 ML 
• SAMs / Torpedoes 
upgrades 
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 2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
Major Capability/ 
Purpose 
Direction Items to procure Direction Items to procure Major 
Capability/ 
Purpose 















• Space Launch 
systems 
• AIP Propulsion 
 
• FX 
• Aerial Mine Field  
• KSR-1 















• Aerial Mine Field  
• KSR-1/2 
• Micro Air Sensor 




• Directed Energy 
Beam Technology 
• High Altitude Flight 
Technology 
• Aerial Mine Field  





• Ballistic & 
Cruise Missile 





• High Altitude 
Flight Technology 
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ARMY R&D EXPENDITURE 
2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil 
AH-64D $0.150 AH64D $0.080 KAH66 $0.250 KAH66 $0.200 
KIFV $0.020 KAH66 $0.200 AGM-11X $0.050 AGM-11X $0.030 
K1-A1 MBT $0.050 AGM-11X $0.030 SAM(A-400) $0.180 SAM(A-400) $0.050 
SAM (A-300) $0.100 SAM (A-400) $0.160 Tactical Radar (GBS) $0.050 Tactical Radar (GBS) $0.050 
Tactical Radar (GBS) $0.030 Tactical Radar (GBS) $0.030 THEL $0.020 THEL $0.500 
Others $0.285 Others $0.317 Others $0.458 Others $0.619 
                
                
Total $0.635 Total $0.817 Total $1.008 Total $1.449 
Budget Allocated $0.635 Budget Allocated $0.817 Budget Allocated $1.088 Budget Allocated $1.449 
 
NAVY R&D EXPENDITURE 
2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil 
Torpedoes $0.030 SAM (SM-2) $0.070 MSO/MHO $0.070 KDX-X $0.190 
Submarine (T-214) $0.150 Torpedoes $0.030 Mine Layer $0.080 SS-N-21 Integration $0.045 
KDX-2/3 $0.300 KDX-X $0.280 SAM (SM-3) $0.100 HPM $0.280 
HPM $0.150 Submarine (T-214) $0.200 KDX-X $0.325 SSM/CM $0.200 
    HPM $0.200 HPM $0.325 ASW $0.200 
    UUV $0.020 UUV $0.080 UUV $0.125 
Others $0.216 SS-N-26 Integration $0.025 Torpedo (Squall) $0.050 
Next Generation 
Submarine $0.350 
    Others $0.264 Others $0.421 Others $0.542 
Total $0.846 Total $1.089 Total $1.451 Total $1.932 
Budget Allocated $0.846 Budget Allocated $1.089 Budget Allocated $1.451 Budget Allocated $1.932 
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AIR FORCE R&D EXPENDITURE 
2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil R&D Program US$ Bil 
FX $0.200 FX $0.250 FX $0.275 FX $0.150 
A/T-50 $0.050 UCAV $0.050 UAV HAE $0.150 UAV HAE $0.100 
E3 AWACS $0.080 AWACS $0.040 UCAV $0.080 UCAV $0.125 
KT-2 $0.015 Harm Blk 6 $0.060 MAV $0.055 MAV $0.100 
KOX-1 $0.025 JSOW/JDAM $0.050 AAM $0.040 AAM $0.040 
UAV $0.010 Tanker $0.025 Air Minefield $0.150 ABL $0.300 
AAM $0.020 MAV $0.055     Air Minefield $0.175 
Others $0.235 Others $0.287 Others $0.338 Others $0.459 
Total $0.635 Total $0.817 Total $1.088 Total $1.449 
Budget Allocated $0.635 Budget Allocated $0.817 Budget Allocated $1.088 Budget Allocated $1.449 
 
DBA PROGRAMS EXPENDITURE 
2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 




Satellites $0.125 Microsatellites $0.125 Microsatellites $0.250 
Spy Satellites $0.220 Spy Satellites $0.260 Micro Spy Satellites $0.150 Micro Spy Satellites $0.360 
Launch Vehicle (KSR-1) $0.100 Launch Vehicle (KSR-1) $0.125 Spy Satellites $0.250 
Launch Vehicle (KSR-
3) $0.225 
Aerostat $0.080 Aerostat $0.080 Launch Vehicle (KSR-2) $0.155 KLENS $0.150 
Micro Air Sensor $0.080 Micro Air Sensor $0.080 KLENS $0.100 Micro Air Sensor $0.280 
Defense Digitization $0.215 Defense Digitization $0.250 Micro Air Sensor $0.180 Defense Digitization $0.355 
Others $0.039 Others $0.127 Defense Digitization $0.285 Others $0.238 
        Others $0.150     
Total $0.814 Total $1.047 Total $1.395 Total $1.858 
Budget Allocated $0.814 Budget Allocated $1.047 Budget Allocated $1.395 Budget Allocated $1.858 
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Micro-Air Sensor Network (MASN) – Korea’s Strategic DBA Solution  
Introduction 
 Concurrent with the ROK feasibility study on space-based sensors, the idea of the micro-air 
sensor network was born.  Based on revolutionary advances already taking place in 2000 in the 
fields of nanotechnology and bioengineering, MND projected and set the goal of putting in place 
a micro-air sensor network by the year 2020.  The risk of this investment was classed as 
moderately high and a total program budget of US$3.5 billion spaced over 20 years was 
approved.  To make the program affordable, MND solicited the participation from industry due 
to its commercial potential and dual-use technology.  Thus the development of the MASN 
concept is tied closely to the development of the ROK’s space program. 
Concept 
 The concept of the Micro-Air Sensor Network (MASN) is similar to the application of 
nanosatellite technology for military applications, that of employing a swarm of miniature 
satellites communicating with micro sensors on a battlefield and conveying important 
surveillance and tactical information.74  In the case of the MASN, however, the platform differs 
as micro-air vehicle (MAV) and/or super pressure balloons instead of nanosatellites are utilized 
as the primary sensing platform.   
Requirement 
 To support Korea’s DBA goal of information superiority and the need for a surveillance 
system to support its military missions, especially in the protection of Korea’s SLOCs, the ROK 
military identified a need to acquire a low-cost, high-altitude, with extended on-station times , 
                                                           
74 “PicoSat Constellations Debuts November”, Spacedaily, October 11, 1999. 
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and high reliability surveillance system that would provide continuous surveillance coverage.  In 
this development, low-cost, high-altitude, and extended on-station times are the driving 
requirements.75   
Solution 
 Based on the technology that currently existed in 2000, the possible technological solutions 
to answer this requirement were the use of satellites, high altitude endurance UAVs (HAE 
UAV), and tactical UAVs.  These options, however, had their respective strengths and 
weaknesses, summarized below: 
Surveillance System Satelllite HAE UAV Tactical UAV 
Sensor Payload Fixed, multi-sensor capable 
Variable, payload 
catered to mission 
Variable, payload 
catered to mission 
Technology Maturity Mature and proven Recent and immature Mature and proven 
Area of Coverage Large Large Small 
Time of Coverage 
Fixed and predictable 
based on orbital 
period 
Long Limited 
Resolution ~ 1 m (IKONOS) < 1 m < 1 m 
Cost to Acquire High Moderate Low 
Cost to Operate High Moderate Low 
Time to Acquire At least 3 years At least 1.5 years About 3 months 
Technology Upgrade None Easy Easy 
Table 3-120.  Comparison Between Different Available Airborne Surveillance Systems 
 From the above analysis of present technological solutions, MND concluded that none of the 
systems would meet its requirements.  Consequently, the decision was made to indigenously 
design, R&D and produce a new class of high altitude surveillance system suited to Korea’s 
military operations.  Such a system, it was decided, would employ the revolutionary advances 
already taking place in the fields of nanotechnology and bioengineering.  Specifically, this new 
system would merge the micro-air vehicle, microsatellite, and miniaturization technologies to 
                                                           
75 Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, Blimps, Balloons, and Long Endurance Vehicles.”  Future 
Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  Progress in Astronautics and 
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create a new capability.  And so, the idea of the MASN concept began to take on a more concrete 
form. 
Parameters. 
 The initial parameters put forth by MND aimed to foremost address the most current 
deficiency of the lack of a credible maritime surveillance and identification system.  The MASN 
involves the deployment of numerous miniaturized sensors timed according to predicted wind 
patterns.  Each MAS would consist of a surveillance platform and a sensor payload.  Simply put, 
the MAS is a high resolution digital camera mounted on a high-altitude capable platform.  From 
the study of wind patterns, MND stated that the MAS would be deployed at the lower 
stratosphere around 20 km,76 with a mission time of ten days.77   
a. Sensor Payload 
 Utilizing low-cost and commercially available CCD and focusing technology found in 
today’s (2001) digital cameras, and operating in the optical and near IR region, the sensor 
payload would have dimensions not more than 10 cm (4 inches) on any given side and its weight 
would be less than 500 grams.  Its power requirements would be not more than 1 Watt per hour.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, 1997.  211. 
76 The stratosphere is comparatively stable (when compared to the troposphere) and turbulence is far less energetic.76  
In the lower stratosphere, winds begin to decrease with altitude and reach a minimum around 20 km.  At that level 
wind in the mid-altitude is typically below 10 m/s.  This minimum wind zone presents an opportunity to conduct a 
variety of missions.  Epley, Lawrence E.  “Stratospheric Aircraft, Blimps, Balloons, and Long Endurance Vehicles.”  
Future Aeronautical and Space Systems.  Ahmed K. Noor and Samuel L. Venneri. ed.  Progress in Astronautics and 
Aeronautics.  Vol. 172.  Virginia:  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, 1997.  214.   
77 Research data shows that balloon drift patterns over ten days follow fairly narrow patterns.  After ten days, most 
balloons completed between one-half global circumnavigation and one complete global circumnavigation.  The 
mean difference in latitude at that time was 8.5 degrees, or a ground distance of approximately 950 km.  At an 
altitude of 36 km, the balloon has a line-of-sight footprint on the ground of 730 km radius.  Thus even with a drift 
distance of 950 km, the balloon retains visibility of a sizeable portion of the original footprint.  Other points to note 
are that ending latitude was found to be dependent upon starting latitude and month but not on starting longitude, 
and starting longitude was not found to be a significant factor, except for an Equator launch in the 30 day category.  
Reitinger, Kurt C.  Analysis of Simulated Drift Patterns of a High Altitude Balloon Surveillance System.  NPS.  
June 1993.  43. 
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This would make the incorporation of a chargeable battery with the supplementation of solar 
energy a possible power source  
 As a baseline, the optical resolution as of 2001 is 6 megapixels.  Based on Moore’s Law and 
advances in digital imaging technology, the optical resolution of the MAS should easily achieve 
upwards of 15 megapixels.  Once the imagery is optically captured, this data must then be 
processed using some intelligent matching algorithm into useable information.  Acknowledging 
the limitations of bandwidth, some form of compression algorithm must also be used to reduce 
the bandwidth requirement.  Preliminary estimates put this bandwidth requirement at 2 Mbps for 
operating a network of 200 MAS.78  This information is then communicated at a fixed interval 
rate via an IR port to either an orbiting satellite or a roving UAV, before being subsequently 
transmitted to dedicated ground receiving stations, where further data processing would be 
executed and the intelligence gathered disseminated via the JC3IS. 
b. Surveillance Platform 
 To achieve a 20 km altitude, MND narrowed the platform to the use of either MAVs or 
balloons/super pressure balloons79 or a combination of both ie. a super pressure MAV blimp.  
The advantage of combining the two platforms into a super pressure MAV blimp is the reduced 
power requirements.80  The advantages of employing either of these platforms have already been 
covered in the main write-up in epoch one. 
                                                           
78 Assuming a conservative data compression that reduces the file size by half, the initially processed information 
would take up 3 megapixels.  With a transmission interval refresh rate of 5 minutes (300 sec), the bandwidth 
requirement for an individual MAS then works out to 10 kbps.  With a bandwidth transmission capability of 2 Mbps, 
this would allow for the simultaneous deployment of up to 200 MASs. 
79 The use of super pressure balloons would be necessary for extended missions at constant altitude.  Regular 
balloons change altitudes throughout the day due to thermal expansion. 
80 For example, a 100m long blimp-type craft (at 20 km altitude) could hover over a point on the Earth with less than 
1 kW of net propulsive power.  In another example, it was estimated that a 23,000m3 airship can maintain station in 
average midlatitude winds (15 kts) with a 0.15 kW net propulsive power.  Marcy, W. L., and Hookway, R. O., 
“Propulsion Options for the HI-SPOT Long Endurance Drone Airship,” Martin Marietta Corp., Sep 1979. 
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 The parameters put forth in their requirements in 2000 were the MAV would be less than 4-
inches in any one dimension, possessing an inertial/GPS positioning capability up to 1 m 
accuracy, with an ability to hover or float in air at over 30 km altitude for up to 3 months, and 
utilize passive multi-/hyper-spectral sensor (depending on technology maturity), employ one-
way microwave transmitters, and utilizing solar power coupled with rechargeable battery for 
power requirements.  The entire MASN would be rocket-/missile- or balloon-delivered 
depending on mission. 
 Its small dimensions would make the sensors virtually undetectable.  To meet the inertia GPS 
needs, the sensor platform would employ commercially available fiber-optic gyro and etched 
silicon accelerometer-based inertial measurement units.  The requirement for these micro-air 
sensors to hover or float in air at over 30 km altitude for up to 3 months, in essence, wpould 
allow the South to maintain a continuous surveillance coverage over its area of interest.  To 
effect a viable means of communications, these could take the form of optical communication 
via fiber optic tethers and other cluster architectures for miniature satellites for which experience  
with tethers is useful.81 
Capability 
 Assuming a field of field of 20 degrees, the area of coverage a MAS will provide is 
approximately a circle of radius 3.5 km.  With a network of 200 MAS employed cooperatively, 
the equivalent coverage that results from such a system is equivalent to a circle of radius 49.5 
km.  Also assuming a focal length of 1 cm with a pitch of 10 microns per pixel, the MAS will be 
able to provide a spatial resolution up to 5 cm (from Rayleigh’s criterion) in the optical region of 
operation.  This system resolution thus allows Korea to possess a high quality identification 
surveillance system that meets its need for a maritime surveillance system. 
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Advantages Over Existing Systems. 
 The advantages of the MASN concept are its low life cycle costs, its expendability, easy 
upgrade ability, almost continuous coverage, high reliability, and low observability.  Comparing 
these traits with satellites and HAE UAVs, the choice of employing the MASN is obvious.  
When compared to tactical UAVs, however, the MASN does not enjoy the operator control such 
a system offers due to its dependence on weather patterns.  However, its operational control 
limitations are offset by the cost advantages that the MASN enjoys.  Based on 2000 figures, a 
tactical UAV costs at least US1 million.  Assuming the MAS in its most simple form as that of 
attaching a floating device to a 6 megapixel digital camera, the cost of a MAS unit with mass 
production effected works out to the order of US$500.  Thus, with a US$1 million budget, the 
trade-off is summarized below: 
Surveillance System MASN Tactical UAV 
Sensor Payload Variable, payload catered to mission 
Variable, payload catered to 
mission 
Per Unit Cost (US$) 500 1 million 
Qty for US$1 million 2000 1 
Instantaneous Coverage 
Area (km2) ~80,000 ~1 
Technology Maturity Recent Mature and proven 
Time of Coverage Up to 10 days Limited 
Resolution 5 cm < 1 m 
Cost to Acquire Low Low 
Cost to Operate Low Low 
Time to Acquire  <1 month About 3 months 
Technology Upgrade Easy Easy 
Table 3-121.  Cost Analysis Between MASN and Tactical UAV  
 The use of the optical wavelength region limits the MAS to a day time maritime surveillance 
capability.  Looking at the threat environment formed mainly by the East Sea, however, this is 
not a significant limitation as the movement of ships is rather slow and makes tracking by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
81 “PicoSat Technology Gets Serious”, Spacedaily, October 11, 1999. 
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MASN with a continuous coverage time over the area of interest very possible.  This again is not 
the same case as that for a UAV. 
Conclusion 
 To conclude this discussion, Korea believes that its investment in MASN is a realizable 
technological goal over the twenty year time frame.  To better predict the flight patterns and 
coverage of the MAS, there is a need to understand the weather patterns associated with the East 
Sea as well as the regional seas constituting Korea’s SLOCs.  Hence, Korea will have to become 
a member of the International Weather Consortium. 
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Aerial Mine Field System (AMFS) – Korea’s Air Defense Solution 
Introduction 
 In concert with the MASN development is the exploration and planned development of the 
Aerial Mine Field  system (AMFS) that also exploits nanotechnology and MEMS.  Instead of 
providing a sense capability, the AMFS is a passive offensive weapon used for enhancing ROK’s 
air defense capability.  As will be discussed below, the AMFS comprises MAVs armed as 
weapons that could either carry a shaped-charge plastique or be titanium-tipped.82  Upon 
attaining technology maturity and mass production, MND predicts that the individually-armed 
mines could cost as little as US$5.  The introduction of the AMFS into Korea’s military 
operations serves to enhance its air defense capabilities. 
Concept 
 Conceptually, the AMFS is just what its namesake implies – that of forming a mine field in 
three-dimensional space.  Similar in its employment as world war two barrage balloons and flak, 
the purpose of the AMFS is to deny enemy air threats the use of Korea’s airspace by forcing 
enemy pilots to deviate from its planned flight path and to consequently channel these deviations 
into planned SAM kill zones such that Korea’s SAM arsenal is able to effectively neutralize the 
enemy air threat.  The only exception to barrage balloons and flak is the AMFS’s low 
observability that translates to operational surprise for Korea.  From the analysis of wind 
dispersion patterns, these air mines would have a deployment time of up to 30 minutes before 
they effect self-destruction. 
                                                           
82 Titanium-tipped MAVs would result in a rain of red-hot fragments through thousand pounds of jet fuel and 
ammunition when sucked into jet engine air intakes would fracture the whirling turbine blades.  Jim Wilson, “Micro 
Warfare:  Small, smart and deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular Mechanics, February 
2001.  http://www.popularmechanics.com. 
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Requirement 
 To achieve and maintain it’s declared goal of air and space superiority83, MND concluded 
that Korea needed to maintain an effective air defense capability.  Existing Korean air defense 
systems are essentially reactive systems because they must first sense the presence of the enemy 
air threat before countering the threats by “throwing” missiles at it.  Consequently, the enemy is 
able to deploy countermeasures to defeat the incoming missile or to out maneuver the missile.  
Additionally, present SAMs are physically visible both visually and on the radar screens.  This 
cue thus enables enemy pilots to be successful in undertaking the necessary evasive maneuvers.   
 From the above analysis, MND decided that Korea wanted an air defense weapon system that 
would take the fight to the enemy.  Hence, MND explored the feasibility of applying MEMS and 
miniaturization technology as well as its space and MASN program developments to create a 
deployable low cost, high lethality air defense weapon system with low probability of detection 
and observability, minimal maintenance needs, and with a limited self-destruct deployment time 
and a fire-and-forget capability.  The system would also be Higher Level Architecture (HLA) 
compliant and interoperable with the Joint C3I System (JC3IS) software to integrate with the 
existing air defense network systems.   
Solution 
 From concept explorations done, several technological solutions were considered.  These 
solutions comprised either acquiring an advanced SAM or air-to-air combat capability.  
Essentially, the above technological solutions entailed the acquisition of better missiles.  MND 
                                                           
83 Air superiority is a necessity.  Since the German attack onPoland in 1939, no country has won a war in the face of 
enemy air superiority, no major offensive has succeeded against an opponent who controlled the air, and no defense 
has sustained itself against an enemy who had air superiority.  John A. Warden III.  “Air Superiority – the Concept” 
from The Air Campaign:  Planning for Combat.  Brassey’s Air Combat Reader.  Boyne, W.J. and Handleman, P., 
ed.  Washington:  Batsford Brassey’s, Inc.  1999.  309. 
Annex 3E:  TECHNOLOGY; Appendix 3:  MAJOR R&D PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS 
3E - 15 
deemed that this was appropriate but still wanted a new capability and this was captured in the 
AMFS concept. 
 The AMFS aims to complement Korea’s existing suite of air defense assets.  The AMFS is 
meant to primarily overcome the enemy air threat posed by its advanced combat fighters, with a 
secondary capability being the negation of incoming cruise missile threats.  Based on modern 
combat aircraft operations, MND wanted this air defense weapon system to be deployable 
anywhere between 50 m to as high as 15,000 m altitude84.  The air mines will be armed with 
contact-detonated explosives (at least for the first generation).  Depending on the mission 
scenarios, these mines will be either rocket-, missile- or balloon-delivered.  Mines “kill” Aircraft 
and CMs by either destroying their airframes or detonating internally after the mines get sucked 
into the air intakes. 
Parameters 
 The initial parameters put forth by MND aimed specifically at answering the defensive air 
defense mission through the exploitation of Korea’s terrain to influence and shape the airspace.  
And these parameters were arrived at from performing a threat analysis. 
a. Projected Enemy Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics. 
 Korea’s assessments had identified the needs to achieve and maintain air superiority and to 
enhance its coastal defenses.  These conclusions were borne out by the existence of enemy 
advanced air fighters and cruise missiles.  Based on enemy intelligence analysis of Korea’s 
terrain and SAM deployments as well as its fighter or cruise missile control authorities85, all 
possible air corridors and flight paths to be used as ingress and egress routes would be identified 
                                                           
84 The maximum altitude threshold is established from Korea’s present and planned inventory of missile or rocket 
delivery systems 
85 By control authorities, it is meant to imply accounting for the airframe’s maneuverability in terms of altitude, 
speed, and turn radius to conclude the feasibility of flying any particular flight profile for a given air tasking order. 
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and prioritized.  To assure the survivability of the enemy’s air assets sufficient enough to at least 
accomplish its mission, one of its supporting goals would be to minimize the detection of these 
assets by Korea’s sense systems.  To accomplish this, the enemy could fly either above the SAM 
ceiling or below the radar coverage height.   
 Once the enemy’s air assets attempt to fly over Korea, it is very likely that these fighters or 
cruise missiles would fly nap-of-the-earth.  Consequently, the AMFS would be deployed in 
places where the enemy least expects – inside the valleys where he attempts to fly nap or at the 
altitudes above the SAM umbrella.  Alternatively, the AMFS could also be deployed at higher 
altitudes beyond that of Korea’s SAM ceiling.  The deterrence effect of repelling the enemy’s 
forces is attained through the “unexplained” kill of his aircrafts.  From world war two data 
analysis, it was shown that a deterrence effect to influence an enemy air threat to change his 
operational plans enroute is achieved if he suffers 5% attrition.86  Consequently, this became the 
MND baseline requirement for the AMFS concept – the employment of miniaturized air mines 
dispersed in a given volume of space sufficient to effect at least a kill probability of 0.05, where 
the kill is defined as either a soft or hard kill.  Also, each air mine would consist of a “kill” 
mechanism attached to some floating device. 
 During MND’s net assessment in the third epoch, the need to defend against cruise missiles 
(CM) was also identified.  This then led to an additional requirement to study the feasibility of 
employing the AMFS as a suitable CM defense.  For this requirement, MND set the probability 
of kill at 0.3.  
b. Kill Mechanism 
 The primary “kill” element of the AMFS consists of micro air mines armed with contact-
detonated explosives based on shaped-charge plastique.  In such a case, the air mines would 
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“kill” enemy aircrafts or cruise missiles by sufficiently puncturing the airframe to cause 
aerodynamic instability.  Additionally, these air mines could also be titanium-tipped whereby 
this would result “in a rain of red-hot fragments through thousand pounds of jet fuel and 
ammunition [upon ingestion] into jet engine air intakes by [fracturing] the whirling turbine 
blades.”87   
c. Floating Device 
 As promulgated by the MASN concept, the air mines would “float” in air by attaching the 
kill mechanism to either a MAV or balloon-platform.  When attached to a balloon, employing 
MEMS technology to regulate the air pressure contained within the balloons could then control 
the altitude of the dispersion pattern. 
Capability 
 From the extensive terrain and control authority analyses conducted by Korea’s military, 
MND has identified all the possible air corridors and flight paths that the enemy will use as 
ingress and egress routes.  The AMFS would thus be deployed in places where he least expects 
ie.  inside the valleys where he attempts to fly nap or above the SAM ceiling if he so decides to 
fly “high”.   
 Assuming that Korea possesses a network of ground-based sensors that performs a radar 
gating function, this ability would then give a constant update of an incoming air threats position 
in time and space.  Consequently, a track of the air threat’s path would be obtained and its 
precise location in time and space at a discrete increment of time be predicted with sufficient 
certainty.  With this precondition, an intercept solution could be determined based on a pre-
programmed targeting algorithm identifying a suitable volume of space to deploy the AMFS 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
86 This fact was pointed out to the author during a discussion with Professor Mike Melich on 12 Feb 2001. 
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such that the mine field would be in place out to two minutes ahead of the air threat’s arrival.  
Through the use of firing theory, the mine density was determined.88  And this calculations will 
be elaborated below.   
   PK 0.05    
   
z 0.0641 
   
 σ (m) 50 100 150 200 250 500 
Size of Mine Field, r* (m) 12.60 35.57 71.15 106.72 142.29 177.87 
        
Area of Air 
Threat 
Radius of Air 
Threat Optimal Number of Mines Required 
a (m2) r (m) n(σ=50m) n(σ=100m) n(σ=150m) n(σ=200m) n(σ=250m) n(σ=500m) 
6.75 1.466 149 596 1342 2385 3727 14907 
6.80 1.471 148 592 1332 2368 3699 14797 
6.85 1.477 147 588 1322 2350 3672 14689 
6.90 1.482 146 583 1312 2333 3646 14583 
6.95 1.487 145 579 1303 2316 3619 14478 
7.00 1.493 144 575 1294 2300 3594 14375 
7.05 1.498 143 571 1285 2284 3568 14273 
7.10 1.503 142 567 1275 2268 3543 14172 
7.15 1.509 141 563 1267 2252 3518 14073 
7.20 1.514 140 559 1258 2236 3494 13975 
Table 3-122.  Optimum Number of Mines Against Aircraft for Pk = 0.05 
 Against cruise missiles, the requirement was to attain a 30% kill rate to complement the other 
air defense weapons and hence provide an overall effective air defense shield against CMs.  
From the assumptions above, a mine field density of about 2000 mines with a circularly 
dispersed radius of around 15m achieves the desired effect.  Based on the same considerations 
discussed earlier, the volume requirement is 2m3. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
87 Jim Wilson, “Micro Warfare:  Small, smart and deadly, micro air vehicles swarm onto the battlefield”, Popular 
Mechanics, February 2001.  http://www.popularmechanics.com. 

















z eezp 2211)( πσ  was used to perform the mine density determination.   
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   PK 0.30    
   
z 0.6296 
   
 σ (m) 10 15 20 25 50 100 
Size of Mine Field, r* (m) 12.60 18.90 25.19 31.49 62.99 125.97 
Area of Air 
Threat 
Radius of Air 
Threat Optimal Number of Mines Required 
a (m2) r (m) n(σ=10m) n(σ=15m) n(σ=20m) n(σ=25m) n(σ=50m) n(σ=100m) 
0.05 0.126 7912 17801 31646 49447 197788 791151 
0.10 0.178 3956 8900 15823 24723 98894 395575 
0.15 0.219 2637 5934 10549 16482 65929 263717 
0.20 0.252 1978 4450 7912 12362 49447 197788 
0.25 0.282 1582 3560 6329 9889 39558 158230 
0.30 0.309 1319 2967 5274 8241 32965 131858 
0.35 0.334 1130 2543 4521 7064 28255 113022 
0.40 0.357 989 2225 3956 6181 24723 98894 
0.45 0.378 879 1978 3516 5494 21976 87906 
0.50 0.399 791 1780 3165 4945 19779 79115 
Table 3-123:  Optimum Number of Mines Against Cruise Missiles for Pk = 0.30 
Advantages Over Existing Systems 
 MND’s analysis shows that the AMFS enjoys the following advantages, namely the aerial 
mine field once deployed is virtually undetectable or observable.  In terms of cost, MND 
estimates that given the advances of miniaturization and advantages of mass production, each 
mine could cost as little as US$5 in 2020.  Using the cost for manufacturing the bomblets 
contained in a SADARM projectile for example, the costs of mass producing the AMFS is 
probably a very affordable option for Korea.  From the system requirements calculated, the cost 
of a 2000 mine payload would cost about US$10,000.  Estimating the cost of the delivery system 
at US$30,000, a deployable AMFS would cost US$40,000 per missile. 
 Another advantage of the AMFS is its simplicity of application.  Essentially, the AMFS can 
be compared to a simple missile with a timed fuze that detonates and deploys the mines at the 
pre-determined altitude.  There is simply no requirement for the use of complicated electronic 
circuits found in AAMs, for example, due to the lack of a seeker. 
Annex 3E:  TECHNOLOGY; Appendix 4:  NEW SYSTEMS DESCRIPTIONS 
3E - 20 
Conclusion 
 As the examples of history have shown with the barrage balloons of world war two, the 
AMFS concept can also shape the air battlespace.  As the enemy now realizes that he needs to be 
aware whether his next flight will be his last, this influences him to either fly higher or not at all, 
thereby facilitating Korea’s goal attainment of air superiority.
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AAM   Air-to-Air Missiles 
AA-X  Extended Range AMRAAM 
AC  Automatic Control 
ADA  Air Defense Artillery 
AEW  Airborne Early Warning 
AF  Air Force 
AIFV  Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles 
AIP  Air Independent Propulsion 
AH  Attack Helicopters  
AMFS  Aerial Mine Field System 
AMRAAM Advanced Med Range Air-to-Air Missile 
APC   Armored Personnel Carriers 
ASIM Application Specific Integrated Micro-Instruments 
ASPJ  Airborne Self Protection Jammer 
ASW  Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile Systems 
AWACS Airborne Early Warning And Control Systems 
BM  Ballistic Missiles 
BMD  Ballistic Missiles Defense 
BW   Biological Weapons 
C3I Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence 
C4I Command, Control, Computer, Communications and Intelligence 
CAIV  Cost As an Independent Variable 
CEC  Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CFC   Combined Forces Command 
CM  Cruise Missiles 
DBA  Dominant Battle Space Awareness 
DHI  Daewoo Heavy Industries 
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DMZ  De-militarized Zone 
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
EO  Electro-Optics 
ESM  Electronic Support Measures 
FDP  Future Development Plans 
FIP  Force Improvement Priorities 
FMS  Foreign Military Sales 
FX  Future Fighter 
GCCS-M Global Command & Control System – Maritime 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GNP  Gross National Product 
GSR  Ground Surveillance Radar 
HAE  High Altitude Endurance 
HPM  High Power Microwave 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
JASSM  Joint Air-to-Surface Stand Off Missile 
JC3IS Joint Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence System 
JDAM  Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
JEC  Joint Economic Council 
JFPC  Joint Foreign Policy Council 
JMC  Joint Military Council 
JSC  Joint Social Council 
JSOW  Joint Stand Off Weapon 
KAFV  Korean Armored Fighting Vehicle 
KAI  Korea Aerospace Industry 
KEDO Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization 
KLENS Korean Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensors 
KNTDS Korean Naval Tactical Data System 
KOED Korean OSIS Evolutionary Development 
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KFP Korean Fighter Program 
KPA  Korean People’s Army 
KPN  Korean People’s Navy 
KPAF  Korean People’s Air Force 
KT  Korean Trainer 
K (N) Korea (North); after declaration of unification 
K (S) Korea (South); after declaration of unification 
LMTAS Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems 
MASN  Micro Air Sensor Network 
MAV  Micro-Air Vehicle 
MEMS  Microelectronic Mechanical Systems 
MBT  Main Battle Tanks 
MCMV  Mine Counter Measures Vessels 
MIRV  Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle 
MLRS  Multiple Launch Rocket System 
MND  Ministry of Defense 
MPA  Maritime Patrol Aircrafts 
MTCR  Missile Testing Control Regime 
MW  Microwave 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NMS  National Military Strategy 
NSS  National Security Strategy 
O&M  Operations and Maintenance 
OPCON Operational Control 
P-3X  Improved Variant of P-3C 
PLA  People’s Liberation Army 
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
R&D  Research and Development 
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ROK   Republic of Korea  
ROKA   Republic of Korea Army 
ROKN  Republic of Korea Navy 
ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force 
SAM  Surface-to-Air Missiles 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SLEP  Service Life Extension Program 
SLOC  Sea Lines of Communications 
SM  Standard Missiles 
SOF  Special Operation Forces 
SRBM  Short Range Ballistic Missiles 
SSM  Surface-to-Surface Missiles 
THEL  Tactical High Energy Lasers 
TMD  Theater Missile Defense 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
UCAV  Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles 
UHF  Ultra-High Frequency 
ULDB  Ultra Long Duration balloon 
UN  United Nations 
US  United States 
USFK  United States Forces in Korea 
USN  United States Navy 
UWA  Under Water Acoustics 
VLE  Very Long Endurance 
VLS  Vertical Launch System 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WS  Weapons Systems 
XR    Exchange Rate
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Lieutenant Commander 
Gordon R. Oliver II 
 
 Lieutenant Commander Oliver was raised in Moon Township, 
Pennsylvania and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1986 
with a Bachelors Degree in Ocean Engineering.  Following flight training in 
Pensacola, Florida and Beeville, Texas he was designated Naval Aviator in April 1988.  After initial A-7E 
training with VA-122 at NAS Lemoore, California, he joined the VA-27 “Royal Maces” in April 1989.  He 
deployed to the Western Pacific onboard USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70) in 1990, subsequently transitioned to 
the FA-18A Hornet in 1991, and began pre-deployment work-ups aboard USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63).  While 
with VA/VFA-27, he served as the Line Division, Maintenance Quality Assurance, Training and Landing 
Signals Officer.  He was the 1992 recipient of the Commander, Strike Fighter Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral 
Wesley L. McDonald Leadership Award for Junior Officers from among all Pacific Fleet FA-18 pilots.   
 Lieutenant Commander Oliver then reported to the VMFAT-101 Sharpshooters at MCAS El Toro, 
California as an Instructor Pilot and Landing Signals Officer.  After 16 months, he was ordered to join CVW-9 
underway during their 1993 Western Pacific/Arabian Gulf deployment onboard USS NIMITZ (CVN-68) as the 
Staff Landing Signals Officer.  He also served as the staff Administrative and assistant Operations Officer.  
  In 1995, Lieutenant Commander joined the staff at the Naval Strike Warfare Center at NAS Fallon, Nevada 
as the Precision Strike Tactics Officer and an Overall Evaluator for Air Wing Training.   
 His next tour was with theVFA-147 Argonauts at NAS Lemoore, California serving as the Safety, 
Maintenance and Operations Officer.  He made the 1997-98 World Cruise aboard USS NIMITZ (CVN-68) to 
the Western Pacific/Arabian Gulf flying missions over the skies of Iraq in support of Operation SOUTHERN 
WATCH.  During this deployment he spent 30 days attached to staff of Commander, Joint Task Force-
Southwest Asia as a Liaison Officer in support of contingency operations.   
 In June 1998 Lieutenant Commander reported to the Naval Postgraduate School for study in the Systems 
Engineering and Integration curriculum.  He graduated (With Distinction) from the Naval War College 
Command and Staff Non-Resident Program in December 2000, and received a Master of Science Degree in 
Systems Integration in March 2001 with follow-on orders to Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron NINE 
(VX-9) at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California.  
 Lieutenant Commander Oliver has accumulated 2850 flight hours with over 1900 hours in the FA-18 
Hornet, 600 hours in the A-7E Corsair II  ¸and 535 landings on ten different aircraft carriers.  His awards include 
the Air Medal (1st Strike Flight), Navy Commendation Medal (four awards), Air Force Achievement Medal, 
Navy Achievement Medal (two awards) and various unit and service awards.   
 Lieutenant Commander and his wife Sandee enjoy time spent with their daughter Meredith. 
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Major 
 NG Boon Heong 
 MAJ Ng joined the Singapore Armed Forces in March 1989 and 
was awarded the Company Best Trainee for Basic Military 
Training.  He was then selected and commissioned as an officer in 
Apr 1990 after graduating from the Officer Cadet School as Echo Company’s Best Trainee.  In Apr 
1990, he assumed his duties at the First Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment as a platoon 
commander for a period of one year.  He then left active duty to further his education at the Nanyang 
Technological University graduating with Bachelors Degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering 
(Hons).  In May 1994, MAJ Ng reported back to active duty at the 3rd Battalion, Singapore Infantry 
Regiment to assume the appointment as a Company second-in-command where he served for one year.  
In 1995, while serving as a Commanding Officer at the Basic Military Training Center, MAJ Ng 
attended and graduated 3rd in class from the Company Tactics course.  He was then assigned back to 
the First Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment first as a Officer Commanding of an active company. 
After graduating second in class in the Battalion Intelligence Officer’s Course, MAJ Ng was assigned 
as Battalion Intelligence Officer (S2) in the same unit.  Incidentally, the First Battalion, Singapore 
Regiment won the coveted SAF Best Combat unit that same year.  He moved on the next year as an 
officer instructor at the School of Military Intelligence.  In June 1999, MAJ Ng was selected to join the 
Army Planning Branch and was reassigned to the Naval Postgraduate School where he received a 
Master of Science in Systems Integration.  Upon Graduation, MAJ Ng was reassigned to the 
Headquarters Ministry of Defense, Singapore where he will serve as an Army Weapons Staff Officer.  
MAJ Ng’s Awards include the Good Conduct Medal and the Jungle Confidence badge.
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Captain  
Thomas M. Fugate 
 Captain Fugate joined the U.S. Army in the December 1984.  
During his enlistment, he served as an Infantry Team Leader and 
Anti-Tank Section Leader at Fort Ord, California.  In May 1988, he 
left active duty for the California Army National Guard where he 
served for three years while attending college and the ROTC program at the California State 
University in Chico, California.  A Distinguished Military Graduate, Captain Fugate received his 
Regular Army Commission in May 1991.  Following Flight School, Airborne, Air Assault, and Ranger 
Schools, Captain Fugate reported to the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea where he served as an Aero-
Weapons (AH-1 Cobra) Platoon Leader in 5-17th Cavalry.  In 1993 Captain Fugate returned to Fort 
Rucker for the Apache Qualification course and reported to the 24th Infantry Division at Hunter Army 
Airfield and Fort Stewart, Georgia.  Captain Fugate served as an Attack Helicopter Platoon Leader 
(AH-64 Apache) and Battalion S-1 in 1-24th Aviation until June 1996.  Following the Aviation Officer 
Advanced Course, Captain Fugate and family reported to 1-4th Aviation Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas 
in December 1996.  He served initially as the Assistant Battalion  S-3 and later Commander, Bravo 
Company, 1-4 Aviation.  In June 1999, Captain Fugate was selected to serve in the Army Acquisition 
Corps and was reassigned to the Naval Postgraduate School where he received a Master of Science in 
Systems Integration.  Upon graduation, CPT Fugate was reassigned to Fort Rucker, Alabama where he 
is serving as an Army Aviation Combat Developer.  Captain Fugate’s awards and decorations include 
the Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, the Senior Army Aviator Badge, Ranger 
Tab, Airborne and Air Assault Badges.  Captain Fugate is married to the former Diana  Hankinson, a 
Registered Nurse from Enterprise, Alabama.  Their children are Ian and Hannah.
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Captain 
LO Weng Wah Christopher 
 CPT Lo enlisted in the Singapore Army in March 1990 and was 
awarded the second best trainee in Delta Company for Basic Military 
Training (BMT).  Upon completing BMT, CPT Lo was selected for 
Officer Cadet School where nine months later  he was commissioned as an Infantry Second Lieutenant.  
In March 1991, CPT Lo became a Platoon Commander for Delta Company, Platoon 16 in the School 
of Basic Military Training.  Following this stint, CPT Lo was awarded the Singapore Armed Forces 
Military Training Award to pursue his undergraduate studies and professional development at the 
United States Military Academy at West Point.  While at West Point, CPT Lo completed Air Assault 
and Rappel Master School.  He graduated in 1995 seventh in a class of over 1000 and was a 
Distinguished Graduate in Bachelor of Science (Engineering Physics).  As an undergraduate, CPT Lo 
was also a nominee for the 1995 Rhodes Scholarship.  He completed the Field Artillery Officer’s 
Conversion Course in February 1996 with top honors and was assigned as a Battalion Recce Officer 
with the 23rd Battalion, Singapore Artillery.  In December 1998, he held his Battery Command in the 
24th Battalion, Singapore Artillery.  Accorded the SAF Postgraduate Award in September 1999, CPT 
Lo received his Master of Science in Systems Integration degree at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California in March 2001.  Upon graduation, CPT Lo returned to Headquarters Singapore 
Artillery to assume the appointment of Weapons Staff Officer.  Captain Lo’s awards and decorations 
include the Good Conduct Medal, National Defense Service Medal (US), and the Air Assault (US) and 
Airborne Badges.  Captain Lo is married to the former Tan Ai Lin, a homemaker.  They were recently 
joined by their daughter, Ashley, who was born in November 2000. 
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Australia 2021:  Defense in the Era of Growth 
Executive Summary 
During the past 20 years, Australia’s role in international affairs has grown.  At the 
beginning of the 21st century the leadership role in Southeast Asian affairs was undertaken.   The 
past two decades have been marked by vast increases in wealth for many Pacific Rim nations.  
Australia was a major participant in this economic renaissance with a Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate between 3 and 4.5% since the year 2000.  This unprecedented period of 
sustained growth was facilitated by a variety of factors including increased trade, knowledge 
sharing, emerging technologies and effective governmental policies.  This growth created a 
unique opportunity for a defense force built to accomplish the country’s national goals and 
objectives. 
The defense of the homeland has always been the primary task of the Australian Defense 
Force (ADF).   While this objective did not appreciably change during the last 20 years, the ADF 
was directed to undertake additional chores.  Responding to the challenges of the 21st century 
and the global economy, Australia added the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and the maintenance of key Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).   
Coalition operations and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) were emphasized in 
the Defense White Paper of 2000 and were a recurring phenomenon in the Pacific Rim. 
The force structure that arose from the Defense Ministry’s vision was systematically 
designed for difficult joint, combined, and low intensity environments.  The structure notably 
served the nation well in the United Nations-sponsored operation in Irian Jaya in the year 2015.   
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To accomplish the goals established in the Defense White Paper of 2000, the percent of 
defense spending as a total of GDP was increased from 1.9% to 2.45% in the first epoch.  Figure 
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Figure 1. GDP Growth and % Spent on Defense 
Additionally the allocation of funds was changed to leverage monies into the building of 
new systems.  The current operations budget decreased over the period 2000-2010.  Funds were 
reallocated to the future procurement and Research and Development (R&D).  As the size of the 
force structure and the demands on it grew, it became apparent that a larger percentage of the 
total budget would be required to be reallocated to current operations.  In the year 2020 the 
allocation by function was similar to the base year of 2000.  This is illustrated in figure (2). 
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Figure 2. Broad Function Allocation 
Australia’s position as a smaller nation has always required linking their security strategy 
to the global powers.  The Defense White Paper of 2000 put forward the concept of the Howard 
Doctrine, which closely aligned Australia to the interests and objectives of the United States.  
This role was revised during the past 20 years as a result of world events, including a hollowing 
of the US presence in the Pacific Rim.  Multiple operations in all corners of the globe combined 
with slowing economic growth and public sentiment for reducing defense spending have caused 
a retrenchment of the US military in the region.   The reunification of the Koreas and the 
subsequent removal of US troops from that region and from southern Japan have caused a 
relative vacuum.  In the same period, China’s increasingly hegemonic claims and actions have 
also been a cause for concern to Australia.  Their increased presence in the South China Sea 
(SCS), their basing intentions in the Philippines and their most recent overtures to the unstable 
government of Indonesia have extended their reach to new extremes.   
The Indonesian instability has continued into the 21st century.  Most recently the 
breakaway province of Irian Jaya was occupied in 2015 by an Australian-led peacekeeping force.  
The archipelagic waterways have been threatened as a result.  These SLOCs have taken on 
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increased significance in recent years as Australia’s exports of energy resources and iron ore to 
Japan have greatly increased.  This maritime problem remains one of Australia’s primary 
concerns. 
Force structure is complicated.  Military planners must tell the national leadership what 
tasks the military force can and cannot do.  The vulnerabilities or weaknesses of the force 
structure can be addressed via future planning scenarios in order to identify alternatives to 
eliminate or mitigate each of the vulnerabilities. This process comes full circle when the newly 
acquired systems are pitted in combat against an adversary.   
Australia does not possess the resources necessary to tackle every issue and problem and 
must look for financially responsible solutions.  The lack of robust industrial base and/or R&D in 
some areas means Australia can’t indigenously produce some military systems.  Accordingly, 
Australia has linked itself closely with the United States for procurement of modern military 
systems.  Australia benefits from this arrangement by receiving military systems without the 
associated high cost of development and the United States benefits by having a strong, 
interoperable ally in the Asia Pacific region. 
Over the series of epochs, Australia produced an order of battle that supported the 
national and military strategies and was effective against postulated threats.  The first epoch was 
characterized by the continuation and modernization of existing systems.  With this solid 
foundation in place, the second epoch embarked on a plan to expand military capability and size.  
The third epoch realized even greater capability and expansion of the force and infrastructure.  
The final epoch saw the introduction of state-of-the-art technology in laser systems for maritime 
and air defense. 
As a result of the 20-year development, the ADF force structure fully supports the 
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nation’s military strategy.  Two key insights have become apparent.  The first insight is that the 
ADF is a modern force with a demonstrated level of lethality and firepower.  These attributes 
allow the ADF to operate autonomously within 1000 NM of the northern Australian coast in 
support of their national interests and those of their allies. 
The second insight is that Australia offers attractive basing for the United States in the 
Pacific.  With relative stability in Northeast Asia the dominant theme in 2020 and beyond, the 
focus of future military operations is likely to spread to Southeast Asia and Indonesia.  As a 
hedge, the northern port facility of Darwin was developed to support such a basing plan.  Ship 
berthing facilities were expanded to support the additional ships and assets from a United States 
carrier battle group.  This expansion includes deep draft capability for the carrier and other major 
assets from the battle group.  The infrastructure was also modernized to support troop basing, 
training, and operations as well as the aircraft from the carrier battle group.  To protect these 
valuable resources of Australia and the United States, the air defenses surrounding Darwin are 
laser-based systems capable of intercepting short and intermediate range surface-to-surface 
missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. 
Australia offers many capabilities in the future. Close cooperation with allies can expand 
the reach and influence of the ADF beyond the inner arc in support of multinational and coalition 
operations.  In short, Australia is poised and ready to support military operations throughout the 
Pacific. 
The development of the net assessment scenarios has provided useful examinations of the 
Australian military force structure in regional contingencies. The scenarios were developed 
based on two spheres of influence in terms of range. These two spheres are separated into the 






Figure 3. Inner and Outer Arc 
During the first epoch, the ability of Australia to project forces into the outer arc was 
limited to frigate-sized surface vessels and its Collins-class submarine. The distance involved 
also removed any ability to project air power. Within the inner arc, there are growing problems 
in Indonesia and a need to project military forces to regional hotspots like East Timor and Irian 
Jaya. Land force capability to deal with Indonesia was lacking at the beginning of this time 
period. The land force capability was beefed up with the introduction of the 21st Century Soldier 
concept to enhance the fighting capability of individual troops. 
To enhance the force projection capabilities of the military in the outer arc, Australia 
procured Spruance class destroyers during the second epoch. Even with this procurement, 
Australia realized the limitations in conducting military operations at extended ranges. The 
successful conduct of operations in this sphere requires close cooperation with regional powers.  
In the third epoch, Australia focused on maintaining its economic lifeline by protecting 
the SLOCs within the inner arc. This requirement stems from China's military expansionist 
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behavior in the South China Sea, threatening major SLOCs through the region. Australia offers 
an alternative SLOC through Darwin and can provide maritime security within the inner arc. 
Advanced maritime assets like the introduction of the new Howard-class Aegis destroyers and 
the F/A-18 E/F Hornet fighters sealed Australia's authority as a regional maritime power. 
Australia also developed an amphibious assault force to fill a capability gap for force 
projection to regional hotpots. This force comes in the form of two Marine brigades and their 
associated amphibious vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft. 
By the fourth epoch, Australia raised two additional infantry brigades to further enhance 
regional force projection capabilities. Australia addressed its SLOC security requirements with 
its advanced maritime force. In its participation in military activities in the outer arc, Australia 
continues to rely on cooperation with regional allies to maintain security. 
In terms of technology R&D, Australia is in a unique position given its large landmass 
but relative small population and GDP.  As such, Australia specifically chose to explore and 
capture certain technological niches for an edge both in the economy and military.  The focus is 
on building technologies that incorporate existing strengths.   
The Howard doctrine encourages an intimate defense relationship with the United States. 
Australia’s R&D into future capabilities is very much developed along the line of US military 
technology. As a result of this and limited resources, Australia specifically chose to develop 
technology niches in energy storage and supply technology as well as space launching 
capabilities. 
In the first epoch, initial technology feasibility studies of nanotechnology, space 
launching technology, high-density energy storage and supply, and new energy resource 
technology were initiated.  These initial studies led to more comprehensive studies into space 
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launching technology and energy R&D. 
In the second epoch, Australia’s initial investment in space launching infrastructure in 
Cape York, Melville Island and Christmas Island was completed in 2008 with the 
commencement of commercial launching projects following shortly thereafter.  Concurrently, 
R&D into electro-magnetic assisted launch continued.  R&D into remote sensing resulted in the 
ability to image and map offshore oil reserves.  This capability, coupled with the lower cost of 
deep sea drilling and the consistently high (US $30 per barrel) price for oil, fueled the aggressive 
export of oil to Japan, China and other Asian countries.  Australia also realized a breakthrough in 
photovoltics technology causing a shift in the internal energy requirement of Australia from less 
than 10% solar energy to 50% solar energy allowing export of energy resources to other 
countries.  Additional breakthroughs in fluidized-bed technology for coal burning resulted in an 
aggressive development of coal as a source of energy.  High-density liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
transportation was yet another export.  Looking forward, Australia also continued R&D of 
energy storage and supplies concentrating on quartz technology, fuel cell and photovoltics. 
In the third epoch, the electro-magnetic assisted launch ability was realized, reducing per 
launch costs by utilizing solar energy.  Energy R&D breakthroughs in quartz technology allowed 
the development of high-density storage, thus providing the ability to power small commercial 
and military equipment.  Increased efficiency in fuel cells also led to widespread use in 
automobiles, miniature airframes, and military systems. 
In the final epoch, Australia’s R&D was in three key defense projects.  The first project 
was a High Energy Laser (HEL) missile defense system codenamed DPAMDS (Darwin Port 
Anti-Missile Defense System).  DPAMDS is essentially a two-tier system consisting of the 
upgraded version of the HEL and tactical HEL previously available in the US and Israel in 2000.  
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This upgraded version incorporates Australia’s new niche in energy storage and supply 
technology and produces an enhanced range.  The second key military project was Project 
BOLDEAGLE, a R&D effort to acquire the technological capability of developing a Theater 
Ballistic Missile (TBM) defense system using airborne lasers and/or ground Free Electron Lasers 
(FEL).  The third key project undertaken by the ADF was the integration of a diode pumped 
solid-state laser anti-ship missile defense system on the existing fleet of frigates and destroyers.  
This project, codenamed STINGRAY, provides an unlimited defense against anti-ship missiles.  
Besides giving the Navy a quantum leap in anti-ship missile defense, the project also serves to 
operationalize the ADF in fighting with directed energy weapons.  
Twenty years of development for Australia has highlighted a number of issues and 
insights.  On the geopolitical scale, the geographic isolation of Australia coupled with relative 
economic self-sufficiency provides a buffer zone from the perils of globalization.  Additionally, 
Asia will be the primary world focus in the coming era.  Finally, small nations must accurately 
assess the participation of global powers in key theaters to formulate a defense force that is able 
to project power beyond a minimal range.   The actions of the “elephants” greatly influence the 
decision making process of the smaller and less influential nations. 
Economically, nations with a relatively small GDP, population, and industrial base must 
focus on specific niches in R&D or the entire effort will be diluted.  Australia’s significant 
investment and expertise in energy resource and supply technology enhances its position in the 
world.  The investment in R&D infrastructure will allow Australia to leverage new technologies 
for commercial and military applications. 
On the force structure front, a mix of revolutionary, evolutionary and legacy systems will 
exist at any given time and challenge the abilities of the force planner to integrate these systems 
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seamlessly.  The ADF modernized throughout the 20-year period, and although small by China 
and US standards, the ADF is a presents a capable and formidable force.  The technological 
advances of the 21st century in information technology and weaponry make the ADF seem larger 
than it really is.  Accordingly, the advance in ability to conduct a wide range of operations may 
be viewed as an increased capability to conduct multiple or simultaneous operations.  As a result, 
the final Australian force structure may become overextended during multiple operations in 
widely separated theaters.  The government and its leaders must be careful to only assume those 
operations that are a direct threat to or of interest to Australia and avoid the “able to do all” 
mentality.  Australia has confirmed that alliances and coalitions still are an integral part of the 
nation’s national security strategy in spite of possessing a modern and lethal force.  Finally, 
future operations will entail the protection of SLOCs throughout the Asia Pacific region.  
Australia’s ability to influence and control the SLOCs will be key to maintaining these vital 
lanes open for all nations.  Basing at Darwin may be an important capability for the US in the 
future.  
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A. Epoch One (2000-2005) 
1. Australian Security Environment in the Year 2005 
The dawn of the 21st century heralded important changes for the Australian Defense 
Force.  The Defense White Paper of 2000 contained guidance, which in many ways increased the 
scope of potential tasks to be performed by the ADF.  The alliance with the United States was 
emphasized as a key tenant of the new vision.  Our role as the US deputy in the region was 
buoyed by the new US administration in the early part of the epoch.  Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell was quoted as saying, “In the Pacific we are very, very pleased that Australia… has 
displayed a keen interest in what is happening in Indonesia.  And so we will coordinate our 
policies, but let our ally, Australia, take the lead as they have done so well in that troubled 
country.”1  The support of the Bush administration for the Howard Doctrine has further solidified 
the vision put forward in the Defense White Paper.  Accordingly changes to operational doctrine 
and future force development were undertaken. 
Operationally, joint combined operations were emphasized and trained for intensively.  
The land and maritime forces participated in a variety of exercises with US, Japanese and other 
regional armed forces helping to solidify and consolidate tactics and system compatibility issues.  
Joint service teams addressed the issues of terrorism, cyber-war and narcotics trading.  These 
teams were charged with developing various scenarios and vulnerabilities with the aim of 
minimizing potential damage and risk. Their conclusions have become the basis for the 
development of future doctrine and training for all members of the ADF in their respective areas.   
The other objectives of the ADF were also pursued.  These objectives were prioritized by 
region by the Defense White Paper of 2000 and are illustrated by Figure (4).   The inner arc 
                                                 
1 Colin Powell in US Senate Confirmation Hearing. January 2001.   
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region primarily contains the nations of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Indonesia. 
This region is key to Australia’s domestic security as a significant portion of our trade flows 
through the SLOCs in the region.   
The instability of Indonesia in recent years has caused significant concern. As stated in 
the White Paper, “Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region.” 2 
 
Figure 4. Australia's Defense Priorities3 
The ASEAN nations remained an important secondary priority for the ADF.  With the 
size of our armed forces, we cannot expect to play a major role in affecting events in the region 
beyond the inner arc.  Future military capabilities may someday allow us to effectivly operate at 
these ranges. 
                                                 
2 Commonwealth of Australia, Defense 2000, Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, p. 29. 
3 Unattributed.  Australia Aims for Active Security Role in Asia Pacific, Stratfor.com, December 22, 2000. 
 4-13 
2. Economic Development and Defense Spending 
a. Policies of Growth 
Australia’s Economic Ministry made some fundamental changes in this epoch designed 
to set the economy on a course for sustainable growth.  The use of diplomatic channels to 
establish trade relationships and agreements was one tool.  The opening of import and export 
markets has already demonstrated benefits in the form of new markets, comparative advantages 
and economic efficiencies for all nations.   
Additional monetary and fiscal policy measures were instituted with the aim of producing 
sustained growth.  Short-term lending rates and the money supply were tightly controlled so that 
investment was stimulated but without significant inflationary pressures.  The increased defense 
and entitlement spending was a net positive for the economy.   
Information system efficiencies were felt as Australian businesses became more adept at 
lowering overhead and automating many functions. Retraining programs for displaced workers 
were also introduced with the aim of filling the demand for trained technology workers. 
Labor demand for these technology workers was one area that was identified as a limit on 
future growth.  Along with educational initiatives at the elementary and secondary levels and 
worker retraining, the Australian government relaxed immigration quotas for skilled workers.  
This program was successful in drawing talent from many nations including India, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and China.  The relaxation of the immigration quotas must be carefully monitored to 
ensure the needs of our growing nation and economy are met without overburdening the 
entitlement system. 
b. Growth Results 
The growth of the economy in the first epoch was between 3.0% and 3.5% with a slight 
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downturn in the years 2002 and 2003.  This retrenchment was as a result of general global 
economic malaise driven by a slowdown of economic growth in the United States.  This 
indication of a business cycle effect was short lived as a relatively quick recovery was noted both 
in the US and in the international community.  Figure (5) illustrates the Australian economic 
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Figure 5. GDP Growth and % Spent on Defense 
c. Cost Cutting and Budget Reallocation in the ADF 
The leadership of the ADF elected to undertake some difficult steps to secure a credible 
force.  These fundamental changes targeted wasteful policies in the areas of personal services 
and administration and also shifted some funds from the current operations to future capabilities 
budget.  In 2000, 57.9% of the entire defense budget was allocated to current operations and 
29.3% to future capabilities or system procurement.  By comparison, at the end of the epoch, 
only 50% was allocated to current operations and 35.7% to procurement.  This reduction in the 
current operations budget allowed the modernization of the force.  This action was undertaken 
only after careful assessment of the near-term impact and probability of war.  The essentially 
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secure geographical nature of Australia combined with a lack of credible threat in the region 
made this course of action best suited to meet the long-range goals.  The absence of a major 
conflict in the last decade has supported the wisdom of this decision and several large leaps in 




3. Australian Force Structure 2005 
The force structure of the ADF at the end of the first epoch is a result of the 2000 
Defense White Paper, previously initiated programs and projects, and efforts to resolve identified 
capability weaknesses.  For the most part, changes to the Service’s force structure were a result 
of previously initiated programs and projects. 
As part of the study, static net assessments were used to evaluate one military force 
against another in a given scenario.  Vulnerabilities identified as part of this process will be used 
to highlight the changes necessary in the force structure to mitigate or eliminate the vulnerability.   
In the case of Australia in the year 2000, the ADF faced several weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in each of their military components.  These vulnerabilities were addressed as part 
of the military force planning effort in the first epoch.  Accordingly, the force structure for the 
individual service components of the ADF is discussed below.  As a manner of practice, the 
vulnerabilities identified for each service component will be discussed followed by the service 
order of battle, trends, and the rational behind any changes.   
a. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
For the RAN, the vulnerabilities identified as a result of the 2000 Defense White Paper 
are: 
(1). Anti-ship missile defense for ANZACs 
(2). Long range air-defense capability 
(3). Limited replenishment capability 
(4). Submarine platform and combat systems 
(5). Patrol craft are aging 




In an effort to address these issues, several programs were initiated.  Specifically, the 
ANZAC class of frigates underwent an improvement in its anti-ship missile defense and the 
Harpoon missile system was introduced. 
The Collins submarine program included engineering and system changes to reduce 
platform noise and correct the combat systems deficiencies.  The weapons capability was also 
enhanced through the procurement of the Mk-48 ADCAP or Advanced Capability torpedo.  This 
weapon offers an increased weapons range at higher search speeds via digital signal processing.  
These improvements resulted in the Collins being one of the most advanced diesel electric 
submarines in the world. 
The Navy force structure for 2005 is provided below. 
(1). Surface Combatants 
(a). 6 FFG 
(b). 8 ANZAC FF 
(c). 15 Patrol Boats (PB) 
(d). 2 oiler/replenishment ships 
(e). 1 Heavy Amphibious Lift Ship (HALS) 
(f). 2 Amphibious Lift (LPA) 
(g). 15 Landing Craft Medium (LCM) 
(h). 6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) 
(2). Mine Warfare 
(a). 2 Inshore Mine Countermeasure ships (MCM) 
(b). 6 Huon-class MCM 





(3). Submarine Force 
(a). 6 Collins-class SS 
(4). Navy Air 
(a). 16 Sea Hawk helicopters 
(b). 7 Sea King helicopters 
(c). 10 Super Sea Sprite helicopters 
(d). 19 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft 
Australia’s remaining guided missile destroyer (DDG) was decommissioned in 2001 after 
a 35-year service life.  The loss of this ship removes the only RAN)three-dimensional 
surveillance radar from the maritime forces and exacerbates the poor air defense and surveillance 
capability of the RAN. 
The ANZAC frigate production line started in the late 1990s resulted in a total of ten 
ships being constructed.  Eight of these ships went into the RAN and the other two ships went to 
the New Zealand Navy.  All ANZAC frigates in the inventory were outfitted with the latest anti-
ship missile defense systems and the Harpoon offensive anti-ship missile. 
Four additional Huon-class minesweepers were added to the inventory.  The Huon-class 
minesweeper is considered to be one of the most advanced ships available. 
The Collins submarine construction program resulted in three additional ships being 
added to the inventory.  These modern submarines are equipped with the latest torpedo and fire 
control systems and have proven to be an excellent platform for countering the proliferation of 





As an integral part of the surface ship procurement process, helicopters were purchased to 
serve as deployable assets on those platforms.  A total of ten Super Sea Sprite helicopters were 
purchased to equip the ANZAC class frigates with anti-submarine capability.  The anti-
submarine capability of the P-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) was upgraded with the 
introduction of the MK-50 torpedo, an advanced lightweight torpedo. 
As a result of the 2005 force structure, the fleet is still faced with the lack of long-range 
air-defense ships.  Current studies are focusing on the development of such a ship that will be 
producible in Australia.  Additionally, the replenishment and amphibious lift capability of the 
fleet remains an issue of concern.  Finally, the replacement of the Fremantle patrol boat was 
postponed until the second epoch.  
b. The Australian Army 
For the Australian Army, the vulnerabilities identified as a result of the 2000 Defense 
White Paper are: 
(1). Army’s small size 
(2). No heavy armored force 
(3). Slow modernization of equipment. 
As identified in the 2000 Defense White Paper, the size and constitution of the Australian 
Army is small as compared to its nearest neighbors.  This small size is considered adequate given 
that Australia faces no significant conventional threat on the ground.  Accordingly, the focus of 
the army has shifted to MOOTW and coalition operations.  While the army may be small, 
significant improvements were instituted to provide the latest technology improvements for the 
individual soldiers as well as for their vehicles, equipment, and firepower. 




force is not necessary given the threat, use of the army, and the cost associated with maintaining 
heavy armor capabilities.  Accordingly, the army will retain its current armor capability and does 
not expect to expand it in the future.  Australia believes light forces suitably equipped and 
supported will be sufficient for the types of military operations it expects to be involved in as 
well as capable of homeland defense. 
The Army force structure for 2005 is provided below. 
(1). Special Forces (1 regiment SASR/1 Commando regiment) 
(2). Mechanized Force (1 brigade) 
(3). Light Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(4). Motorized Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(5). Army Aviation Force 
(6). Ground-Based Air Defense 
(7). Combat & Logistics Support 
(8). Army Reserve Force 
(9). Army Aviation (helicopters) 
(a). 36 S-70A Black Hawk 
(b). 6 CH-47D Chinook 
(c). 25 UH-1H Iroquois 
(d). 43 Kiowa Light Observation 
(e). AS305BA Squirrel 
(f). 24 Apache Armed Reconnaissance 
(10). Air Defense  




(b). 10 Patriot firing units 
(11). Reserve Units 
(a). 11th Brigade (North & Central Queensland) 
(b). 4th Brigade (Victoria) 
(c). 5th Brigade (NSW) 
(d). 8th Brigade (NSW) 
(e). 9th Brigade (SA & Tasmania) 
(f). 13th Brigade (WA) 
(12). Reserve Surveillance Units 
(a). Northwest Mobile Force (NORFORCE) 
(b). Pilbara Regiment (WA) 
(c). Far North Queensland Regiment 
The size and composition of the army’s mechanized, light infantry, and motorized 
infantry forces remained the same from 2000 to 2005.  The major changes in the army’s forces 
are in the areas of equipment modernization, aviation and air defense.  
For the individual soldiers, an entire modernization program, dubbed the 21st Century 
Soldier, was started to supply the latest in body armor, weapons, night vision goggles, and 
communications equipment. 
To support these soldiers, an extensive upgrade to the army’s armored personnel carriers 
was developed.  This program involved modifying M113A1 vehicles to an M113A3 standard. 
The modifications provide significant improvements to the vehicle’s firepower, protection, 
mobility and habitability.   




Mobility Vehicle (IMV) and the Australian Light Armored Vehicle (ASLAV) were executed.  
These vehicles provide a range of operational mobility to the soldiers in the mechanized and 
motorized infantry brigades.  Additionally, shoulder-fired weapons were added to the inventory 
to bolster the offensive firepower against armored vehicles, bunkers, and buildings.   
In the aviation branch, the procurement of Apache armed reconnaissance and attack 
helicopters supplemented the capability previously provided by the Kiowa and UH-1 helicopters.  
The Apache will provide battlefield reconnaissance and aerial fire support.  It will have a nose-
mounted cannon as well as pod-mounted rockets, air-to-ground missiles, and an extensive 
electronic warfare self-protection suite.  In all, the expansion of the helicopter fleet will enhance 
future battlefield firepower and the mobility of troops in the field. 
The army’s air defense capability was significantly improved through the introduction of 
the Patriot missile system.  The Patriot system supplements the RBS-70 system and replaces the 
Rapier system currently in the inventory.  The Patriot system, with eight launchers in each firing 
unit, provides 32 missiles and their associated radar and tracking systems for air defense 
purposes.  The addition of the Patriot ensures that Australia has the most capable air defense 
systems available to support and defend its troops and infrastructure, either at home or abroad. 
In 2005, the army will be a light force with limited heavy armor capability and resources.  
Given the types of operations Australia expects to undertake over the coming decade, this 
vulnerability is offset by the improvements to the soldiers and their equipment.  This light force 
is better equipped and positioned to integrate with other coalition forces in support of operations 
in the region while providing firepower sufficient to ensure homeland defense.  The army 
continues to struggle with the role and composition of the reserve forces. 




For the RAAF, the vulnerabilities identified as a result of the 2000 Defense White Paper 
are: 
(1). Limited air combat capability with respect to regional defense forces 
(modernization issue) 
(2). Aging of air-to-air refueling  
(3). Long-term replacement for F/A-18 and F-111 
The RAAF faces modernization issues on several fronts.  Specifically, the relative air 
combat capability of the F/A-18 fleet with respect to regional forces is expected to lag without 
considerable upgrades.  Also, the ability to support the air combat mission as well as the strike 
mission will be severely curtailed unless a replacement air-to-air refueling aircraft is not 
obtained.  And finally, the replacement aircraft to conduct the air combat and strike role in the 
2012 to 2015 timeframe is unknown.  To address these issues several upgrades and new 
procurement initiatives were implemented. 
The resulting RAAF structure 2005 is provided below. 
(1). 71 F/A-18 Hornet  
(a). 53 A, 18 B 
(2). 35 F-111 
(a). 21 C, 14 G 
(3). 24 C-130 Hercules 
(a). 12 H, 12 J 
(4). 14 DHC-4 Caribou 
(5). 4 AEW&C Boeing 737-700 




(7). EWSP upgrades for all air platforms 
(8). Trainer fleet 
To address the air combat modernization and capability issues, the F/A-18 Hornets were 
upgraded including the installation of new and improved radar, advanced air-to-air missiles, 
advanced tactical data links, and helmet-mounted cueing. 
The strike capability inherent in the F-111 platform is valuable, but the platform is aging 
and will require replacement.  A suitable replacement platform for this aircraft that specifically 
meets the needs of Australia may become available in the future.  In order to maintain the F-111 
as a capable platform, several enhancements and improvements were initiated.  These include the 
acquisition of standoff weapons and electronic warfare self-protection systems.  These 
improvements will make the F-111 a viable asset into the near- to mid-term future. 
The most crucial addition was the Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) 
aircraft.  The AEW&C aircraft provide early warning, surveillance, command and control, and 
air-defense warning for our surface ships and fighter aircraft.  In short, these aircraft give the 
ADF the capability to maintain the tactical picture throughout a theater engagement. 
The replacement of the tanker fleet was addressed with the procurement of five Boeing 
767 tanker aircraft.  These aircraft provide the critical air-to-air refueling capability of the entire 
air force inventory.  Without this capability, the best aircraft in the world are limited in their 
ability to operate without restrictions. 
To ensure their protection, an extensive electronic warfare self-protection system 
(EWSP) was developed for all the aircraft.  This system provides the latest protection available 
against the emerging threats to aircraft.  This enhancement is scalable in size and threat based, so 




In 2005, the RAAF is well positioned to engage regional combat aircraft and achieve 
success.  The improvements and enhancements to the F/A–18 Hornets allow the ADF to 
maintain pace with regional forces, but a replacement aircraft must be identified and purchased 
during the second epoch.  The replacement of the F-111 must also be identified in the near term.   
d. Information Capability 
In the area of information, the vulnerabilities identified as a result of the 2000 Defense 
White Paper are: 
(1). Limited indigenous intelligence capability (signals, imagery, processing, 
dissemination) 
(2). Obsolete communications (harness growing IT innovations) 
(3). Command & Control 
The status of the country’s Command, Control, Communications, and Computers 
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (C4ISR) capability was on par with other regional 
countries.  In order to move Australia to the forefront of the area, significant improvements were 
initiated to improve information collection as well as the dissemination of that information and 
the associated command and control.  Harnessing the quantum leap in information technology 
was the key to these improvements. 
Additionally, in the area of communications and command and control, the ability to 
build a robust system to tie the battlefield elements together across the Services was determined 
to be a real challenge. 
The Information Capability force structure for 2005 is provided below. 
(1). Operational Command 




(b).  Communications (SATCOM, HF, Networks) 
(c).  Command and  Information Management Systems 
(2).  Strategic Intelligence 
(3). Strategic Surveillance  
(4). Geospatial Information 
(5). Hydrographic Survey Force 
To ensure the ADF acts as a coherent unit during deployed operations, a deployable 
headquarters provides focused command and control functions for theater operations.  
Communication facilities and capabilities were upgraded in order to harness the latest in 
information technology.  These communications systems include satellite-based communications 
as well as networked communications systems to tie the strategic and tactical battlefields 
together.  The command and control system to link all of these elements together was an integral 
part of this development process. 
In the areas of intelligence and surveillance, significant improvements were made.  
Cooperative efforts with the United States and the exploitation of new collection opportunities 
have provided an intelligence edge to the ADF.  The introduction of the Jindalee Over-The -
Horizon (OTH) radar and the AEW&C aircraft significantly improved the surveillance of the 
northern approaches.  This provides a sustained 24-hour picture that can be fused with other 
information systems to provide an integrated national surveillance picture. 
As with all networked information systems, the possibility of exploitation of the 
information by the enemy increases substantially as new systems are chained together.  To 
combat this effort, investment in counter information warfare was initiated.  It is expected that 




will ensure the continuity and legitimacy of the information provided to the ADF forces.   
In 2005, the challenge of the future will be maintaining pace with the changing 
information technology.  Future costs and the derived benefits from a proposed change will 















Note:  The baseline forces and the construction and development plans discussed in this section were derived from 
the following sources.  Due to the breadth of information, footnotes were not used. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force, December 2000 
 
Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, Defence Review 2000 - Our Future Defence Force, A Public 
Discussion Paper, June 2000 
 
Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Defence Force, Capability Fact Book, June 
2000 
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4. Scenarios for Static Net Assessment 
a. Introduction 
A Static Net Assessment (SNA) based on two likely scenarios to be faced by the 
Australian military is presented to determine if Australia’s military structure projected at year 
2005 can deal with the scenarios. 
The first scenario takes place in the South China Sea during a combined maritime 
exercise between the US, Australia, and Japan. The heavy presence of military elements so close 
to their doorstep antagonizes the Chinese government. The Chinese leaders decide to stage a 
show of force in the region with military combatants dangerously close to those of the coalition 
forces.  
The second scenario occurs in Australia’s backyard. A military coup has occurred in 
Indonesia and the military regime quells resulting unrest in the populace. To divert attention 
from internal problems to a nationalist agenda, they attempt to reunite the Indonesian archipelago 
by taking back East Timor from the Western infidels. Once the Indonesian troops cross into East 
Timor, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force stationed there is quickly overrun. Although 
the Indonesian authorities try to limit the level of force, many casualties are taken on the UN 
side. The resulting international outcry calls for Australia to retaliate by taking back East Timor.  
b. Scenario 1:  Military Confrontation in the South China Sea (SCS) 
Here, an Australian force of about four frigates with a Collins-class submarine join a SCS 
exercise along with the US and Japan. 
Japan is providing continuous maritime surveillance with six P-3C MPA operating 
around the clock in the SCS. Two Kongo-class destroyers and a diesel submarine are also 
supporting the exercise. 
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The United States is providing the main force in the exercise with a carrier battle group 
(CVBG). The air power in the exercise is provided by the CVBG with up to 85 F-14s and F/A-
18s. Two cruisers and a Spruance-class DDG are escorting the CVBG. Two nuclear submarines 
are also in the area of operations. The force contributions by each nation in the RIMPAC West 
exercise is as summarized: 
(1). US CVBG     
(a). 1 x CVN 
i. 24 x RIM-162B, ESSM AAW missiles 
(b). 2 x Ticonderoga-Class CG 
i. 6 x Mk-46 ASW torpedoes 
ii. 8 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
iii. 22 x RIM-116B, RAM AAW missiles 
iv. 83 x Tomahawk missiles 
v. 39 x SM-2 missiles 
(c). 2 x Arleigh Burke-Class DDG 
i. 6 x Mk-46 ASW torpedoes 
ii. 8 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
iii. 90 x Tomahawk missiles 
iv. 39 x SM-2 missiles 
(d). 2 x Seawolf-Class SSN 
i. 50 x Mk-48/Tomahawk weapons (8 tubes)    
(2). Japan 
(a). 2 x Kongo-Class DDG 
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i. 6 x Mk-46 ASW torpedoes 
ii. 8 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
iii. 90 x RIM-66C, SM-2MR, AAW/RUM-139A, VLA ASW missiles 
(b). 1 x Oyashio-Class SS 
i. 6 x G-11/2 ASW/Harpoon anti-ship missiles and torpedoes  
(3). Australia 
(a). 4 x Anzac-Class FF 
i. 6 x Mk-54 ASW torpedoes 
ii. 8 x RIM-162A ASuW/AAW missiles 
(b). 1 x Collins-Class SS 
i. 6 x Mk-48 torpedoes/Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
China will have the luxury of proximity to the region and this advantage is clearly shown 
in its air force of some 400 jet fighters.  Chinese forces are as summarized below. 
(1). 4 x Luda Class DDG 
(c). 6 x A244 ASW torpedoes 
(d). 16 x C-801 AsuW missiles 
(e). 8 x HQ-7 AAW missiles 
(2). 2 x Soveremenny Class DDG 
(a). 8 x TE-2 ASW/AsuW torpedoes 
(b). 48 x SA-N-12 Grizzly AAW missiles 
(c). 8 x SS-N-22 Sunburn AsuW missiles 
(3). 2 x Kilo Class SS 
(a). 12 x SA-N-8 Gremlin AAW missiles 
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(b). 2 x TEST 96 ASW torpedoes 
(c). 4 x 56-65 KE ASuW torpedoes 
(4). 1 x Han Class SSN 
(a). 6 x SET-65E ASW torpedoes 
The following table compares numerically and in aggregate the coalition forces versus 
those of China. 
Country Aircraft Surface Vessels Submarines 
Australia 0 4 1 
Japan 50 2 1 
US 85 3 2 
Coalition 135 9 4 
China 400 6 3 
Conclusion Inferior Superior Superior 
Table 1. Military Assets Comparison between Coalition Force and China 
It can be seen that due to distance, projection of airpower by the coalition force is limited 
to carrier-based platforms.  China can project its air power from land bases.  Australia is 
predicted to be unable to provide any major air assets to any regional coalition operating outside 
3000 NM from its borders. In the case of major surface combatants, the coalition force has a 
definite advantage, overall having three more vessels than China. Furthermore, the American and 
Japanese vessels are far superior in terms of technology to the Chinese vessels.  
With only slight numerical advantage for submarines, the coalition leads the Chinese by 
one unit. Again, the coalition force’s vessels are superior in technology and capabilities.  
In summary, Australia’s contribution in this scenario can be seen to be quite significant. 
In terms of surface vessels, Australia’s assets makes up for close to 50%, but it is only in the 
form of frigates that are far less capable than the US and Japanese destroyers and cruisers. Its 
contribution of a Collins-class submarine is very significant as it shifts the balance between the 
coalition and the Chinese forces. All in all, the US may view an Australian alliance as significant 
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in the region.   
Additionally, the provision of air support by Australia in the region is limited. It is 
unlikely that this will change in the near future. The use of air-to-air refueling may alleviate the 
problem. However, we feel that Australia should still maintain its strategic priority, focusing on 
its interests within its inner arc.  
c. Scenario 2:  Indonesian Invasion of East Timor 
The Indonesian army is comprised of over 200,000 personnel. Due to the unrest caused 
by the military coup, the military would be busy maintaining security throughout the 
archipelago. An infantry division is envisioned to be occupying and controlling East Timor after 
the initial invasion. Resupply of this force can be done relatively easily and economically via 
land from West Timor. Although not a heavy division, about 120 tanks and armored fighting 
vehicles are present on the island. 
The likely Indonesian naval force in the region would be no more than six frigate-sized 
vessels and an older German diesel submarine (Type 209). The available air force comprises 
only 40 fighter aircraft. Overall, the maritime force of Indonesia presents a significant threat to 
any Australian task force attempting to project a forcible landing onto East Timor.    
The most notable shortfall of the current ADF is the lack of significant ground forces. 
The best force available for insertion is comprised of a light infantry brigade (3rd Bde) and a 
motorized infantry brigade (7th Bde). These are not amphibious elements and landing them under 
hostile conditions would be very risky. Even if landed intact, they will face a severe threat from 
the Indonesian army division present on the island. The force on force ratio is a definite 
disadvantage for the Australian Army. 
On the other hand Australian maritime assets are far superior to those of Indonesia. 
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Australia is likely to be able to obtain maritime superiority in the theater of operations. However, 
with the terrain in East Timor, the maritime assets can provide limited support for the land forces 
other than resupply. A long war will have significant disadvantages for the Australians.  The 
following table compares the Australian and Indonesian forces. 
Country Army Pers Tanks/AFV Surface 
Vessels 
Aircraft Submarines 
Australia 6,000 40 12 104 3 
Indonesia 10,000 120 6 40 1 
Conclusion Inferior Inferior Superior Superior Superior 
Table 2. Force Comparison between Australia and Indonesia 
In summary, the use of army troops is a crucial ingredient in taking back East Timor. As 
the Australian force is not amphibious, landing these troops would be highly risky. Nevertheless, 
with superior maritime assets, it is believed Australia can execute a successful landing provided 
the insertion of special forces (SAS and Commando Battalions) to secure beachheads had been 
achieved, coupled with the attainment of maritime superiority. 
In spite of a superior maritime force to facilitate a successful landing, Australia is 
unlikely to succeed in a long land campaign to forcefully retake East Timor. Australia believes 
this confrontation can only be successful with external intervention and support. The availability 
of US Marines to secure the landing areas would be most helpful.  
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5. Technology Niches and R&D Report 
a. Introduction 
In terms of technology R&D, Australia sees herself in a unique position, given its large 
landmass but relative small population and GDP.  As such, Australia specially chose to explore 
and capture certain technological niches that provide an edge both in the economy and military.  
The focus is on building technologies that incorporate existing strengths.  Such technology will 
be developed with the intent of establishing a technological edge for both commercial and 
military application. 
These technological niches will provide Australia with huge commercial and economic 
benefits as well as quantum leaps in military capabilities in the future.  The technology R&D will 
be a joint effort between the Defense Science and Technology Organization (DSTO), 
commercial sector and foreign partnerships and collaboration. 
Australia’s technology R&D approach revolves around three key ideologies. The main 
thrust of the R&D efforts are the national R&D projects, which serve to boost our economy and 
technological expertise, however, in specific cases, these would also allow Australia to 
incorporate new technology into their military equipment, thus enhancing military capability. 
The second ideology is being attributed to the Howard doctrine, which encourages an 
intimate defense relationship with the US.  As such, R&D into future capabilities is very much 
developed along the lines of US military technology. 
Finally, given the country’s limited resources, Australia specifically chose to develop 
technology niches in energy resources technology (storage and supply) as well as space 
launching capabilities. 
b. Initial Feasibility Studies 
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In the first epoch, initial technology feasibility studies were initiated in the following 
broad areas:  nano-technology, specifically the customization of advanced smart materials; space 
launching technology including electromagnetic launch, trans-atmospheric flight and laser 
propulsion; high-density energy storage and supplies technology including silica gel energy 
storage as well as new generation fuel cell; and finally, new energy resource technology such as 
remote sensing, deep sea drilling, photovoltics, ‘clean’ burning of coal, and high-density 
transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 
In each of the specific technological niches, the following factors were examined for 
feasibility: 
(1). Related/specific area of technology advancement 
(2). Significant military impact 
(3). Significant commercial impact 
(4). Possible R&D partners 
(5). Examples of specific application 
(6). Projected annual budget 
(7). Projected industry worth 
(8). Project timeline and milestones 
The findings of the feasibility study are indicated in Table (3) and a brief description of 
the various technologies is provided.  The initial feasibility studies occurred from 2000 – 2002.  
Total investment in these studies was US$500 million of which DSTO contributed US$100 
million, industry contributed US$150 million and private collaborations contributed US$250 
million. 
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c. Detailed Studies 
Results from the feasibility studies drove the focus of technology effort in two specific 
areas, space launching capability (commercial space launch facilities) and energy R&D (R&D 
into new energy resource technology and high-density energy and supplies).  The detailed studies 
occurred from 2003 to 2005.  The total investment in space launching capability was US$500 
million of which DSTO contributed US$100 million while the industry and private collaboration 
contributed the reminding US$400 million.  Energy R&D investments totaled US$250 million of 
which DSTO contributed US$100 million while the industry and private collaboration 
contributed the remaining US$150 million. 
d. Technology Description  
Nanotechnology4 is the revolutionary area of science and technology.  The science refers 
to the ability to manipulate individual atoms and molecules, making it possible to build machines 
using molecular building blocks or creating materials and structures from the bottom up and 
designing the properties by controlling the structure. In the nanoworld, objects are measured in 
nanometers -- 1 billionth of a meter. That's about four times wider than an atom and more than 
1,000 times narrower than a human hair. Nanotechnology could change the way almost 
everything, from medicines to computers to objects not yet imagined, are designed and 
manufactured.   
Interrelated areas of nanoscale science and engineering research focus goals are: 
(1). Biosystems at the nanoscale - learning how nature operates on a nanoscale.  
(2). Nanoscale structures, novel phenomena and quantum control - how to overcome 
existing limits to miniaturization. 
                                                 
4 Nanotechnology Magazine: The Technology of the 21st Century (http://www.nanozine.com) 
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(3). Device and system architecture - integrating nanoscale devices into measurement 
and control assemblies.  
(4). Nanoscale processes in medicine - new approaches to visualizing, trapping and 
releasing nutrients and drugs.  
(5). Molecules - Understanding single molecule mechanics, different length scales, 
and correlating material properties of molecular assembly.  
(6). Modeling and simulation at the nanoscale - needed to understand, control and 
accelerate the development of new nanoscale processes and regimes.  
Some of the applications that might be achieved through the evolution of nanoscale 
science and engineering in the future are: 
(1). Materials - new materials many times stronger or far lighter than anything known 
today, chemical sensing, and optical switching 
(2). Information technology - quantum computing and computer chips that store 
trillions of bits of information on a pinhead device 
(3). Medical - improved drug and gene delivery, biocompatible materials for implants 
and nanoscale sensors for detection of disease 
 Nanotechnology is molecular manufacturing or, more simply, building things one atom 
or molecule at a time with programmed nanoscopic robot arms.  Utilizing the well-understood 
chemical properties of atoms and molecules (how they "stick" together), nanotechnology 
proposes the construction of novel molecular devices possessing extraordinary properties. The 
trick is to manipulate atoms individually and place them exactly where needed to produce the 
desired structure.  
Potential technical feasibilities include: 
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(1). Self-assembling consumer goods  
(2). Computers billions of times faster  
(3). Extremely novel inventions  
(4). Safe and affordable space travel  
(5). Medical Nano (virtual end to illness and aging) 
(6). No more pollution and automatic cleanup of already existing pollution  
(7). Molecular food syntheses  
Nanotechnology also provides the ability to produce “super materials”.  Atomic precision 
construction capable through the use of nanotechnology could produce metal structures devoid of 
microscopic imperfections, dramatically increasing strength. Bearings made to atomic precision 
(every atom in "round") would last far longer, run cooler and bear greater loads.  Nano 
construction can also produce materials with a great strength at low weight.  For example, in 
diamond form, carbon is 50-70 times stronger than steel and less than one-fourth the weight. 
Buckytubes built using nanotechnology would be 100 times as strong and conduct electrons like 
copper.  Much of the carbon needed to build those is available now from the billions of pounds 
of fossil fuel burned in the atmosphere since the industrial revolution. The raw material delivers 
itself.  
Nanotechnology can also provide for smart materials.  If you're one of the few million or 
so in the US who use nail polish, imagine applying a clear liquid to your nails that changes color 
on some, or all of the surface, at your verbal command!  Additionally, no more broken nails! The 
smart coating also infiltrates the nail with a diamond lattice, effectively creating a composite at 
strength physically safe for the tips of one's nails. If a nail should be damaged in any way, the 
coating automatically makes repairs.  Or maybe lay your hand on the fabric of your outfit and 
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verbally command the liquid to search the array of complimentary colors until one suits your 
desires. By rearranging surface atoms in appropriate patterns, the smart material will utilize the 
same light diffraction technique used in butterfly wings to produce color.   Smart materials will 
undoubtedly be popular and find their way into many amazing applications especially military 
applications such as camoflauge. 
Electromagnetic launch5 involves the use of magnetic forces to accelerate “projectiles” 
into the air.  Electromagnetic launch of spacecraft might basically involve a combination of 
levitation and acceleration.  A direct current (DC) magnetic field levitates the carrier to eliminate 
frictional losses.  This mechanism is composed of numbers of coils through which a high current 
is discharged.  Such discharge produces a strong field gradient, resulting in different magnetic 
pressure on each side of the superconductor thus producing the acceleration. 
Electromagnetic launch of spacecraft offers significant advantages.  Once infrastructures 
are available, the cost of launching a payload will be little more than the cost of electricity.  In 
the case of Australia, where widespread solar energy is available, and if coupled with 
advancements in energy storage and supplies technology, the costs are drastically reduced. 
Technology R&D into new energy resources can greatly enhance Australia’s economy 
given its vast energy resources.  Possible developments in this area includes fluidized bed coal 
burning technology, which allow micro coal particles to be mixed with a highly combustible 
combination of gases to ensure more efficient and complete burning.  This method will increase 
the energy conversion efficiency as well as significantly lower the amount of harmful by-
products.  As such, with this particular technology, coal will increasingly become popular as a 
form of energy.  In addition, LNG is fast becoming a popular form of energy given its “clean” 
                                                 
5 Harney, Robert C. (2000), The Enemy's Access Denial System, Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, p. 353. 
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environmental properties.  The current pitfall is the issue of transporting this flammable cargo.  
As such, the investment into the ability of transporting LNG at high densities will greatly 
increase the amount of energy that could be transported and thus lower the cost of transportation. 
Many potential military systems require extremely compact, high-energy power supplies 
to be practical.  As such, Australia with its inherent expertise in chemistry related to the fields of 
fuel and energy, is well positioned to explore this technology niche.  Such compact and 
lightweight “super batteries” will have tremendous military and commercial applications such as 
powering directed energy weapons and military and commercial vehicles.  One possible version 
of these super batteries is the de-hydrated silica gel, which when deprived of the water content, 
its remaining physical structure exists as an amorphous structure with extremely high surface 
area to volume ratio, similar to the familiar “cotton candy”.  Such structures have been found to 
store a large amount of electrical charge, which has the potential to serve as compact super 
batteries.  Another high-density storage media under development is that of fuel cells that 
incorporate the use of methanol. 
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6. Summary 
The first five years of the 21st century was relatively uneventful for the Australian 
Defense Force.  The change in vision put forth by the Defense White Paper of 2000 gradually 
became a part of ADF doctrine.  The diplomatic arrangements with the US were emphasized and 
Australia’s role as the US deputy in the region was strengthened.  Participation of Australian 
maritime and ground forces in exercises with the US and other allies was increased with the aim 
of developing common operational philosophies.   Trade arrangements with the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan and China were finalized, which will help secure 
Australia’s place as a valued member of the Asia Pacific community.  
 The relationship with the global powers remained relatively unchanged during this 
period.  At times competitive rhetoric from China and the troubled North Korea was heard but 
there were no major threats of conflict.  Closer to Australian soil, Indonesia remained a concern 
due to instability caused by separatist movements and religious differences.  Their economic 
situation has not improved significantly and they are beginning to fall farther and farther behind 
their Asian neighbors. 
 The basic objectives and functions of the ADF remained largely unchanged.  Efforts were 
made to address some of the emerging threats of the new millennium.  Special joint military 
teams were set up to address the emerging non-military threats of terrorism, cyber-war, narcotics 
trading and illegal immigration.  The dilemma of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction was also addressed in national and international forums.  Australia believes these 
considerations will remain paramount in the coming years.   
 Australia had a stable and prosperous economic beginning of the new millennium.  The 
GDP grew at a rate between 3.0 and 3.5 % during the five-year period.  A brief slowdown in 
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2002-2003 was caused by a global slowdown of growth due to a brief contraction of the US 
economy.  Evidence of an increase in the rate of growth was seen towards the end of the epoch.  
The percentage of GDP spent of defense increased during this period.  The Australian people 
have been resoundingly supportive of the Howard Doctrine and their ADF and have rallied 
around the growth of the defense sector. 
 Cost cutting initiatives and reapportionment of assets were instituted in this epoch.  
Efforts to reform the administrative and personal services sectors of the ADF were made so that 
more money could be spent to develop new weapons systems.  Additionally, a cut in the current 
operational budget was undertaken with the leveraging of these future systems in mind.  
 The development of the ADF during this epoch was primarily a result of previously 
initiated programs and projects.  These programs and projects were clearly identified in the 2000 
Defense White Paper.  Additionally, the white paper highlighted the identified vulnerabilities of 
each of the military services and the actions that were being taken to eliminate or mitigate the 
issues. 
 In the navy, several existing shipbuilding programs came to fruition resulting in the 
ANZAC frigate, the Collins submarine, and the Huon minesweeper.  These modern and state-of-
the-art ships form the nucleus of the navy and the basis for further construction and development.  
In the army, existing programs provided new and improved infantry vehicles to enhance the 
mobility of the soldiers.  To make those soldiers more lethal, modern technology enabled the 
development of support equipment and weaponry necessary to equip the 21st century soldier.      
Advances in army aviation and air defense improved the battlefield firepower and defensive 
capability.  The air force struggled with several modernization issues, specifically with combat, 
strike, and tanker aircraft.  Ultimately, the combat and strike aircraft received upgrades to 
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improve their tactical capabilities and the tanker aircraft was replaced with modern airframes.  
The most critical development in the air force was the addition of the Airborne Early Warning 
and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, providing crucial surveillance and command and control 
functions to the entire ADF.  Information capability improved with the development of an 
integrated command and control system supported by a robust communications suite. 
To access the effectiveness of the ADF, this epoch saw Australia attempting to project 
power beyond 1000 NM through participation in a RIMPAC type exercise with the US and 
Japan against a potentially hostile China. Australia’s contribution in this exercise can be seen to 
be quite significant. In terms of surface vessels, Australia’s assets makes up for close to 50%, but 
is only in the form of frigates that are far less capable than the US and Japanese destroyers and 
cruisers. Provision of air support by Australia in the region is limited. It is unlikely that this will 
change in the near future. The use of air-to-air refueling may alleviate the problem.  
In the inner arc, Australia force planners examined the scenario of taking back East 
Timor. The use of Australian army troops is a crucial ingredient. As the Australian force is not 
amphibious capable, landing these troops would be highly risky. The smallness of Australia 
ground forces tilts the balance against them. Nevertheless, with superior maritime assets, it is 
believed Australia can execute a successful landing provided the beachheads can be secured by 
special forces and maritime superiority can be attained. 
In spite of a superior maritime force to facilitate a successful landing, Australia is 
unlikely to succeed in a long land campaign to forcefully retake East Timor. Australia believes 
this confrontation can only be successful with external intervention and support. 
In the R&D area, initial technology feasibility studies into nanotechnology, space 
launching technology, high-density energy storage and supplies technology, and new energy 
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resource technology were undertaken.  Results from these feasibility studies drove Australia’s 
R&D focus in two specific areas, space launching technology and energy.  Initial investment into 
space launching capability R&D was US$500 million and energy totaled US$250 million. 
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B. Epoch Two (2006 – 2010) 
1. Australia Security Environment in the Year 2010 (White Paper Addendum) 
Note: Due to an attempt to format this document in a manner similar to the Defense White Paper 
of 2000, there are notable similarities.  
 
 When the last Australian White Paper was issued in December 2000, it contained a 
comprehensive blueprint for the shape of the Australian Defense Force.  The document was 
intended to look forward for an entire decade to create a defense vision that would describe the 
objectives and priorities of the Australian people and would provide guidelines for the 
development of the supporting force structure.  Some of the themes addressed in that document 
were the emergence of globalization, the increased importance of Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW), and the primacy of the US in the region.  The period from 2000 to 2010 
was remarkably similar to these projections. The emergence of the ADF designed to work within 
these parameters was well underway by 2010. 
a. Globalization 
Globalization was perhaps the most dominant trend of the decade.  The importance of the 
economic underpinnings of this trend is articulated in the following section entitled Economic 
Development and Defense Spending.  The synergies created by trade have lead to unprecedented 
economic growth in the region.  While this has provided many nations with the wealth necessary 
to be viable members of the international community, it has also created international 
codependency that has set the stage for small disagreements on trade issues to flare into potential 
conflicts.  On the positive side, Australia sees less reason for nations to resort to conflict when 
most disputes are more advantageously resolved at a regional diplomatic forum.  In short, the 
nature of the global economy is both a positive and a negative from the standpoint of probability 
of war.  
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 Perhaps tipping the scale in the direction of insecurity was the growing rift in nation’s 
energy requirements and their available resources.  Many nations of the Asia Pacific Rim were 
limited in growth as the result of constrained fuel resources.  This phenomena and Australia’s 
response to the dilemma will be addressed in depth in the R&D section.  
b. MOOTW 
The trend of low intensity regional conflict was examined in the Defense White Paper of 
2000.  Regional hot spots such as East Timor and Somalia in the 1990’s were examples of this 
sort of conflict.  Australia continued to participate in these operations in the first decade of the 
new millennium.  In particular we worked closely with the Indonesian government to curtail 
conflict on the island of Irian Jaya.  We also continue to support the edict of the United Nations 
by augmenting the forces in the Balkans as well as the Middle East.  We expect that stopping 
future intrastate conflicts, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping missions will be necessary in the 
upcoming epochs.  Australia will continue to participate in these operations when our national 
interests are at stake.  
c. Non-Military Threats 
Australia still faces many security concerns other than those involving military force.  
The 2000 Defense White Paper considered this trend and steps were taken to remedy the 
situation.  These threats include cyber attack, organized crime and terrorism. They also include 
concerns over illegal immigration, the drug trade, illegal fishing, piracy and quarantine 
infringements.   
Many of these problems, such as illegal immigration, involve the challenge of effective 
surveillance, patrolling and policing of maritime approaches.  Illegal incursions into the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and territorial waters, and onto our territory, constitute an on-
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going problem for Australia.  Given the size of our maritime jurisdiction, this is a significant and 
growing challenge. 
A major review of coastal surveillance and enforcement activities, including the 
significant contribution made by the ADF to these efforts was conducted in the early 2000’s.  
That review proposed important enhancements, including improved surveillance capacity 
through the acquisition Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft and the 
establishment of an integrated surveillance center.   
The ADF will continue to have a major part to play in these activities.  Our patrol boats, 
maritime surveillance aircraft and intelligence capabilities are fully engaged in the day-to-day 
monitoring and policing of our maritime approaches.  
d. Australian Defense Priorities  
The strategic environment that Australia faced in this decade was as predicted.  Our 
nation’s primary objectives and priorities have not changed a great deal but do deserve some 
reexamination. 
At its most basic, Australia’s strategic policy aims to prevent or defeat any armed attack 
on Australia.  This is the bedrock of our security and the most fundamental responsibility of 
government.  Our armed forces need to be able to do more than simply defend our coastline. We 
have strategic interests and objectives at the global and regional levels. Australia is an outward 
looking country.  We are engaged in many different ways - economic, cultural and personal - 
with the nearest region and the world beyond.  We are a major trading nation, with our prosperity 
dependent on our engagement with other countries.  Australia therefore cannot be secure in an 
insecure region, and as a middle-size power, there is much we can and should do to help to keep 
our region secure, and support global stability. Working with others we can do a lot more than 
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we can do by ourselves.  
At the same time we must be realistic about the scope of our power and influence and the 
limits to our resources.  We need to allocate our effort carefully.  To do that, we need to define 
and prioritize our strategic interests and objectives.  We do that in the following paragraphs, 
listing our interests and objectives in priority order.  
We have given highest priority to the interests and objectives closest to Australia. In 
some circumstances a major crisis far from Australia may be more important to our future 
security than a minor problem close at hand. But in general, the closer a crisis or problem to 
Australia, the more important it would probably be to our security and the more likely we would 
be able to help to do something about it.  
The existence of strategic interests in a situation does not determine how Australia would 
respond in the event of a crisis that challenged those interests. Australia would always have a 
range of options and the government of the day would need to determine how best to respond. In 
particular, careful consideration would always need to be given before the serious step of 
deploying forces was taken. That consideration would need to balance the Australian interest at 
stake with the human, financial, political, diplomatic, and wider costs of committing military 
forces.  Nevertheless, our defense planning recognizes that the Government may decide that such 
a commitment could be warranted in some circumstances.  It is of course intrinsic to Australia’s 
approach to regional affairs that such commitments would be undertaken in collaboration with 
regional friends and allies, and with full respect for other countries’ sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.   
In summary, the defense priorities remain as stated in the 2000 Defense White Paper.  
For brevity and clarity, the defense priorities are: 
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(1). Ensure the defense of Australia and its direct approaches 
(2). Foster the security of our immediate neighborhood 
(3). Promote stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia 
(4). Support strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region 
(5). Support global security 
(6). Prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
e. Australia’s Military Strategy 
The military strategy developed as a result of the national strategy, objectives, and 
defense priorities remains unchanged from the 2000 Defense White Paper.  To reiterate, the tasks 
are: 
(1). Defend Australian territory from any credible attack, without relying on help from 
the combat forces of any other country.  This provides a clear basis for our defense 
planning. We are confident that forces built primarily to defend Australia will be able to 
undertake a range of operations to promote our wider strategic objectives.  The 
Government’s approach to this task is shaped by the principles of self-reliance, maritime 
strategy, and proactive operations.  
(2). Ensure security of our immediate neighborhood.  Australia needs to be able to 
work with our neighbors to respond in the very unlikely event of armed aggression 
against them. We also need to be able to join UN-sanctioned international operations, 
regional peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief operations.  We should be prepared to be 
the largest force contributor to such operations.  Our planning needs to acknowledge that 
we could be called upon to undertake several operations simultaneously, as we were in 
East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. 
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(3). Contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond 
our immediate neighborhood where our interests are engaged.  Such coalitions might 
involve operations ranging from peacekeeping and disaster relief to relatively high-
intensity conflict.  In general, the closer a crisis to Australia, the larger the contribution 
we would want to be able to provide. 
(4). In addition to these core tasks in support of Australia's strategic objectives, the 
ADF will also be called upon to undertake a number of regular or occasional tasks in 
support of wider national interests.  These include specific and ongoing commitments to 
coastal surveillance and emergency management, as well as ad hoc support to wider 
community needs. 
f. Examining the Regional Powers 
The United States in 2010 has a preponderance of military capability and strategic 
influence that is still unparalleled.  The past decade has shown a narrowing of the gap however.  
Australia believes that US strength supports a generally stable global strategic environment.  The 
primacy of the United States is built on the strength of its economy, the quality of its technology, 
the willingness of the US government and voters to accept the costs and burdens of global 
power, and the acknowledgement by most countries that US primacy serves their interests.   
The Australian Government believes that US presence in the region will ultimately 
promote economic, social and political developments that align with our interests and values.   
To this end, an aggressive diplomatic campaign to the US government has been undertaken, 
which extends increased US force basing privileges and calls for increased US/Australian Joint 
and combined exercises.  We believe that the combination of our forces will achieve our joint 
objectives in spite of the lessened US presence in the theater.  Other nations such as Japan have 
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also shown an interest in joining an alliance.  Abroad, no country in the world will have the 
military or economic power to challenge a combined force of US, Australian, and Japanese 
global primacy over the next few decades.  
 This document has reiterated the thinking of the Australian government in the area of 
defense spending and of our force structure. The specifics of the economic and structural 
constraints of defense and research areas will be addressed in the coming sections. 
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2. Economic Development and Defense Spending 
The policies initiated at the advent of the new millennium continued into the second 
epoch and the economic benefits became apparent.  The economy expanded at an increasing rate 
resulting in an annual growth between 3.89 and 4.5%.  The fiscal and monetary policies allowed 
this growth without a great deal of inflation.  The tight labor market still exists but the 
immigration and education policies instituted in the last epoch have begun to reap the rewards of 
a larger and more stable workforce.  The percentage of GDP allocated towards defense remained 
constant at 2.4% over the epoch. 
The global trade economy was strengthened during this epoch.  Australia was able to tap 
some of its abundant natural resources to assist our allies in obtaining the energy reserves at 
reasonable prices.  The diversification of Asia’s energy resources caused by new sources and 
technologies has further contributed to international growth.  The rate of GDP growth was 
directly affected by this new Australian market in the latter portion of the epoch.  Australia 
expects these energy markets to account for an even greater portion of our economic growth in 
the coming years.  Gains that had been largely dominated by pure business efficiencies brought 
on by new information technology capabilities neared the point of diminishing returns as the 
absorption of these assets neared completion.   
This unprecedented growth and the continued support of the Australian people for a 
robust military capability have given the nation a rare opportunity to purchase new systems 
designed to fight the battles of the future.  The shift of assets from the current operations to the 
future capabilities budget continued in this epoch allowing more money to be spent on 
procurement of new systems.  The future remains bright for the Australian nation, economy, and 
the armed forces.  
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3. Australian Force Structure 2010  
As part of any force structure assessment process, several factors must be reviewed.  
First, the national strategy and its relationship to the military strategy must be evaluated and 
updated as required to reflect the changing state of the world.  Second, the known vulnerabilities 
from the previous assessment process must be reviewed and evaluated for the adequacy of the 
corrective actions taken.  Finally, vulnerabilities identified as a result of net assessment or 
interactions with other armed forces must be reviewed.  The combination of these factors results 
in changes to military force structure. 
In the case of Australia in the year 2006, the ADF still faced several weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in each of their military components.  These vulnerabilities, along with the 
highlighted issues discovered as part of the net assessment process, were addressed as part of the 
military force planning effort in the second epoch.  The national and military strategy for 
Australia and its armed forces did not change from the first to second epoch.  Accordingly, the 
force structure for the individual service components of the ADF is discussed below.  In review, 
some of the force structure vulnerabilities were not completely eliminated, but were mitigated by 
our 2010 force structure. 
a. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
For the RAN, the vulnerabilities identified during the first epoch are as follows:  
(1). Long range air-defense capability 
(2). Limited replenishment capability 
(3). Patrol craft are aging 
(4). Limited amphibious lift capability 
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The issues of replenishment and amphibious lift capability were addressed through the 
development of a Multi-Role Auxiliary (MRA) ship.6  This auxiliary was designed to assume the 
roles of amphibious transport as well as to provide afloat logistics support.  As a multi-role ship, 
this auxiliary will ultimately serve as a replacement for the current landing platform ships, the 
heavy-lift amphibious ship, and the underway replenishment ships, all of which are due to be 
decommissioned over the next 10 years.  While not optimized for specific missions, it is believed 
that this ship will achieve a significant life cycle cost savings by combining the various roles into 
a single hull form.  As mentioned, this ship will serve as a replenishment ship, a transport ship 
for 1200 troops and their equipment, an aviation support ship, a logistics support ship, or a 
combination of these roles.  The ship will resemble an amphibious assault ship, but will be fitted 
with cranes of sufficient capacity to enable the over-the-side loading of landing craft.  The 
possibility of configuring the ship with a well deck to support amphibious craft is a possibility 
and will be examined as part of the overall design effort. 
The replacement of the Fremantle patrol craft was addressed by the procurement of a 
similar craft built to civilian standards.  These vessels will continue to perform the role 
analogous to the United States Coast Guard and are invaluable to this end.  
Studies into the design and construction of the next generation air defense ship for the 
RAN were started this epoch.  It is expected that the first ship will be commissioned into the 
navy in the third epoch. 
 The Navy force structure for 2010 is provided below. 
(1). Surface Combatants 
                                                 
6 Bostock, Ian. Australia devises multi-role ship. Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2000 
(http://www.janes.com/regional_news/asia_pacific/news/jdw/jdw000718_1_n.shtml) 
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(a). 6 FFG 
(b). 14 ANZAC FF 
(c). 4 Spruance DDG 
(d). 4 High-speed Catamarans 
(e). 30 Patrol Boats (PB) 
(f). 2 Multi-Role Auxiliary (MRA) ship 
(g). 1 oiler/replenishment ship 
(h). 2 Amphibious Lift (LPA) 
(i). 15 Landing Craft Medium (LCM) 
(j). 6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) 
(2). Mine Warfare 
(a). 2 Inshore Mine Countermeasure (MCM) ships 
(b). 12 Huon class MCM 
(c). 4 Dive Teams 
(3). Submarine Force 
(a). 8 Collins class SS 
(4). Navy Air 
(a). 16 Sea Hawk helicopters 
(b). 7 Sea King helicopters 
(c). 40 Super Sea Sprite helicopters 
(d). 19 P-3C Orion 
(e). 10 LAMPS Mk-III helicopters 
The ANZAC frigate’s production line was continued through this epoch resulting in an 
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additional six ships in the inventory.  Maintenance of this industrial base is strongly desired since 
Australia wants to build the next generation of air-defense ships in country.  The modular 
construction techniques learned and developed during the ANZAC construction will prove 
invaluable to the development of this follow-on air-defense platform.  Of note, all ANZAC 
frigates in the inventory will have the latest anti-ship missile defense systems and the Harpoon 
offensive anti-ship missile. 
Spruance destroyers were purchased from the United States as part of an effort to bolster 
the RAN’s firepower.  These ships, configured with vertical launch missile tubes capable of 
firing the Tomahawk cruise missile, fulfill two roles.  First, these ships allow the RAN to 
redevelop and refine the concepts behind capital ship operations prior to the introduction of an 
air-defense ship in the third epoch.  With the decommissioning of the DDGs in 2001, the RAN 
has lost the expertise and knowledge of operating its forces around a maritime action group.  
Second, these ships will provide a sea-based strike capability that will augment and serve as an 
eventual replacement for the current F-111 air strike capability.  Early procurement of this 
capability in advance of the F-111 retirement in the later epochs will allow the navy to build its 
expertise in this critical war fighting area. 
To boost the amphibious lift and transport capability, high-speed catamarans were added 
to the inventory.  One of these vessels, previously leased, proved to be invaluable to operations 
in East Timor and provide a rapid transit option throughout the region.  The catamarans can carry 
up to 500 combat ready troops and equipment.  Their 40-knot speed puts most areas of the region 
within a 12 to 24 hour transit window. These ships allows for rapid and timely response to 
regional contingencies by significantly boosting military sealift within the inner arc region. 
The multi-role auxiliary ship was developed to replace the capability of the amphibious 
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and replenishment ships.  During this epoch, one MRA replaced the heavy-lift amphibious ship 
TOBRUK and the second replaced the oldest replenishment ship in the inventory. 
As envisioned by the majority of the world’s navies, the threat of sea-based mines in the 
future will be of great significance.  In an effort to bolster the RAN’s mine-clearing capability, 
the construction program of the Huon minesweeper was continued and the inventory doubled 
over this epoch.  The Huon continues to be one of the most advanced MCM ships available.  
Continuing the construction of this vessel maintains the industrial base and allows for foreign 
military sales. 
Two additional Collins submarines were purchased to supplement the submarine force.  
The proliferation of modern quiet diesel electric submarines is best countered with another 
submarine, and the Collins has proven to be an excellent platform for this role.   
The ANZAC construction program and the Spruance DDG procurement left Naval 
aviation short of airborne assets to deploy with these ships.  Accordingly, additional helicopters 
were purchased to serve as deployable assets on those platforms.  The LAMPS Mk-111 
helicopters were purchased to supplement the anti-submarine role of the Spruance-class 
destroyers and additional Super Sea Sprite helicopters were purchased for the ANZAC-class 
frigates. 
As a result of the 2010 force structure, the navy is still faced with the lack of long-range 
air-defense capable ships.  Current studies are focusing on the development of such a ship that 
will be producible in Australia.  With the advent of the multi-role auxiliary ship, the 
replenishment and amphibious lift capability of the fleet is improving.  The MRAs provide the 
heavy lift capability while the addition of the catamarans significantly enhances the lift 
capability for light forces.  Future purchases of the MRA will continue this positive trend in both 
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mission areas. 
b. The Australian Army 
For the Australian Army, the vulnerabilities identified during the first epoch are as 
follows: 
(1). Army’s small size 
(2). Smaller reserve force 
As identified in the last epoch, the size of the Australian Army is small as compared to its 
nearest neighbors.  Given the operations participated in during this epoch and those it expects to 
undertake in the coming decades, Australia considers this small force adequate.  The lack of a 
conventional threat to the Australia homeland further supports the maintenance of a small army.   
 The Army force structure for 2010 is provided below. 
(1).     Special Forces (2 regiment SASR/2 Commando regiments) 
(2).     Mechanized Force (1 brigade) 
(3).     Light Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(4).     Motorized Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(5).     Army Aviation Force 
(6).     Ground Based Air Defense 
(7).     Combat & Logistics support 
(8).     Army Reserve Force 
(9).     Army Aviation (helicopters) 
(a). 36 S-70A Black Hawk 
(b). 6 CH-47D Chinook 
(c). 24 Apache Armed Reconnaissance 
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(d). 12 Troop Lift 
(10). Air Defense  
(a). 12 RBS-70 laser guided  
(b). 10 Patriot firing units 
(c). 12 Patriot PAC-3 firing units 
(11). Reserve Units 
(a). 11th Brigade (North & Central Queensland) 
(b). 4th Brigade (Victoria) 
(c). 8th Brigade (NSW) 
(12). Reserve Surveillance Units 
(a). Northwest Mobile Force (NORFORCE) 
(b). Pilbara Regiment (WA) 
(c). Far North Queensland Regiment 
The size and composition of the army’s forces remained essentially the same between the 
two epochs.  The Special Forces gained an additional regiment in both the Special Air Service 
(SAS) and commando branches.  These additional regiments will further enhance Australia's 
special operations capability.  The size of the mechanized, light infantry, and motorized infantry 
remain the same with respect to their individual composition.  The major change in the army’s 
forces was in the utilization and composition of the reserves.  
In the aviation branch, the procurement of Apache armed reconnaissance and attack 
helicopters allowed the retirement of the Kiowa and UH-1 helicopters.  Additional next-
generation troop-lift assets were added to provide aircraft to support amphibious operations 
aboard the newly acquired multi-role auxiliaries.  The expansion of the helicopter fleet continues 
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to provide light lift for troop transportation. 
The army’s air defenses continued to improve through the introduction of the Patriot 
PAC-3 missile system.  The PAC-3 system supplements the RBS-70 and Patriot systems 
currently in the inventory.  The Patriot PAC-3 system quadruples the number of missiles in each 
of the individual launcher systems by providing 128 missiles per firing unit. 
The army reserve has undergone the largest and most extensive transformation in its 
history.  In the past, the reserves were viewed as a mobilization base in the time of a major 
conflict, a remote possibility at best.  Operations in the beginning of the century highlighted the 
importance of the reserves in meeting contemporary and concurrent operations.  To fully support 
MOOTW during this period, more Australian reservists served on full-time active duty than 
since the end of World War II.  As a result of these operations, the focus of the reserves shifted 
from mobilization to support a major conflict to mobilization to support non-traditional military 
operations.  The reserves will be used to sustain these operations abroad as well as provide a 
surge capacity to cover tasks at home.  As with all modern-day reserve components, support of 
the reserve mission and individual by the general public, especially the employing public, is 
crucial to its success.  In the case of Australia, the public has wholeheartedly supported this 
increased in the reserve’s mission. 
To support these future operations with well-trained and equipped personnel, the number 
of reserve brigades was reduced from six to three.  While this may not seem the correct action 
given the future role of the reserves, decreasing the number of reserve brigades was required to 
ensure fully trained and equipped personnel were readily available.  The equipment from the 
three decommissioned brigades was transferred to the three remaining brigades to ensure a full 
compliment of equipment.  Training was enhanced for the remaining brigades resulting in an 
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improved overall capability of the reserve components.  In the future, the reserves will provide 
critical back up and support of the active forces, both in operations home and abroad. 
In 2010, the army will remain a light force with limited heavy armor capability and 
resources. Additionally, the net assessment process revealed that Australia lacks an opposed 
landing amphibious capability.  The ADF does have the equipment to move troops 
amphibiously, but does not have the sustained firepower and protection to land troops on an 
opposed beach. 
c. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
For the RAAF, the vulnerability identified during the first epoch is the long-term 
replacement of F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft.  This replacement is a modernization issue.  The 
replacement aircraft to conduct the air combat and strike role in the 2012 to 2015 timeframe 
remains unknown. 
The RAAF force structure for 2010 is provided below. 
(1). 50 F/A-18 Hornet 
(a). 32 A, 18 B 
(2). 40 F/A-18 E/F Hornet 
(3). 35 F-111 
(a). 21 C, 14 G 
(4). 24 C-130J Hercules 
(5). 14 C-27J Spartan 
(6). 7 AEW&C Boeing 737-700 
(7). 8 Boeing 767 Tankers 
(8). EWSP upgrades for all air platforms 
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(9). 20 Global Hawk UAV 
To maintain a modern air combat fleet, the F/A-18 Hornet A/B models were gradually 
phased out as the follow-on air combat platform, F/A-18 Hornet E/F models, were purchased 
from the United States.  These aircraft, with the latest hardware and systems, will enable the air 
force to maintain pace with the regional forces while allowing for a smooth transition from one 
airframe to another.  This procurement will continue throughout the coming epochs to replace 
the older model Hornets. 
The replacement aircraft for the F-111 has proven to be more elusive.  Investigations and 
analysis of existing programs causes Australia to believe a suitable replacement platform for this 
aircraft that specifically meets the needs of Australia will not exist in the future.  Accordingly, 
Australia is planning to phase out the F-111 upon reaching its end of life between 2015 and 
2020.  To maintain the strike capability in the ADF, this role will be shifted to the Spruance 
DDGs and the follow-on air-defense ship.  Fulfilling the strike mission using large transport 
aircraft is not outside the realm of possibilities.   
The medium airlift capability was improved with the purchase of the C-27J Spartan 
aircraft.  These platforms replaced the aging Caribou transport aircraft.   
The procurement of the Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft 
continued during this epoch. An additional three aircraft were added to the fleet bringing the total 
number of AEW&C aircraft to seven.   
Additional tanker aircraft were added to the inventory bringing the total number of 
tankers tanker aircraft to eight.  The new tankers, a Boeing 767 design, have the capability to 
refuel not only the F/A-18 but also the F-111 and the AEW&C aircraft.  This enhanced 
capability extends the reach of all the tactical and strategic fixed-wing aircraft in the Australian 
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inventory. 
The electronic warfare self-protection program developed during the first epoch was 
extended to cover the new aircraft entering the fleet.  This indigenous system allows it to be 
adapted to fit many different airframes, including helicopters, and a wide range of threats.   
As part of a cooperative development effort with the United States, the Global Hawk 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was added to the inventory.  This UAV increases the 
surveillance and monitoring capability of the ADF in both the maritime approaches and potential 
land operating sites.  This UAV also provides a baseline of operating expertise for future 
unmanned vehicles, possibly even unmanned air combat vehicles.   
In 2010, the air force continues to be well positioned to engage regional combat aircraft 
and achieve success.  The replacement of the older F/A–18s with the latest E/F model will gives 
Australia a potent and formidable air combat force.  The continuing procurement of the E/F 
model will further this capability.  While the loss of the F-111 to retirement will remove specific 
strike aircraft from the inventory, Australia feels this is negated through the introduction of strike 
capability in the maritime forces. 
d. Information Capability 
In the area of information, the vulnerability identified during the first epoch was how to 
maintain pace with changing technology.  This issue is essentially a measure of where, when, 
and how to allocate resources to improve the information capability.  With the rapid changes in 
information technology taking place every 18 to 24 months, implementing changes on this time 
schedule would be cost prohibitive.  A reasonable development process and schedule must be 
adopted to initiate these changes. 
The force structure for 2010 is provided below. 
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(1). Operational Command 
(a). Single Joint Headquarters 
(b). Deployable HQ (two) 
(c). Communications (SATCOM, HF, Networks) 
(d). Command and Information Management Systems 
(2). Strategic Intelligence 
(3). Strategic Surveillance  
(4). Geospatial Information 
(5). Hydrographic Survey Force 
To ensure the ADF acts as a coherent unit, a single integrated command headquarters was 
developed.  This headquarters, along with the deployable headquarters, provides focused 
command and control functions for national, theater, and deployed operations.  To link these 
headquarters together, communication facilities and capabilities continue to be upgraded in order 
to harness the latest in information technology.   
Counter information warfare efforts continue in this epoch to further isolate and support 
Australia’s information systems against foreign forces and elements.  These actions are crucial to 
the success of the ADF in operations against the enemy.   
In 2010, the challenge will continue to be how to maintain pace with the changing 
information technology. 
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4. Scenarios For Static Net Assessment 
a. Scenario 1:  Conflict in the Philippine Sea  
This scenario is similar to the one discussed in epoch one.  The significant changes to the 
scenario are the location of the exercise (Philippine Sea vice the South China Sea) and the order 
of battle for the participants.   
The exercise, dubbed RIMPAC West, occurs in 2010 with a coalition force from the US, 
Japan, and Australia.  The presence of large number of foreign ships creates tension in the region 
and Chinese leaders produce their own show of force and stage their military forces in the 
Philippine Sea. There are no significant force changes for the US contingent. In the case of the 
Japanese contingent, there is an additional Kongo class DDG deployed. For the Australian force, 
the new force structure is as listed: 
(1). 2 x Spruance Class DDG 
(a). 6 x Mk-46 ASW torpedoes 
(b). 8 x Harpoon anti-ship missile 
(c). 8 x RIM-7H Sea Sparrow missile 
(d). 61 x Tomahawk missile 
(2). 2 x Anzac Class FF 
(a). 6 x Mk-54 ASW torpedoes 
(b). 8 x RIM-162A ASuW/AAW missile 
(3). 2 x Collins Class SS 
(a). 6 x Mk-48/Harpoon anti-ship missile  
The significant change in this structure from the first epoch is the addition of the 
Spruance DDG.  Instead of four frigates, Australia will only be sending two for this epoch. The 
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submarine force remains unchanged. 
The disposition of the coalition force in the theater of operations is as shown: 
 
Figure 6. Coalition Force Disposition in Philippines Sea 
The exercise scenario is one of anti-submarine warfare with the submarines in a line east 
of the surface vessels. The Japanese Kongo destroyers are located at the top of the picture nearest 
Japan. The US CVBG is in the middle of the picture with the two SSNs directly to the east. The 
Australian force is positioned to the south of the CVBG with the two Collins submarines directly 
north of the Australian surface vessels. The goal of the CVBG is to penetrate the submarine 
screen.    
In response to the coalition force build-up, the Chinese responded with the following 
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military assets: 
(1). 4 x Luda Class DDG 
(a). 6 x A244 ASW torpedoes 
(b). 16 x C-801 ASuW missiles 
(c). 8 x HQ-7 AAW missiles 
(2). 3 x Sovremenny Class DDG 
(a). 8 x TE-2 ASW/ASuW torpedoes 
(b). 48 x SA-N-12 Grizzly AAW missiles 
(c). 8 x SS-N-22 Sunburn ASuW missiles 
(3). 2 x Kilo Class SS 
(a). 12 x SA-N-8 Gremlin AAW missiles 
(b). 2 x TEST 96 ASW torpedoes 
(c). 4 x 56-65 KE ASuW torpedoes 
(4). 1 x Han Class SSN 
(a). 6 x SET-65E ASW torpedoes 
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The disposition of the Chinese forces is as shown: 
 
Figure 7. Chinese Force Disposition 
Each of the warfare capabilities of the coalition and Chinese forces were examined and 
evaluated against one another.   
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The anti-air capabilities of the coalition force are as shown: 
 
Figure 8. Anti-air weapons range of Coalition Force 
The circles show the range of the anti-air weapons. Equipped with the Aegis anti-air 
systems, the Japanese and US fleets offer far superior anti-air capabilities as compared to the 
Australians (lower portion).  
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The Chinese air defense is as shown: 
 
Figure 9. Air Defense Weapons Range of Chinese Force 
The Sovremenny destroyers provide decent air defense. The Luda DDG provides only 
meager air defense capabilities as seen by the weapon ranges. 
 4-73 
 In terms of anti-ship capabilities, the coalition force's umbrella is as shown: 
 
Figure 10. Anti-Ship Weapons Range of Coalition Force 
With Harpoon anti-ship missiles, all the coalition force's capabilities are similar. The 
Collins submarines have slightly shorter striking range than their US and Japanese counterparts.  
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The Chinese vessels have superior anti-ship capabilities in their vessels as shown: 
 
Figure 11. Anti-Ship Weapons Range of Chinese Force 
The long range is attributed to the new Sunburn missiles found on the latest Sovremenny 
destroyer.  
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Anti-submarine capabilities are as shown for the coalition force: 
 
Figure 12. Anti-Submarine Weapons Range of Coalition Force 
In terms of pure range comparisons, only the submarine force contains any credible anti-
submarine capabilities for the Australian force. Again, the Japanese and US vessels offer 
superior range as compared to the Australian vessels.  
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The Chinese anti-submarine capabilities are as shown: 
 
Figure 13. Anti-Submarine Weapons Ranges of Chinese Force 
The three Sovremenny destroyers possess the bulk of the Chinese anti-submarine 
capabilities. The Kilo and Han Class provide adequate anti-submarine weapons. 
b. Scenario 1: Numerical Comparison 
Numerically speaking, Australian force contribution is quite substantial as shown in the 
following table:  
Country Surface Vessels Submarines Aircraft 
US 4 2 100 
Japan 3 1 50 
Australia 4 2 0 
Total Coalition 11 5 150 
China 7 3 200 
Table 4. Numerical Comparison of Coalition Force and Chinese Force 
Australia’s surface and submarine contribution accounts for 30-40% of the entire 
coalition force. Nevertheless, in terms of added capabilities, the contribution is still not 
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significant enough to tip the balance. 
c. Scenario 1: Summary of Capabilities 
Overall, the Chinese possesses slightly better anti-ship capabilities with their latest 
Sunburn missiles. However, in terms of anti-air defense, the coalition force has a definite 
technological advantage with the Aegis air defense systems. The anti-submarine capabilities of 
the forces are about evenly matched. The Australian contribution of Spruance DDGs is much 
better than the previous epoch's contribution of only ANZAC surface vessels. Nevertheless, the 
Australian vessels are still inferior in terms of capabilities when compared to the US and 
Japanese forces.  
d. Scenario 2:  Invasion Of East Timor    
As in the first epoch, the second scenario is an invasion of East Timor by Australian 
forces to retake the province.  While similar in nature to the first epoch, the scenario in this 
epoch conducts a complete comparison of the weapons systems and capabilities of the individual 
platforms and their effectiveness against an opposing force.   
This scenario occurs under the veil of a military coup in Indonesia in 2010. The military 
regime that took over the government had to quell whatever civil unrest existed. They chose to 
divert attention from internal problems to a nationalist agenda of attempting to reunite the 
Indonesian archipelago by taking back East Timor from the Western infidels. Once the 
Indonesian troops crossed into East Timor, the UN peacekeeping force stationed there is quickly 
overrun. Although the Indonesian military authorities attempted to limit the amount of force 
used, many casualties occurred on the UN side. This resulted in an international outcry and 
Australia, being the major force in East Timor, decided to retaliate. 
In view of the economic turmoil Indonesia is expected to face in the 2000-2010 decade, 
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Australia projects that very limited military upgrades have occurred in the Indonesian Defense 
Force (TNI). The expected Indonesian force allocation in the theater of operations is as follows: 
(1). 7 x Ahmad Yani Class FF 
(a). 6 x Mk-46 ASW torpedoes 
(b). 4 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
(c). 8 x Sea Cat SAM missiles 
(2). 1 x Fatahillah Class FF 
(d). 6 x Mk-46 ASW torpedoes 
(e). 4 x Exocet ASuW missiles 
(3). 1 x Whiskey Class SS 
(a). 4 x 53-65 ASuW torpedoes 
(b). 2 x SET-65 ASW torpedoes 
(4). 1 x Type 206 SS 
(a). 8 x Seehecht ASW/ASuW torpedoes 
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The disposition of these forces is as shown: 
 
Figure 14. Indonesian Force Disposition 
In comparison, the ADF has grown in terms of size and capability due to economic 
growth and force expansion in line with our military doctrine. The Australian maritime assets in 
the theater of operations are as follows: 
(1). 4 x Spruance Class DDG 
(a). 6 x Mk-46 ASW torpedoes 
(b). 8 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
(c). 8 x RIM-7H Sea Sparrow missiles 
(d). 61 x Tomahawk missiles 
(2). 3 x Collins Class SS 
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(a). 6 x Mk-48/Harpoon weapons  
(3). 4 x Anzac Class FF 
(a). 6 x Mk-54 ASW torpedoes 
(b). 8 x RIM-162A ASuW/AAW missiles 
(4). 4 x Knox Class FF 
(a). 4 x Mk-46 ASW/ASuW torpedoes 
(b). 8 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
The disposition of the Australian forces is as shown: 
 
Figure 15. Australian Force Disposition 
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Comparing capabilities, the following two diagrams illustrate the anti-air umbrella of the 
Indonesian and Australian forces respectively: 
 
Figure 16. Anti-Air Weapons Range of Indonesian Force 
 
Figure 17. Anti-Air Weapons Range of Australian Force 
Figure (16) shows the limited air defense capabilities of the Indonesian force. The 
Fatahillah Class FF offers the best air defense range for the surface vessels. The two aircraft in 
the theater are the Skyhawk (to the west) and F-16. Only the F-16 has any significant anti-air 
(radar or weapon) range. Figure (17) shows that the Australian forces, in comparison, offer 
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superior anti-air capabilities. The Spruance DDG provides the best anti-air defense for surface 
vessels. The Australian military possesses the F/A-18 Hornet (A/B model) that are of equivalent 
capabilities (fourth generation fighter) as the F-16s of the Indonesian force but with upgraded 
missiles and protective measures. The Indonesian Skyhawks are inferior to the F/A-18s. 
The following two diagrams compare the anti-surface capabilities for Indonesian and 
Australian forces respectively: 
 
Figure 18. Anti-Ship Weapons Range of Indonesian Force 
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Figure 19. Anti-Ship Weapons Range of Australian Force 
Here, the comparison is more evenly matched. The Ahmad Yani Class ships in the 
Indonesian inventory provide very capable anti-ship capabilities in the form of Harpoon missiles. 
The Fatahillah Class only offers the Exocet and is less impressive in terms of range. The 
Australian vessels are similarly equipped, as they possess similar Harpoon missiles. The Knox 
Class frigates are outdated in this comparison. 
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The anti-submarine capabilities of the Indonesian and Australian forces are as illustrated 
in the following two diagrams respectively: 
 
Figure 20. Anti-Submarine Weapons Range for Indonesian Force 
 
Figure 21. Anti-Submarine Weapons Range for Australian Force 
From the figures, it is seen that the submarine vessels offer the major anti-submarine 
capabilities. The Collins SS provides the advanced Mk-48 ADCAP torpedo that is superior in 
range to the weapons of their Whiskey and Type 206 counterparts.  
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This capabilities comparison concludes that the ADF has superior maritime assets over 
her Indonesian counterparts. In a straight numerical comparison, the following table summarizes 
the size of the respective force in conflict for this scenario: 
Country Surface Vessels Submarines Aircraft Land Force 
Australia 12 3 80 1 Inf Div 
Indonesia 8 2 40 2 Inf Bde 
Table 5. Numerical Comparison of Australian vs Indonesian Forces 
The army component in the comparison is skewed in favor of the Indonesians. The 
projected Indonesian land forces amounts to some 10,000 personnel compared with 6,000 from 
the Australian Army. This hypothetical comparison is based on the assumption that the ADF can 
comfortably defeat the Indonesian maritime forces and land their assault troops (which is still 
non-amphibious capable) unopposed in East Timor.  
Although the ADF is shown to possess much more capable maritime assets and able to 
gain control of the seas, it is difficult to land troops without control of the port due to very 
limited amphibious assets. In all likelihood, there would be some opposition in landing 
Australian ground troops, and being non-amphibious, they are highly vulnerable in this process. 
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The Australian troops are much better trained and equipped than the Indonesian troops. 
The equipment enhancements include night vision capabilities, networked communications, and 
body protective gear. Overall, the Australian soldier would produce a higher kill capability than 
the Indonesian counterpart. Applying a Lanchester Square Law model7, we can derive the 
following attrition table: 
Australian Force Attrition 
Factor (Alpha) 




1 1 8000 
1.2 1 7537 
1.4 1 7043 
1.6 1 6512 
1.8 1 5933 
2 1 5292 
2.2 1 4561 
2.4 1 3688 
2.6 1 2530 
2.7 1 1673 
2.8 1 Parity Attained 
Table 6. Lanchester Square Law for Land Force Comparison 
The model is based on the following formula with Alpha value being the attrition factor 
for the Australian soldier and Beta being that of the Indonesian soldier (held constant for 
























If both sides have equivalent attrition factors, then the Australian forces would be 
annihilated at the end of the battle with 8,000 Indonesian troops still standing. However, if the 
Australian attrition factor improves to 2.8 times that of the Indonesian counterparts, the attrition 
                                                 
7 Taylor, James G. (1983), Lanchester Models of Warfare, Ketron Inc., Arlington, VA. 
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of both forces would be equivalent.  
This does not seem like an incredible capability improvement. With the enhanced 
capability developed between 2001 and 2010, the Australian infantry soldier has seen an 
improved capability in the following areas: 
(1). Body armor for increased survivability 
(2). Enhanced communications for better command and control capability 
(3). Improved small arms with higher lethality 
Although the improvements above can significantly raise the kill ratio for Australian 
troops, the need to attain a 1:4 numerical advantage for an offensive force would dictate a far 
higher kill factor than 2.8.  The Australian land force projection capability is severely 
handicapped in view of the numerical deficiencies. Besides increasing the numerical numbers, 
important force projection capabilities like amphibious assault vehicles are also painfully absent 
for the Australian force. In short, to accomplish an opposed landing of ground troops to East 
Timor would be very difficult. 
e. Scenario 2 Conclusion 
These comparisons point out certain Indonesian maritime weaknesses in terms of anti-air 
and anti-submarine capabilities. With the procurement of more capable Spruance DDGs and 
F/A-18E/F fighters, Australia is poised to take advantage of these weaknesses and 
comprehensively exploit them. The main shortfall comes from the lack of an amphibious force 
designed to effectively neutralize enemy's coastal defense. Even if the full complement of land 
forces could somehow be landed, the Indonesian troops still possess an overwhelming numerical 
advantage.  
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However, with the emphasis on better training and utilization of technology, it is believed 
that the Australian forces can provide sufficient kill factor to counter the Indonesian's numerical 
advantage. Compared to the last epoch, Australia's ability to win this conflict is significantly 
improved. 
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5. Technology Niches and R&D Report 
a. Introduction 
In this epoch, investment in space launching infrastructure in Cape York, Melville Island 
and Christmas Island was completed in 2008 with the commencement of commercial launching 
projects.  Concurrently, continued R&D into electro-magnetic assisted launch feasibility 
proceeds as planned.  R&D into remote sensing resulted in the ability to discover offshore oil 
reserves.  This development, coupled with the lower cost of deep sea drilling and the consistently 
high price for oil (US$30 a barrel), gave rise to the aggressive exportation of oil to Japan, China 
and other Asian countries. 
Australia also realized the breakthrough in photovoltics technology causing a shift in the 
internal energy requirement of Australia from less than 10% solar energy to 50% solar energy 
dependent.  This further allowed an increased export of energy resources to other countries.  
Breakthroughs in fluidized bed technology for coal burning also resulted in the increased and 
aggressive interest in coal as a source of energy.  This is an inherent advantage for Australia 
since they have the fourth largest coal reserve in the world and has been the largest coal exporter 
since the end of the 20th century.  High-density LNG transportation allows yet another alternate 
energy resource for export.   
In terms of future technology R&D in the area of energy storage and supplies, Australia 
concentrated on the following areas: quartz technology (silica gel) or miniature energy storage, 
fuel cells (methanol) and photovoltics. 
b. History of Australia’s Space Program since 20008 
                                                 
8 Australia in Orbit:  Space Policy and Program, written by Matthew James, Technology 
Advisor, Science, Technology, Environmental and Resource Group. 
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Space programs provide an important variety of services to Australia.  However, they 
require a degree of independent capability to best serve a population with limited technological 
resources.  The diffusion of knowledge and innovation across industry and society is an 
important aspect of space capability and is a potential catalyst for creating new and valuable 
spin-off technologies.  These spin off technologies include bioengineering, robotics, optics, 
materials, software, electronics, power cells, ground control systems, data processing and 
advanced manufacturing technologies.  Project management, space education and training follow 
as important support structures.  The development of commercially viable spacecraft launchers 
has been a growing activity since the beginning of the 21st century, so is the growth of 
collaborative international space ventures, both public and private.   
Australia has been primarily involved the three main applications of space technology 
since 2000, namely, remote sensing of Earth, communications systems, and scientific 
exploration.   Remote sensing studies the atmosphere, oceans, ice and land and how they interact.  
This helps Australians to better understand the changing environment over a diverse continent 
and the surrounding seas.  The work also assists the Australian space industry to gain the best 
possible position in international markets for satellite systems, ground support stations and data 
services.  Remote sensing satellites provide images of the Earth in optical, infrared, radar and 
other types of electromagnetic spectrum channels. However, the unique properties of the 
Australian landmass require special observing techniques and processing for success.  Such 
satellite data are used in a myriad of ways, from monitoring vegetation cycles, studying 
earthquake deformations, forecasting the weather and climate modeling, through to mineral 
prospecting, fishing stock mapping, urban planning and nature conservation. 
Satellite communications and multimedia linked with navigation systems enable global 
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services for mobile terminals and applications such as aircraft contact, shipping logistics, tele-
medicine, Internet use and tele-education. Broadcasting satellites provide direct regional 
television and radio and specialized local services. Telecommunications satellites offer flexible, 
high-capacity routes for voice and data services, providing backup in the event of undersea cable 
failure.  Defense satellite communications and monitoring provide the basis for intelligence, 
treaty observance and military deployments.  Given the rate of change in the information 
revolution, space systems will play a major future role for Australia and the rest of the world. 
Lastly, together with Earth-based astronomy, space science helps man  to better 
understand the solar system, our galaxy, the universe and ourselves.  Special scientific 
instruments on spacecraft collect and interpret data on radiation levels, forces, magnetism and 
the electromagnetic spectrum of emissions.  Bursts in the solar wind can disrupt power 
transmissions on Earth and also damage satellites.  Investigation of the role of gravity in the 
evolution of plants can also lead to understanding in the causes of demineralization of human 
bones and muscle atrophy.  The pharmaceutical industry has interest in the growing of high-
quality protein crystals in space, while the study of influenza viruses in low gravity helps our 
understanding of Earth based biological processes.  The study of space debris and the space 
environment and its hazards emerged as an area of interest since 2000.  
Since 2000, space activities have been important to Australia in both monetary and utility 
terms. In 2000, Australia spent over US$500 million annually on satellite systems, but mostly 
overseas and with no guarantee that local industry will derive benefit and involvement in such 
programs.  Australia purchased Intelsat and Inmarsat satellite system access, but our industry has 
not participated in the spacecraft or component assembly contracts.  Other nations provided 
Australia with meteorological and remote sensing imagery and navigational satellite services, but 
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with no certainties over continuation of service or the future costs.  Australia considered these 
arrangements unsatisfactory and embarked on the program to develop their own space launching 
infrastructure and support activities. 
As a result, several programs were initiated and came to fruition.  To demonstrate the 
development and launch of small satellite payload demonstration projects, the FedSat program 
was started.  The FedSat program focused on the design and construction of a multi-purpose 
spacecraft in time for the Centenary of Federation. The privately funded ARIES program 
capitalized on local expertise in imaging systems through development of a small commercial 
remote sensing satellite.  A number of private commercial satellite launch vehicle proponents 
view the Australian landmass as offering stable potential for cost-effective rocket operations.  All 
of these launching activities involve the use of derivative overseas rocket systems launched from 
sites as diverse as Woomera, Darwin, Gladstone, Cape York or Christmas Island.  The feasibility 
of these launch programs relied heavily on the world market for communications and imaging 
satellite systems, a market that international competitors are also keen to secure.  
Accordingly, Australia invested heavily in its space launching capability. The proximity 
of Australia to the equator provides for a higher initial launch velocity and the landmass offers a 
stable potential for cost effective rocket operation.  Additionally, Australia gained significant 
experience in feasibility studies, design, and management of space missions as a service 
provider.  The FedSat program enabled the initial development of service supplier capabilities 
and was a stepping stone towards more demanding and complex launch projects Australia’s 
share of the remote sensing industry market increased to about 5% and the and grew 
substantially to over US$500 million annually by the year 2005.   
In 2000, the market for the space launch industry was derived from two principle 
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requirements: development of a new generation of mobile communications satellites in low-
Earth orbit and, high capacity satellite systems operating in the higher geostationary Earth orbit.  
The explosion of information technology at the beginning of the century called for new mobile 
communications systems on small, low-Earth orbit satellites to provide global 
telecommunications by handheld telephones, no matter where users call from on Earth. Growth 
in national, direct-to-home TV broadcasting satellites includes new geostationary systems for 
several Asian nations.  As a matter of history, by the end of 1997, there were 95 civilian 
geostationary communications satellites providing services to the Asia Pacific region. Of these, 
some 24 satellites provided Australia with telecommunications or broadcasting type coverage. In 
2000, China and Russia remained the only current commercial launch service providers in the 
region with Japan and India not far behind.  Other parties proposed rocket flights from Australia.  
Since 2000, the various competing launcher proposals for Australia comprise the Kistler venture, 
the International Resource Corporation (IRC) Soyuz program, the Space Transportation Systems 
(STS) plan, or United Launch Systems (ULS) Unity rocket program.  Together, these proposals 
represent an investment of Aus$1.85 billion. Table (7) and Figure (22) show the location of the 




Launch Sites: IRC-Soyuz: on Cape York Queensland or Christmas Island, Kistler-
K1: Woomera SA, STS-Proton: Melville Island or Gunn Point NT, 
and ULS-Unity: off Gladstone Queensland. 
Adelaide: DSTO, Institute for Telecommunications Research-University of 
SA, British Aerospace Australia, Codan, Vipac, Woomera 
(Nurrungar), NT-Pine Gap. 
Brisbane: Space Centre Satellite Navigation-University of Queensland., 
S.C.Microwave Technology-Griffith University, Qld. Univ. of 
Technology, Geoimage, Mitec. 
Canberra:  NASA Canberra Deep Space Communications Complex, ADFA, 
ACRES, CSIRO-COSSA-CRC, ANU, Auspace, Electro-Optics, 
Departments. 
Melbourne: Bureau of Meteorology, KEL Aerospace, LaTrobe Univ., Sigtec. 
Sydney: Optus, Telstra, D-Space, Hawker de Havilland, Spot, TFS, 
Universities. 
Perth: Telstra, Optus, ERM, Universities, Geraldton Defence Satellite 
Station. 
Table 7. Australian Space Launch Site Proposals and Space Support Facilities. 
 
Figure 22. Australian Space Launch Site Proposals and Space Support Facilities. 
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c. History of Energy R&D since 20009 
Australia is a member of the OECD, the British Commonwealth, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  With an extremely low population density, Australia has ample natural 
resources for its own energy needs and, since 2000, is one of the few OECD countries that is a 
significant net energy exporter.  Australia's hydrocarbon consumption habits are similar to those 
of other large, industrialized countries such as the United States and Canada.  
(1). Oil 
Australia's proven oil reserves (not counting shale oil) increased from 1.8 billion barrels 
in January 1998 to 2.9 billion in January 1999.  Oil reserve estimates remain at 2.9 billion barrels 
as of January 2000.  Record levels of petroleum discoveries and exploration were central to the 
surge in oil reserves in 1998.  Production increased in 1999 to 621,000 barrels per day from 
619,000 barrels per day in 1998.  The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) projects further increases in oil production in 2000 and beyond.    
(2). Natural Gas 
Australia's proven natural gas reserves more than doubled from 19.4 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) in 1998 to 44.6 Tcf as of January 2000.  Natural gas production increased gradually 
throughout the 1990s, but larger increases are expected in the coming decades.  According to the 
Australian Gas Association, Australian natural gas consumption will double from its 1998 total 
of 1.1 Tcf by 2015.  As of 2000, demand increases did not keep pace with supply increases, 
leading to an over-supply.   
Australia is a growing LNG producer and exporter. The North West Shelf project, an 
                                                 
9 EIA:  Energy Information Adminstration. 
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equal joint venture between Woodside (operator), Chevron, Shell, BHP, BP Amoco, and Japan 
Australia LNG (which is a joint venture of Mitsubishi and Mitsui), is the only source of exports, 
mostly bound for Japan.  In November 1999, Australia LNG (ALNG), a marketing organization 
established in 1999 aimed at matching up Asian demand for LNG with Australian suppliers, 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Taiwanese gas company Tunex to supply that 
country with Australian LNG. The agreement increased Australian LNG exports by 50% and 
exports to Taiwan began in 2003.  Additionally, ALNG researched the possibility of supplying 
India with LNG to fire its Gopal power project in Orissa.  China developed as  another potential 
customer for Australian LNG, and the North West Shelf project  started supplying LNG to China 
in 2005 for its Guandong pilot project.  
(3). Coal 
Since the mid-1980s, Australia has been the world's largest coal exporter. Exports  more 
than doubled from 87 million short tons (Mmst) in 1984 to 184 Mmst in 1998. Over half of 
Australia's total coal production is exported, with around 70% bound for Japan and the rest to 
other Asian markets.  Australia has about 100 billion short tons (Bst) of recoverable reserves 
(fourth largest in the world), with about 52 Bst of black coal and 47 Bst of brown coal.  
Australian coals have good coking properties, low sulfur content (between 0.3% and 0.8%), and 
many are low in phosphorus. 
BHP is Australia's largest coal producer and exporter.  The company mines coking and 
thermal coal in Australia and abroad in the United States and Indonesia.  Japanese steel mills are 
a key consumer of Australian exports. ABARE predicted that Asian coal demand would increase 
in 2005, led by the recovery of the Japanese steel industry.  The weak Australian dollar made 
Australian exports especially attractive. The opening of China's markets further boosted 
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Australia's coal exports.  The removal of Chinese coal subsidies and tariffs made Australian coal 
very competitive in China.  
d. Economics Benefits of Technology and R&D in 2010 
With the established space launching industry, Australia expects the space launch and 
support industries to contribute 0.5% to the GDP during this epoch. Additionally, energy exports 
will contribute 1% to the GDP.  Of this total, oil production will be 1.5 million barrels per day 
(approximately 5% of the combined OPEC production) and be worth US$16 billion.  Coal 
production will be 300 Mmst at an estimated value of US$9 billion.  Finally, LNG production 
will be 9 Tcf at an estimated value of US$300 million.   
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6. Summary 
The period between 2005 and 2010 was marked by significant growth for the Australian 
Defense Force.  Carrying forward the doctrine developed in the Defense White Paper of 2000, 
changes in the structure of the ADF and the way it conducts warfare were well underway.  
Alliances with the United States, Japan and the ASEAN nations were still being cultivated.  The 
peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan was accomplished and the superpower continued to 
grow economically and militarily.  However, questions began to arise about the role of China as 
a peaceful neighbor.  Japan has begun to show signs of concern about the Chinese role in Korea 
and the South China Sea.   Closer to home, Indonesia remained in a cloud of political instability 
and tedious economic growth. 
Australia’s military tasks and objectives remained unchanged during this period.  The 
ADF’s primary focus was on adapting our forces to fit the mobile and efficient force called for 
by the government.   Increased attention was paid to maritime patrols and surveillance in the 
inner arc as these sea-lanes became busier than ever in this period.   
The economic expansion that began at the advent of the new millennium continued 
throughout this epoch.  The rate of GDP growth increased from 3.89% to 4.5% as a result of 
increased trade, business efficiencies and some new market development.  Globalization 
continued to be a dominant trend in economic and political affairs.  Continued monetary and 
fiscal policy measures were utilized to help produce this sustained growth.  The percentage 
allocation of government funds towards defense steadied out at a mean rate of 2.4%. 
The ADF entered the second epoch with a solid baseline and force structure inventory to 
support its military strategy.  With this solid baseline established, the Services focused on the 
expansion of their inventories.  Each of the services still faced several weaknesses and 
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vulnerabilities.  These issues formed the basis for the force planning effort during the second 
epoch. 
In the navy, action taken to resolve the lack of a robust amphibious and replenishment 
capability resulted in the development of a Multi-Role Auxiliary (MRA) ship.  This ship was 
designed to serve as replenishment, troop transport, aviation support, or a logistics ship.  The 
combination of these roles will result in significant life cycle cost savings.  High-speed 
catamarans were purchased to augment the light lift capability and provide a means of rapid 
transportation or troops to regional contingencies.  The catamarans and the MRAs will provide 
the foundation for future amphibious doctrine and operations.  The success of the ANZAC 
frigate, Collins submarine, and the Huon minesweeper construction programs provided 
justification to continue these programs into the second epoch.  The continuation of these 
programs maintains the industrial base and provides additional hulls to the inventory.  Finally, 
vertical-launch equipped Spruance destroyers were purchased from the United States to bolster 
the RAN firepower and strike capability. 
The size and composition of the regular army remained virtually unchanged during this 
epoch.  Additional aviation and air defense assets were provided to support the amphibious and 
troop transport roles.  The biggest change in the army structure was in the reserves.  The reserve 
components went through the most extensive change in their history resulting in a smaller, better 
trained, and better equipped force.  Integration of this reserve force with or in place of regular 
troops continues to shape their mission. 
The air force underwent a major transformation in its combat aircraft fleet.  To replace 
the older F/A-18 A/B Hornet aircraft, new E/F models were purchased from the United States.  
This aircraft replaced out older Hornets and will provide air combat capability well into the 
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coming decades.  To support all the aircraft, the continued procurement of tanker assets was 
continued.  Additional AEW&C aircraft and the Global Hawk UAV were purchased to round out 
the surveillance and monitoring capability. 
In the information arena, the continued development and refinement of command and 
control was realized with the integration of a single command headquarters.  The 
communications and support systems continue to evolve to support critical functions. 
During this epoch, Australia’s involvement in a RIMPAC type exercise was proven to be 
more capable with its offerings of destroyer class vessels instead of frigate size vessels as in the 
first epoch. Nevertheless, in spite of providing bigger maritime vessels, Australia’s force 
projection capability to the outer arc is still limited and there is no provision for providing air 
assets. Australia continues to rely on cooperation with regional powers like Japan and the US to 
ensure security in the outer arc. 
For operations within the inner arc, a comparison between an Indonesia and Australian 
force highlights certain Indonesian maritime weaknesses with respect to anti-air and anti-
submarine capabilities. With the procurement of more capable Spruance DDGs and F/A-18E/F 
Hornet fighters, Australia is poised to take advantage of these weaknesses and comprehensively 
exploit them. The main shortfall of the Australian force is the lack of an amphibious force 
designed to effectively neutralize enemy coastal defenses.  Even if the full complement of 
Australian land forces could somehow be landed, the Indonesian troops still possess an 
overwhelming numerical advantage.  
However, with the emphasis on better training and utilization of technology, it is believed 
that the Australian forces can provide sufficient kill factor to counter Indonesia's numerical 
advantage. When compared to the last epoch, Australia's ability to win in a conflict with 
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Indonesia is significantly improved. 
In this epoch, Australia’s R&D focused on the development of space launching capability 
and energy resources.  The initial investment in space launching infrastructure in Cape York, 
Melville Island and Christmas Island was completed in 2008 with the commencement of 
commercial launching projects. Concurrently, continued R&D into electro-magnetic assisted 
launch proceeded.  R&D into remote sensing resulted in the ability of imaging offshore oil 
reserves. This capability, coupled with the lower cost of deep sea drilling and the consistently 
high price of oil (US$30 a barrel) gave rise to aggressive export of oil to Japan, China and other 
Asian countries.  Australia also realized a breakthrough in photovoltics technology enabling a 
shift in the internal energy requirement of Australia from less than 10% solar energy to 50% 
solar energy. Breakthroughs in fluidized bed technology for coal burning results in aggressive 
interest in coal as a source of energy.  High-density LNG transportation allows yet another 
alternate energy resource for export.  Forward looking, Australia also continued R&D into 













This page intentionally left blank. 
 4-103 
C.   Epoch Three (2011-2015) 
1. Australian Security Environment in the Year 2015 
Since the last update to the Defense White Paper in 2010 there has not been substantial 
change to the basic goals, policies and structures of the Australian Defense Force.  It is prudent 
however to take stock of global events those have unfolded, weigh their effects on our future as a 
nation, and make the appropriate mid-course corrections to the ADF’s direction.   
a. Globalization  
Globalization was noted in both the Defense White Paper of 2000 and the addendum in 
2010 as the most dominant factor shaping the Pacific Rim.  The benefits of economic 
cooperation have lead to unprecedented economic growth in the region.  While this has provided 
many nations with the wealth necessary to establish themselves as viable members of the 
international community, it has also created a state of international interdependency that has set 
the stage for small disagreements on trade issues to potentially flare into conflict.  On the 
positive side, Australia sees less reason for nations to resort to conflict when most disputes are 
more advantageously resolved (for both nations) in regional or diplomatic forums.  In short, the 
nature of the global economy is both a positive and a negative from the standpoint of probability 
of war.   
Perhaps tipping the scale in the direction of insecurity was the growing rift in nations fuel 
requirements versus their available resources.  Many nations of the Asia Pacific Rim were 
limited in their ability to grow as the result of constrained energy resources.  This has actually 
been positive for Australia, as our natural resources have begun to meet world demand for 
energy.  This contributed to the growth in GDP and spurred foreign investment in Australia. 
b. Australian Strategic Interests and Objectives 
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The core priorities for Australia’s defense have not been altered significantly in this 
epoch.   The only major change is the recognition of the role that the global economy plays in 
national and international security.  Although Australia is somewhat immune from international 
economic disturbances due to an abundance of natural resources and isolated geographic 
location, significant interruption in trade would have dire consequences to our economy.  For this 
reason the Defense Ministry has decided to include the facilitation of free trade as a core interest.  
This interest could be affected by a maritime strategy designed to control key sea lines of 
communication (SLOC).   Examples of these key routes include the Straits of Malacca and the 
routes between Darwin, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.   
In 2000, the ADF leadership undertook difficult steps to secure a credible force into the 
21st century.  These changes were predicated by adjusting the allocations of defense dollars. 
Long-ranging external operational commitments were skewed in favor of a reapportionment of 
assets into the procurement of future capabilities.  This reduction in the current capabilities was 
undertaken with careful studies of the near-term impact and probability of war.   The essentially 
secure geographical nature of our country, combined with a lack of credible threat in the region, 
made this course of action best suited for our long-range goals.  The absence of a major conflict 
in the last decade has supported the wisdom of this decision. Several large leaps in capability 
were made in this epoch and will be in detail in the force structure section.  The period 2010 to 
2015 witnessed an ADF that had grown in size and subsequently required more investment in 
current operations.  The changes in these budgetary allotments can be seen in the following table. 
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 2000 Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 
Current Capabilities 57.930% 52.00% 51% 56% 
Future Capabilities 29.320% 33.72% 33% 28% 
Research 1.955% 2.95% 3% 4% 
Personal Services 7.463% 7.46% 10% 9% 
Resource 
Administration 3.332% 3.33% 3% 3% 
Table 8. Broad Functions 
c. Examining the Regional Powers 
(1). The United States 
The United States today has military capability and strategic influence that is still 
unparalleled. However, the past decade has shown a narrowing of the gap.  Australia believes 
that US strength supports a generally stable global environment.  The primacy of the US is built 
on the strength of its economy, the quality of its technology, the willingness of US governments 
and voters to accept the costs and burdens of global power, and the acknowledgement by most 
countries that US primacy serves their interests.  There has been some evidence that the US has 
begun to retreat inwards in recent years however.  A slowdown of the mighty economic machine 
from its growth rates of the 1990’s was expected by most.  The domestic reaction of its slowing 
of growth has been towards a more isolationist stance with respect to Asia.  There is evidence of 
a slowdown of naval deployments as well as the continued troop withdrawals from the unifying 
Korea.   
The Australian Government believes that US presence in the region will ultimately 
promote economic, social and political developments that align with our interests and values.   
To this end, an aggressive diplomatic campaign to the US government has been undertaken 
which features increased US basing privileges and calls for increased US/Australian joint and 
combined exercises.  The gradual withdrawal of US troops from Korea has left a noticeable gap 
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in military presence in the region.  The investment undertaken to develop the port of Darwin 
aims to provide not only a comfortable port for Australian vessels but also as a base for US and 
other fleets.  We believe that the combination of our forces will achieve our joint objectives in 
spite of the lessened US presence in the theater.  Other nations such as Japan have also shown an 
interest in joining the alliance.  Abroad, no country in the world will have the military or 
economic power to challenge the combined US, Australian and Japanese forces over the next 
few decades.  
(2). Indonesia 
Indonesia has been a key area of concern for Australia for the past several years.  Its 
relative proximity to our shores and the instability that has erupted has caused great concern in 
the world community.  In late 2014, Irian Jaya became the second major state to declare its 
independence from Indonesia in the past fifteen years.  Despite the implicit support for their 
sovereignty by the government of Indonesia, the breakaway caused problems almost 
immediately.  The Indonesian military establishment, which had already been openly critical of 
the civilian power struggle, took this opportunity to capitalize on nationalistic sentiment to 
initiate a coup d’etat.  After the takeover and firm establishment of power in Jakarta, a state of 
martial law was declared in Irian Jaya.  A mass influx of regular troops into the nation set off 
alarms in the international community.  Worried that the troops could spread to adjoining Papua 
New Guinea, the UN Security Council issued a resolution condemning the invasion of Irian Jaya 
and formally recognizing it as a nation.  Australia was appointed as lead nation of the UN task 
force that was sent to the area.  This force remains in place in 2015.   
One of the primary concerns with the invasion of an Indonesian state was the importance 
of the shipping lines around the island nation to the international economic infrastructure, 
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particularly oil shipments.  Maritime support from the United States in the form of an Aircraft 
Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and minesweeping helicopters was provided.  The Japanese Self-
Defense Force  (JSDF) has also become involved with the operation as their energy supply lines 
have been threatened.  Maintaining the SLOCs open through the Indonesian archipelago remains 
the top priority of the ADF as of this writing. 
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2. Economic Development and Defense Spending 
Australia’s economy has experienced sustained upward momentum for the last 15 years.  
In the period 2010 to 2015, the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.36%.  This growth rate 
resulted in the GDP increasing from US$523 billion to US$595 billion by the end of the decade.  
While the size of the economy continued to increase, the percentage allocated to defense 
remained relatively constant at 2.4% of GDP.  The growth rate of the economy and the 
percentage spent on national defense is represented in Figure (23).  This growth was driven by a 
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Figure 23. GDP Growth and % Spent on Defense  
Australia embarked on a comprehensive economic vision in the year 2000.  This 
integrated strategy contained three main thrusts.  The monetary and fiscal policy measures 
instituted were designed to facilitate sustainable growth with minimal inflation.  Immigration 
policy was changed so that key labor shortfalls could be eliminated.  Diplomatic measures 
sought to open trade boundaries in both the Pacific Rim and internationally.   The results of these 
policies were evident in the sustained growth despite some negative international trends. 
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The notable shift away from a liberal entitlement policy initiated in 2008 was designed to 
empower Australians to invest wisely for their retirement rather than purely relying on social 
security.  The ageing demography of Australia has been a concern for the government for many 
years.  In 1999, 42% of the federal budget was taken up by entitlements.  It was recognized early 
that as our population aged, this would become a heavy burden on other governmental sectors.  
Tax measures designed as incentives to personal investment for retirement were initiated despite 
many internal debates on the subject.   Additionally, wealthy Australians were given estate tax 
benefits for forgoing their entitlements.  These changes, coupled with the growth rate of the 
economy, resulted in the percentage of entitlement spending remaining relatively constant as the 
population aged. 
The fiscal policy measures initiated in 2008 and designed to spur investment in the 
capital markets had the effect of creating a boom in the stock markets and a subsequent “wealth 
effect”.  Additionally the increased GDP allowed federal investment in a variety of projects, 
which had the effect of increasing productivity across the board. 
Monetarily, the government took steps to mitigate the risk of inflation by adjusting short-
term interest rates in response to early indicators of inflation.   The money supply was also 
closely monitored to fine tune short-range growth forecasts.  Employment rates went up 
dramatically towards the end of the epoch as a result of opening markets and the capital influx.   
The services sector grew at the fastest rate followed closely by the energy, technology and 
research areas.   
As Australia’s economy expanded over the last 15 years and new market areas opened, 
the rate of unemployment drastically fell.  The demand for highly skilled workers was the fastest 
growing sector of the labor market while an increase in the service and other sectors was also 
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noted.  The government has reacted to this employment crunch by adjusting its immigration 
policy to reduce key shortages.  Measures to speed the approval of visas for skilled and 
technology workers were introduced.  As a result immigration from the nations of India, China, 
Indonesia and Malaysia increased.  These increases were initially rejected by some portions of 
the Australian populace but were embraced by most as a step towards increased productivity and 
a shift toward key industries.   These policies have begun to alleviate some of the rising labor 
costs that have begun to hamper growth and indicate signs of increasing inflation.  This pressure 
remains one of the Economic Ministry’s highest priorities.  In addition to the continued use of 
focused immigration policy, substantial investment in education and training will need to be 
made to fully take advantage of our diverse culture to maintain growth. 
Diplomatically, Australia continued to seek to build relationships with the key nations of 
the Pacific Rim and with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).   These alliances were 
based not only on mutually beneficial economic arrangements but also on the premise that 
countries that have mutual interests have less impetus to go to war.   Australia continued its close 
relationship with the United States during the last five years and intends to do so in the future.  
Key agreements with several US companies lead to the opening of plants in the manufacturing, 
energy, semi-conductors, fiber optics and aircraft sectors.  These mutually beneficial 
arrangements resulted in not only in a substantial boost to the economy but also to key transfer of 
knowledge in these areas and building of new industrial bases.   
Australia also opened up new channels with Japan.  After experiencing a prolonged 
recession in the 1990’s and the early 2000’s, the island nation undertook some painful but 
necessary reforms.  The protective measures that Japan had traditionally clung to were eased in 
order to realize the synergies of globalization.  Japan’s lack of internal energy resources led to 
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trade agreements with Australia to develop our abundant natural resources.   Significant capital 
inflows to the Australian energy industry by both foreign and domestic sources have begun to 
build a substantial infrastructure that, coupled with our technology leaps in this area, should 
position us to be an international leader in the energy market.  
Arrangements with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were 
successfully pursued during this epoch.  Australia’s status as a key consultant to the organization 
was elevated in 2006 when appointed chief of the ASEAN Regional Forum.  Australia used this 
position to shore up their position in key markets and national security arrangements. 
Australia continued to undertake efforts with China in the areas of trade and security in 
the past five years. While Chinese human rights problems have continued to plague the nation on 
the international front, it’s rapidly developing economy and increased status, as a regional power 
could not be ignored.  Australia’s diplomatic arrangements with China has thus far been 
perfunctory and designed primarily to keep channels open. 
Australia intends to continue work closely with the regional power entities into the next 
epoch to facilitate a stable international economy and mutually beneficial security arrangements.  
While competition among the nations of the Pacific Rim is inevitable, it does not have to be a 
source of conflict if the correct arrangements are stuck.   
The economic policies pursued in the period from 2010 to 2015 have resulted in assisting 
the economy in its growth.  The productivity benefits reaped from information technology were 
significant facilitators of this growth.  Evidence does however; exist that these benefits may be 
approaching the limits of their continued ability to provide huge gains.  Fortunately, the opening 
of new markets such as energy, space and other technologies has contributed greatly the overall 
growth of the economy during this epoch.  The expectation is for this trend to continue. 
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3. Australian Force Structure 2015 
The development of the force structure for the ADF during the third epoch was the result 
of a review of the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the 2010 force structure and issues 
stemming from the 2010 net assessment scenarios.  Additionally, the national and military 
strategies and the ability of the military forces to carry out these strategies were evaluated.   
a. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
For the RAN, the vulnerabilities identified during the second epoch are as follows: 
(1). Limited long range air defense capability 
(2). Improving replenishment capability 
(3). Improving amphibious lift capability 
In the first two epochs, the lack of long-range air defense in our surface ships was a 
recognized vulnerability.  The previous upgrades to the guided missile and ANZAC frigates 
served to mitigate this vulnerability, but did not eliminate it.  As a result, the RAN embarked on 
a plan to indigenously produce an air defense ship.  The result of this project is the introduction 
of the Howard-class Aegis destroyer (DDG).  This class of ships was produced in Australia with 
the assistance of the United States.  The United States provided the latest Aegis weapons system 
at a significant cost savings. The construction of larger hull forms, such as the Multi-Role 
Auxiliary (MRA), served as the model for the construction of the Howard DDG.  The process 
and lessons learned during this construction process greatly facilitated the construction of the 
new class of DDGs.  Due to the continuing construction of the MRA ships during this epoch, 
construction of this new DDG was limited to one hull in this epoch. 
The Navy force structure for 2015 is provided below. 
(1). Surface Combatants 
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(a). 6 FFG 
(b). 14 ANZAC FF 
(c). 4 Spruance DDG 
(d). 1 Aegis DDG 
(e). 8 High-speed catamarans 
(f). 30 Patrol Boats (PB) 
(g). 5 Multi-Role Auxiliary (MRA) 
(h). 2 Amphibious Lift (LPA) 
(i). 15 Landing Craft Medium (LCM) 
(j). 6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) 
(2). Mine Warfare 
(a). 2 Inshore MCM 
(b). 12 Huon-class MCM 
(c). 4 Dive teams 
(3). Submarine Force 
(a). 8 Collins SS 
(4). Navy Air 
(a). 16 Sea Hawk helicopters 
(b). 7 Sea King helicopters 
(c). 40 Super Sea Sprite helicopters 
(d). 19 P-3C Orion MPA 
(e). 10 LAMPS Mk-III helicopters 
The major addition to the Navy inventory was the Howard Aegis air-defense ship.  This 
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ship provides the RAN with the beginnings of a maritime air defense capability.  This capability 
will be instrumental in providing protection to RAN and coalition assets against modern air-
launched weaponry.  Construction of two, and possibly three, additional hulls will continue into 
the next epoch.  The RAN feels the continuation of this construction program is absolutely 
necessary in furthering the capability of the naval forces. 
Four additional high-speed catamarans were purchased during this epoch to augment the 
lift and amphibious capability.  Given the fact that Australia’s forces are small and primarily 
equipped with light weapons, the catamarans are an ideal vessel to rapidly reposition forces.  
These high-speed catamarans have proven their worth in operations throughout the region during 
this epoch. 
Three additional MRAs were added to the naval forces inventory.  One of these ships 
replaced the remaining oiler/replenishment ship.  The other two ships were constructed as 
replacements for the Landing Platform Auxiliaries (LPA).  The LPAs will reach their end of life 
and will be decommissioned in the fourth epoch.  The fifth MRA hull was constructed with a 
well deck configuration to allow the launching and recovery of amphibious craft.  Future MRA 
ships, if constructed, will also have well decks. The remainder of the naval force structure 
remains the same from the second epoch. 
A careful review of the worldwide situation by the Australian government during this 
epoch has revealed some potentialities with respect to the United States.  A combination of 
factors has the potential of forcing the United States to remove its troops and naval presence 
from its traditional Western Pacific bastions in Japan, Korea, and Okinawa.  If the United States 
desires to keep these forces in the Western Pacific, it must find new ports and facilities with 
sufficient size and infrastructure to base them.  As a result of this potentiality, Australia 
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developed the naval facilities in the northern port of Darwin into world-class facilities during this 
epoch.   
The Darwin naval base of 2010 was only capable of supporting minor surface combatants 
on two piers and hardstand dock facilities.  These facilities were unable to support large, deep 
draft warships and other major combatants.10  Accordingly, in an effort to provide an enticing 
basing alternative to the US government and military, a significant investment and construction 
process was started.  This construction expanded the existing naval facilities to support 
additional minor combatants and developed a new facility capable of handling major combatants.  
This facility, located near the East Arm Port commercial facility, was constructed to serve 
primarily as a naval base, but also had the attributes of a commercial facility should the United 
States decide not to base its fleet there.  Accordingly, the facility is capable of supporting ships 
up to 100,000 tons at a minimum draft of 46 feet.  Support of deeper draft ships is possible with 
dredging should the need arise.  Much like the East Arm Port, this facility has adequate fuel 
storage and logistics capability and is linked to the overland routes via the Northern Territory 
railway system.11  Since its completion in 2010, the East Arm Port commercial facility has 
proven to be a successful endeavor and the lessons learned during that construction and 
subsequent operations have been applied to the expansion of the naval facilities.  Australia feels 
this new naval facility will be of sufficient size and scope to support the United States military 
forces in the future as a new homeport for the US 7th fleet.  
As a result of the 2015 force structure, the RAN is still faced with a moderate air defense 
                                                 
10 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Commonwealth of Australia, Darwin 
Naval Base Redevelopment, September 2, 1999. 
11 The information on the East Arm Port commercial facility was derived from the following web 
site: http://www.nt.gov.au/dpa/eastarm/index.html (home page). 
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capability, but significant improvement was made with the introduction of the Howard Aegis 
DDG.  Construction of future hulls will continue the positive trend in this area.  The oldest Knox 
class FFGs and the two LPAs will be decommissioned during the next epoch.  The 
decommissioning of these vessels will decrease the total ship inventory, but the addition of 
modern warships such as the Spruance and Aegis DDGs and the MRAs offset these impending 
losses to the inventory.  The most pressing issue facing the navy force planners in the next epoch 
is the one of its anti-submarine warfare and surveillance aircraft.  The navy’s P-3 fleet is ageing 
and faces retirement or an airframe extension in the coming years.  Australia must decide on 
whether to replace the aircraft with a similar airframe and capability or to adjust its surveillance 
capability, possibly with unmanned aircraft. 
b. The Australian Army 
For the Australian Army, the vulnerabilities identified during the second epoch are as 
follows: 
(1). Remains a light fighting force with limited heavy equipment and armament 
(2). No amphibious capability 
In 2010, it was noted that Australia’s army is small, lightly equipped, and expected to 
remain so during the third epoch given the range of expected operations.  The technology 
advances and the superior weaponry purchased during the second epoch made up for the shortfall 
in actual troop numbers.  However, the net assessment against Indonesia highlighted the fact that 
while technically superior, the Australian Army did not possess the means to conduct an opposed 
amphibious landing. 
The Army force structure for 2015 is provided below. 
(1). Special Forces (2 regiments SAS/2 Commando regiments) 
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(2). Mechanized Force (1 brigade) 
(3). Light Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(4). Motorized Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(5). Marine Amphibious Force (2 brigades) (150 AAAVs) 
(6). Army Aviation Force 
(7). Ground-based Air Defense 
(8). Army Reserve Force 
(9). Army Aviation (helicopters) 
(a). 36 S-70A Black Hawk 
(b). 6 CH-47D Chinook 
(c). 24 Apache Armed Reconnaissance 
(d). 12 Troop Lift 
(e). 20 V-22 Osprey 
(10). Ground Based Air Defense 
(a). 12 RBS-70 laser guided units 
(b). 10 Patriot firing units 
(c). 12 Patriot PAC-3 firing units 
(11). Army Reserve 
(a). 11th Brigade (North & Central Queensland) 
(b). 4th Brigade (Victoria) 
(c). 8th Brigade (NSW) 
(12). Reserve Surveillance Units 
(a). Northwest Mobile Force (NORFORCE) 
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(b). Pilbara Regiment (WA) 
(c). Far North Queensland Regiment 
As a result of the major deficiency identified during the 2010 net assessment process, the 
army embarked on a campaign to develop an amphibious capability.  As a result, the major 
change to the ground capabilities of the army was the creation of two marine amphibious 
brigades.  Recognizing the magnitude of this effort, this capability and the formation of these 
units were conceived in close cooperation with the United States Marine Corps (USMC).  
Operational doctrine, normally developed over decades, was developed during this epoch as a 
direct result of this cooperation.  Extensive operations and training under the guidance of USMC 
observers established the operational basis for these units.  As part of the overall force, these 
units also have 150 Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAV) to support their 
operations.  The addition of an amphibious troop capability allows the Australian military to 
conduct an opposed beach landing of forces should the need arise.   
Army aviation saw the addition of the V-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft to the inventory to 
support the newly formed Marine brigades.  The technical and mechanical difficulties 
experienced in the Osprey program in the early part of this century were overcome and the 
aircraft has proven to be reliable and effective.  The V-22 and the MRAs provide the capability 
to deploy troops over land and over the sea as the opportunity dictates.  The V-22 also serves as a 
long-range replacement aircraft for the aging CH-46 helicopter fleet.  As the Marine amphibious 
capabilities expand, additional V-22 Ospreys will be added to the inventory in future epochs. 
Australia's reserve components remained unchanged from the last epoch.  The reserve 
forces have continued to train, supplement, and in some cases, deploy in place of regular troops. 
The army of 2015 looks much like that of 2010.  The army remains a light fighting force 
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with limited heavy equipment and armament.  The additional of dedicated marine amphibious 
brigades have bolstered the overall capabilities force, but it still remains a small and light 
fighting force.  Australia feels this is a satisfactory force structure given the range of future 
conflicts. 
c. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
For the RAAF, the vulnerabilities identified during the second epoch are as follows: 
(1). Air combat capability with respect to regional defense forces (modernization 
issue) 
(2). Loss of air strike capability with the retirement of the F-111 
During the second epoch, the RAAF began the combat aircraft procurement plan to 
address the modernization issues of the air combat fleet.  This plan resulted in the purchase of 
F/A-18 E/F Hornet aircraft to replace the older A/B models.  The RAAF also faced the 
retirement the F-111 and the loss of air strike capability. 
The RAAF force structure for 2015 is provided below. 
(1). 80 F/A-18 E/F Hornet 
(2). 35 F-111 
(a). 21 C, 14 G 
(3). 24 C-130J Hercules 
(4). 14 C-27J Spartan 
(5). 7 AEW&C Boeing 737-700 
(6). 8 Boeing 767 Tankers 
(7). EWSP upgrades for all air platforms 
(8). 50 Global Hawk UAV 
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During this epoch, the F/A-18 A/B models were completely phased out with the purchase 
of forty additional E/F models.  The procurement of this aircraft and its modern weaponry gives 
Australia one of the most capable air combat fleets in the region. 
Thirty additional Global Hawk Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) were added to the 
inventory to bolster the surveillance capability of the force. These unmanned aircraft may be the 
replacement for the P-3 surveillance capability in the future epochs. 
The RAAF in 2015 is ready for operations throughout the region. The biggest 
vulnerability faced in the near future is the retirement of the F-111 aircraft and the loss of long-
range air strike capability.  However, the maritime forces and their Tomahawk cruise missiles, 
along with the UAVs for surveillance, have replaced the strike capability of the F-111. 
d. Information Capability 
In the area of information, the vulnerability identified during the second epoch was the 
issue of how to maintain pace with changing information technology.  The issue is how 
incorporate emerging technology without having to make wholesale changes to the information 
capability of the nation with each new release or new technology.  Accordingly, Australia 
developed a carefully planned and executed modernization program to maintain pace with 
changing information technology while maintaining robust information systems. 
The Information Capability force structure for 2015 is provided below. 
(1). Operational Command 
(a). Single Joint Headquarters 
(b). Deployable HQ (two) 
(c). Communications (SATCOM, HF, Networks) 
(d). Command and Information Management Systems 
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(2). Strategic Intelligence 
(3). Strategic Surveillance  
(4). Geospatial Information 
(5). Hydrographic Survey Force 
In 2015, the information capability of the ADF remains largely unchanged.  The 
modernization program resulted in an information capability superior to other countries in the 
region.  Additionally, the functionality of the system enables the ADF to seamlessly integrate 
with other advanced nations during coalition operations. 
 In the future, Australia must still carefully weigh the cost versus benefit aspects of any 
prospective information technology.  Also, Australia faces the challenge of integrating multiple 





4. Scenarios for Static Net Assessment  
a. Scenario 1: Protection of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) 
The fastest trade route from the West to Asia is via the Straits of Malacca and the South 
China Sea (SCS) as shown in the following diagram.  With Chinese forces increasingly exerting 
military influence in the SCS, the result is the transformation of the area into a "bath tub", 
potentially restricting commercial vessel passage. In essence, this fast trade route comes under 
the direct threat of Chinese military dominance in the region. 
 
Figure 24. Main SLOC in Southeast Asia via Malacca Straits 
An alternative trade route could be devised as shown in the following diagram. This trade 
route bypasses the treacherous SCS, goes south of Indonesia, and uses Darwin as a transit center. 
By going northwards towards Japan, the route transits through the Indonesian archipelago, a 
potential hotspot in view of the instability of the regime after a recent military coup. 




restricted to piracy, or rogue troops firing shoulder launched weapons at merchant vessels.  
Threats by the conventional Indonesian military elements are unlikely, as this will constitute an 
act of war. 
 
Figure 25. Alternate SLOC via Darwin 
To ensure even better protection from potential harm, a third trade route could be 
established as shown in the following diagram. This trade route via Melbourne bypasses 
Indonesia and SCS completely. By transiting through Papua New Guinea, a friendly nation, 





Figure 26. Alternate SLOC via Melbourne 
There are severe tradeoffs in the usage of the safer routes. A typical supertanker cruising 
at about 10 knots can transit from Sumatra to Japan via Singapore in about 15 days. If Darwin is 
made the transit center, the transit time increases to 24 days. Should Melbourne be used as the 
transit center, a transit time of 38 days is required. If the Chinese military threat in SCS is 
imminent, forsaking the shortest trade route may be a necessary option. In this case, the use of 
Darwin as a transit center is feasible in terms of the relative risk involved and the time 
compromise. Australia can offer its service as the regional policeman by ensuring the security of 




There are a number of threats to the SLOCs in the form of: 
(1). Land based attacks by terrorists 
(2). Mine warfare 
(3). Surface vessels or piracy 
(4). Submarine attack 
(5). Air attack. 
Land-based attacks by terrorists may be conducted using low-tech infantry anti-tank 
weapons like the Carl Gustav 84mm recoilless rifles. Though effective against land-based 
targets, it may not be very effective against commercial shipping. Certainly, with ships transiting 
more than a nautical mile (NM) from shore, the effectiveness of such a weapon is greatly 
reduced. This threat, though highly likely, does not present itself as credible enough to consider 
here. 
The use of asymmetrical weapons like mines poses enormous problems for Australia’s 
maintenance of a security region. This weapon is cheap, easy to implement, and very difficult to 
neutralize. It is a problem the ADF needs to carefully examine for future solutions.  However, 
mines are non-discriminatory and would cause great damage to the Indonesian coastal trade if 
deployed. 
Piracy in the SCS region has long been rampant and with the influx of Chinese military 
vessels, pirates could well be forced out of their territory into the southern waters of the 
Philippines and Indonesia. This is a likely threat that will impact the security of the region 
tremendously.  
The submarine and air threats are deemed to be unlikely, as these actions will require the 




actions occur, it will almost certainly cause an international outcry and Indonesia will be faced 
with the consequences of starting a war. Nevertheless, with the military leaders now in control of 
the country, any scenario is plausible and Australia must be ready for these contingencies. 
b. Scenario 1: Provision of Maritime Action Group (MAG) 
Australia will introduce a MAG in the region to ensure that the possible threats to 
commercial shipping are addressed. The responsibilities of SLOC protection by Australia must 
be developed in close cooperation with regional powers like the US, Japan, and India. Australia 
can provide protection from southern Sumatra through to Darwin and the channels leading north 
of Darwin through western Irian Jaya. The responsibilities for protection of shipping west of 
Sumatra can be negotiated with the US naval assets in the Indian Ocean and the Indian Navy. For 
the waters north of Indonesia, the US and the Japanese Navy can play a role to ensure safe transit 
by commercial vessels. Australia should limit its responsibilities so as not to unduly overstretch 
its military assets. 
In providing a static net assessment on the abilities of the Australian MAG, the questions 
"How Much?", "How Far?", and "How Fast?" will be addressed. 
c. Scenario 1: How Much? 
The MAG composition will be as follows: 
(1). 1 x MRA supply ship 
(2). 4 x ANZAC FFGs 
(3). 4 x Huon MCM 
(4). 2 x Collins SS 
(5). 8 x UAV (Global Hawk) on patrol at any time 




(7). 2 x AEW&C aircraft on patrol 
(8). 1 x F/A-18 squadron on standby at Tindal AFB 
The MRA supply ship is capable of sustaining the surface vessels operating at the 
Indonesian channel north of Darwin (the ANZAC frigates and the Huon MCM). The ANZAC 
FFGs provide anti-surface capabilities with search and detection of such threats provided by the 
UAVs. The Collins submarines offer anti-submarine capabilities in conjunction with the P-3C 
Orion aircraft. The newly acquired F/A-18 E/F Hornet fighters provide anti-air capabilities 
should the need arise. The MAG will operate from Darwin Naval Base and Tindal Airbase.  
d. Scenario 1: How Far? 
The aim of the MAG is to provide a security zone up to 1,000 NM from the northern 
coastline of Australia. With provisioning from the MRA supply ship, the ANZAC FFGs, the 
Collins submarines, and the Huon MCM can comfortably cover the required distance. The 
Global Hawk UAV has an endurance of 46 hours flight time cruising at 300 knots. The entire 
security zone can be searched by a single UAV without refueling with detection by an Electro-
optic/infrared sensor up to 60 NM range and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) radar up to 100 
NM range. 
The range extension of air force fighters to 1,000 NM will require the use of air-to-air 
refueling, now available to the ADF. Without air-to-air refueling, the operating range of the F/A-
18E/F (with anti-air weapon configuration) extends to a maximum of 600 NM from the 
coastline.  
e. Scenario 1: How Fast? 
The search pattern of the UAVs is as shown in the following diagram. A single UAV can 




ensure that every single spot is searched once every five hours. This will allow the MAG to map 
every single surface vessel in the region and classify them accordingly, assuming they can 
discriminate the threats from the traffic. 
 




Should hostile activities be determined, the FFGs (deployed as shown in the following 
diagram) will be able to react within four hours along the SLOC. As the surface threats are 
defined to be mainly low level with piracy being the major culprit, the FFG should be adequate 
to counter this threat. Should military vessels from the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) be 
involved, then backup vessels like the Spruance or Howard DDGs will have to be summoned. 
This is unlikely, as Indonesia has no reason to provoke military confrontation with its neighbors. 
It has enough internal strife as it is.  
 




If mines are detected along any of the routes, the Huon MCMs will immediately be 
dispatched from Darwin to execute mine clearing operations. The operational speed of such 
vessels is at about five knots while clearing. To clear a mine-safe route from Darwin out from 
Indonesia (as shown in the following diagram) will take at least eight days for a single 
minesweeper. With the use of four Huon MCM vessels, the channel could perhaps be opened 
within perhaps two days. 
 




If the scenario of submarines threatening merchant vessels should materialize, then the 
activation of the Collins submarines to react along the SLOC can occur within 10 hours. More 
rapid reaction can be through air means with the P-3C Orion operating from Tindal to anywhere 
along the SLOC in less than four hours. The deployment of the Collins submarines are as shown 
in the following diagram. 
 
Figure 30. Deployment of Submarine along SLOC 
The F/A-18 Hornet fighters can react to enemy air threat within two hours if the threat is 
less than 600 NM from the coastline, and three hours if the threat is up to 1,000 NM. This delay 
is to meet the requirement for air-to-air refueling to extend the range of the fighters. The 
detection of hostile enemy air threats is provided by the Jindalee over-the-horizon radars (able to 
cover up to 1,000 NM from northern coastline) and the employment of the Airborne Early 
Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, which has a 350 NM air search radar. The endurance 




submarine and air threats are viewed as improbable, the setup of the MAG is designed to counter 
such threats should the improbable scenario occur. 
 
Figure 31. Aircraft Range with and without Air-to-Air Refueling 
f. Scenario 1: Summary for SLOC Protection Scenario 
The SLOC protection effort by the ADF through the provision of a Maritime Action 
Group demonstrated a force able to deal with the various possible threats faced by commercial 
shipping. The surface threats are adequately neutralized by the use of patrols along the SLOCs 
with detection provided by the UAV.  
The problem of mines is less adequately addressed as it is difficult and slow to ensure a 
mine safe SLOC. Even the optimistic reaction time of two days can be quite hampering to 
commercial shipping and this can be a potent weapon for the adversaries to exploit. 




government become desperate. Under such a scenario, the MAG is adequately setup to react 
competently. Nevertheless, the further problem of imminent war will have to be addressed, as the 
opponent will clearly have signaled a desire to elevate conflict. 
g. Scenario 2: Invasion of East Timor/Irian Jaya  
The declaration of independence of Irian Jaya will pose similar problems for this 
province as it did for its predecessor, East Timor. With the military coup, it is envisioned that the 
Indonesian military government may attempt to retake Irian Jaya by force. The task force used to 
counter such a threat will be similar to that used on the East Timor invasion scenario discussed in 
the second epoch.  
Geographically, East Timor and Irian Jaya are situated at about 500-600 NM from 
Darwin. Some of the main weaknesses of trying to retake East Timor are the numerical 
inferiority of the ADF task force and the severe lack of amphibious assets to mount an 
amphibious assault. The task force has demonstrated a capability to achieve maritime superiority 
over the Indonesian maritime force in the last epoch. In this epoch, with the economic and 
political problems faced by Indonesia, it is predicted that many of its modernization efforts for its 
military are stalled. Therefore, a weak maritime force struggling to operate old equipment in the 
region is presented in this scenario. Further, Indonesia is unlikely to possess the military might to 
simultaneously retake East Timor and Irian Jaya in view of the political turmoil the country is 
undergoing. Much of the military assets will be used to quell the civilian unrest. With this setting 
in mind, the answers to the questions "How Much?", "How Far?", and "How Fast?" are 
attempted. 
h. Scenario 2: How Much? 




The Australia task force will be comprised of the same force in the last epoch with an additional 
Howard DDG with the following configuration: 
(1). 1 x Howard Class DDG 
(a). 6 x Mk-50 ASW torpedoes 
(b). 8 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
(c). 90 x RIM-161A SM-3 missiles 
(d). 90 x Tomahawk missiles 
The Howard DDG is the equivalent of the US Arleigh Burke DDG. This ship offers 
superior anti-air capabilities with the SM-3 missiles having an extended range to up to 200 NM.  
To boost the shortcomings of the land forces, two Marine brigades were raised in this 
epoch to provide the capability to mount an amphibious assault. In addition, the numerical 
ground troop comparison is much more favorable with the Australian troop numbers actually 
surpassing their Indonesian counterparts.  The lift assets for the additional Marine brigades are as 
listed: 
(1). 2 x Marine Bdes for Amphibious Assault 
(a). 1st Bde - 2 x MRAs (30 AAAV, 1800 personnel), 2 MRA (rest of 
personnel and equipment) 
(b). 2nd Bde - 6 x Catamarans (personnel), 2 x LPAs (equipment) 
(2). 2 x Infantry Bdes for Follow-on Land Campaign 
(a). 1st Bde - 19 x C-130J (Light Bde) 
(b). 2nd Bde - 6 x Catamarans, 2 x LPAs  
i. Scenario 2: How Far? 




NM from Darwin to East Timor or Irian Jaya. Once the air and surface threats had been 
countered, the lift assets can project land forces to East Timor or Irian Jaya. 
k. Scenario 2: How Fast? 
The time for projection of land forces to deploy to retake Irian Jaya or East Timor by 
force is as listed: 
(1). 1st Marine brigade to land in 30 hours (based on amphibious ship speed of 15 kts) 
(2). 2nd Marine brigade in 40 hours 
(3). 1st Infantry brigade by second day 
(4). 2nd Infantry brigade by third day 
The stated time does not include mobilization period for reserves to cover the active 
personnel. The time assumes the task force is already concentrated at staging area (Darwin). 
l. Scenario 2: Summary for East Timor/Irian Jaya Invasion Scenario 
For this epoch, the ADF has developed a much more capable land force to support a 
forcible invasion of either East Timor or Irian Jaya. The benefits of this new land force include 
the amphibious fighting capabilities and more troops (12,000 Australian soldiers versus 10,000 
Indonesian troops). Further, the investment in a 21st Century Soldier concept in the first epoch 
had developed a soldier with enhanced body armor protection, integrated command and control 
systems for each soldier through enhanced communications devices, and better weapons that can 
provide anti-armor capabilities. In terms of soldier performance, the Australian soldier is 
definitely superior to their Indonesian counterpart. 
The maritime assets of the TNI have not been upgraded significantly in view of the 




turmoil in the country, the military is under tremendous pressure and their commitment in 
countering any possible East Timor or Irian Jaya invasion will be very limited in view of the 
other problems This therefore results in a maritime force which is not improved in capability 
compared to the one in the last epoch, so the Australian task force can easily gain an upper hand 
in the maritime arena. 
In conclusion, the ADF had geared itself over the last two epochs to become a much 
more capable and all-rounded force to deal with a potentially serious conflict they might face. 
The maritime assets control the sea and air channels, and the land forces are capable of launching 
amphibious assaults and possess a numerical advantage over their Indonesian counterparts. The 
ADF is now capable of handling this scenario as long as it doesn’t deteriorate into a drawn out 
campaign against a large fraction of the total Indonesian forces. 
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5. Technology Niches and R&D Report 
a. Introduction 
In epoch three, electro-magnetic assisted launch capability materialized resulting in 
significantly reduced per launch cost when coupled with power supplied by solar energy.  
Energy R&D breakthroughs in quartz technology allowed high-energy density storage in 
compact size enabling the powering of small commercial and military equipment.  Increased 
efficiency in fuel cells also led to their widespread use in automobiles and miniature airframes in 
the future. 
With electro-magnetic assisted launching capability achieved, quartz energy storage, and 
efficient fuel cells becoming available in 2015, the main R&D focus in the next epoch will be 
shifted to R&D into military application of these high-density energy storage and supplies 
(quartz technology).  
The investment into electro-magnetic assisted launching infrastructure totaled US$500 
million with industry and private collaboration. In addition, R&D into military applications of 
quartz technology undertaken by DSTO cost US$200 million.  
b. Economic Benefits 
(1). Space Launching Service 
The demand for space launching service will depend heavily on the elasticity of demand 
and the availability and quality of supply.  In 2000, the cost of launching various payloads into 
space varied between US$4000 and US$10000 per pound.  Based on the extrapolation of the 
technologies available for space launching, it is possible to reduce this cost to approximately 
US$500 by the year 2015.  This is an eight-fold decrease in cost, which could conservatively 
lead to an estimated increase in demand of at least ten fold.  In the area of supply, Australia 
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envisions that, based on the investment and the inherent advantages of our large landmass and 
geographical location, it will be able to capture at least 10% of the launch industry by 2015.   
(2). Energy Export 
The percentage of GDP generated by the energy export is based on a figure of 10% of the 
net profit margin generated by the five largest oil companies; this would generally take into 
account the expenses, investment as well as operating cost involved.  
(3). Impact on GDP 
The economic benefits derived in this epoch from the space industries amounted to an 
increase of 0.75% in GDP.  Energy export continues to contribute 1.5% in GDP during this 
epoch. With the export of oil constant with respect to the previous epoch at 1.5 million barrels 
per day, approximately 5% of OPEC combined oil production, total revenue is about US$16 
billion (@US$30 a barrel).  The amount of coal exported remained at 300 Mmst, which is worth 
US$9 billion (@ US$30 a ton).  Finally, LNG export remains at 90 Tcf, which provides US$3 
billion.  These figures are essentially constant with respect to the last epoch, but reflect a two-
fold increase in oil, LNG and coal export as compared to 1999.  This change is due substantially 
to the rapid technology breakthroughs and aggressive investment into energy infrastructure and 
exploration.    
In addition, new niche markets in miniature high-density energy storage devices and fuel 
cells contribute an average of 0.25% to the GDP during this epoch. 
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6. Summary 
Epoch three was punctuated by several major events that had repercussions for Australian 
security.   The trend of economic globalization, which has produced a vast array of international 
interdependencies, has continued.  While the increased wealth has generally raised the standard 
of living in Australia and elsewhere in the Pacific Rim, clouds on the international relations 
horizon have cast a pall.   The peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China in 2008 was not as 
calamitous as many had predicted.  It did however have significant effects on the world order.  
The increasingly forward deployment of Chinese forces in Taiwan and recent indications of a 
stepped up presence in the Philippines has many worried.  The relationship of China to both 
Korea and Japan will be key in ascertaining whether or not the trade routes that have produced 
such wealth for Australia will be threatened.   
Australia has continued to closely ally itself with the regional powers for this and other 
reasons.   The recent hollowing of the US military presence in the region, due to both domestic 
and diplomatic reasons, has shifted the Australian force planners away from dependence on this 
global power.  Since the US has lost bases in both Okinawa and Korea and the potential of their 
basing in the Philippines gone with new Chinese presence there, Australia has undertaken a 
program to fill this void with a base and port facility in Darwin.  This investment will hopefully 
further improve Australia’s ability to operate with allies and maintain free SLOCs in the region.   
The economic picture for Australia during this time period remained bright.  The full 
impact of the increased export of energy and iron ore was realized in this epoch.  Along with 
efficient economic policies, growing market efficiencies dominated the business terrain.  The 
GDP grew at a mean annual rate of 4.35%.  The program of sacrificing the military’s operating 
budget for future procurement was nearing its end.  The operational demands of new systems and 
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personnel demanded more resources.  The emerging friction of regional nations in this time 
period also required a slightly higher state of readiness. 
In this epoch, the ADF embarked on an ambitious expansion of military forces and 
capability.  Significant allocation of resources resulted in a vastly improved overall force 
structure. 
 In the navy, the continued lack of long-range air defense capability was addressed.  The 
first indigenously produced Aegis destroyer joined the fleet, providing the much needed 
maritime air defense and surveillance capability.  The Multi-Role Auxiliary (MRA) and high-
speed catamaran continue to contribute to a wide range of lift and sustainment operations. 
 In the army, lessons learned from the 2010 net assessment process revealed the offensive 
amphibious capability of the ADF to be lacking.  In close cooperation with the United States, the 
army developed and fielded two amphibious marine brigades in five short years during this 
epoch.  This massive undertaking could not have been done without the support and cooperation 
of the United States Marine Corps.  Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAV) and the 
next generation tilt rotor aircraft were procured as part of this development. 
The air force continued the retirement and replacement of its combat aircraft throughout 
the epoch and eventually replaced all the older aircraft.  Additional Global Hawk UAVs were 
added to the inventory to boost and compliment the surveillance capability. 
 Political developments throughout the Asia Pacific region highlighted the potential for 
United States troop withdrawals from the Korean Peninsula and Japan.  Recognizing this 
situation and the importance of the northern port of Darwin to the ADF and its allies prompted 
Australia to modernize and expand the military infrastructure in and around that city.  Expansion 
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of ship berthing and the addition of deep draft facilities made Darwin a very attractive alternative 
homeport and base for US ships and troops currently based in Japan.  
This epoch’s net assessment process focused on issues within the inner arc. The 
Indonesian SLOC protection effort by the ADF through the provision of a Maritime Action 
Group demonstrated a capable force in dealing with the various possible threats faced by 
commercial shipping. The surface threats are adequately neutralized by the use of patrols along 
the SLOCs with detection provided by the UAV. The problem of mines is less adequately 
addressed as it is difficult and slow to ensure a mine safe SLOC. Even a reaction time of two 
days can be quite hampering to commercial shipping.  This can be a potent weapon for the 
adversaries to exploit. 
Submarine and air threats, though unlikely, can certainly occur should the Indonesian 
government become desperate. Under such a scenario, the MAG is adequately setup to react 
competently. Nevertheless, the further problem of imminent war will have to be resolved, as the 
opponent will clearly have signaled a desire to escalate the conflict. 
For this epoch, the ADF has developed a much more capable land force to support an 
operation to liberate either East Timor or Irian Jaya. The benefits of this new land force include 
the amphibious fighting capabilities and more troops. Furthermore, the investment in a 21st 
Century Soldier concept in the first epoch developed a soldier with enhanced body armor 
protection, integrated command and control systems for individual soldiers through enhanced 
communications devices, and better weapons that can provide anti-armor capabilities. In terms of 
soldier performance, the Australian soldier during this epoch is definitely superior to their 
Indonesian counterpart. 
The maritime assets of the TNI have not been upgraded significantly in view of the 
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economic problems of the country. Operating with aging equipment and having to deal with 
turmoil in the country, the military is under tremendous pressure and their commitment in 
countering any possible East Timor or Irian Jaya invasion will be very limited in view of the 
other problems. This resulted in a maritime force that is not improved in capability compared to 
the one in the last epoch, so the Australian task force can easily gain an upper hand in the 
maritime arena. 
In the third epoch, Australia realized the electro-magnetic assisted launch capability 
resulting in a significantly reduced per launch cost with the power being supplied by solar 
energy.  This capability significantly offsets the initial investment into electro-magnetic assisted 
launching infrastructure.  Energy R&D breakthroughs in quartz technology enables high energy 
density storage in compact sizes, thus providing the ability to power small commercial and 
military equipment.  Increased efficiency in fuel cells also led to widespread use in automobiles 
and miniature airframes.  With these breakthroughs, Australia then embarked on R&D into 
military application of such high-density energy storage and supplies. 
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D. Epoch Four (2016-2020) 
1. Australian Security Environment in the Year 2020 
The dominant trend of globalization has been discussed at length by the ADF as a 
primary driver of the security environment.  This factor once again played an important role in 
defining the region in which we reside and trade in during the period 2015 to 2020.  Many Asia 
Pacific Rim nations were hampered by the supply of energy in this epoch.  This has actually been 
positive for Australia, as the enormous natural resources of our nation have been tapped to meet 
this demand for energy.  This has contributed to the overall gross domestic product and has 
spurred foreign investment in Australia.  The importance of regional trade routes has increased 
as a result of this new market.  Security of these routes is a crucial factor towards a stable 
regional and domestic economy. 
While the core priorities for Australia’s defense have again remained relatively static, the 
core mission of keeping the SLOCs open has been added as a primary objective.   The key routes 
of between Darwin, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea along are the highest priority for our 
maritime forces but we may be asked to participate in coalition or allied operations as far north 
as the South China Sea or the Sea of Japan.   
a. The Regional Powers 
(1). The United States 
During the third epoch Australia took steps to fill the void caused by a hollowing of the 
US presence in the Pacific Rim.  The reunification of Korea and the subsequent removal of 
American troops stationed there and in Okinawa left a power vacuum that Australia felt was not 
in our interest or that of our neighbors.  For this reason, we undertook a program to build a base 
facility in Darwin, which would be extremely attractive to the global power.   The substantial 
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investment required to develop this base was justified by the importance of our trade routes and 
the force multiplying effect of having allied troops based there.  We have continued to work 
closely with the United States to further joint interests and have developed an outstanding 
operational and diplomatic relationship with them.   Australia continues to believe that the US 
strength supports a generally stable global strategic environment.   
(2). Indonesia 
Indonesia has been a key area of concern for Australia for the past several years.  Its 
relative proximity to our shores and the continued instability has caused great concern for our 
nation because of the aforementioned importance of the surrounding SLOCs.  Recent overtures 
by China to the beleaguered Indonesian government have demonstrated that nation’s intention to 
extend their influence as a regional hegemon.  This remains a situation that is possibly 
destabilizing and threatening to regional trade. 
(3). Japan 
As previously mentioned Australia and Japan share mutual interest of stability in the Asia 
Pacific region.  Unencumbered transit of the sea is required by Japan to obtain the necessary raw 
materials to fuel their now powerful economy.  Supply chain disruption of fuel or iron ore 
provided by Australia would be disastrous to Japan’s ability to continue to grow.  Japan has 
recognized this situation and has assisted in Australia and the United States in patrolling key 
SLOCs with maritime and surveillance assets.  The diplomatic and operational arrangements our 
nations have allowed distribution of key intelligence and military tasking when called for in 
exercises and everyday surveillance. 
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Net assessments scenarios have shown that joint and combined forces can control the key 
choke points and communications routes.  Future cooperation with both Japan and the United 
States coupled with diplomatic arrangements with other nations and NGOs should contribute to 
maintaining continued security in the region. 
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2. Economic Development and Defense Spending 
Australia’s economy has experienced sustained upward momentum for the last two 
decades.  Between 2015 and 2020, the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 3.78%, slightly 
less than the previous five-year period.  The Australian Economic Ministry does not see this as a 
significant downward trend but rather a healthy shift to a sustainable rate of growth given the 
current international and domestic trade environment.   The overall increase in trade has resulted 
in the GDP rising from US$618 billion to US$690 billion by the end of the decade.  While the 
size of the economy continued to increase, the percentage allocated to defense has remained 
relatively constant at 2.4% of GDP.  The growth rate of the economy and the percentage spent on 
national defense is graphically represented in Figure (32).  This growth was driven by a variety 
of factors including both domestic policy and technology-based productivity gains and the 














% Spent on Defense GDP Growth 
 
Figure 32. GDP Growth and % Spent on Defense 
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3. Australian Force Structure 2020 
The development of the force structure for the Australian Defense Force during the fourth 
epoch was the result of a review of the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the 2015 force structure 
and issues stemming from the 2015 net assessment scenarios.  The national and military 
strategies and the ability of the military forces to carry out these strategies were evaluated as part 
of the process.  Finally, world events and the possible actions of China and the United States in 
the region were evaluated.  The combination of these three reviews yielded the following forces 
structure and rationale for that structure. 
a. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
For the RAN, the vulnerabilities identified during the third epoch are as follows: 
(1). Improving long range air defense capability 
(2). Impending loss of some FFGs 
(3). Impending loss of LPAs 
(4). Replacement aircraft for the P-3C or a replacement of its capability? 
During the last epoch, the issue of maritime long-range air defense capability was 
addressed through the introduction of the Howard-class Aegis DDG.  This ship, indigenously 
produced in Australia, provided a significant improvement to the maritime air defense capability.  
During this epoch, this construction program continued and three additional Aegis ships were 
delivered. 
The loss of some ships due to retirement is inevitable in any naval force.  The retirement 
of four of the older Knox-class FFGs was recognized and the capability of these ships was 
replaced with the more capable Spruance and Aegis DDGs in earlier epochs.  The Multi-Role 
Auxiliary (MRA) construction program offset the loss of the amphibious capability previously 
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provided by the Landing Platform Auxiliaries (LPA).   
During this epoch, the future of the ageing P-3C Orion aircraft fleet was addressed.  It 
was recognized that these aircraft provide two vital functions.  They provide a primary role of 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and the secondary role of maritime surveillance.  A careful 
review of the possible platforms to replace these capabilities was conducted.  It was found that 
the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was a viable platform to assume the 
maritime surveillance role, but did not satisfy the ASW role.  Since a suitable replacement 
aircraft or airframe was not available, it was decided that the P-3C aircraft would be refurbished 
to extend the airframes and improve the capabilities with the latest generation Synthetic Aperture 
Radars (SAR).  This refurbishment program resulted in service life extensions of the airframes. 
The Navy force structure for 2020 is provided below. 
(1). Surface Combatants 
(a). 2 FFG 
(b). 20 ANZAC FF 
(c). 4 Spruance DDG 
(d). 4 Aegis DDG 
(e). 11 High-speed catamarans 
(f). 30 Patrol Boats (PB) 
(g). 6 Multi-Role Auxiliary (MRA)  
(h). 15 Landing Craft Medium (LCM) 
(i). 6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) 
(2). Mine Warfare 
(a). 2 Inshore MCM 
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(b). 12 Huon MCM 
(c). 4 Dive Teams 
(3). Submarine Force 
(a). 8 Collins SS 
(4). Navy Air 
(a). 16 Sea Hawk helicopters 
(b). 7 Sea King helicopters 
(c). 40 Super Sea Sprite helicopters 
(d). 19 P-3C Orion (refurbished and improved) MPA 
(e). 10 LAMPS Mk-III helicopters 
The 2020 Navy force structure shows the decommissioning of four Knox class FFGs.    
These ships were retired at the end of their 35-year useful life. 
Given the strong possibility that the RAN will be called upon to maintain the SLOCs, the 
loss of the FFGs was viewed as a serious issue.  To offset the FFGs and to bolster maritime 
capability, the ANZAC shipbuilding project was restarted.  The modular construction technique 
of these ships and the maintenance of the knowledge base allowed this program to be rapidly 
redeveloped.  The project added six ships to the naval inventory.  Each of these ships was fitted 
with the latest in sensor and weapon technology.   
Three additional Howard-class Aegis DDGs were constructed.  The three new DDGs, 
along with the original ship of the class, were back fitted with a laser anti-ship missile system 
(IOC 2020).  This system provided a quantum leap in the missile defense capability of the RAN.  
The Australian advance in energy storage was the enabler of this technology. 
The last of the class of the MRAs was completed.  This ship, like the fifth hull, was 
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constructed and configured with a well deck to allow the loading and offloading of amphibious 
vehicles.   
The high-speed catamarans have proven to be viable and valuable additions to the RAN.  
Three additional ships were added to the inventory.  These ships will be instrumental in proving 
a rapid response capability to any area within the inner arc region.   
The remainder of the naval force structure remains the same from the third epoch. 
The expansion of the Darwin Naval Base (DNB) during the third epoch has proven to be 
a worthwhile investment.  The base provided support to RAN ships as well as ships from other 
nations in the region and the United States.  It has served as the hub for operations in the region 
and will provide key military infrastructure and support in the future.   
b. The Australian Army 
For the Australian Army, the vulnerability identified during the third epoch was that it 
remains a light fighting force with limited heavy equipment and armament.  This fact will remain 
true during the fourth epoch.  Given the range of excepted operations in the future, military 
planners determined light, highly mobile troops were more advantageous that heavy armored 
troops.  To counter for its lack of size, the army has embraced technology advances and superior 
weaponry to make their small force lethal and able to handle a variety of missions.   
The Army force structure for 2020 is provided below. 
(1). Special Forces (2 regiments SAS/2 Commando regiments) 
(2). Mechanized Force (1 brigade) 
(3). Light Infantry Force (3 brigades) 
(4). Motorized Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(5). Marine Amphibious Force (2 brigades) (150 AAAVs) 
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(6). Army Aviation Force 
(7). Ground-Based Air Defense 
(8). Army Reserve Force 
(9). Army Aviation (helicopters) 
(a). 36 S-70A Black Hawk 
(b). 6 CH-47D Chinook 
(c). 24 Apache Armed Reconnaissance 
(d). 12 Troop Lift 
(e). 60 V-22 Osprey 
(10). Air Defense 
(a). 12 RBS-70 laser guided units 
(b). 10 Patriot firing units 
(c). 12 Patriot PAC-3 firing units 
(d). High Energy Laser air defense system 
(11). Army Reserve 
(a). 11
th  Brigade (North & Central Queensland) 
(b). 4
th Brigade (Victoria) 
(c). 8
th  Brigade (NSW) 
(12). Reserve Surveillance Units 
(a). Northwest Mobile Force (NORFORCE) 
(b). Pilbara Regiment (WA) 
(c). Far North Queensland Regiment 
For 2020, the biggest change in the structure of the land forces was the addition of two 
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light infantry brigades.  The addition of these troops was a result of Australia’s operations in 
Irian Jaya during the third epoch.  These lightly equipped troops are suited to serve as long-term 
occupation forces in Irian Jaya.  The Irian Jaya operation proved that additional troop structure 
was warranted and required.   
To ensure all the land forces deployed with modern equipment in sufficient numbers, an 
ongoing modernization program was developed to purchase additional and replacement vehicles.  
Infantry Mobility Vehicle (IMV), Australian Light Armored Vehicle (ASLAV), and Armored 
Personnel Carriers (APC) were upgraded or purchased to support the land forces. 
In the aviation branch, forty additional V-22 Ospreys were purchased to support troop 
transport and amphibious operations.  These aircraft operate from the MRA ships as well as from 
land bases to perform its mission.  The aircraft has proven its worth in operations in the region. 
In the air defense capability, a High Energy Laser (HEL) air defense system was 
developed and deployed to support the defense of Darwin.  This system was developed and 
deployed as a cooperative effort with the United States and Israel.  This system supplements the 
air defense system surrounding Darwin and provides a quantum leap in the engagement 
capability.   
Australia's Army reserve components remained unchanged from the last epoch.  The 
reserve forces have continued to train, supplement, and in some cases, deploy in place of regular 
troops. 
c. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
For the RAAF, the vulnerability identified during the third epoch was the fact that the F-
111 would be retired during the fourth epoch.  This loss was recognized and planned for in 
earlier epochs.  The strike capability provided by the F-111 was replaced by the DDGs of the 
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maritime forces.  Sufficient lead-time was provided to the maritime forces to develop the 
capability and operational doctrine to support long-range strike.  While the loss of an air 
delivered strike capability may be an issue for some operations, the lack of a suitable 
replacement aircraft forced the ADF to shift this capability to another branch of the service.   
The RAAF force structure for 2020 is provided below. 
(1). 80 F/A-18 E/F Hornet 
(2). 24 C-130J Hercules 
(3). 14 C-27J Spartan 
(4). 7 AEW&C Boeing 737-700 
(5). 8 Boeing 767 Tankers 
(6). 50 Global Hawk UAV 
In 2020, the main thrust of the air force combat capability will rely on the F/A-18 E/F 
Hornet aircraft.  These aircraft have proven to be capable in a variety of missions. 
The Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), along with the Airborne Early 
Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft, provides a surveillance capability unmatched by regional 
forces.  The long loiter time of the UAVs and the command and control capability of the 
AEW&C aircraft simplify the surveillance of the SLOCs and the surrounding region.  These 
capabilities serve to reduce the vulnerabilities facing Australia in the region. 
d. Information Capability 
The Information Capability force structure for 2020 is provided below. 
(1). Operational Command 
(a). Single Joint Headquarters 
(b). Deployable HQ (two) 
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(c). Communications (SATCOM, HF, Networks) 
(d). Command and Information Management Systems 
(2). Strategic Intelligence 
(3). Strategic Surveillance 
(4). Geospatial Information 
(5). Hydrographic Survey Force 
In 2020, the information capabilities of the ADF remain largely unchanged from the last 
epoch.  A robust C4ISR system links varied forces throughout the region and provides for rapid 
dissemination of information and intelligence. 
 4-155 
4. Scenarios for Static Net Assessment 
a. Scenario 1:  Protection of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) 
During this epoch, the protection of SLOC becomes an even more important issue. 
China's rapid military expansion in the South China Sea (SCS) region affects regional stability 
and threatens the transit of merchant vessels along the traditional SLOCs. As in the last epoch, 
Australia will continue to provide a MAG to provide security for the SLOC. The MAG had been 
significantly strengthened for this epoch and the composition will be as follows: 
(1). 2 x MRA supply ship 
(2). 2 x Spruance DDG 
(3). 2 x Howard DDG 
(4). 4 x ANZAC FFGs 
(5). 4 x Huon MCM 
(6). 4 x Collins SS 
(7). 4 x UAV (Global Hawk) on patrol at any time 
(8). 2 x P-3C Orion on standby 
(9). 2 x AEW&C aircraft on patrol 
(10). 1 x F/A-18 Hornet squadron on standby 
The main enhancement is the provision of the Howard DDG, which would enhance the 
overall air-defense capabilities of the MAG.  
The MAG will be divided into four Task Groups (TG) to patrol each area. Each TG 
composition is as follows: 
(1). 1 x Howard/Spruance DDG 
(2). 1 x Collins SS 
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(3). 1 x ANZAC FFG 
(4). 1 x UAV (Global Hawk) 
b. Scenario 1:  Dynamic Net Assessment Analysis - Submarine Detection in SLOC 
In this epoch, Australia examined the effect of the submarine threat in more detail by 
applying a dynamic net assessment. Submarine threats are much more difficult to neutralize as 
detection is a crucial problem. Even with the substantial naval assets patrolling the respective 
patrol zones, it is difficult to detect a submarine. However, once a submarine is detected, it can 
be neutralized with much higher confidence with the available assets. The detection of 
submarines will primarily be through: 
(1). Visual/Radar: the submarine will have to snorkel or be traveling in very shallow 
water for detection to be possible via this means.  
(2). Passive Sonar: with the amount of traffic anticipated in the SLOC, detection by 
this method is very difficult. 
(3). Active Sonar: this method is dangerous to adopt for our forces as it immediately 
provides the locality of our forces to the enemy.  
The UAV surveillance capabilities rely on its SAR (up to 100 NM) and IR imaging (up to 
60 NM). Searching for submarines with the UAV yields low probability of success. The use of 
P3-Cs or the Sea Hawk helicopter may provide more effective submarine detection capability. 
However, the search area is huge and employment of such assets to scour the entire SLOC is 
inefficient and costly.  
Employment of active sonar techniques will threaten our surface vessels with attacks and 
is a risk that should only be considered when all other options fail. This method will serve to 
deter potential hostile submarines from having free reign in the area of operations although it 
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may also force them to attack our assets.  
The safest compromise is through the use of passive sonar techniques to detect 
submarines in the SLOC. The dynamic net assessment is attempted to provide information on the 
probability of detecting a hostile submarine based on the available assets.  
c. Scenario 1:  Potential Submarine Threats 
In a scenario with the Indonesian government favoring the Chinese military 
expansionism provides Indonesia opportunity to align with a powerful ally.  The issue of racial 
animosity has been discarded in favor of possible economic development and military ties. In 
this scenario, threats in the SLOCs may come from both Chinese and Indonesian sources. The 
Chinese advanced submarines are the Han SSNs and the Kilo Type 636 advanced diesel variants. 
The Indonesian government had modernized its submarine fleet to include five new Type-206A 
diesel submarines from Germany that are quieter and more capable than the previous Type-209 
submarines. The sonar emission signatures by these submarines are shown in the following table 
(Passive Sonar Cross Section (PSCS)): 
Submarine Type Front (dB) Side (dB) Rear (dB) 
Han Class SSN 100 101 102 
Kilo Class SS 85 86 87 
Type 206A SS 85 86 87 
Table 9. Passive Sonar Cross Section of Various Submarine Types12 
                                                 
12 Figures derived from Harpoon 2 computer simulation software. 
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The Han SSN measures over 100 meters in length and has a displacement in excess of 
4,000 tons.  Its PSCS figures are naturally significantly higher than the smaller diesel 
submarines. With its nuclear power plant, it also emits a stronger signature than the others. In 
other words, it is significantly easier to detect a nuclear submarine than the more advanced diesel 
submarines. Note that the Han SSN is China's first attempt at building an indigenous nuclear 
attack submarine and is not on a par with its western counterparts. If it does not improve in terms 
of passive sonar emission, then it is not a formidable foe. 
Annex E describes the details of calculations to derive the conditions for detection based 
on passive sonar techniques. A submarine route is plotted as shown in the following diagram to 
determine the effectiveness of the passive sonar detection capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 33. Simulated Submarine Route through SLOC 
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The figure shows a yellow arrow indicating a simulated path of a submarine transiting 
through the SLOC with the patrols in place. A simulation program called Harpoon 213 was used 
to determine the effective detection capability of the patrols in place to detect a submarine in the 
SLOC. A number of Monte Carlo style trials were put into the program whereby three slightly 
different paths were taken by each submarine through the SLOC. The patrols in place only use 
passive sonar for detection. Annex E describes in detail on how the Harpoon 2 software 
calculates when detection will take place based on a set of mathematical rules. The results of the 
trials are summarized in the following table: 
Trial 1 2 3 
Han 42 hrs 22 hrs 34 hrs 
Kilo 36 hrs Not Detected 42 hrs 
Type 206A 110 hrs Not Detected 62 hrs 
Table 10. Experimental Results for Submarine Detection 
The results show the possibility of detecting an SSN to be significantly higher than the 
diesel variants. Detection of diesel submarines is very difficult and there is a good chance that a 
diesel submarine may bypass detection completely. This will pose a significant threat for the 
MAG to ensure SLOC protection when a submarine threat is imminent. 
However, if the submarines are detected, then the activation of the Collins submarines to 
react along the SLOC can occur within six hours. Surface vessels can react within four hours and 
more rapid reaction can be by the P-3C Orions operating from Tindal to anywhere along the 
SLOC in less than four hours.  
d. Scenario 1:  Summary for SLOC Protection Scenario 
The SLOC protection by a Maritime Action Group is capable of dealing with the various 
                                                 
13 Harpoon 2 is a computer based war-gaming software used to simulate world conflicts with realistic algorithms to 
determine the results of maritime engagements. The software was originally created by Larry Bond and was 
published in 1995 by 360 Software (Inc).  
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possible threats faced by commercial shipping. The surface threats are adequately neutralized by 
the use of patrols along the SLOC with detection provided by the UAVs.  
The problem of mines is less adequately addressed, as it is difficult and slow to ensure a 
mine-safe SLOC. Even the optimistic reaction time of two days can be quite hampering to 
commercial shipping and this can be a potent weapon for the adversaries to exploit. 
Submarine and air threats, though unlikely, can certainly occur should the Indonesian 
government become desperate. Under such a scenario, the MAG is adequately setup to react 
competently against an air threat. The problem of defeating a submarine threat is mainly a 
detection problem. It is shown that detection of diesel submarines is extremely difficult.  It 
should be stressed that although the submarine and air threats are viewed as improbable, the 
setup of the MAG is designed to counter such threats should the improbable scenario occurs. 
e. Scenario 2:  Invasion of East Timor/Irian Jaya  
For this epoch, the Australian Defense Force has developed a much more capable land 
force to support a forcible invasion of either East Timor or Irian Jaya. Raising two additional 
infantry brigades to further beef up our land force capabilities does this. The benefits of this new 
land force include the amphibious fighting capabilities and 18,000 Australian soldiers (with total 
of six brigades) versus 10,000 Indonesian troops (still at one infantry division size). Further, the 
investment in a 21st Century Soldier concept in the first epoch had developed a soldier with 
enhanced body armor protection, integrated command and control systems for each soldier 
through enhanced communications devices, and better weapons that can provide anti-armor 
capabilities. In terms of soldier performance, the Australian soldier is definitely superior to their 
Indonesian counterpart. 
The maritime assets of the TNI have not been upgraded significantly in view of the 
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economic problems of the country. Operating with aging equipment and having to deal with 
turmoil in the country, the military is under tremendous pressure and their commitment in any 
possible East Timor or Irian Jaya invasion will be very limited in view of the other problems 
they are handling, particularly civilian unrest. This therefore results in an Indonesian maritime 
force that is no better in capability than the one in the last epoch. The Australian task force can 
easily gain an upper hand in the maritime arena. 
In conclusion, the ADF had geared itself over the twenty years to become a much more 
capable and all-rounded force to deal with a hostile Indonesia, a potentially serious conflict. The 
maritime assets control the sea and air channels and the land forces are capable of launching 
amphibious assaults while possessing a numerical advantage over their Indonesian counterparts. 




5. Technology Niches and R&D Report 
In this epoch Australia’s R&D is manifested in three key defense projects.  The first is a 
High-Energy Laser (HEL) missile defense system for Darwin.  The second is a technology 
concept study into Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) defense and the third is a ship-based anti-ship 
missile laser defense system. 
a. High Energy Laser 
The first key project is a High-Energy Laser (HEL) missile defense system.  The project, 
code named DPAMDS (Darwin Port Anti-Missile Defense System), is essentially a two-tier 
system consisting of an upgraded version of the HEL currently available in the US at White 
Sands.  Australia’s upgraded version of the HEL incorporates the new niche results in energy 
storage and supply technology.  The system will incorporate enhanced range (up to 20km) and 
has the capability of targeting and destroying cruise missiles.  The project will commence in 
2015 with the first tier IOC in 2020.  The ADF will invest US$1.5 billion into the system R&D, 
integration and deployment for Darwin. 
The second tier is a Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) missile defense system 
consisting of a upgraded version of the THEL current in operation with the Israel defense force, 
which was jointly develop with US.  The upgraded version of the THEL also incorporates the 
new niche results in energy storage and supply technology.  The system will incorporate 
enhanced range (up to 5 km), while at the same time being more compact and mobile.  This 
system serves as a quantum leap in air defense capability against short and intermediate range 
surface-to-surface missiles as well as aircraft.  The project will commence in 2015 with the first 
tier IOC in 2018.  The ADF will invest US$500 million into the system R&D, integration and 




The broad system specifications for DPAMDS are provided below. 
(1). Deuterium Fluoride Chemical Laser, Mega-Watt (MW) class 
(2). Wavelength:  3-5 microns (visible – near IR) 
(3). Aperture diameter:  1-2 m 
(4). Range:  THEL (up to 5 km), HEL (up to 20 km) 
(5). IR search and track Radar (8-12 microns, 3-5 microns) 
(6). Incorporate adaptive optics to reduce thermal blooming and diffraction 
The following figures depict various portions of Project DPAMDS. 
 





Figure 35. Above ground HEL Installation 
 
Figure 36. Schematic Diagram of the Engagement Scenario14 
                                                 




b. TBM Defense Concept Studies 
The second project is an R&D effort code named BOLDEAGLE.  This is a 
technology R&D project to acquire technology for developing a TBM defense system 
possibly using airborne lasers and ground Free Electron Lasers (FEL).  The investment in 
this R&D will cost US$50 million per year and will be conducted in collaboration with 
the US and Japan. 
c. Ship-Based Laser Anti-Ship Missile Defense System 
The third key project undertaken by the ADF is the installation of a diode-pumped solid-
state laser anti-ship missile defense system into the existing fleet of frigates and destroyers.  This 
project is code named STINGRAY.  It is based on the concept of “unlimited” and low cost per 
shot defense against anti-ship missiles.  The project commences in 2015 with IOC in 2020.  The 
initial investment into the R&D and prototypes cost US$500 million and the integration cost is 
US$100 million per ship.  Besides giving the Navy a quantum leap in anti-missile defense, the 
project introduces the ADF to fighting with directed energy weapons (DEW).  This would allow 
doctrine and tactics to be developed and operationalized for future operations using DEW. 
Project STINGRAY also includes the option of upgrading to an efficient MW-class FEL 
DEW system for satisfying shipboard self-defense requirements on future generations of Navy 
vessels.  The FEL technology is expected to become feasible in 2020 and beyond.  FEL is chosen 
because of the potential for high-power operation and the accessibility to all IR wavelengths. 
d. R&D 2020 and Beyond 
Australia is well posed to embark on a wide variety of future developments.  In the non-
defense realm, Australia sees the possibility of synthetic fuel being available in 2020 and 




sintering of advance smart materials.   
In the defense realm, the advancements in energy storage and supplies would likely make 
miniature UAVs and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) a reality in the near future.  Laser 
weapons would also be widely used giving rise to the concept of unmanned laser weapons 
platform operating from a “mother” platform.  Portable DEW could also materialize as part of 
the weapons arsenal for ground troops.  Finally, with the issue of energy supply worked out, it 
may be possible to artificially enhance the capability of our solders using biomechanical means. 
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6. Summary 
Several events of the past epoch and, indeed of the past several years, have produced an 
environment in which Australia has become aware of its new role of security in the Pacific Rim.  
The spreading influence of China and the continuing instability in the Indonesian archipelago 
during this period have presented an environment fraught with potential conflict.  Exports to 
Japan and other Asian nations have increasingly become a larger portion of the Australian GDP 
and a vital and safely diversified source of energy and iron ore stores for these nations.  For these 
reasons, the maintenance of the SLOCs in this region has become a paramount security concern.  
The continued bitterness from the troubled Indonesian government in Irian Jaya and recent 
indications that the PRC has made some inroads towards securing some influence and possible 
military presence in Indonesia have caused Australia, Japan and the United States to reexamine 
the strategy to maintain maritime security in the region.  The force structure developed in the 
previous epochs has allowed a certain degree of freedom given our expanded capability and 
reach.  Australia still must solicit the participation of allies to effectively patrol the vast areas.   
It was with this aim that the substantial investment in the port of Darwin was justified.  
The attractiveness of this port to the United States was predicated on the relatively short 
steaming time to key points in both the Pacific Rim and the Middle East.  Additional investment 
in this facility by the United States has helped reduce its vulnerabilities to hostile attack.  
Diplomatic arrangements with the Japan have secured porting rights for the Japanese Maritime 
Self Defense Force (JMSDF).  The military arrangements were solidified during this epoch by a 
series of exercises designed to demonstrate the interoperability of these combined allied forces 
and dissuade aggressive hegemonic aims of the PRC. 
Economically, the GDP growth continued although at a slightly lesser rate.  The slight 
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decrease in the rate of growth from the 4.5% during the previous epoch to the mean of 3.78% 
this epoch is not considered serious by the Economic Ministry but rather a damped version of the 
business cycle.  The effect of a slowdown in trade to our Asian partners is one factor that could 
potentially seriously wound both the Australian and global economy.  It is for this reason that 
Australia values the security of the trade routes so highly.   
The force structure developed during this epoch focused on expanding the existing force 
and introducing new, available, and cost effective technology innovations. 
The navy completed the procurement of the Howard Aegis DDG and added a total of 
three ships to the inventory.  The ANZAC frigate construction program was restarted in order to 
counter the decommissioning of older frigates.  Maritime surveillance was enhanced through the 
improvement and refurbishment of the P-3C Orion aircraft.  A suitable replacement aircraft 
capable of anti-submarine warfare was not available forcing the ADF to refurbish the older 
aircraft.  This program was effectively a service lift extension similar to that performed on ships. 
 In the army, the addition of two light infantry brigades and the replacement of infantry 
vehicles maintained this branch of the ADF ready to support operations throughout the region.  
To support these additional troops and the amphibious forces, the air force saw an increase in the 
number of next generation tactical tilt rotor aircraft.   
The largest technological advance in the ADF was the introduction of laser-based 
weapons systems.  These systems, based on the Howard Aegis DDG at the end of the epoch and 
in the air defense system surrounding Darwin, will provide anti-ship missile defense and air 
defense and provide a quantum leap in the missile defense capability in the ADF.  The land-
based system utilizes a high-energy laser capable of intercepting short and intermediate range 
surface-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft.   
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In this epoch, the ADF continues to provide a Maritime Action Group that has 
demonstrated to be a capable force in dealing with the various possible threats faced by 
commercial shipping. The surface threats are adequately neutralized by the use of patrols along 
the SLOCs with detection provided by the UAVs.  The availability of Howard destroyers meant 
a more capable MAG with better firepower and anti-air capabilities. 
Additionally, the ADF has developed a much more capable land force to support a forced 
invasion of either East Timor or Irian Jaya. The benefits of this new land force include the 
amphibious fighting capabilities and more troops.  Further, the investment in a 21st Century 
Soldier concept in the first epoch developed a soldier with enhanced body armor protection, 
integrated command and control systems for each soldier through enhanced communications 
devices, and better weapons with anti-armor capabilities. In terms of soldier performance, the 
Australian soldier is definitely superior to their Indonesian counterpart. 
In conclusion, the ADF had geared itself over the last two epochs to become a much 
more capable and rounded force to deal with a range of conflicts. The maritime assets control the 
sea and air channels, and the land forces are capable of launching amphibious assaults and 
possess a numerical advantage over their Indonesian counterparts. The ADF is now capable of 
handling a land force invasion of Indonesia. 
In the fourth epoch, Australia’s R&D effects was manifested in three key defense 
projects.  The first is a High Energy Laser (HEL) missile defense system code named DPAMDS 
(Darwin Port Anti-Missile Defense System).  It is a two-tier system consisting of the upgraded 
version of the HEL and Tactical HEL, currently available in the US and Israel respectively.  This 
upgraded version incorporates the new niche in energy storage and supplies technology and 
enhances the effective weapons range.  The second key military project is Project BOLDEAGLE 
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which is a technology R&D to acquire the capability of developing a TBM defense system 
possibly using airborne lasers and ground FELs.  The third key project undertaken by the ADF is 
the integration of a diode pumped solid-state laser anti-ship missile defense system on the 
existing fleet of frigates and destroyers.  This project is code named STINGRAY.  It is based on 
the concept of “unlimited” and low cost per shot defense against anti-ship missiles.  Besides 
giving the Navy a quantum leap in anti-ship missile defense, the project also serve to 




Note:  The background information for Team Australia is closely associated with and in many 
ways identical to the Australian Defense White Paper published in December of 2000. This 
annex provides background information and can be considered an abstract of the Defense White 
Paper.   
 
Security and The Role of Australia’s Armed Forces 
1. Force in International Affairs 
The Australian Government has considered the future role of force in international 
affairs, including the argument that changes in the structure of the international system will 
reduce the importance of force in relations between nations over the coming years.  The 
Government does not dismiss these views, and indeed it places a high priority on working with 
others, at both the regional and global level, to further minimize, and if possible to eliminate, the 
risk of war. The continuing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction makes those 
efforts all the more important.  
Resort to force will continue to be constrained by many aspects of the international 
system, and armed conflict between states will remain less common than in earlier centuries. But 
there remains a risk that circumstances may still arise in which these constraints are not effective. 
That risk is as high in the Asia Pacific region as it is elsewhere in the world. It is best minimized 
by realism about the challenges still to be faced in strengthening peace in our region, and a 
commitment to work with others, both locally and globally, to build a more robust and resilient 
international system.   This requires strategic policy, which is integrated with wider diplomatic 
and political policies. But it also means we need to maintain a capable defense force, that is 
trained and equipped to meet the demands of conventional wars between states. 
2. New Military Tasks 
a. Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW): 
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Australia has been engaged in only one conventional conflict since the Vietnam War, and 
that was the Gulf War of 1990-91.  But our armed forces have been busier over the last decade, 
and especially the past two years, than at any time since our involvement in Vietnam. This 
reflects a worldwide trend.  
It is clear that various forms of military operations other than conventional war are 
becoming more common. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a worldwide upsurge in 
intra-state conflicts. These disputes have accounted for the vast majority of armed conflicts, and 
have placed new demands on the armed forces of many countries, including humanitarian relief, 
evacuations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.  
The Australian Defense Force (ADF) is no exception. Over the past decade we have 
deployed the ADF to places as diverse as Namibia, Somalia, Western Sahara and Rwanda in 
Africa; the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East; and Cambodia, the Solomon Islands, Papua 
New Guinea (Bougainville), Indonesia (drought relief in Irian Jaya) and East Timor in our nearer 
region. In these places, the ADF has undertaken tasks from famine and disaster relief to 
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.  
The Australian Government believes that this is an important and lasting trend, with 
significant implications for the ADF.  Over the next 10 years the ADF will continue to undertake 
a range of operations other than conventional war, both in our own region and beyond.  
Preparing the ADF for such operations will therefore take a more prominent place in our defense 
planning than it has in the past.  
In many cases, especially at the lower end of the spectrum of intensity, we are likely to 
need to deploy quickly and operate effectively in dangerous and uncertain situations that may not 
necessarily require the use of force. Our tasks might include distribution of relief supplies, 
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evacuation of civilians, providing medical help or monitoring a peace agreement. 
But often these operations will be more demanding. The boundary between a benign 
situation and open conflict, either against local irregulars or more capable armed forces, can 
become blurred.  Participation in peacekeeping operations, particularly in the region, is strongly 
supported as being in Australia’s interest.   Even in benign situations, an evident capability to use 
force can help to keep things peaceful.   The capabilities we need for MOOTW have a lot in 
common with those we develop for conventional conflicts.  
b. Non-Military Security Issues  
Australia faces many security concerns other than those involving military force. These 
include the potential for non-military threats, such as cyber attack, organized crime and 
terrorism. They also include concerns over illegal immigration, the drug trade, illegal fishing, 
piracy and quarantine infringements.   
Many of these problems, such as illegal immigration, involve the challenge of effective 
surveillance, patrolling and policing of our maritime approaches.  Illegal incursions into our 
Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial waters, and onto our territory, constitute an on-going 
problem for Australia. Given the size of our maritime jurisdiction, this is a significant challenge.  
The Government has recently undertaken a major review of our coastal surveillance and 
enforcement activities, including the significant contribution made by Defense to these efforts. 
That review proposed important enhancements, including improved surveillance capacity 
through the acquisition of two extra aircraft, and the establishment of an integrated surveillance 
center. 
The ADF will continue to have a major part to play in these activities.  Our patrol boats, 
maritime surveillance aircraft and intelligence capabilities are fully engaged in the day to day 
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monitoring and policing of our maritime approaches, and their efforts are closely integrated with 
other agencies.  
New defense capabilities have the potential to make an even bigger contribution to 
coastal surveillance in the future. Within a few years, the ADF’s wide area surveillance system 
will provide the potential for continuous real-time coverage of our northern air and sea 
approaches.  This system will be fully integrated with other national coastal surveillance 
capabilities, to provide a comprehensive coverage of ships and aircraft approaching our shores.  
The ADF maintains counter terrorist capabilities for resolving situations that are beyond 
the capacity of our police forces.  It also helps in sea search and rescue and special circumstances 
such as the Olympics, firefighting, and in responding to other types of natural disaster.   
Defense will also be among the key contributors to the Government’s efforts to develop 
responses to cyber attack on Australia’s critical information infrastructure. 
3. Australia’s Strategic Environment 
This section outlines those aspects of Australia’s strategic environment that will influence 
the overall direction of our strategic policy and force development over the next 10 to 20 years.  
a. Our Strategic Setting: The Global Context  
At the global level, two interrelated trends are likely to shape our strategic environment - 
globalization and the primacy of the United States. The trends of globalization especially in 
trade, investment and communications are increasing cross-border integration and 
interdependence around the world. Overall, globalization looks likely to be good for security 
because it strengthens the stake that governments and people have in the smooth working of the 
international system. For example, increased international flows of trade, investment and 
technology increase the benefits of a stable international environment and the costs of any 
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disruption. However, the security benefits of globalization are limited by countervailing 
pressures.  First, nation-states remain the most important strategic actors. Moreover, nationalism 
in various forms remains potent and in some areas is an increasingly powerful motivator.  
Second, globalizing trends are being accompanied by growing regionalism, especially in the field 
of security, where the end of the Cold War has moved attention from the global power balance to 
a series of regional strategic systems -including the Asia Pacific. Third, the integrative trends of 
globalization themselves are not irreversible and could be especially vulnerable to a deteriorating 
security environment. 
(1). US Primacy 
The United States today has a preponderance of military capability and strategic 
influence that is unique in modern history. That preponderance supports a generally stable global 
strategic environment.  The primacy of the United States is built on the strength of its economy, 
the quality of its technology, the willingness of US governments and voters to accept the costs 
and burdens of global power, and the acknowledgement by most countries that US primacy 
serves their interests.  All these factors are likely to endure. 
However, we should be careful not to take US primacy for granted. Over the coming 
years the US global role may come under pressure, both from within the United States and from 
other countries.  Domestically, the United States will continue to accept the human and material 
costs of supporting causes that directly touch its vital interests.  But the willingness of the United 
States to bear the burden of its global role where its interests are less direct could be eroded, 
especially if it faces protracted commitments, heavy casualties or international criticism.  The 
incoming administration of President George W. Bush has expressed reluctance to continue 
involving US forces in remote areas where the risk is high and direct US interests are not 
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involved.  While the Bush Administration has voiced this concern the Australian government 
does not see a quantum change in US policy for the next decade. 
(2). The Role of the United Nations 
A third significant global trend has been the evolution of the United Nations. Over the 
past decade the UN has become more active and effective.  In doing so it has broadened the 
range of its activities and responsibilities in the security area.  The UN has grappled with internal 
problems and crises from the Balkans to Rwanda, Cambodia and East Timor, responding to a 
widespread recognition that international security can be affected by problems within, as well as 
between, states.  
b. Areas of Potential Conflict Outside the Asia Pacific  
Outside the Asia Pacific region, strategic problems continue to be most likely in the 
Middle East, and potentially also in Central Asia. Primarily NATO and European security 
structures will manage European security problems, such as those in the Balkans.  
Russia’s future place in the European and global strategic environment remains unclear.  
Security and stability in Europe will continue to depend on the maintenance of an effective 
working relationship between Russia, and the United States and its European allies.  
c. The Asia Pacific Region 
Although there remains a risk of localized or more widespread economic downturn from 
time to time, the Asia Pacific is set to be the most dynamic region in the world over the next few 
decades. Economic growth should help build stability. But it will also put strains on old 
relationships, raise new expectations and perhaps offer new temptations. The most critical issue 
for the security of the entire region is the nature of the relationships between the region’s major 
powers - China, Japan, India, Russia and the United States.  
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The United States is central to the Asia Pacific security system, and its role will be 
critical in maintaining security over the coming decades. It will be in Asia that the United States 
is likely to face the toughest issues in shaping its future strategic role - especially in its 
relationship with China.  
(1). China, Japan and the United States 
The trilateral relationship between China, Japan and the United States will define the East 
Asian strategic framework. Both Beijing and Washington clearly understand the importance of 
managing the US-China relationship effectively, and recognize the costs to both of them - and to 
the rest of the region - if they fail to do so. The benefits of a stable and cooperative relationship 
would be very great.  Important steps have been made, for example in progress towards China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization, but significant problems remain in the relationship - 
especially concerning the issue of Taiwan. It is therefore possible that US- China relations may 
be a significant source of tension in the region in coming years. This could be important to 
Australia’s security. 
(2). US-Japan 
The US-Japan relationship is the key pillar of US strategic engagement in Asia. The 
strength of US security commitments to Japan, and the scale of US military deployments in 
Northeast Asia, which the US-Japan relationship facilitates, is critical to maintaining strategic 
stability in the whole region. The US-Japan relationship has great depth and resilience, and both 
sides have worked effectively in recent years to overcome problems and adapt to new conditions.  
This has provided a welcome framework in which Japan has been able to take a larger role in 
regional and global security issues. Without the reassurance provided by the US relationship, 




(3). North and South Korea  
The Korean Peninsula is clearly a key dynamic factor in the Northeast Asian strategic 
balance. Reconciliation between North and South Korea, leading to a reduced level of military 
confrontation, seems closer now than for many years. But it could also introduce new pressures – 
including over the future of US forces in Korea - which would need careful management.    
(4). India  
India’s economic growth is enhancing its strategic potential and influence in the region.  
Its nuclear tests, and the development of an operational nuclear capability, have made the 
regional nuclear balance more complex. There are elements of strategic competition between 
China and India that have been amplified by the development of India’s nuclear capability. The 
future of this relationship will be important for the security of the whole region.  The risk of war 
- and even of nuclear war - between India and Pakistan remains significant and disturbing, but it 
is India’s growing role in the wider Asia Pacific strategic system that will have more influence 
on Australia’s security.   
(5). Conclusion 
In general, we believe the forces for peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region are 
strong, helped by the growth of regional multilateral structures and frameworks. The likelihood 
is that over the coming decades the region will enjoy growing economic integration and political 
cooperation. But there will inevitably be tensions between the major powers of Asia over the 
next 20 years, and their relationships may change significantly.  There is a small but still 
significant possibility of growing and sustained confrontation between the major powers in Asia, 
and even of outright conflict.  Australia’s interests could be deeply engaged in such a conflict, 
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especially if it involved the United States, or if it intruded into our nearer region.   
d. The Nearer Region and Immediate Neighborhood 
The security of the nearer regions: Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific - could be 
affected directly by instability and conflict among the region’s major powers, but countries of the 
nearer region also face major challenges of their own.  
Overall, Southeast Asia remains an area of great promise. Economic liberalization and 
institutional reform provide hope that in many countries a return to high growth rates can be 
sustained over the longer term.  Political and social evolution is strengthening the robustness, 
legitimacy and resilience of the political systems in many ways.  Despite the strains of economic 
crisis and rapid enlargement of its membership, ASEAN continues to provide a focus for the 
sense of shared interests and common goals, which has been so important to Southeast Asia over 
recent decades. There remain a number of security issues, such as conflicting claims in the South 
China Sea, which will need to be handled carefully if regional security is to be maintained.  
The countries of our immediate neighborhood - Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New 
Guinea, and the island states of the Southwest Pacific - face large economic and structural 
challenges.  
(1). Indonesia  
Indonesia is at a critical point in its history. The political evolution of the past few years 
has seen a vibrant democracy emerge with unexpected speed. The successful conduct of 
elections throughout the country in June 1999 and the subsequent installation of a democratic 
government have been an historic achievement for the people of Indonesia. Since May 1998, 
they have shown a determination to make democracy work. This is a major cause for optimism 
about Indonesia’s future. 
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But at the same time there are challenges ahead.  Three issues in particular stand out.  
The first is the challenge of political evolution through democratization and decentralization. The 
second is the need for wide-ranging economic reforms to put Indonesia back on the path to 
sustainable growth. The third is the resolution of religious, separatist and other challenges to the 
cohesion and stability of Indonesia.  
The Government believes the interests of Indonesia’s neighbors, and of the Indonesian 
people themselves, will best be served by a country that is united, stable and democratic; well-
governed and prosperous; cohesive and peaceful at home; and responsible and respected abroad.  
Indonesia’s size, its huge potential, and its traditional leadership role in Southeast Asia 
mean that adverse developments there could affect the security of the whole of our nearer region, 
and beyond.  
(2). East Timor 
East Timor’s emergence as an independent state is a new factor in our security 
environment. The willingness of Presidents Habibie and Wahid to facilitate East Timor’s 
transition, and to build a friendly bilateral relationship between Indonesia and East Timor, are 
most welcome. But important security issues remain, which may not be resolved by the time the 
UN- sponsored transition to independence is completed, probably by the end of 2001.  
There is a significant risk of continued security challenges from armed militias opposed 
to independence. It is clearly important that East Timor should be allowed to develop in peace, 
without the threat of intimidation or violence. East Timor, for its part, will need to establish a 
national approach to security and defense issues that serves it well while maintaining ties to 
Indonesia.  
(3). Papua New Guinea 
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Twenty-five years after independence from Australia, Papua New Guinea has maintained 
many of the key foundations of progress and prosperity, including an active democracy, free 
press, and an independent judiciary. Abundant mineral resources exemplify its economic 
potential.  
But as its leaders have acknowledged, Papua New Guinea has made little progress over 
the past few years, and in important respects has slipped backwards. Economic growth has been 
slow, corruption has afflicted public life, social progress in areas like education and health has 
been limited, and law and order have deteriorated Papua New Guinea faces a long and uncertain 
road to prosperity and stability. Without progress, important problems that have significance for 
security and stability beyond its borders will remain. One is the threat to national cohesion from 
secession movements, most particularly in Bougainville. Another is the potential for threats to 
the security of legitimate government from unlawful and violent challenge, including by 
elements within the armed forces.  
(4). Southwest Pacific  
Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea share the Southwest Pacific with 13 
other countries. They are all unique, with different histories; cultures, institutions, opportunities 
and problems, but they have some things in common. These include the inherent problems of 
national development for small and isolated nations, many with an unsustainable relationship 
between population and resources.  
Current problems in Fiji and the Solomon Islands provide important evidence of deep-
seated ethnic and political problems that pose threats to law and order, legitimate government 
and even national cohesion in some Pacific Island states. In others, such as the small states of 
Polynesia and Micronesia, economic and environmental challenges are uppermost. 
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Pacific Island leaders are well aware of many of these problems, and are taking steps to 
different degrees to address them. Even so, the stability, cohesion and viability of some of these 
nations will remain under significant pressure over the years ahead.  Their resulting vulnerability 
will continue to be a strategic concern for Australia.   
e. An Attack on Australia? 
Australia today is a secure country, thanks to our geography, good relations with 
neighbors, a region where the prospect of inter-state conflict is low, our strong armed forces and 
a close alliance with the United States. Of these positive factors, only the benefits of our strategic 
geography are immutable. But the chances of an attack on Australia remain low.  
A full-scale invasion of Australia, aimed at the seizure of our country and the erasure or 
subjugation of our national polity, is the least likely military contingency Australia might face. 
No country has either the intent or the ability to undertake such a massive task.  The region’s 
major powers could conceivably develop the capabilities to undertake an invasion of the 
continent, but none has anything like that level of capability at present, and it would take many 
years of major effort to develop. They would also need to establish major bases near Australia.  
Such developments are not credible unless there were to be major changes in the region’s 
security environment. 
A major attack on Australia, aimed at seizing and holding Australian territory, or 
inflicting major damage on our population, infrastructure or economy, remains only a remote 
possibility. The capabilities to undertake such an attack would be easier to develop than those 
needed for an invasion, especially if bases near Australia were accessible. Such developments 
are highly unlikely in our current strategic environment, but our defense planning cannot 
altogether dismiss the possibility that they might occur. Some countries have weapons of mass 
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destruction - nuclear, biological or chemical weapons - which, delivered by long-range ballistic 
missiles, could reach Australia.  But it is very unlikely that any of those countries would see 
advantage in attacking Australia with such weapons, not least because of our alliance with the 
United States.  
Minor attacks on Australia, aimed at harassing or embarrassing Australia, or putting 
pressure on our policies, would be possible with the sorts of capabilities already in service or 
being developed by many regional countries. But such attacks would become credible only if 
there were a major dispute.  Even then, it would be most unlikely that another government would 
miscalculate so badly as to think that it would gain by attempts at military intimidation.  
Nonetheless such miscalculations do occur, and sometimes with little warning.  
f. The Development of Military Capabilities 
A key factor in the evolution of Australia’s strategic environment is the development of 
military capabilities in the Asia Pacific region.  This will influence the relationships between 
countries in the region, and it is a critical issue to consider in deciding Australia’s own future 
capability needs. In recent times the Asia Pacific has seen the fastest growth of military 
capabilities in the world.  There have been four factors underpinning that trend: economic 
growth, development of managerial and technical skills, changing strategic perceptions and 
priorities, and access to technology. All of these factors seem likely to endure over the next two 
decades. Our defense planning therefore needs to take account of the likelihood that capabilities 
in our region will continue to show substantial and sustained growth, in ways which are 
important to Australia’s military situation.  
(1). Air Combat Capabilities 
Over the last 10 to 15 years, a number of regional defense forces have begun to develop 
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sophisticated air combat capabilities. They have introduced new-generation fighters with the 
weapons and sensor systems for Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air combat which means the 
ability to detect and attack hostile aircraft from ranges of up to 60 or 70 nautical miles.  Until the 
mid-1990s Australia was one of very few countries in the Asia Pacific region with BVR 
capabilities.  By 2005, at least nine regional countries, apart from the United States and 
Australia, will have developed these capabilities, and some will have built up substantial 
numbers of BVR-capable fighter aircraft. 
In a parallel development, some countries in the region are expected to acquire Airborne 
Early Warning and Control aircraft over the coming decade. These aircraft provide a key edge in 
air combat, because they allow earlier detection of hostile forces, and more effective deployment 
of aircraft in action. They also contribute critically to maritime and strike operations.  By 2010, 
some seven regional countries apart from the United States and Australia are expected to have 
acquired various levels of AEW&C capability.  
These developments, and others including air-to-air refueling and relatively low-cost 
stealth modifications to make aircraft harder to detect, will mean that across the region – 
including in some countries of Southeast Asia - there are likely to be significant increases in air-
combat capability over the coming decade.   
(2). Naval Forces 
Naval forces will become more capable over the coming decade as a result of a number 
of well- established trends. One is the proliferation of high-capability anti-ship missiles such as 
Harpoon, Exocet and their Russian equivalents. Over the past decade a number of regional 
countries have acquired more sophisticated anti-ship missiles with longer range, better guidance, 
and more capable systems which allow several missiles to be launched at a target simultaneously 
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from different directions. The number of types of platform that can launch these missiles has also 
increased to include not just ships but submarines and several types of aircraft. These trends are 
expected to continue over the current decade. For example we expect to see supersonic anti-ship 
missiles enter service in several countries in the region over that time and the capability to target 
ships at long range will improve. Regional navies will also deploy improved defenses against 
these missiles on their ships.  
Another key development is the expansion of submarine capability in the region. Over 
the coming decade it is likely that the capabilities of submarines being operated by regional 
navies will improve significantly, and a number of navies will acquire submarines for the first 
time.  Anti-submarine warfare capabilities will also improve.  
(3). Strike Forces 
Strike capabilities will continue to improve in the region with the introduction of more 
capable aircraft, supported by air-to-air refueling in some cases, and able to be fitted with longer 
range standoff weapons.  Ships and submarines in some regional navies may also develop 
enhanced strike capabilities, as they acquire long-range cruise missiles and shorter-range 
standoff weapons. Such weapons will carry increasingly sophisticated guidance systems and 
warheads and will be supported by more advanced reconnaissance and targeting systems.  
Defenses against strike will also improve, with better air combat capabilities and more advanced 
surface-to-air missiles coming into service in the region.   
(4). Land Forces 
 Most land forces throughout the region already have a numerical advantage in troop 
numbers over Australia’s.  Land forces in the region will become more sophisticated, with the 
wider introduction of important technologies such as night-vision equipment, unmanned aerial 
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vehicles for reconnaissance and improved communications. Firepower and mobility will be 
enhanced in many armies by acquisition of more helicopters, including reconnaissance and fire-
support helicopters, and new types of armored vehicles. 
At lower levels of technology, but still very important in many types of operation, we 
expect to see a wide range of non-state actors, including criminals and insurgents, continuing to 
gain access to modern, sophisticated weaponry. The proliferation of light guided weapons such 
as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles is likely to continue.  
(5). Information Capabilities 
Developments in information technology, and the rapid changes they are bringing to the 
nature of warfare, will enhance the operational effectiveness of armed forces over the coming 
decade. Intelligence, surveillance, communications, command and control capabilities, and the 
whole spectrum of information warfare, will expand significantly.  To take one example, the 
increased availability of high-quality satellite imagery from commercial sources will 
significantly enhance the information-gathering capabilities of many countries.   
(6). Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Weapons of mass destruction remain a concern for the region’s strategic stability. 
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their chief means of delivery - ballistic missiles - 
are all aspects of weapons of mass destruction over which we need to remain vigilant. The trend 
towards proliferation of weapons of mass destruction globally will require our continued focus. 
4. Australia’s Strategic Interests and Objectives 
This section explains the Government’s decisions about Australia’s broad strategic 
policy: our strategic interests, objectives and priorities.  At its most basic, Australia’s strategic 
policy aims to prevent or defeat any armed attack on Australia. This is the bedrock of our 
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security, and the most fundamental responsibility of government. But there is more we can do to 
prevent attack on our territory than building armed forces, and our armed forces need to be able 
to do more than simply defend our coastline. We are a major trading nation, with our prosperity 
dependent on our engagement with other countries.  Australia therefore cannot be secure in an 
insecure region, and as a middle-size power, there is much we can and should do to help to keep 
our region secure, and support global stability.  
a. Ensure the Defense of Australia and its Direct Approaches 
Australia’s most important long-term strategic objective is to be able to defend our 
territory from direct military attack. We therefore have an overriding strategic interest in being 
able to protect our direct maritime approaches from intrusion by hostile forces. As previously 
mentioned a major attack on Australia is not at all likely in current circumstances, and even 
minor attacks are improbable. But we do not rule out the possibility, especially over the longer 
term that circumstances might change in ways that make the prospect less unlikely. Even if the 
risk of an attack on Australia were low, the consequences would be so serious that it must be 
addressed.   
b. Foster the Security of our Immediate Neighborhood  
Our second strategic objective is to help foster the stability, integrity and cohesion of our 
immediate neighborhood, which we share with Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
East Timor and the island countries of the Southwest Pacific. We would be concerned about 
major internal challenges that threatened the stability and cohesion of any of these countries. We 
would also be concerned about any threat of outside aggression against them.  
c. Promote Stability and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
Our third strategic objective is to work with others in Southeast Asia to preserve the 
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stability and cooperation that has been such a notable achievement over the past few decades.  
Our key strategic interest is to maintain a resilient regional community that can cooperate to 
prevent the intrusion of potentially hostile external powers and resolve peacefully any problems 
that may arise between countries in the region. We would be concerned about any major external 
threat to the territorial integrity of the nations in our nearer region, especially in maritime 
Southeast Asia, whether that threat came from outside or inside the region. 
d. Support Strategic Stability in the Wider Asia Pacific Region 
Our fourth strategic objective is to contribute in appropriate ways to maintaining strategic 
stability in the Asia Pacific region as a whole, and to help contribute to building a stronger sense 
of shared strategic interests.  
e. Support Global Security 
Our fifth strategic objective is to contribute to the efforts of the international community, 
especially the United Nations, to uphold global security.  The success of the UN in nurturing the 
principle that armed aggression by one state against another is not to be tolerated, and the 
effectiveness of its mechanisms in marshalling an international response when the principle is 
flouted, are important Australian strategic interests.  That is a key reason why Australia is among 
the UN’s most consistent supporters. We will also continue to support the United States in the 
major role it plays in maintaining and strengthening the global security order.   
Australia also has an interest in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). This interest has both a humanitarian and a strategic aspect. We have an interest in 
helping to ensure that no one should experience the horrors of nuclear, chemical or biological 
warfare.  We have a strategic interest in minimizing the risk that WMD might one day be used or 
threatened against us.  Effective global non-proliferation regimes are vital to limit the spread of 
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WMD in our region.  
5. Australia’s Military Strategy 
This section explains the tasks of Australia’s armed forces in achieving our strategic 
objectives, the consequent priorities for the development of our military capabilities and the 
principles underpinning our force-development priorities.   
The strategic tasks for the ADF are: 
a. Defending Australia 
The Government has reaffirmed that the primary priority for the ADF is to maintain the 
capability to defend Australian territory from any credible attack, without relying on help from 
the combat forces of any other country. The Government’s approach to this task is shaped by the 
following principles.  
(1). Self-Reliance 
 Our armed forces need to be able to defend Australia without relying on the combat 
forces of other countries.  This principle of self-reliance reflects, fundamentally, our sense of 
ourselves as a nation. As we made clear in discussing our US alliance in Chapter Five, the 
Government’s commitment to self-reliance does not reflect any lack of confidence in our allies. 
Nor does it suggest that we would not seek and expect help from our allies and friends in time of 
need.  It simply means that we should not rely on others having either the capacity or the 
willingness to defend our country especially if we have not taken the effort to provide effectively 
for our own defense  
(2). A Maritime Strategy 
The key to defending Australia is to control the air and sea approaches to our continent, 
so as to deny them to hostile ships and aircraft, and provide maximum freedom of action for our 
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forces. The nature of our air and sea approaches is such that a maritime strategy includes a vital 
and central role for land forces. They would assist air and naval forces to control those 
approaches and would be needed to defeat any incursions onto our territory.  A key role would 
be to ensure the security of the bases from which our air and naval forces operate.  
(3). Proactive Operations  
Australia’s strategic posture is defensive in the most fundamental sense. We would not 
initiate the threat or the use of force, and our objectives in conflict would be to terminate hostile 
operations against us as quickly as possible, and to our maximum benefit, at minimum cost in 
lives and resources. But that does not mean that our approach would be operationally defensive. 
On the contrary, if attacked, Australia would take a highly proactive approach in order to secure 
a rapid and favorable end to hostilities. 
b. Contributing to the Security of our Immediate Neighborhood  
Our second priority is to have defense forces able to make a major contribution to the 
security of our immediate neighborhood. This might require the ADF to contribute to regional 
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations and help evacuate Australians and others from 
regional trouble spots. We should be prepared to be the largest force contributor to such 
operations.  Our planning needs to acknowledge that we could be called upon to undertake 
several operations simultaneously, as we are at present in East Timor, Bougainville and the 
Solomon Islands. 
(1). Resisting Aggression 
In the highly unlikely event of unprovoked armed aggression against any of our 
immediate neighbors, Australia would want to be in a position, if asked and if we concluded that 
the scale of our interests and the seriousness of the situation warranted such action, to help our 
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neighbors defend themselves.  The capability to provide such help would be drawn from the 
forces we have developed for the defense of Australia. Fortunately the strategic geography of our 
neighborhood makes this feasible. The air and naval capabilities we develop for the defense of 
Australia would be able to make a valuable contribution to this task. Land forces would also be 
important for securing bases, and providing specific contributions such as Special Forces. 
(2). Lower-Level Operations 
Lower-level operations, such as evacuations, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations 
of different sorts are the most likely types of operation that we might need to undertake in our 
immediate neighborhood. The ADF needs to be prepared and equipped to undertake such 
operations should it be required to do so. 
In general, the capabilities we develop in the ADF for defending Australia provide forces 
appropriate for these tasks. However, the experiences of East Timor, Bougainville, Cambodia 
and elsewhere have taught us important lessons about the use of forces in lower level 
contingencies. Such operations have specific characteristics that place strong demands on some 
elements of the ADF, especially our land forces, logistics capacity and deployment capabilities. 
Key lessons and their implications for our forces include the following: 
Training: Operations like INTERFET and the Peace Monitoring Group on Bougainville 
place great demands on the training and personal quality of the men and women of the ADF. In 
sometimes dangerous and ambiguous situations, they can be called upon to make snap judgments 
that can have life and death significance. Often junior personnel who must have the training, 
preparation and personal qualities to handle such situations must make these decisions on the 
spot.  
Readiness and Sustainment: The need for operations such as evacuations or support for a 
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legitimate government can arise quickly and with little warning, so forces need to be available at 
high levels of readiness. Some kinds of operations, such as peacekeeping, can require a relatively 
large presence on the ground, so significant numbers of personnel might need to be deployed and 
supported. And while some types of operations such as evacuations are over quickly, others, 
such as some types of peacekeeping, can last for months or even years. So it is important that 
forces are sized and structured to allow sustainment and rotation.  
Deployment and Support:  Forces may need to be inserted, and evacuees extracted, 
sometimes in dangerous circumstances, so substantial military air and sealift must be available. 
Forces must be supported and provided with a wide range of services in difficult conditions.  
There is often a need to provide relief services to local populations as well. We therefore need 
adequate logistics and support capabilities, including deployable medical facilities; cargo-
handling systems, water and fuel supply facilities, and engineering capabilities.   
Firepower and mobility: Success in pacifying an unstable situation often depends on a 
demonstrated ability and willingness to use preponderant force swiftly in response to any 
violence, so forces need to have ample firepower. While such operations might typically involve 
lightly armed adversaries, there can be potential for escalation by intervention of well-armed 
conventional forces. We need to have capabilities available to deter or, if need be, respond to 
such escalation.  This would often involve not just land force capabilities but also air and naval 
forces to protect force elements as they deploy, maintain lines of supply and provide additional 
firepower. 
Command and Communications: The task of leading such operations places additional 
demands on the ADF for command, communications, intelligence and other facilities.   
The Government intends that, within the capabilities we develop for the defense of 
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Australia, we will make sure that we have sufficient forces to meet these demands, so that we are 
well prepared to respond to credible contingencies in our immediate neighborhood.   
At the same time, it is important that we recognize the limits to Australia’s ability to 
influence and help in major crises, even in our immediate neighborhood. Relatively small crisis 
situations can require very high levels of resources to manage and control.  For example, even if 
we had had much larger forces than we have today, Australia could not have undertaken to 
restore peace and security in East Timor under INTERFET except with the help of a large 
number of coalition partners and the cooperation of the Indonesian authorities. Australia would 
contemplate contributing with armed forces to an international response our immediate region 
only if it had the support of our neighbors, and of other countries from the region and beyond.  
c. Supporting Wider Interests 
The third priority for Australia's forces is to be able to contribute effectively to 
international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighborhood where our 
interests are engaged.  Such coalitions might involve operations ranging from peacekeeping and 
disaster relief to relatively high-intensity conflict.  In general, the closer a crisis to Australia, the 
larger the contribution we would want to be able to provide. 
We do not envisage that Australia would commit forces to operations beyond our 
immediate neighborhood except as part of a multinational coalition.  The scale of our 
contribution would depend on a wide range of factors, but in general we would expect to make a 
greater contribution to coalition operations closer to home, where our interests and 
responsibilities are greater.  In Southeast Asia we would want to be able to make a substantial 
contribution to any regional coalition that we decided to support - especially if it involved our 
undertakings under the FPDA.  In the wider Asia Pacific region we would want to have the 
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capacity to make a significant contribution to any coalition we thought it appropriate to join.  In 
most cases the United States would lead such a coalition, and we would expect our forces to 
operate closely with US forces.  Beyond the Asia Pacific region we would normally consider 
only a relatively modest contribution to any wider UN or US-led coalition, proportionate to our 
interests and the commitments of contributors from elsewhere in the world. 
We would be most unlikely to contemplate the leadership of any coalition operations that 
were focused beyond Southeast Asia or the South Pacific. 
We would expect to be able to provide the forces needed to contribute to coalition 
operations from within the capabilities we develop for the defense of Australia and for operations 
within our immediate region.  The key requirements of such forces would be that they should be 
able to succeed with an acceptable level of risk in the operational environment expected, taking 
into account the levels of adversary forces and capabilities that they might encounter.  They 
should also be capable of operating adequately with the other coalition members. 
In broad terms, these conditions suggest that a major Australian contribution to a 
coalition for higher intensity operations would more likely involve air or naval forces than land 
forces.  The air and naval forces we develop for the defense of Australia will provide the 
Government with a range of options to contribute to coalitions in higher intensity operations 
against well-armed adversaries.  Our land forces would be ideally suited to provide contributions 
to lower intensity operations including peace-enforcement, peacekeeping and many types of 
humanitarian operations.  Such operations are much more likely than high intensity operations 
and would emphasize mobility and the levels of protection and firepower appropriate for our 




d. Peacetime National Tasks 
In addition to these core tasks in support of Australia's strategic objectives, the ADF will 
also be called upon to undertake a number of regular or occasional tasks in support of wider 
national interests.  These include specific and ongoing commitments to coastal surveillance and 
emergency management, as well as ad hoc support to wider community needs. 
One of the most important of these is the critical contribution that the ADF makes to the 
security of our coastline from illegal immigration, smuggling, quarantine evasion and other 
intrusions on our sovereignty.   
Other peacetime national tasks include counter-terrorist response, maritime search and 
rescue, and natural disaster relief. 
(1). ADF Special Forces maintain a highly respected capacity for counter-terrorist 
operations, which is among the most sophisticated in the world; 
(2). Emergency Management Australia provides training, national policy coordination 
and coordinated responses for civil emergencies; 
(3). The ADF's long-range air and naval capabilities assist maritime search and 
rescue, undertake navigational and hydrographic work, and also support fisheries 
management; 
(4). Major contributions are made to other events, such as the Sydney 2000 Olympic 
Games and the coming Centenary of Federation celebrations; and 
(5). ADF units, including Reserve units, make a major contribution to disaster relief in 
Australia and our immediate neighborhood. 
6. Australian Force Structure 2000 
As stated in the 2000 Defense White Paper, Australia outlines its strategic interests and 
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objectives as follows: 
(1). Defense of Australia and its direct approaches 
(2). Foster the security of our immediate neighborhood 
(3). Promote stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia in a collaborative effort 
(4). Contribute in appropriate ways to maintaining strategic stability in the wider Asia 
Pacific region 
(5). Contribute to the efforts of the international community, especially the United 
Nations, to uphold global security. 
These national strategic interests and objectives directly shape the military strategy of 
Australia.   
To achieve these key tasks, the ADF will maintain and further develop an integrated and 
balanced joint force that can provide capabilities appropriate to the two highest tasks identified 
above.  First, Australia will maintain maritime capabilities - mostly air and naval forces - that can 
defend Australia by denying our air and sea approaches to any credible hostile forces.  Second, 
Australia will maintain land forces - including the air and naval assets needed to deploy and 
protect them - that can operate as part of a joint force to control the approaches to Australia and 
respond effectively to any armed incursion onto Australian soil.  Both those sets of capabilities 
would also be able to support the security of our immediate neighborhood and contribute to 
coalition operations. 
In order to meet the military strategies dictated and strategic objectives above, the ADF 
leadership and the government have embarked on a new approach to capability planning by 
preparing a detailed, costed plan for the ADF over the next 10 years.  The plan provides the ADF 
with clear long-term goals for its development and the funding needed to achieve those goals. 
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The acquisition procurement changes will focus on the life cycle costs of the systems and 
include not only the initial capital investment required, but also personnel, operating, support and 
upgrade costs over a 20 year nominal operating cycle.  The acquisition plan will be revised 
annually, within the 10-year budget constraint, to take account of changing strategic 
circumstances, new technologies and changed priorities. 
a. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
Australia's force for maritime operations provides the ability to deny an opponent the use 
of the maritime approaches and ensures the freedom to operate at sea.  This ability to deny 
opponent operations while allowing the operation of ADF maritime forces at sea is critical to the 
defense of Australia and highlights the capacity to provide security to the immediate region.  
Additionally, Australia’s maritime forces must be able to integrate and operate with coalition 
forces seamlessly.  
Australia's maritime forces consist of the surface fleet, which includes major combatants, 
helicopters and support ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, mine hunters, and patrol 
boats.   
The capability goal of the maritime forces is maintain an assured capability to detect and 
attack any major surface ships, and to impose substantial constraints on hostile submarine 
operations, in our extended maritime approaches.  Also, the maritime forces must be able to 
support Australian forces deployed offshore, to contribute to maritime security in our wider 
region, to protect Australian ports from sea mines, and to support civil law enforcement and 
coastal surveillance operations.  Additionally, the force must be able to operate effectively with 
those of the United States and to contribute to regional coalition operations.  The submarines 
must be able to operate effectively in high capability operational environments in the Asia 
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Pacific region.  Maritime patrol aircraft must have the capacity to operate throughout the region, 
with high-quality sensors and weapons for attacks on surface ships and submarines.  The patrol 
boats must be able to make a cost-effective and sustained contribution to civil coastal 
enforcement and surveillance operations. 
(1). Major Issues 
(a). Surface Fleet 
Australia's surface fleet consists of two classes of major warship.  The first of those is the 
six guided missile frigates (FFGs) that entered service between 1980 and 1993.  The second class 
is the eight ANZAC ships that have or will enter the service between 1996 and 2004.   
These ships have three potential shortfalls that must be considered.  The first is the 
adequacy of ships' defenses against the more capable anti-ship missiles.  Without adequate 
defenses, these ships are limited in their ability to operate against capable regional navies and 
within range of hostile air forces.  A project now under way will provide such defenses for the 
FFGs, but the ANZACs do not have adequate defenses and have other significant deficiencies in 
their combat capabilities. 
The second is the requirement for a long-range air-defense capacity in the fleet.  Without 
such capability, the ships are more vulnerable to air attack, less capable of defending forces 
deployed offshore and less capable of contributing effectively to coalition naval operations. 
The third is the future replenishment capability.  A robust replenishment capability 
increases the maritime capability by allowing the ships to operate at sea for longer periods of 
time and at greater ranges from port.  One of the support ships, the HMAS Westralia, will reach 
its end of life in 2009 and the other in 2015.  The future procurement plan must address the 
replacement of these ships 
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To address these issues, the ADF developed the following plan.  First, the ANZAC ships 
will be upgraded to provide a reasonable level of anti-ship missile defenses and other 
enhancements of their combat capabilities, including the fitting of Harpoon anti-ship missiles.  
This project is scheduled to start in 2001 with upgraded ships in service by 2007. 
Second, the FFGs will be replaced upon decommissioning in 2013 by a new class of at 
least three air-defense capable ships.  It is expected that these ships will be significantly larger 
and more capable than the FFGs.  The project is scheduled to commence in 2005-06.  The 
government desires to build these ships in Australia, which will provide significant work for 
Australia's shipbuilding industry. 
Third, the ADF plans to replace HMAS Westralia, which is a converted commercial 
tanker, with a purpose-built support ship upon decommissioning.  The second ship, the HMAS 
Success will be replaced, with another ship of the same class upon decommissioning in 2015.  As 
before, the government desires to build these ships in Australia.  The project to replace HMAS 
Westralia is planned to start around 2004-05. 
(b). Submarines 
The government plans to bring all of the Collins class submarines to a high level of 
capability by major improvements to both the platform and combat systems.  Modifications 
already under way to some boats have resulted in major improvements in the acoustic 
performance of the boats and in the reliability of a number of the ship systems.  Interim 
modifications to the combat system have improved performance.  All boats will now be modified 
for better acoustic performance and reliability and a new combat system will be introduced.   
In addition, a project is also scheduled to commence in 2002-03 to address the 
replacement of the current heavyweight torpedo with a new and more capable weapon.  The first 
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new torpedoes are planned to enter service around 2006. 
(c). Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
Australia's fleet of 19 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft will undergo a major 
refurbishment and capability upgrade over coming years.  The P-3Cs will reach the end of their 
current planned life in around 2015.  Unless new technology emerges that can replace the P-3C's 
roles, the aircraft will be refurbished to allow operation past that date.  This refurbishment plan 
would start in 2007.  Capability upgrades planned for the future are the fitting of new electro-
optical sensors to improve capacity to detect ships under difficult circumstances, starting around 
2004-05, and the acquisition of a new lightweight torpedo to improve the P-3C's critical 
submarine-killing capabilities, starting around 2002.  A remaining shortfall is self-protection for 
the aircraft from missiles if they were to be deployed in medium or high threat environments. 
(d). Patrol Boats 
The 15 Fremantle class Patrol Boats are close to the end of their service life.  These boats 
provide the critical function of coastal surveillance and enforcement and are therefore a high 
priority for replacement.  The ADF will embark on a project in 2001 to replace the patrol boats 
with a new class of patrol boat as the older ones are decommissioned.  The new boats will 
preferably be built in Australia and are expected to enter service from 2004-05. 
(2). Navy Force Structure 2000 
The Navy force structure for 2000 is provided below. 
(a). Surface Combatants 
i. 1 DDG 
ii. 6 FFG 
iii. 2 ANZAC FF 
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iv. 1 High Speed Catamaran (leased) 
v. 15 Patrol Boats (PB) 
vi. 2 oiler/replenishment ships 
vii. 1 Heavy Amphibious Lift Ship (HLAS) 
viii. 2 Amphibious Lift (LPA) 
ix. 15 Landing Craft Medium (LCM) 
x. 6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) 
(b). Mine Warfare 
i. 2 Inshore Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
ii. 3 Huon MCM 
iii. 2 Dive Teams 
(c). Submarine Force 
i. 1 Oberon SS 
ii. 3 Collins SS 
(d). Navy Air 
i. 16 Sea Hawk (anti-submarine/surveillance) helicopters 
ii. 7 Sea King (utility/transport) helicopters 
iii. 6 Squirrel (light utility) helicopters 
iv. 5 Kiowa (light utility/training) helicopters 
v. 10 Super Sea Sprite helicopters 
vi. 19 P-3C Orion MPA 
b. The Australian Army 
The land force capability grouping includes all elements of the Army, and those elements 
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of Navy and Air Force whose principle task is to deploy them.   
The capability goal of the land forces and its supporting elements is to provide land 
forces that can respond swiftly and effectively to any credible armed conflict on Australian 
territory.  Additionally, the land forces must be able to conduct the more likely types of 
operations in the immediate region i.e., MOOTW. 
The ADF has also decided against the development of additional heavy armored forces 
suitable for contributions to coalition forces in high intensity conflicts.  These forces would be 
cost prohibited and would most likely not be needed in the defense of Australia or in our 
immediate region.  Some level of armor capability will remain in place. 
The ADF will implement these broad goals under four headings: Ready Frontline Forces; 
Sustainment and Rotation; Combat Weight; and Deployment, Support and Command, Control, 
Communication and Intelligence (C3I). 
(1). Ready Frontline Forces 
The Army will be structured to ensure the ability to sustain a brigade deployed on 
operations for extended periods, and at the same time maintain at least a battalion group 
available for deployment elsewhere.  To achieve this, they will retain on a permanent basis the 
increased numbers of land force units that have been brought to high readiness over the last two 
years.  This is an expansion in the number of infantry battalions at high readiness from four to 
six.  Under this plan six battalion groups, each of around 1,000 personnel, will be held at no 
more than 90 days notice to move, and most at 30 days or less.  They include a parachute 
battalion, two light infantry air-mobile battalions, a motorized battalion, a mechanized battalion, 
and a commando battalion.  In addition, the current SAS Regiment of 700 personnel will be 
maintained at high readiness. 
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The above forces will be organized in three brigades and the Special Operations Group as 
at present.  The brigades, each of around 3,000 personnel, will include, in addition to the infantry 
battalions, a range of specialized combat units such as armor, artillery, aviation, combat 
engineers, and logistics and support units. 
(2). Sustainment and Rotation 
Special attention will be paid to the capacity of our land forces to sustain operations once 
deployed.  This has been a significant weakness of the land forces in the past.  Accordingly, 
service personnel will not serve on operations for longer than six to 12 months at a time followed 
by a substantial period of recuperation before being deployed again.  Recent operations in East 
Timor highlighted the limited sustained deployment capability of the ADF.   
The key to the land force sustainment capability will come from the reserve forces.  In 
line with the new emphasis on a small, high-readiness army ready for deployment, the role of the 
reserve forces will undergo a major transition.  In the past, the partially trained reserve forces 
were to be used to supplement and expand the Army for major land operations in some future 
crisis.  This action did not take proper advantage of the skills available in the Reserves.  As a 
result, the priority of the future for the reserve force will be to provide fully trained personnel to 
our ready frontline forces deployed on operations.  This will greatly enhance the capacity to 
sustain forces on operations for extended periods.   
(3). Combat Weight 
The ADF believes that land forces should have sufficient firepower, protection and 
mobility to provide clear advantage in any likely operations in defense of Australia or in our 
immediate region.  To support these goals, a program of rapid enhancement of a range of combat 




(1). Two squadrons (around 20-24 aircraft) of Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters 
planned to enter service from 2004-05. 
(2). An additional squadron (about 12 aircraft) of troop-lift helicopters to provide 
extra mobility for forces on operations. 
(3). Major upgrade of 350 of the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier fleet, with the 
upgraded vehicles planned to enter service from around 2005. 
(a). A new shoulder-fired guided weapon for key elements of the force to 
attack armored vehicles, bunkers and buildings.  This weapon is planned to enter 
service around 2005. 
(b). Improved body armor, weapons, and night vision equipment and 
communications systems for all soldiers in deployable land forces.  New 
equipment should begin to enter service from around 2003. 
(c). New air defense missile systems to supplement the existing RBS-70 and 
replace the existing Rapier systems, giving comprehensive ground-based air 
defense coverage to deployed forces.  These systems are planned to enter service 
from around 2005 and 2009 respectively. 
(d). Twenty new 120mm mortar systems mounted in light armored vehicles to 
improve mobile firepower planned to enter service in 2006. 
(e). A new thermal surveillance system and tactical uninhabited aerial vehicle 
(UAV) to provide surveillance for deployed forces, planned to enter service from 
around 2003 and 2007 respectively. 
Additionally, sustained investment will be made in maintaining or enhancing current land 
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force capabilities such as the 105mm and 155mm field artillery. 
(4). Deployment, Support and C3I 
The recent operations in East Timor and as the leader of the United Nations follow-on 
operations, Australia recognized a deficiency in the capacity to deploy forces on operations and 
support them while deployed. 
The major weakness in these operations was the ability to conduct amphibious lift.  This 
capability was substantially increased by the introduction into service of amphibious support 
ships, HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla, after the lease of the catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay 
expires.  The heavy lift Landing Ship HMAS Tobruk will be replaced when it reaches the end of 
its service life in 2010, and a program to replace of Manoora and Kanimbla in 2015 will be 
implemented.  The result is that Australia's recently expanded amphibious lift capability will be 
retained at its present level of three major ships.  In addition, we plan to replace the fleet of 15 
medium landing craft and six heavy landing craft, and study options to retain access to the 
unique capabilities of catamarans such as Jervis Bay. 
The airlift capabilities will be enhanced by the acquisition of new aircraft to replace the 
Caribou from 2010, and by the refurbishment of our 12 C130H aircraft by about 2008.  We plan 
to undertake a major program to provide better electronic warfare self-protection of our transport 
aircraft and helicopters from missiles by around 2004. 
The Logistics Support Force will be enhanced by increasing the preparedness of 
individual units thus providing improved support to deployed forces and an enhanced ability to 
rotate forces. 
(5). Army Force Structure 2000 
The Army force structure for 2000 is provided below. 
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(a). Special Forces (1 regiment SASR/1 regiment Commando) 
(b). Mechanized Force (1 brigade) 
(c). Light Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(d). Motorized Infantry Force (1 brigade) 
(e). Army Aviation Force 
(f). Ground Based Air Defense 
(g). Combat & Logistics Support 
(h). Army Reserve Force 
(i). Army Aviation (helicopters) 
i. 36 S-70A Black Hawk 
ii. 4 CH-47D Chinook 
iii. 25 UH-1H Iroquois  
iv. 43 Kiowa Light Observation 
v. AS350BA Squirrel 
(j). Air Defense  
i. 12 RBS-70 laser guided firing units 
ii. 12 Rapier radar tracking units 
(k). Reserve Units 
i. 11th Brigade (North & Central Queensland) 
ii. 4th Brigade (Victoria) 
iii. 5th Brigade (NSW) 
iv. 8th Brigade (NSW) 
v. 9th Brigade (SA & Tasmania) 
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vi. 13th Brigade (WA) 
(l). Reserve Surveillance Units 
i. Northwest Mobile Force (NORFORCE) 
ii. Pilbara Regiment (WA) 
iii. Far North Queensland Regiment 
c. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
(1). Air Combat 
Air combat is the most important single capability for the defense of Australia, because 
control of the air over the territory and maritime approaches is critical to all other types of 
operation in the defense of Australia. 
Australia's air-combat capability is based on its fleet of 71 F/A-18 aircraft with its sensor 
systems and missiles, supported by other systems including air-to-air refueling (AAR), and an 
integrated command and communications system, including surveillance and battle space 
management systems in the Air Defense Ground Environment.  
The capability goal of air combat is to ensure the ability to protect itself from air attack, 
and control the air approaches to ensure that we can operate effectively against any hostile forces 
approaching Australia.  The air combat capability must be maintained at a level at least 
comparable qualitatively to any in the region, and with a sufficient margin of superiority to 
provide an acceptable likelihood of success in combat.  These forces must be large enough to 
provide a high level of confidence that they could defeat any credible air attack on Australia or in 
our approaches, and capable enough to provide options to deploy an air-combat capability to 
support a regional coalition.  They will also have the capacity to provide air-defense and support 
for deployed ground and maritime forces in our immediate region. 
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Given this capability goal, the major challenges to achieving this goal are three-fold.  
First, the air-combat capabilities of a number of defense forces throughout the region have grown 
steadily in recent years, and are expected to continue to do so.  As a result, it is anticipated that 
the capabilities of the F/A-18 aircraft will be out of date with respect to a number of regional air 
forces.   
Second, the air-to-air refueling (AAR) aircraft - four Boeing 707 aircraft - are close to the 
end of their effective life.  Over the next few years they will need to be substantially refurbished 
or replaced in order to maintain an AAR capability.  AAR is crucial to the effectiveness of the air 
combat element as it extends the range and endurance of the fighters.  This is critical for 
covering our extended air approaches, including offshore territories and for providing air support 
to surface ship deployments including amphibious task forces and land forces deployed in the 
immediate region.   
Third, future air combat needs to be addressed before the F/A-18 aircraft reach the end of 
their service life between 2012 and 2015.  
Given the above challenges, the ADF developed a four-pronged plan in response.  First, 
the current upgrade program for the F/A-18 aircraft will continue.  Significant phases are already 
underway; including the installation of new and significantly improved radar, and the acquisition 
of new advanced air-to-air missiles.  Additional phases have been scheduled to provide the 
fighter force with a range of upgrades.  This program of upgrades is planned to be completed by 
2007 and includes: 
(a). Advanced tactical data links to allow the aircraft to exchange combat 
information instantly with other units, allowing better cooperative tactics 
(b). A new helmet-mounted missile cueing system to get the best out of new 
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short-range air-to-air missiles 
(c). Structural improvements to extend the life of the airframe and reduce its 
detectability by enemy radars 
(d). Some initial improvements to electronic warfare self-protection 
Second, the acquisition of four Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, 
with the possibility of acquiring a further three aircraft later in the decade will be a reality.  The 
AEW&C will make a major contribution to many aspects of air combat capability, significantly 
multiplying the combat power of the upgraded F/A-18 fleet.  These aircraft will improve 
command and control, improve capacity for air defense of surface ships, and enhance our strike 
capability.  The aircraft are planned to start entering service around 2006. 
Third, a firm schedule for a major project to replace and upgrade the AAR capability.  
This project will acquire up to five new-generation AAR aircraft, which would have the capacity 
to refuel not only our F/A-18 aircraft but also our F-111 and AEW&C aircraft over a wide area 
of operations.  These aircraft will also provide a substantial air cargo capability, and are planned 
to enter service around 2006. 
Fourth, the ADF will examine options for acquiring new combat aircraft to follow the 
F/A-18, and potentially also the F-111.  Provision has been made in the Defense Capability Plan 
for a project to acquire up to 100 new combat aircraft to replace both the F/A-18 and F-111 
fleets.  Acquisition is planned to start in 2006-07, with the first aircraft entering service in 2012.   
(2). Strike 
The strike capability focuses on the forces that enable Australia to attack hostile forces in 
the territory of an adversary, in forward operating bases, and in transit to Australia.  This 
capability is viewed as very important to the government.  Strike capability allows Australia 
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more scope to determine the pace and location of hostilities and would impose major defensive 
costs on an adversary contemplating hostile action.  Additionally, strike forces provide support to 
Australian forces deployed abroad and may contribute to regional coalitions. 
Strike operations can be conducted by F/A-18s and other platforms equipped with the 
appropriate weapons.  The F-111 long-range bombers, however, provide the bulk of the strike 
capability.   
The capability goal of the strike capability is to ensure the capability to contribute to the 
defense of Australia by attacking military targets within a wide radius of Australia, against 
credible levels of air defenses, at an acceptably low level of risk to aircraft and crew.  Australia 
does not desire a strike capability large enough to conduct sustained attack on an adversary's 
wider civil infrastructure, but does require a capability able to attack those militarily significant 
targets that might be used to mount or support an attack on Australia.  The country does not, 
however, require sufficient capacity to mount sustained strike campaigns against a significant 
number of such targets.  The government expects that the strike capabilities developed for the 
defense of Australia would provide options to contribute to regional coalitions against more 
capable adversaries at acceptable levels of risk to crew and aircraft. 
The ADF has considered three key issues in relation to the F-111 strike capability.  First, 
the capacity of the F-111s to overcome improving air defenses has been enhanced recently by 
improvements to the electronic warfare self-protection (EWSP) systems and by the acquisition of 
standoff weapons, allowing aircraft to launch attacks from outside the range of some air defense 
systems.  However, the ADF recognizes that over the coming decade further improvements will 
be required in both areas.  Accordingly, further EWSP upgrades and acquisition of additional 
types of stand-off weapons with longer range and with different guidance and targeting systems 
Annex A 
 4A-41 
to provide more alternative attack options and better capability against hardened and area targets 
will be required.   
Second, the decision to acquire AEW&C aircraft and enhance the AAR capability will 
also contribute significantly to strike capability.  For the first time, air-to-air refueling of the F-
111s will be able to be conducted, increasing the range, payload and tactical options.  The 
expansion of the AAR capability will also benefit the capacity of the F/A-18s to undertake strike 
missions at longer range with greater weapons loads.  AEW&C aircraft will help the strike force 
penetrate air defenses and avoid hostile forces.  In-flight refueling for our AEW&C aircraft will 
increase their capacity to support strike missions. 
Third, the future of the strike capability after the F-111 leaves service, expected to be 
between 2015 and 2020, must be considered.  It is unlikely that there will be any comparable 
specialized strike aircraft suited to the needs of the ADF at that time.  A range of alternatives 
may be available by then, including the much greater use of long-range missiles fired from large 
transport aircraft, naval platforms, or even unmanned combat aerial vehicles.  Alternatively, the 
best option may be specialized strike variants of air-combat aircraft.  This would allow the 
replacement of the F-111 by the same type of aircraft that is bought to replace the F/A-18, which 
would result in large savings in operating costs.   
(3). RAAF Force Structure 2000 
The Air Force force structure for the year 2000 is provided below. 
(a). 71 F/A-18 Hornet 
i. 53 A, 18 B 
(b). 35 F-111 
i. 21 C, 14 G 
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(c). 24 C-130 Hercules 
i. 12 E, 12 H 
(d). 14 DHC-4 Caribou 
(e). 5 Boeing 707 Tankers 
(f). EWSP upgrades for all air platforms 
(g). Trainer Fleet 
d. Information Capability 
Effective use of information is at the heart of Australia's defense capability.  This trend is 
a reflection of the dominant theme in the evolution of the modern military force.  As information 
technology matures, its place in the every day operations of a military force will be critical.  This 
trend is more significant to Australia than to many other countries.  The strategic circumstances 
of Australia mean that innovative applications of different aspects of information technology 
offer Australia unique advantages. 
Major advances in surveillance technology will allow the detection of hostile forces far 
from the shore.  Faster secure communications and data links between tactical units enable these 
units to cooperate in combat with unprecedented speed and ease.  This will multiply the 
effectiveness of each platform significantly. 
The Information Capability grouping covers intelligence and surveillance capabilities, 
communications, information warfare, command and headquarters systems, and logistics and 
business applications. 
The capability goals for Information Capabilities are to position the ADF to harness 
advances in information technology in ways that ensure that the ADF has timely, accurate and 
secure information to exploit fully individual and unit combat capabilities, and allow their 
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employment in more flexible ways.  Our specific objectives include: 
(1). Maintaining first-rate intelligence capabilities 
(2). Developing a comprehensive surveillance system providing continuous coverage 
of our extended air and sea approaches 
(3). Developing an integrated command system covering operations at all levels and 
in all environments 
(4). Providing communication capabilities that can support Australian operations 
throughout our territory and our immediate region, with increased capacity to support a 
range of new information systems 
(5). Maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of our logistics systems and 
management processes by cost-effective investment in information technology 
applications 
(6). Ensuring these systems are managed effectively, secure against information 
warfare attack and able to achieve a high level of interoperability with our allies and 
partners. 
(7). Major Issues 
(a). Intelligence 
Good intelligence will remain critical to Australia's strategic posture in a complex and 
fluid environment.  The intelligence organization and infrastructure must be able to monitor 
comprehensively several crises at the same time and provide effective operational support to 
deployed forces.  New technologies offer new opportunities for collection, analysis and 
distribution of intelligence.  The future development plan incorporates substantial and sustained 
investment in enhanced intelligence capabilities, including: 
Annex A 
 4A-44 
i. Enhanced signals intelligence and imagery collection capabilities 
ii. Enhanced geospatial information systems 
iii. Improved intelligence processing and dissemination systems 
iv. Deeper levels of cooperation with the United States in some key 
systems 
(b). Surveillance 
Recent technology developments have expanded significantly the potential for sustained, 
24-hour surveillance of the northern approaches, particularly by the Jindalee Operational Radar 
Network (JORN) and other systems.  The ADF plans to exploit these developments by 
undertaking a sustained program of enhancement to the JORN over the horizon radar system.  
An improved capability to fuse data from JORN and other sensor systems to provide an 
integrated national surveillance picture will be undertaken. 
(c). Communications 
Sustained investment in communications capability will be necessary to support the 
application of information technology innovations, especially for deployed forces.  Key 
enhancements planned include the fixed network within Australia, long-range communications 
to deployed forces, networked communications systems throughout an area of operations, 
tactical communications for combat units, and improved communications network management 
systems.  Specific projects will include higher capacity satellite communications based on a 
commercial provider, enhanced broadband communications with ships at sea, and improved 
battle space communications for air and land force elements. 
(d). Command, Logistics and Business Systems 
Investment in systems to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of command and 
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management functions in the ADF is a high priority.  Improved command arrangements and 
systems are essential to our ability to deploy and operate effectively in complex environments at 
short notice.  Better logistics and business systems will increase combat power in the field and 
save money.  The key investments planned over the coming decade are the establishment of a 
single collocated Theatre Headquarters, and the development of two deployable headquarters to 
provide on the spot command for two deployed forces simultaneously; a single integrated 
command support system linking all ADF elements; and an integrated personnel, logistics and 
financial system based on e-business principles. 
(8). Information Capability Force Structure 2000 
The Information Capability force structure and capabilities are provided below. 
(a). Operational Command 
i. Deployable HQ (one) 
(b). Communications (SATCOM, HF, Networks) 
(c). Command and Information Management Systems 
(d). Strategic Intelligence 
(e). Strategic Surveillance  
(f). Geospatial Information 




The information presented in Annex A was derived from the following sources.  In some cases, 
entire sections of the source documents were cited; therefore, footnotes were not used. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force, December 2000 
 
Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, Defence Review 2000 - Our Future 
Defence Force, A Public Discussion Paper, June 2000 
 
Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Defence Force, Capability 




       
SEI Team Australia Economic Model  
Navigation Table of Contents    
   
GDP Growth and Defense Spending 
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Spending by Broad Function 
Epoch 1 Budget  
Epoch 2 Budget  
Epoch 3 Budget  
 
Epoch 4 Budget  
 
        
        
This spreadsheet represents the economic model and assumptions  
used by derive future growth and budgetary constraints for this study.    
Initial parameters were derived from a variety of Australian government  
sources including the Defense Discussion Paper and the   
Australian Bureau of Statistics.      
        
        
        
        




          GDP (US B $) Defense Budget 
   GDP % Spent Economic Defense Expenditure Us Dollar Conversion 
   ( Aus B $) on Defense Growth (In Billions of  Aus $) 1.8287 $aus/$us 
 
  2000-2001 684 1.90% 3.50% 13 374.151324 7.108875157 
 2001-2002 708.2 1.90% 3.50% 13.455 387.24662 7.357685788 
 2002-2003 729.4 2.00% 3.00% 14.588 398.864019 7.97728038 
 2003-2004 751.3 2.10% 3.00% 15.777 410.82994 8.627428731 
  2004-2005 775.7 2.20% 3.25% 17.065 424.181913 9.332002078 
 
  2005-2006 805.9 2.30% 3.89% 18.535 440.682589 10.13569955 
 2006-2007 839.3 2.40% 4.15% 20.144 458.970916 11.015302 
 2007-2008 877.1 2.40% 4.35% 21.050 479.624608 11.51099059 
 2008-2009 916.6 2.45% 4.50% 22.456 501.207715 12.27958902 
  2009-2010 916.6 2.45% 4.50% 22.456 501.207715 12.27958902 
 
  2010-2011 956.9 2.43% 4.40% 23.252 523.260855 12.71523876 
 2011-2012 998.5 2.40% 4.35% 23.964 546.022702 13.10454484 
 2012-2013 1041.9 2.40% 4.35% 25.007 569.774689 13.67459254 
 2013-2014 1087.3 2.40% 4.35% 26.095 594.559888 14.26943732 




  2015-2016 1130.8 2.40% 4.00% 27.138 618.342284 14.84021481 
 2016-2017 1173.7 2.40% 3.80% 28.170 641.839291 15.40414297 
 2017-2018 1217.2 2.40% 3.70% 29.212 665.587344 15.97409626 
 2018-2019 1262.2 2.40% 3.70% 30.293 690.214076 16.56513782 
  2019-2020 1262.2 2.40% 3.70% 30.293 690.214076 16.56513782 
             
     
Total Defense 
Expenditure for 20 yr 




This model assumes the Australian dollar remains constant at the current exchange rate of 1.87 Australian dollars per US dollar.  A 






    
      
  0.51 US $  (Million People) Per Capita  
    GDP (US B $) Population GDP (US$)   
Base Line 2000-2001 374.15 19.169083 19518.48 
Epoch I 2004-2005 424.18 21 20199.14 
Epoch II 2009-2010 501.21 21.7 23097.13 
Epoch III 2014-2015 594.56 23 25850.43 
Epoch IV 2019-2020 690.21 24.5 28172.00 








Epoch 1      
Defense Budget Broad Function 1999 Epoch 1 2005-2006 Defense 
   % of Total % of Total Defense Budget Expenditure 
Current Capabilities  57.930 52.00% 40.40 21.01 
Future Capabilities  29.320 33.72% 40.40 13.62 
Research  1.955 2.95% 40.40 1.191 
Personal Services  7.463 7.46% 40.40 3.01 
Resource Administration  3.332 3.33% 40.40 1.34 
     
Total     
      
Epoch 2:  End of Epoch    
Defense Budget Broad Function 2009-2010 Defense    
  % of Total Expenditure    
Current Capabilities 51% 29.1822   
Future Capabilities 33% 18.8826   
Research 3% 1.7166   
Personal Services 10% 5.7220   
Resource Administration 3% 1.7166   
      
Total 100%    
      
      
Epoch 3:   End of Epoch  
Defense Budget Broad Function 2010-2015 2010-2015 Defense   
  % of Total Defense Budget Expenditure   
Current Capabilities 56% 68.03 38.0986  
Future Capabilities 28% 68.03 19.0493  
Research 4% 68.03 2.7213  
Personal Services 9% 68.03 6.1230  
Resource Administration 3% 68.03 2.0410  
      
Total 100%    
      
Epoch 4:   End of Epoch  
Defense Budget Broad Function 2015-2020 2015-2020 Defense   
  % of Total Defense Budget Expenditure   
Current Capabilities 60% 79.35 47.6092  
Future Capabilities 25% 79.35 19.8372  
Research 3% 79.35 2.3805  
Personal Services 9% 79.35 7.1414  
Resource Administration 3% 79.35 2.3805  
      
All dollar amounts  
Are in US B $     




 2000 Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4 
Current Capabilities 57.93 % 52.00% 51% 56% 60% 
Future Capabilities 29.32 % 33.72% 33% 28% 25% 
Research 1.95 % 2.95% 3% 4% 3% 
Personal Services 7.46 % 7.46% 10% 9% 9% 
Resource Administration 3.33 % 3.33% 3% 3% 3% 
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Summary of Australia Study 
Area of Concern 2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
Geopolitical 
Situation 
•Partnering with US, Japan and other 
regional powers 
•Increase in MOOTW 
•Increase in UN/Coalition 
Operations 
•US partnership despite slight 
pullback in the region 
•MOOTW continue to grow 
•Continued reliance on coalitions 
•Peaceful transfer of power 
between Taiwan and China 
•US pullback leading nations to 
pursue other alternatives 
• Continued unification efforts in 
Korea 
•China making overtures to 
Philippines and Indonesia 
• Darwin increasing in importance 
as a regional base/port 
Themes •Globalization 
•US Strategic Primacy 
•Globalization increases and 
spreads interdependencies 
•Energy resources increasingly 
important 
•Globalization continues 
•Energy resources scarce for 
many 
• Concern for secure SLOCs 
•Australia increasingly important 
as exporter of energy and iron ore. 
• SLOC security becomes a 




•Ensure defense of Australia and its 
direct approaches. 
•Foster security in the immediate 
neighborhood. 
•Work with other nations to promote 
security in Southeast Asia 
•Contribute in appropriate ways to 
maintaining strategic stability in the 
wider Asia Pacific Region 
•Contribute to the efforts of the 
international community (United 
Nations) 
•Ensure defense of Australia and its 
direct approaches. 
•Foster security in the immediate 
neighborhood. 
•Work with other nations to 
promote security in Southeast Asia 
•Contribute in appropriate ways to 
maintaining strategic stability in the 
wider Asia Pacific Region 
•Contribute to the efforts of the 
international community (United 
Nations) 
•Ensure defense of Australia and 
its direct approaches. 
•Foster security in the immediate 
neighborhood. 
•Work with other nations to 
promote security in Southeast 
Asia 
•Contribute in appropriate ways to 
maintaining strategic stability in 
the wider Asia Pacific Region 
•Facilitate free trade in the Pacific 
Rim 
•Contribute to the efforts of the 
international community (United 
Nations) 
•Ensure defense of Australia and its 
direct approaches. 
•Foster security in the immediate 
neighborhood. 
•Work with other nations to 
promote security in Southeast Asia 
•Contribute in appropriate ways to 
maintaining strategic stability in the 
wider Asia Pacific Region 
•Facilitate free trade in the Pacific 
Rim 
•Contribute to the efforts of the 




•Defense of Australia 
• Self Reliant  
• Control air and sea approaches  
• Attack hostile forces as far away 
from shore as possible 
• Contribute to the security of 
immediate neighborhood 
•Support Australia’s interests and 
objectives by contributing to 
international coalitions 
•Defense of Australia 
• Self Reliant  
• Control air and sea approaches  
• Attack hostile forces as far 
away from shore as possible 
• Contribute to the security of 
immediate neighborhood 
• Support Australia’s interests and 
objectives by contributing to 
international coalitions 
•Defense of Australia 
• Self Reliant  
• Control air and sea 
approaches  
• Attack hostile forces as far 
away from shore as possible 
• Contribute to the security of 
immediate neighborhood 
• Support Australia’s interests and 
objectives by contributing to 
international coalitions 
•Defense of Australia 
• Self Reliant  
• Control air and sea approaches  
• Attack hostile forces as far 
away from shore as possible 
• Contribute to the security of 
immediate neighborhood 
• Support Australia’s interests and 
objectives by contributing to 
international coalitions 
 





•1995.274 Billion US $ 
 
•$20,200/capita 
• 2381.694 Billion US $ 
• $23,097/capita 
• 2828.178 Billion US $ 
• $25,850/capita 









• 57.22 Billion US $ 
 
• 2.3-2.45% 









































































































































• Surface Combatants: 6 FFG, 8 
ANZAC FF, 15 Patrol Boats (PB), 2 
oilers, 3 LPAs, 15 Landing Craft 
Medium (LCM), 6 Landing Craft 
Heavy (LCH) 
• Mine Warfare:  2 Inshore Mine CM 
(MCM), 6 Huon MCM, 2 Dive Teams 
• Submarines:  6 Collins SS 
• Navy Air:  16 Sea Hawk, 7 Sea King, 




• Special Forces (1 reg; 1 bn; 1res) 
• Mechanized Force (1 armor; 1 
calvary; 2 mech infantry; 2 artillery) 
• Light Infantry Force (2 infantry bn; 1 
calvary; 2 paratroopers) 
• Motorized Infantry Force (3 infantry; 
2 mech transport) 
• Army Aviation Force (130 helos) 
• Ground Based Air Defense (12 
Rapier; 12 RBS-70) 
• Combat & Logistics Support 
• Army Reserve Force (6 infantry 
brigades; 3 surveillance units) 
 
 
• 71 F/A-18 A/B (57 A, 18 B), 35 F-
111 (21 C, 14 G), 24 C-130 Hercules 
(12 H, 12 J), 14 DHC-4 Caribou, 4 
AEW&C Boeing 737-700, 5 Boeing 
767 Tankers, 59 PC9 Trainer, 25 BAe 
Hawk Fighter Trainer 
 
 
• Operational Command 
• Strategic Intelligence 
• Strategic Surveillance  
• Geospatial Information 
• Hydrographic Survey Force 
 
• Surface: 6 FFG, 14 ANZAC FF, 
4 Spruance DDG (VLS), 4 
catamarans, 30 PB, 2 Multi Role 
Auxiliary (MRA), 1 oiler, 2 
LPAs, 15 LCM, 6 LCH  
• Mine Warfare:  2 Inshore MCM, 
12 Huon MCM, 4 Dive Teams 
• Submarines:  8 Collins SS 
• Navy Air:  16 Sea Hawk, 7 Sea 
King, 11 Super Seasprite, 19 P-3C 
Orion, 10 LAMPS Mk-III 
 
• Special Forces (2 reg; 2 bn) 
• Mechanized Force  
• Light Infantry Force 
• Motorized Infantry Force  
• Aviation Force (78 helos) 
• Ground Based Air Defense (12 
RBS-70; 10 Patriot; 12 PAC-3) 
• Combat & Logistics Support 
• Army Reserve Force (3 inf 





• 50 F/A-18 A/B (32 A, 18 B), 40 
F/A-18 E/F, 35 F-111 (21 C, 14 
G), 24 C-130J Hercules, 14 C-27J 
Spartan, 7 AEW&C Boeing 737-
700, 8 Boeing 767 Tankers 
 
 
• Operational Command 
• Strategic Intelligence 
• Strategic Surveillance  
• Geospatial Information 
• Hydrographic Survey Force 
 
• Surface: 6 FFG, 14 ANZAC 
FF, 4 Spruance DDG (VLS), 1 
Aegis DDG, 8 catamarans, 30 
PB, 5 MRA, 2 LPAs, 15 LCM, 6 
LCH  
• Mine Warfare:  2 Inshore 
MCM, 12 Huon MCM, 4 Dive 
Teams 
• Submarines:  8 Collins SS 
• Navy Air:  16 Sea Hawk, 7 
Sea King, 11 Super Seasprite, 19 
P-3C Orion, 10 LAMPS Mk-III 
• Special Forces (2 reg; 2 bn) 
• Mechanized Force  
• Light Infantry Force 
• Motorized Infantry Force  
• Marine amphibious force (2 
brigades w/150 AAAVs) 
• Aviation (78 helos, 20 V-22) 
• Ground Based Air Defense (12 
RBS-70; 10 Patriot; 12 PAC-3) 
• Army Reserve Force (3 inf 






• 80 F/A-18 E/F, 35 F-111 (21 
C, 14 G), 24 C-130J Hercules, 
14 C-27J Spartan, 7 AEW&C 




• Operational Command 
• Strategic Intelligence 
• Strategic Surveillance  
• Geospatial Information 
• Hydrographic Survey Force 
 
• Surface: 2 FFG, 20 ANZAC FF, 
4 Spruance DDG (VLS), 4 Aegis 
DDG, 11 catamarans, 30 PB, 6 
MRA, 15 LCM, 6 LCH  
• Mine Warfare:  2 Inshore 
MCM, 12 Huon MCM, 4 Dive 
Teams 
• Submarines:  8 Collins SS 
• Navy Air:  16 Sea Hawk, 7 Sea 
King, 11 Super Seasprite, 19 P-
3C Orion (refurbished SLEP), 10 
LAMPS Mk-III 
• Special Forces (2 reg; 2 bn) 
• Mechanized Force  
• Light Infantry Force 
• Motorized Infantry Force  
• Marine amphibious force (2 
brigades w/150 AAAVs) 
• Aviation (78 helos, 60 V-22) 
• Ground Based Air Defense (12 
RBS-70; 10 Patriot; 12 PAC-3, 
laser based system) 
• Army Reserve Force (3 inf 





• 80 F/A-18 E/F, 24 C-130J 
Hercules, 14 C-27J Spartan, 7 
AEW&C Boeing 737-700, 8 





• Operational Command 
• Strategic Intelligence 
• Strategic Surveillance  
• Geospatial Information 
• Hydrographic Survey Force 



























• Anti-ship missile defense for 
ANZACs 
• Long range air defense capability 
• Limited replenishment capability 
• SS platform and combat systems 
• Patrol craft are aging 




• Army’s small size 
• No heavy armored force 
• Smaller reserve force  
 
 
• Limited air combat capability wrt 
regional defense forces (modernization 
issue) 
• Air-to-air refueling capability aging 




• Limited indigenous intelligence 
capability 
• Communications 




• Long range air defense 
capability 
• Improving replenishment 
capability 






• Remains a light fighting force 




• Improving air combat capability 
wrt regional defense forces 
• Facing loss of air strike 










• Improving long range air 
defense capability 
• Impending loss of some FFGs 
• Impending loss of LPAs (older 
amphibious ships) 
• Replacement aircraft for the P-




• Remains a light fighting force 
with limited heavy equipment 
and armor  
 
 
• Facing loss of air strike 







• Maintain pace with changing 
technology 






Issues for 2021 and beyond 
 
• ADF remains small but has 
modern equipment and capability 
• All services can be easily 
overextended if conducting 
multiple operations in different 
and widely separated theaters 
• Will remain reliant on allies to 
conduct operations outside of the 
inner arc against an 
overwhelming force 














Philippine Sea  
 
• Ability to project force and control 
maritime area of ops 
• Difficult to succeed at any land 
campaigns due to limited land forces 
and amphibious lift 
• Without external intervention, a 






• Contribution is significant 
• Due to distance, it may be difficult to 
attain air parity 
 
• Weak Indonesian anti-air & 
anti-submarine capabilities 
• Superior air assets for Australia 
against Indonesia 
• Inferior land troop numbers vs 
Indonesian Army 
• Technology advantage for 
Australian soldiers 
 
• Credible contribution of forces 
by Australia for Coalition Force 
in numerical terms 
• Limited air-defense capabilities 
of Australian vessels (FF) 
 
 
Invasion of East Timor/ Irian 
Jaya 
• Weak Indonesian Maritime 
assets (lack of economic 
progress result in limited 
upgrades) 
• Superior air assets for Australia 
against Indonesia  
• Superior land assets for 
Australia through addition of 
Marine Bdes 




• Requires alliance with other 
regional powers 
• Adequate protection against 
surface threats 
• Slow reaction to mine warfare 
threats 
• Submarine and air threats 
unlikely 
 
Invasion of East Timor/Irian Jaya 
• Weak Indonesian Maritime 
assets (lack of economic progress 
result in limited upgrades) 
• Superior air assets for Australia 
against Indonesia  
• Better land assets for Australia 
through addition of Marine Bdes 






• Ability to counter surface threats 
easily 
• Mine clearance capability 
tedious but possible 
• Submarine: uncertainty in 




• Growth of fighter aircraft with 
Beyond Visual Range targeting 
capability. 
• More highly capable anti-ship 
missiles 
• Increasingly significant strike and 
land forces 
• Proliferation of Cyberwar, 
WMD 
• Increasing presence of highly 
capable AAW/ASuW ship 
platforms 
• Emergence of UAVs 
• Proliferation of Cyberwar, 
WMD 
• AAW/ASuW ship platforms 
• Surveillance assets keep 
movement difficult to conceal 
from most nations 
• Theater Missile Defense 
• Asymmetric tactics 
• Area denial solutions vary 
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Technology Focus • Space launch capability and related 
areas of technology development 
• Nanotechnology in the specific area 
of sintering advance smart materials 
• High density energy storage and 
supplies 
• Expensive (US$30/Barrel 
Crude)  
• Generally manageable and not 
a significant drag on Australia as 
a result of significant internal 
energy resources 
• Increasing emphasis on the use 
of control devices and advanced 
materials to lessen energy use. 
(A major benefit of Information 
Age technologies). 
• All countries with the 
wherewithal to do so have taken 
strong and effective steps to 
diversify their energy sources.   
• New fuel types, as well as oil 
and natural gas at inconvenient 
locations 
• Increased emphasis on dirty 
fuels such as coal (with new 
pollution controls) 
 
• Electro-magnetic assisted 
launch capability significantly 
reduces per launch cost.  
• Energy R&D breakthrough in 
quartz technology allows high 
energy density storage in 
compact size.   
• Increase efficiency in fuel cell 
leads to widespread use in 
automobiles, miniature airframes 
etc. 
• R&D into military application 
of high-density energy storage 
and supplies (quartz technology) 
• Electro-magnetic assisted 
launching infrastructure – 
US$500 million (Industry and 
private collaboration) 
• R&D into military applications 




• Two tier – anti-missile defense 
system. 
• First tier – includes the 
development and deployment of a 
HEL missile defense system. 
• Based on concept of HEL for 
medium-range missile defense 
(up to 20km). 
• Second tier – THEL for short-




• R&D in collaboration with US 
and Japan developing the 
technology of a TBM defense 
using airborne laser and ground 
FEL.  
• Serve as a technology 
capability that can be employed 
should the treat arises. 
 
PROJECT STINGRAY 
• Integration of Diode Pumped 
Solid State Laser anti-ship missile 
defense on FFGs and DDGs. 
• Based on the concept of 
“unlimited” and low cost shots 
for defense against anti-ship 
missiles. 
• Option for upgrading to FEL 






Australia’s Technology Research and Development Framework 
 
 Epoch 1 Epoch 2 Epoch 3 Epoch 4 
Main R&D Efforts 
& Breakthroughs 
• Initial technology feasibility 
studies into the following, 
1. Nanotechnology 
(customizing of advance 
smart materials). 
2. Space launching technology 
(electromagnetic launch, 
trans-atmospheric flight, and 
laser propulsion). 
3. High-density energy storage 
and supplies technology 
(silica gel energy storage, 
new generation fuel cell etc). 
4. New energy resource 
technology (remote sensing, 
deep sea drilling, 
photovoltics, ‘clean’ burning 
of coal, high density 
transportation of LNG etc)  
• Results from feasibility 
studies drives the focus of 
technology effort in two 
areas, 
1. Space launching capability 
(commercial space launch 
facilities) 
2. Energy R&D (R&D into new 
energy resource technology, 
high-density energy and 
supplies). 
• Investment in space 
launching infrastructure in 
Cape York, Melville Island 
and Christmas Island. 
• Infrastructure completed in 




• Continued R&D into Electro-
magnetic assisted launch 
feasibility. 
• R&D into remote sensing 
results in advancement in the 
ability of discovering off- 
shore oil reserve, coupled 
with the lower cost of deep 
sea drilling and the 
consistence US$30 a barrel 
price for oil give rise to 
aggressive export of oil to 
Japan, China and other Asian 
countries. 
• Breakthrough in photovoltics 
technology causes a shift in 
the internal energy 
requirement of Australia.  
(less than 10% solar energy 
to 50% solar energy).  Thus 
increasing Australia export of 
energy resources to other 
countries. 
• Breakthrough in fluidized 
bed technology for coal 
burning results in increased 
and aggressive interest in 
coal as a source of energy. 
(Australia has the 4th largest 
coal reserve and is the large 
• Electro-magnetic assisted 
launch capability 
significantly reduces per 
launch cost.  Power supplied 
by solar energy. 
• Energy R&D breakthrough in 
quartz technology allows 
high energy density storage 
in compact size.  Ability to 
power small commercial and 
military equipment. 
• Increase efficiency in fuel 
cell leads to widespread use 
in automobiles, miniature 
airframes etc. 
• R&D into military 
applications of high-density 
energy storage and supplies 
(quartz technology). 
PROJECT DPAMDS 
• Two tier – anti-missile 
defense system. 
• First tier – includes the 
development and 
deployment of a HEL 
missile defense system for 
Darwin. 
• Based on concept of HEL 
for medium-range missile 
defense (up to 20km). 
• Second tier – THEL for 
short-range missile defense 
(up to 5km). 
PROJECT BOLDEAGLE 
• R&D in collaboration with 
US and Japan developing 
the technology of a TBM 
defense using airborne laser 
and ground FEL.  
• Serve as a technology 
capability that can be 
employed should the threat 
arise. 
PROJECT STINGRAY 
• Integration of Diode 
Pumped Solid State Laser 
anti-ship missile defense on 
FFGs and DDGs. 
• Based on the concept of 
“unlimited” and low-cost 
shots for defense against 
anti-ship missiles. 
• Option for upgrading to FEL 






• High-density LNG 
transportation allows yet 
another alternate energy 
resource for export. 
• Continue R&D into energy 
storage and supplies in the 
following areas, 
1. Quartz technology (silica gel) 
– miniature energy storage. 
2. Fuel cell (methane) 
3. Photovoltics 
Timeframe • Initial feasibility studies 2000 
– 2002 (2 years) 
• Detail studies 2003 – 2005 (3 
years) 
• Space launching capabilities 
available starting 2008.   
• Breakthrough in technology 
in remote sensing, deep sea 
drilling, coal burning, LNG 
storage and transportation, 
photovoltics resulting in very 
attractive export of energy 
resources during this epoch. 
• Electro-magnetic assisted 
launching capability achieved 
in 2015. 
• Quartz energy storage and 




• First-tier commence 2015 
with IOC 2020 
• Second-tier commence 2015 
with IOC 2018 
PROJECT BOLDEAGLE 
• R&D gives Australia the 
capability of TBM defense 
should the treat arise. 
PROJECT STINGRAY 
• Integration commences 






• Initial feasibility study - 500 
million (DSTO – 100 
million, Industry – 150 
million, Private collaboration 
– 250 million) 
• Space launching capability – 
500 million (DSTO - 100 
million, Industry and private 
collaboration – 400 million) 
• Energy R&D – 250 million 
(DSTO – 100 million, 
industry and private 
collaboration – 150 million) 
• Space launching 
infrastructure – 1 billion 
(Industry and private 
collaboration). 
• R&D into Electro-magnetic 
assisted launch – 500 million 
(Industry and private 
collaboration) 
• Continued energy R&D – 
100 million (DSTO – 50 
million, Industry – 50 
million) 
 
• Electro-magnetic assisted 
launching infrastructure – 
500 million (Industry and 
private collaboration). 
• R&D into military 
applications of quartz 
technology (DSTO – 200 
million) 
PROJECT DPAMDS 
• Medium-range HEL missile 
defense system investment – 
US$1.5 billion (project). 
• Short-range THEL missile 
defense system investment – 
US$500 million (project). 
PROJECT BOLDEAGLE 
• Airborne and FEL TMD 
investment – US$50 million 
(per year). 
PROJECT STINGRAY 
• Ship board Diode Pumped 
Solid State Laser project 
investment – US$500 
million. 
• Integration cost – US$100 
million (per ship). 
Possible 
Collaborations 
1. US, Japan 
2. US, France, Japan, China, 
Germany 
3. Japan, US, China 
4. Japan, China, US 
1. Commercial space launching 
projects with Japan, 
Germany, US, Russia, China 
and other Asian countries. 
2. Energy R&D - Japan, US. 
1. Commercial space launching 
projects with Japan, 
Germany, US, Russia, China 
and other Asian countries. 
2. Energy R&D - Japan, US. 
PROJECT DPAMDS 
• HEL – US and Japan 
• THEL – US, Israel and 
Japan 
PROJECT BOLDEAGLE 
• TMD –US and Japan 
PROJECT STINGRAY 
• Shipboard Laser missile 
defense system – US 
Economic Benefits  • Space industries contribute 
an increase of 0.5% of GDP 
during this epoch  
• Energy export contributes an 
increase of 1% of GDP 
during this epoch (oil 1.5 
million barrels per day, coal 
300 Mmst, LNG 90 Tcf) 
• Space industries contribute 
an increase of 0.75% of GDP 
during this epoch. 
• Energy export continues to 
contribute and increase of 
1.5% of GDP during this 
epoch. 
• New niche market in 
miniature high-density 
energy storage device and 
fuel cell contributes an 
increase of 0.25% of GDP 
during this epoch. 
 
• Space industries contribute 
an increase of 0.75% of 
GDP during this epoch. 
• Energy export continues to 
contribute and increase of 
1.5% of GDP during this 
epoch. 
• New niche market in 
miniature high-density 
energy storage device and 
fuel cell contributes an 
increase of 0.25% of GDP 
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Mathematical Model for Passive Sonar Detection (based on Harpoon II simulation software) 
 
Introduction 
This appendix shows how the passive sonar submarine detection capability of the various Royal 
Australian Navy (RAN) vessels in the SLOC protection scenario described in epoch 4’s net 
assessment section. The following model is used by the Harpoon II simulation software to 
generate detection of submarines in the SLOC (refer to Figure 33, page 4-158) by the RAN 
maritime patrols. This model is extracted from “Harpoon II Sonar Model” explanation 




Every seaborne object (ship, submarine, torpedo) in Harpoon II has a basis sonar cross-section 
giving the emitted noise level at ultraquiet speed (<=5kts). Depending on its speed, it emits 
sound to each of the three frequency bands at the noise level Lt:  
 
Lt  =  PSCS   +  ( mv,t * vt,eff  +  Gv )         [dB] 
PSCS :   target passive sonar cross-section from the HII database 
vt,eff :   effective target speed 
             vt <= 5 kts :  vt,eff = 0         vt > 5 kts :  vt,eff = vt - 5 kt 
mv,t :   target noise increase with  speed 
            vt < 20kts :  mv,t = 1.30 dB/kts         vt >= 20kts :  mv,t = 0.65 dB/kts 
Gv :   basis noise level increase for high speeds 
         vt < 20kts :  Gv = 0      vt >= 20kts :  Gv = ( 20 - 5 ) * ( 1.30 - 0.65 ) = 9.75 dB  
The engine type and the HII Shrouded Propulsor and Advanced Propulsor flags for submarines 
do not have any effect on the target noise. 
Ambient Noise 
The ambient noise level La is:  
La  =  La,0  +  mw,p * ssl         [dB] 
La,0 :   ambient noise basis level 
            LF :  La,0 = 95 dB         MF :  La,0 = 89 dB         HF :  La,0 = 89 dB 
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mw,p :   noise increase by weather 
             mw,p = 5 dB/(sea state level) 
ssl :   sea state level  
It is assumed that the ambient noise level does not vary with depth.  
Sensor Background Noise (Passive)  
The passive sonar also receives noise from its own platform. The intensity Lr is:  
Lr  =  PSCS  +  mv,r * vr         [dB] 
PSCS :   receiver passive sonar cross-section from the HII database 
mv,r :   receiver noise increase by speed 
LF :  mv,r = 3.6 dB/kts         MF :  mv,r = 4.2 dB/kts         HF :  mv,r = 5.5 dB/kts 
vr :   receiver speed  
It is assumed that cavitation at high speeds has no effect on Lr. 
The total intensity Lb,p is normally equal the ambient noise level La. When Lr is close to or even 
higher than the ambient noise level, the sensor background noise then is:  
Lb  =   10 * log10[ 10^( Lr / 10 )  +  10^( La / 10 ) ]         [dB] 
Gb  =  ( Lb  -  La ) / mb         [dB] 
Lb,p  =  La  +  Gb         [dB] 
mb :   background noise reduction factor 
          LF :  mb = 2.5         MF :  mb = 2.9         HF :  mb = 3.7  
The logarithmic addition of Lr and La can easily be done with the table below. 
    Lr - La         SUM( Lr, La )   [dB]     
> 9 Lr 
9 Lr + 0.5 
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8 Lr + 0.6 
7 Lr + 0.8 
6 Lr + 1.0 
5 Lr + 1.2 
4 Lr + 1.5 
3 Lr + 1.8 
2 Lr + 2.1 
1 Lr + 2.5 
0 Lr + 3.0 
-1 La + 2.5 
-2 La + 2.1 
-3 La + 1.8 
-4 La + 1.5 
-5 La + 1.2 
-6 La + 1.0 
-7 La + 0.8 
-8 La + 0.6 
-9 La + 0.5 




Condition for Passive Detection 
A target is detected by passive sonar at the range R with:  
Lt  -  { 20 * log10( R )  +  md * R }  -  Lb,p  >=  Gs,p 
md   :   dispersion factor 
        LF:   md  =  0.17 dB/nm         MF:   md  =   1.1 dB/nm         HF:   md  =  3.8 dB/nm 
Gs,p :   sensor Passive Sensitivity from the database  
Depth differences between target and receiver do no have any effects on the detection range (no 
thermal layer). At convergence zones the target noise which reaches the receiver is slightly 
increased (ca. 3-5 dB). With  
20 * log10( R )  +  md * R  =  Gd( R )  
and the table below the detection range can be quickly estimated. 
   R [nm]       LF:   Gd( R )       MF:   Gd( R )       HF:   Gd( R )    
2 6.4 8.2 13.6 
3 10.1 12.8 20.9 
4 12.7 16.4 27.2 
5 14.8 19.5 33.0 
6 16.6 22.2 38.4 
7 18.1 24.6 43.5 
8 19.4 26.9 48.5 
9 20.6 29.0 53.3 
10 21.7 31.0 58.0 
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11 22.7 32.9 62.6 
12 23.6 34.8 67.2 
13 24.5 36.6 71.7 
14 25.3 38.3 76.1 
15 26.1 40.0 80.5 
16 26.8 41.7 84.9 
17 27.5 43.3 89.2 
18 28.2 44.9 93.5 
19 28.8 46.5 97.8 
20 29.4 48.0 102.0 
21 30.1 49.5 106.2 
22 30.6 51.0 110.4 
23 31.1 52.5 114.6 
24 31.7 54.0 118.8 
25 32.2 55.5 123.0 
26 32.7 56.9 127.1 
27 33.2 58.3 131.2 
28 33.7 59.7 135.3 
29 34.2 61.1 139.4 
30 34.6 62.5 143.5 
31 35.1 63.9 147.6 
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32 35.5 65.3 151.7 




List of Acronyms 
 
AAAV  Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
AAR  Air-to-Air Refueling 
AAW  Anti-aircraft Weapon 
AB  Airbase 
ABARE Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics  
ACRES Australian Center for Remote Sensing  
ADCAP  Advanced Capability Torpedo 
ADF  Australian Defense Force  
AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control 
AMRAAM Advance Medium Range Anti-Aircraft Missile 
APC Armored Personnel Carrier 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
ASLAV Australian Light Armored Vehicle 
ASW  Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ASuW  Anti-Surface Warfare 
Bde  Brigade 
Bst  Billion Short Tons  
BVR Beyond Visual Range 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Intelligence, 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance  
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization 
CVBG Carrier Battle Group  
CVN Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear) 
dB Decibel 
DC Direct Current 
DDG  Guided Missile Destroyer 
DEW Directed Energy Weapon 
Div  Division 
DNB Darwin Naval Base 
DPAMDS  Darwin Port Anti-Missile Defense System 
DSTO  Defense Science and Technology Organization 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
EO  Electronic Optic 
ESSM  Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 
EWSP  Electronic Warfare Self Protection 
FEL  Free Electron Laser 
FFG  Guided Missile Frigate 
FPDA  Five Power Defense Agreement  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HALS  Heavy Amphibious Lift Ship 
HEL    High Energy Laser 
HF  High Frequency 
HQ  Headquarters 
IMV  Infantry Mobility Vehicle  
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Inf  Infantry 
INTERFET International Force East Timor  
IOC  Initial Operating Capability 
IR  Infrared 
IT  Information Technology 
JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
JORN  Jindalee Operational Radar Network 
JSDF  Japanese Self-Defense Force  
LCH  Landing Craft Heavy 
LCM  Landing Craft Medium 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
LPA  Landing Platform Auxiliary 
MAG  Maritime Action Group 
MCM  Mine Countermeasure ship 
Mmst  Million Short Tons  
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
MPA  Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
MRA  Multi-Role Auxiliary 
MW  Mega-watt 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NM  Nautical Mile 
NORFORCE Northwest Mobile Force 
NSW  New South Wales 
OTH  Over-the-Horizon 
PB  Patrol Boats 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
PSCS  Passive Sonar Cross Section  
R&D  Research and Development 
RAAF  Royal Australian Air Force 
RAN  Royal Australian Navy 
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific 
SA  South Australia 
SAM  Surface to Air Missile 
SAR  Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SAS  Special Air Service 
SASR  Special Air Service Regiment 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SCS  South China Sea 
SLOC  Sea Lines of Communication 
SNA  Static Net Assessment  
SS  Attack Submarine (Conventional) 
SSN  Attack Submarine (Nuclear) 
TBM  Theater Ballistic Missile  
Tcf  Trillion Cubic Feet 
TG  Task Group 
THEL  Tactical High Energy Laser 
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TMD  Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
TNI  Indonesian Defense Force 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN  United Nations 
USMC  United States Marine Corps 
UUV  Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
WA  Western Australia 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
































Commander Timothy S. Luffy 
United States Navy 
 
 Commander Timothy S. Luffy was born in Phoenix, Arizona.  He 
graduated from Coronado High School in Scottsdale, Arizona in 1978.  
While in high school, he was a member of the National Honor Society and 
the varsity wrestling team.  CDR Luffy graduated with merit from the 
United States Naval Academy in 1983, earning a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aerospace 
Engineering.  Following commissioning, he attended Nuclear Power School in Orlando, Florida 
and then reported for prototype training in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
 
 After completion of basic submarine training in February 1985, CDR Luffy reported to 
his first sea duty assignment onboard USS GURNARD (SSN 662) homeported in San Diego, 
California. The ship completed a regular overhaul at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, post overhaul 
certifications and training, and a Western Pacific deployment.  He served as the Reactor Controls 
Assistant, Damage Control Assistant, and Communicator.  He transferred to the staff of 
Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet in November 1988 where he served as a 
Command Center Watch Officer and the Hawaii Area Local Operations Officer. 
 
 In January 1991, CDR Luffy reported to his next submarine assignment as Engineer 
Officer onboard USS SAM HOUSTON (SSN 609) homeported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.  The 
ship completed an Operational Reactor Safeguards Examination and was subsequently 
transferred to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for decommissioning.  Following advanced 
submarine training, he returned to Pearl Harbor as Navigator and Operations Officer onboard 
USS TUNNY (SSN 682).  During this tour, the ship completed several Eastern Pacific and two 
extended Western Pacific deployments.  Following his second department head tour, CDR Luffy 
returned to the staff of Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet in November 1994 
where he served as the Special Projects Officer.  In this capacity, CDR Luffy exercised 
operational oversight of several highly specialized submarine operations, the Navy’s deep 
submergence and submarine rescue operations, and naval special warfare assets. 
 
 Following Prospective Executive Officer training, CDR Luffy reported as Executive 
Officer of USS MARYLAND (SSBN 738) (BLUE) in King's Bay, Georgia in May 1997.   He 
completed three strategic deterrent patrols in support of the nation’s strategic deterrence mission. 
 
 CDR Luffy reported to the Naval Postgraduate School in April 1999 for advanced 
education.  He graduated from the Systems Engineering and Integration curriculum in March 
2001 with a Masters of Science degree in Systems Integration.   
 
 CDR Luffy's personal awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy/Marine 
Corps Commendation Medal (four awards), the Navy/Marine Corps Achievement Medal, the 
Battle Efficiency "E" (three awards), the Navy Expeditionary Medal, the National Defense 
Service Medal (two awards), and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (two awards). 
 
 CDR Luffy is married to the former Elizabeth Higgins of Atlanta, Georgia. They have 





Major Mark Teo 
Singapore Army 
 
Major Mark Teo is a graduate of the prestigious Australian Defense 
Force Academy (ADFA), class of 1993. He attended ADFA as a winner of 
the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Overseas Training Award in 1990. Major Teo graduated 
from ADFA with a Bachelors of Science degree majoring in Computer Science with First Class 
Honors. He subsequently attended the Royal Military College, Duntroon (Australia), to undergo 
officer cadet training and graduated in 1994 as a Lieutenant in the Singapore Army. 
 On return to Singapore from his studies, Major Teo was promoted to the rank of Captain 
and held command of a Division Signal Platoon specializing in advanced military wide-area 
communications network. After his ground tour, he was reassigned to the Signal Formation 
Headquarters as a Staff Officer. During this tour, Major Teo was instrumental in the success of 
numerous Army C4I acquisition projects. He received a formation level commendation award 
for his outstanding contribution to the Signal Formation in 1998.   
 Major Teo assumed command of the Signal Company in the 4th Singapore Armored 
Regiment in 1998 and had gained much operational experience in armored fighting concepts and 
provision of communications support for a rapid movement force. Major Teo was promoted to 
his current rank in 1999. On completion of his command tour, he was awarded the coveted SAF 
Postgraduate Award and selected to attend the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California, USA. 
Major Teo graduated from NPS in 2001 with a Masters of Science degree in Systems 






Lieutenant Gerald R. McMurray 
United States Navy 
 
Lieutenant McMurray was raised in Alexandria, Virginia and 
graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1992 with a 
Bachelors of Science in Economics.  While at the academy, he was a 
member of the Brigade Boxing Team and the Honor Council.  After a brief assignment at the 
Pentagon, he reported to Pensacola, Florida for flight training.  He received his Naval Flight 
Officer wings in August of 1994 and was assigned to the Shamrocks of VS-41 for fleet 
replacement training in the S-3B Viking.  Upon completion he received orders to the VS-29 
Dragonfires and deployed to the Western Pacific aboard the USS KITTY HAWK in 1996.  
During his second deployment on the USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70) he participated in 
Operation Desert Fox and Southern Watch.  While with the Dragonfires, LT McMurray earned 
qualifications as Air Wing Strike Lead, Mission Commander, Staff TAO, NATOPS, and 
Instrument Instructor.  He held the positions of NATOPS, SUW/Conventional Weapons, 
Training and Readiness, Information Systems and Division Officer.   
He reported to the Naval Postgraduate School in June of 1999 where he is currently 
completing a double masters degree program in Systems Engineering and Integration (SEI) and 
Financial Management.  He is currently slated to report to CINCPACFLT in Hawaii to become a 
Tomahawk Planning Officer.   
Lieutenant McMurray has accumulated over 1200 flight hours, over 350 carrier landings 
and over 700 parachute jumps.  LT McMurray’s awards and decorations include the Navy 
Achievement Medal (two awards) and various unit and service awards.   
LT McMurray is married to the former Andrea Renny of Rio De Janeiro, Brazil who is 





Captain Jason Boon Hwa Lee 
Singapore Army 
 
CPT Lee joined the Singapore Armed Forces in December 
1989.  He was commissioned as an officer in December 1990 after 
graduating from the Officer Cadet School.  In December 1990, he 
attended the Armour Infantry Officer Course, after which he assumed his duties at the School of 
Armour as an instructor for a period of 6 months.  In 1991, he was awarded the SAF Academic 
Training Award (LTA) to further his education at the National University of Singapore, 
graduating with a Bachelors degree in Mechanical Engineering (First Class Honors).   
In June 1995, CPT Lee reported back to active duty at the 46th Battalion, Singapore 
Armoured Regiment to assume the appointment as a Platoon commander where he served for 
one year.  In 1996, CPT Lee attended Company Tactics Course (CTC) and Basic Airborne 
Course (BAC) before being assigned to the HQ Armour as a Staff Officer in the Weapons Staff 
branch.   
In 1998, CPT Lee attended the Armour Officer Advance Course (AOAC) before serving 
his Officer Commanding tour in the 42nd Battalion, Singapore Armoured Regiment.   
In September 1999, CPT Lee was awarded the Specialist Postgraduate Scholarship, he 
attended the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, USA, where he received a 
Master of Science in Systems Integration.  Upon graduation, CPT Lee was reassigned to the 






Australia in Orbit: Space Policy and Programs  
(http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1997-98/98cib12.htm (home page)) 
 
Australia in Orbit: Space Policy and Program, written by Mathew James, Technology Advisor, 
Science, Technology, Environmental and Resource Group. 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(http://www.abs.gov.au (home page)) 
 
Bostock, Ian. Australia devises multi-role ship. Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2000 
(http://www.janes.com/regional_news/asia_pacific/news/jdw/jdw000718_1_n.shtml) 
 
Colin Powell in US Senate Confirmation Hearing. January 2001 
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Harpoon 2 is a computer based war-gaming software used to simulate world conflicts with 
realistic algorithms to determine the results of maritime engagements. This software was used 
extensively for the dynamic net assessment simulations for this study. Harpoon 2 was originally 
created by Larry Bond and was published in 1995 by 360 Software (Inc). 
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Executive Summary 
 
Diplomatic relations in East Asia during the past twenty years (2001-2021) 
evolved from individual hedging strategies for an uncertain future to a triangular balance 
of power involving China, Japan, and the United States.  The relative influence of the 
three powers shifted during the century. The declining role of America and the gradual 
ascension of both China and Japan have yet to force other Asian states to choose sides 
among the three. However these three states are each beginning to assert pressure on 
others to shift the balance in their own favor.  
In Japan the economic reforms instituted by the new Progressive Political Party in 
2001 resulted in drastic restructuring that thoroughly changed its economy.  These 
reforms produced Japan’s trade and financial resurgence.  In 2006 the rejection of Japan’s 
attempt to gain a permanent UN Security Council seat perpetuated Japanese domestic 
opinion that it could no longer rely on economics alone as a means to gain international 
prestige. Additionally, the draw down of US forces in Korea in 2006 caused Japan to 
question the nature of America’s commitment to Japanese defense resulting in increased 
efforts to attain military autonomy. The peaceful reconciliation of Taiwan with the PRC 
in 2008 accomplished one of China’s primary national objectives, the reintegration of all 
former Chinese lands (Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan).  This reunification allowed 
China to become more assertive in the South China Sea presenting increased threats to 
Japanese security.  Korean reunification in 2016 and subsequent reduction of US troops 
in Japan beginning in 2020 has caused Japanese force planners to temper efforts toward 
Defense of Japan  
 5 - 2  
military autonomy via the maintenance of the US-Japan security agreement as a hedge 
against alarming Japan’s neighbors.     
Domestically, the institutional reforms mentioned above resulted in significant 
short-term pain but long-term dividends as Japan’s GDP maintained positive growth from 
2006 onward. Japanese producers increased automation and advanced capital-intensive 
means of production.  Concurrently the government encouraged more women to join the 
labor force and prolonged the participation of older workers. Government promotion of 
spending on education, training, and research and development also contributed to the 
positive economic climate. Japan continued to diversify its sources of energy during the 
twenty-year period.  Dependence on oil imports decreased by nearly 12% from 2010 
levels and by 20% since 2000.  Domestic generation and cooperative endeavors with 
Russia and Australia has lessened oil dependence to 1/3 of Japan’s total. While not fully 
self-reliant for energy production, Japan has limited vulnerabilities by both diversifying 
fossil fuel suppliers and promoting means of internal generation. 
Japan’s defense strategy hinged on self-reliance throughout the scenario.  Driven 
by the geopolitical situation outlined above, Japan’s strategic vision became the twin 
pillars of defense and deterrence.  Under the pillar of defense, Japan sought a force 
capable of responding to the full spectrum of warfare. The JSDF also implemented a 
long-term plan to indigenously manufacture and field large numbers of long-range 
conventional missiles to fulfill the role of deterrence.  Japan continued to adhere to the 
US-Japan Security Arrangements.  These agreements were continuously re-evaluated due 
to realignments in the regional power structure but remained integral to Japan’s defense 
strategy.   
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Force structure implementations resulted in a Japanese military in 2020 that is 
self-sufficient for homeland defense, has an advanced and comprehensive C4ISR system, 
and has state-of-the-art weapon systems produced indigenously (including a large 
conventional missile force).  The JSDF at 2020 also has several weaknesses: the lack of a 
nuclear deterrent, comprehensive missile defense, and robust ASW solutions.  To limit its 
strategic vulnerabilities, Japan must address these deficiencies, further diversify energy 
sources and strive for continued self-sufficiency in all three components of national 
power: economic, military, and political.   
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A. Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005) 
1. Foreign Policy 
The Asia-Pacific region is subject to uncertainties and surprises in the post-Cold 
War era as demonstrated by the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan and the missile launch 
over Japan by North Korea. Given this security environment, Japan embraces a three-
pronged security policy: firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, 
building Japan's defenses, and making diplomatic efforts towards international peace and 
security.  
Under our Constitution, Japan has built its defense in accordance with the 
principles of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power 
posing a threat to other countries. With ever-increasing interdependence, the stability and 
prosperity of Japan is inevitably linked to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific 
region and of the world. Efforts must be made at various levels while maintaining the 
U.S. military presence, namely: (1) resolution of individual conflicts and confrontations; 
(2) bilateral and multilateral dialogues and cooperation toward regional stability; (3) 
political and security-related dialogues and cooperation toward increasing the policy 
transparency of the Asia-Pacific countries and building confidence among them; and (4) 
the achievement of greater regional political stability through support and cooperation in 
the economic development of countries in the region.1 
The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, released in September 1997, 
created a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal 
circumstances and during contingencies. In addition, ensuring the effectiveness of the 
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Guidelines and effectively advancing Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the 
Guidelines will foreshadow bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against 
Japan and mutual cooperation planning for areas surrounding Japan. Further development 
of defense technology exchanges between Japan and the United States occur within the 
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Since the end of the Cold War, weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missiles have proliferated, and ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
has become an important task in Japan's defenses.  
Japan has developed closer intra-regional dialogues through sustained summit 
diplomacy with the major regional powers and also worked on building intra-regional 
confidence through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for region-wide political and 
security-related dialogues and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Further, Japan has recently 
been promoting security- and defense-related dialogues with countries such as the 
People's Republic of China, Indonesia and Thailand, with the first-ever security dialogue 
with the Republic of Korea. Other forms of multilateral cooperation in the region include 
cooperation spearheaded by Japan, the United States and the ROK to contain North 
Korean nuclear weapon development and the Four-Party Meeting, with members ROK, 
the US, the PRC and North Korea.2 
 
2. The International Military Situation - Overview 
More than a decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, yet we seem no 
closer to the emergence of a stable international order. Rather, the combinations of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/index.html (1999 Japanese Diplomatic Blue Book) 
2 ibid. 
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political, economic, military, and social factors that have undermined stability during 
much of the 1990s remain at play. The most important of these include: 
a. Significant continuing uncertainties, especially regarding the future of 
Russia, China, Indonesia, the Middle East, and the Korean peninsula.  
b. Rogue states, groups, and individuals are willing to engage in violence to 
improve their position and undermine order.   
c. Rapid technological development (particularly in the areas of information 
processing, biotechnology, communications, nanotechnology, and weapons) 
enables groups to exert inordinate influence relative to their economic and 
military clout.  
d. Global defense spending continues to decline. Nations (including Japan) 
are not keeping pace with the US military in technology. This has spurred some 
toward asymmetric options, widened the gap between US and Japanese forces, 
reduced the number of allied redundant systems, and increased Japanese demand 
on unique US force capabilities such as satellites, JSTARS, AWACS etc.  
e. Pressures continue to result from unfavorable demographic developments. 
By 2020, developing world population will increase some 25% while Japan’s 
declines. Meanwhile, some 20-30 million of the world's poorest people move into 
urban areas each year. These trends will continue to stress the resources, 
infrastructure, and leadership of states throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. 
f. Growing disparities in global wealth and resource distribution continue to 
exacerbate north-south and inter-regional tensions. One quarter of the world's 
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population (the developed world) controls nearly 80% of today's wealth and 
consumes the great majority of the world's resources. The numbers will probably 
get worse (from the developing world's perspective) during the next 15 years. 
g. The changing structure, role, adaptability, and influence of familiar Cold 
War entities – the UN, NATO, the nation state,  – and the increasing presence and 
impact of NGOs, brings greater uncertainty to the way policy is made and 
implemented in the post-Cold War era. 
h. Many individuals, groups, and states fear the global expansion and 
perceived dominance of Western (especially US) values, ideals, culture, and 
institutions. Efforts to resist, halt, or undo this trend will spur anti-Western 
sentiments and behavior. 
i. International drug cultivation, production, transport, and use will remain a 
major source of instability, both within drug producing, transit, and target 
countries, and between trafficking and consumer nations.  
j. Ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions will remain a motivation for and 
source of conflict in much of the world. As the situation in Kosovo demonstrated, 
ethnic-based conflict is often brutal and intractable. 
k. A combination of factors – many of those listed above, plus inadequate 
infrastructure and health facilities, resource shortages, natural disasters, 
epidemics, and insufficient local, regional, and global response capabilities – have 
combined to increase the numbers of people requiring international humanitarian 
assistance. According to UN assessments, some 35-40 million people worldwide 
needed aid each year during the 1990s, compared to slightly more than 20 million 
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in 1985. Likewise, the number, size, cost, and duration of UN and other ‘peace 
operations' have risen significantly since the late 1980s.3  
These factors create the conditions in which threats and challenges emerge, and 
define the context in which Japanese strategy, interests, and forces operate. Collectively, 
they foster a complex, dynamic, and dangerous global security environment.  No power, 
condition, or circumstance is likely to emerge during the next 10 years capable of 
transcending this general instability and imposing a new global order. Accordingly, we 
can expect the global dynamic will continue to spur numerous crises, hotspots, and issues 
that will directly affect Japanese policy and interests.  
 
3. The International Military Situation – Specific Nations 
a. The Koreas 
It is expected that the Korean peninsula will be undergoing reunification within 
the next two decades. If the reunification process goes according to South Korea's plans, 
the economies of the current two states will be kept separate initially and then merged 
slowly over a period of perhaps 10 years.  The South Koreans want to avoid the problems 
that Germany has encountered in reunifying quickly.  If this is so, North Korea will 
continue to be a source of short-term weapon proliferation. Once reunification begins, the 
capabilities of both states will be merged and the balance of power in East Asia will 
likely shift.4  
                                                 
3 Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson  (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), Statement Before The Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence. Military Threats and Security Challenges Through 2015. February 2, 
2000.  
4http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/advocate/ifpa/index.html. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 
1997. 
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In the near-term, North Korea poses a clear proliferation threat. It has developed 
an independent nuclear production cycle, an estimated 1-5 nuclear weapons, biological 
weapons, and a huge stockpile of toxic materials. In addition, North Korea is developing 
an indigenous missile industry aided by funding from Iran, Chinese training of hundreds 
of  North Koreans in missile technologies, imported Russian nuclear and missile 
technicians, and access to other Russian expertise via electronic mail. Since North Korea 
began full missile production runs in 1987, it is believed to have produced 80-120 Scud 
B/C missiles per year. Current Scud production is thought to be only Scud C models, 
which have a range of 500-600 km.5  
As for the new and more complex Nodong-1 missiles, it is estimated that North 
Korea could generate an annual output of 30-50 units if Scud production were halted. The 
Nodong-1 is a based on Scud technology but incorporating a longer fuel tank and using a 
cluster of four engines to give it a range of 1000-1300 km carrying a warhead payload of 
700-1000 kg.  From North Korea, the Nodong's range arc covers most of Japan.  Looking 
to the future, North Korea’s test firing of its next-generation missile system, the Taepo 
Dong6 (TD) in 1998, is obviously targeted at Japan. Although these missile systems 
remain in their infancy, reports indicate that the TD-1 is an 18-meter-long missile with a 
range of 1500-2000 km. It is believed that the TD-2 version will be constructed by adding 
a 14-meter-long thruster on top of a Taepo Dong- 1 body to create a two-stage system. 
Although there is some controversy concerning the expected range of the TD-2, it seems 
likely that the missile will have a range arc that lies in the 4000-6000 km band while 
                                                 
5 Ibid 
6 This refers to the same missile as Korean’s Daepo-dong missile. 
Defense of Japan 2005 
 5 - 11   
carrying a 1000 kg warhead7. Intelligence indicates that the TD-2 is currently ready for 
initial deployment (2005).  
Obviously, missile sales could provide North Korea with desperately needed 
foreign exchange, oil, or food aid. Moreover, there are reports that North Korea is 
transferring technology on chemical and biological weapons, with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and 
Libya being specifically cited as recipient nations. As North Korea is already believed to 
have the ability to manufacture bomblet technology for its ballistic missile warheads, it 
seems likely that it has developed submunition packaging for CW and BW agents.  
In the short term, South Korea is understandably concerned about the North's 
nuclear, missile, and military capabilities in general, but long-term, it is more worried 
about Japan's nuclear and missile potential. In a sense, however, these concerns 
complement and reinforce South Korea's growing desire to see a united Korean peninsula 
play an influential role in East Asia during the next century--an era that many in the 
Asian community believe will become known as "the Asian century."  
South Korea has an extensive nuclear power industry that includes 11 atomic 
power plants. Moreover, the work that was done during the 1970s on developing a 
nuclear weapon reportedly reached the point where it was about 95 percent complete 
before pressure from the United States halted its development8. Essentially, South Korea 
has the knowledge and skills to become a nuclear power very rapidly if it so chooses. 
Since its nuclear industry is under IAEA safeguards, its biggest obstacle to becoming a 
nuclear power is access to weapons-grade material. This obstacle could be overcome if 
South Korea gained access to Russian fissile material or was able to circumvent IAEA 
                                                 
7 ibid 
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safeguards. There have been a few reports that indicate that South Korea may have been 
the intended destination for some intercepted weapons-grade fissile material that was 
being smuggled out of Russia9. When these reports are linked to other reports that 
indicate that South Korea is pursuing the development or acquisition of dual-use 
technology that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons, it seems to show a 
circumstantial pattern of activity which indicates that South Korea may either be planning 
to develop a nuclear weapon or is taking precautionary action to ensure that it could 
assemble a nuclear arsenal within a short period of time.  
As for delivery systems, South Korea has been pursuing missile technology. 
Although hampered by a 1979 bilateral US-ROK accord (reaffirmed in 1990) which 
limited its right to develop ballistic missiles to those with a range of 180 km or less, 
South Korea is working to abolish this accord and join the missile technology control 
regime (MTCR) which would limit its military missile development to 300 km, but allow 
it to pursue space-launch vehicle development. By 2015, South Korea has ambitions of 
having 19 space satellites in geosynchronous orbit (using its own launch vehicles). 
Studies have shown that space launch capabilities are not commercially viable since 
excess capacity exists among the established launch providers and there are suspicions 
that South Korea is interested in developing  it as a hedge against needing its own missile 
force.  
Upon reunification, South Korea will gain access to the missile capabilities being 
developed by North Korea. As such, North Korea's CW, BW, and nuclear weapons and 
technology are likely to be joined to South Korea's advanced technological capabilities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 ibid 
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South Korea is believed to have conducted research on CW and BW. Consequently, a 
united Korea could well become a nuclear, chemical, and biologically armed power with 
IRBM or ICBM delivery capabilities sometime shortly after reunification. Of course, 
how the reality of this potential capability plays out is highly dependent on the political 
moves and events that unfold during the next 10 or so years.  
South Korean officials, looking beyond reunification, are focusing on the role that 
a reunified Korean peninsula will likely play in East Asia. They seem to believe that 
Korea will be able to leverage its peninsular geographic position and its military power in 
ways that will allow it to play an influential role in the region. Many Koreans claim that a 
reunified Korea will be the France of East Asia--an ally of the United States, but one that 
charts its own independent course. Within the new regional order, Korea sees for itself 
the role of mediator between Washington and Beijing. Within the new envisioned era, 
they seem to believe that China is a state with which Korea can deal. As one ranking 
Korean official noted, China is "a benign giant" that could cause pain if he "accidentally 
stepped on you while walking through the neighborhood," but was unlikely--in the 
Korean experience--to strike out intentionally10. According to this official, there are other 
smaller countries [implying Japan] that have more often acted like deliberate predators. 
As is repeated often in Seoul, Korea has had 5000 years of experience in handling its 
larger neighbor, all of which gives Seoul a more balanced perspective on the China threat 
than that being voiced in Tokyo or Washington. It seems clear that Korean policy makers 
expect a united Korea to have close and friendly relations with China.  
                                                                                                                                                 
9 ibid 
10 ibid 
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As for its future relations with Russia, Korean thinkers still seem somewhat wary 
of the Bear, yet there does not seem to be much fear that an adversarial relationship might 
develop between the two countries. Rather, it is its historic enemy, Japan, which most 
concerns many Koreans. It is understood that relations between Japan and Korea may 
again turn hostile as the new regional order in East Asia evolves. In the event that Japan 
finds itself at odds with the Koreans, the United States could be placed in the role of 
playing peacemaker or be forced to choose sides. In short, Japan (and possibly the United 
States) might find itself facing a difficult situation in Northeast Asia if Korea, Russia, and 
China form a de facto alliance against Japan. 
 
b. China 
Modern China is very patriotic, imbued with a collective sense of 5000 years of 
glorious history, a history blotted by 140 years of humiliation by the Western 
imperialistic powers during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Unfortunately, this sense of 
humiliation still irritates China's national psyche and colors its policy development. Any 
Chinese leader who appears to bow to Western pressure on issues involving China's 
rights as a sovereign nation stands in danger of being purged. For practical purposes, this 
means that the Western tendency to conduct confrontational diplomacy via the news 
media puts Chinese leaders in the position of having to oppose Western initiatives for 
fear that acquiescence would appear as yielding to Western imperialistic power. 
China's political leadership has been weakened with Deng Xiao Ping's passing. 
This weakness has allowed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to increase its influence 
in China's political decision-making process. Deng, with his credentials as one of the old 
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revolutionary leaders, was in a position to deal with pressure from the West in a fairly 
pragmatic manner, secure from charges that he was unwilling to stand up to the Western 
imperialists. The current leadership, lacking the stature bequeathed on their predecessors 
by their participation in China's revolution, has much less flexibility in handling 
international issues. The possibility that a Western power could try to pressure Chinese 
policy publicly and inadvertently trigger a military confrontation is increased by China's 
internal political weakness.  
China's prickly national sensitivity toward sovereignty issues is coupled to a 
national legacy of Confucian values in which the world is viewed in terms of an absolute 
hierarchy. Within this philosophy, the idea of a relationship between sovereign equals is a 
foreign concept. In practical terms, as the Chinese view themselves as being the world's 
greatest civilization, the Confucian philosophy imbues this ancient civilization with a 
cultural orientation that suggests that China should lead the world. Thus, as China 
continues to grow in economic and military might, it should be expected that the country 
would exercise its power and become more assertive in international affairs. This could 
result in tense relations with Japan and the United States, especially as China sees the 
status of Taiwan as being its number one national sovereignty issue.  It is questionable, 
however, if China will be able to integrate itself into the current U.S.-led international 
system without creating significant levels of turmoil. Complicating the process is the fact 
that China's leaders distrust the West. This distrust stems from three primary factors. The 
first is leaders who are provincial in their thought processes and have little understanding 
of the West. Second, these leaders feel personally threatened by Western talk of a 
"peaceful democratic evolution" of China's government, an evolution that would displace 
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them personally from power. And lastly, the lessons of China's history over the past two 
centuries argue against being too trusting of the West, conditioning Chinese leaders to 
view the international system in terms of realpolitik.  
Against this backdrop of distrust and fear, the Chinese view the United States as 
having vast powers that enable it to manipulate events--a situation that possibly carries 
the seeds for future misinterpretations and confrontations. For example, in the event that 
China is set back in its quest to modernize its economy and expand its global presence, it 
may well hold the United States responsible for its failures, believing that the U.S. 
interfered with China's economic development for the purpose of eliminating its potential 
rival, China, from the contest for future global leadership.  
Within this evolving situation, the question is now, "How will China use its future 
military capabilities in pursuit of its national interests?" Historically, China has not been 
viewed as an expansionistic nation. The South Koreans see China as a benign giant that 
would not deliberately inflict harm. On the other hand, China has used force offensively 
on a number of occasions during the latter half of the 20th century: China forcibly 
colonized Tibet in the 1950s, attacked India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. More recently, 
it used military force to press its territorial claims in the South China Sea, to the 
consternation of the ASEAN nations. Likewise, China demonstrated disregard for its 
economic interests with Taiwan when it attempted to use military intimidation to 
influence Taiwan's March 1996 presidential elections. These two events seem to indicate 
that China may not be much dissuaded by economic considerations in cases where it 
believes key national interests are at stake and the use of military force is judged to be a 
viable option. At the same time, there are many in China who are hesitant to see the 
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country become too strong militarily because they fear it will antagonize China's 
neighbors and could affect commercial interests.  
It is difficult to define China's national objectives.  Analysis of reports, leadership 
statements, and Chinese activities, taken together, provide sufficient insight to make an 
informed assessment. China's key objectives seem to be to develop China's economic and 
technological potential under the continued leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), to secure future energy supplies (South China Sea, Central Asia, and the Middle 
East), and to reunify all Chinese lands by 2010 (Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan).    
China, and particularly the members of the CCP, believes that the future fate of 
the country and of the party is, to a large extent, dependent upon sustained economic 
growth rates in the vicinity of 10 percent per year. If economic growth declined to 6-7 
percent, China could have difficulty creating the 10 million or so jobs it needs each year 
to keep pace with its growing population. For China's leadership, economic growth is 
seen as necessary to validate the legitimacy of the government.  Until recently, China's 
political leadership has allowed economic growth to occur with little direction. China 
now hopes to change this situation.  
Japan taught the world that it was not necessary to reinvent the economic wheel--
a country can buy new technology and leapfrog into the future. The Chinese hope to use 
Japan's example and develop a more disciplined economic policy that will allow them to 
catch up to the developed world in 15-20 years (Japan took 30 years from 1950 to 1980).  
China hopes to re-centralize some of its economic planning activities and has tasked the 
State Planning Commission to define China's economic trajectory for the rest of the 
decade and beyond. Apparently, China hopes to adopt an industrial policy for its 
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commercial firms based on the Japanese model of grouping its industries and linking 
customer firms with captive supplier companies (keiretsu groupings). For China's defense 
industries, however, Chinese officials seem to believe that the United States' defense 
industrial policy provides the better model for China to emulate.  
As economies develop around the globe, the demand for oil will also increase. 
China only has about 2.4 percent of the world's total oil and gas reserves. Future sources 
of energy supplies are going to be a key factor in its continued ability to sustain economic 
development as it feeds and supports 1.2 billion people, as it experiences the automotive 
revolution, as it meets the demand for expanded air travel, and as it engages in energy-
intensive manufacturing. According to recent estimates, China's net external requirement 
for oil imports is expected to rise from the current daily level of one million to three 
million by 2010, and seven million barrels per day by 2015. During the next 15 years, 
East Asian oil imports from the Middle East could easily triple. In the face of the 
expected demand, China is interested in securing its future supplies.  
China's concerns regarding its future energy supplies are also influencing many of 
its foreign policy decisions. For example, in 1992 it claimed about 80 percent of the 
South China Sea and its use of military force to reinforce that claim is clearly aimed at 
securing oil and gas. Although the dispute over the Spratley Island area seems to be 
cooling somewhat (due to drilling technology limitations in deep waters), this region still 
holds the potential for conflict if oil supplies tighten during the next century and drilling 
technology advances sufficiently to make feasible the extraction of these deposits.  
China's interest in Iran and Iraq (which together contain 20 percent of the world's 
proven oil reserves) seems clearly linked to its concern over future oil supplies, while this 
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same issue might also be coloring China's policy toward the states of Central Asia, states 
that hold the world's second largest reserves of oil. 
Another national objective is the consolidation of perceived Chinese lands under 
centralized Chinese control. The existence of these areas, independent of China's control, 
is a constant reminder of China's humiliation during its 140 years of weakness. While the 
issue of Hong Kong and Macao are settled, the reintegration of Taiwan by 2010 is, of 
course, much more problematic. Taiwan's movement toward successful implementation 
of democratic rule undermines the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the 
mainland to reestablish its legitimacy as the ruling party in China. Under Confucian-
based nationalism, the CCP can justify its rule as being good for China, with the 
Confucian philosophy justifying the CCP's hierarchical, authoritarian rule. In contrast, an 
economically successful Taiwan under a democratic government would demonstrate that 
there is a possible alternative to CCP governance.  
On the opposite side of the ledger, however, Taiwan offers China an opportunity 
(in business terms) to engage in a non-hostile takeover of one of the economic crown 
jewels of East Asia. Taiwan also has a very advanced electronics industry that would 
greatly benefit China as it enters the information era, especially in light of China's 
weakness in advanced electronics. In essence, the challenges and potential benefits that 
Taiwan presents to China ensure that Chinese-Taiwanese relations will remain a tense 
political issue until the reunification issue is resolved.  
Along with the issue of reunification is the problem of securing China's 
geostrategic periphery. Almost 70 percent of China's 21,656 kilometer-long border and 
66 percent of its over 3 million square kilometers of territorial waters face some level of 
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external threat. In addition, some of the threat cited is a result of disputed territorial 
claims for islands in the China Sea. The countries with which China has disagreements 
over islands include Japan plus six other nations involved in the separate Spratley Islands' 
dispute (separate from a Japanese-Chinese dispute).  
China believes in the value of military power, the greater one's military 
capabilities, the greater the awesomeness of the state, and the more likely one is to 
determine conflict outcomes to one's advantage. Nevertheless, the advantages that China 
might be able to gain from such capabilities are about two decades from realization. 
Consequently, the Chinese can be expected to use diplomacy where possible to achieve 
their national objectives.  
China's basic use-of-force philosophy is neither to seek conflict nor to avoid it. 
China's viewpoint that the United States is its most likely long-term security threat has 
been reinforced by the growing U.S. public discussions regarding the need to limit or 
partially "contain" China. The subsequent dispatch of two U.S. carrier battlegroups to the 
vicinity of Taiwan in March 1996 apparently has been interpreted by the Chinese as 
affirming their fear that the United States is adopting a containment strategy for dealing 
with China. China considers Japan, its number two security threat, to be the most likely to 
cause it difficulty in East Asia. As such, at least during the near-term, China seems to 
accept continued U.S. involvement with Japan as a means of reassuring Japan and of 
limiting its inclination to establish a formidable military capability of its own. Although 
apparently ranked as China's number three threat, China sees Russia primarily as a source 
of technology. It also views Russia as useful in helping to limit the United States' 
international role. Both China and Russia are irritated with U.S. actions; therefore, each 
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country gains mutual support from the other as they cooperate against their mutual 
adversary. In the December 1996 Chinese-Russian summit, both countries made it clear 
that they oppose a unipolar world. It is likely that China wants all U.S. forces off the 
Korean peninsula once reunification occurs. Obviously, continued presence of U.S. 
forces in Korea after reunification would potentially limit Chinese influence in the 
peninsula. Those forces would also be useful to the United States in any effort to contain 
China. At a minimum, China needs the Korean peninsula to be neutral, but preferably 
allied with China.  
 
c. Russia 
As Russia is currently preoccupied with its internal affairs, it is difficult to 
enumerate Russia's official national objectives. Russia has not yet developed a coherent 
foreign policy. Nevertheless, a careful review of the comments and writings of Russia's 
political elite provides some recurring patterns of thought from which insights can be 
derived. Russia seeks its former level of international status to include a larger share of 
global markets and greater influence in the international decision-making process.  
One of the main irritations expressed by Russia's political community is frustration over 
its diminished international stature in the post-Cold War order. Moreover, there is a high 
degree of anger over the decline in Russia's share of the international arms market11. 
Russians look at the increase in U.S. arms market share and complain that the United 
States is trying to destroy Russia's defense industries and gain a monopoly for its own 
industries. As a result, Russia's political community is becoming much more adamant 
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regarding Russia' right to sell arms to whomever it wishes. Further, Russia wants to 
encourage a military balance in East Asia.  Its historic fear of Japan is again becoming 
evident. Russia's policy community believes that a withdrawal of U.S. forces from East 
Asia would undoubtedly result in a rearming of Japan--a possibility most Russians fear. 
Thus, the majority believes that a limited U.S. presence in East Asia (one sufficient to 
reassure Japan but limited enough to be kept in check by the other states) would be 
beneficial to Russia's national interests and contribute to a stable East Asian balance of 
power. Within a new power alignment, many Russians believe that a reunified Korea 
would prove to be the natural ally of Russia--thus Russia is actively courting both North 
and South Korea. With regard to China, there seems to be divided opinion. There are 
those in the Russian policy community who believe that a more capable China would 
tend to expand its interests toward the South, which would pose problems for the United 
States and divert U.S. attention away from Russian affairs.  
Regardless, the fact remains that Russia and China are growing closer together in 
the face of U.S. policies that are displeasing to both countries. The conservative estimate 
is that at least 1000 Russian technicians are working in China's nuclear and rocket 
programs. In the early 1990’s, China is estimated to have purchased between $4.5 and $6 
billion worth of weapons and military equipment from Russia. Included in this trade are 
advanced military aircraft, Kilo submarines, defense manufacturing facilities, defensive 
missile systems, and reportedly, key ICBM missile components and possibly missile 
manufacturing information. For Russia, China is a source of inexpensive consumer goods 
and provides an easily accessible market for its defense production. In addition, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 ibid 
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possible option of using China as Russia's "China card" to help maintain a check on U.S. 
behavior may well become part of Russia's national security game plan. Thus, the future 
Russian-Chinese relationship will be a key factor in Japan’s future security equation.  
Russia plans to exercise hegemony over Central Asia and ensure that the region does not 
threaten Russian security. This region contains the world's second largest reserves of 
petroleum, is rich in natural resources and raw materials, contains a majority of the 20 
million ethnic Russians who live outside of Russia's borders. As a result, many in 
Russia's policy-making community deeply regret Russia's loss of direct control over the 
region and are actively working to maintain indirect control. As an exacerbating factor, 
the area's dominant Islamic and Turkic religious and ethnic roots are viewed as potential 
avenues for exploitation by Turkey and Iran.  
 
4. Internal Environment 
a. Domestic Political Evolution 
 The bubble Japanese economy of the 1990s collapsed towards the end of the 
century and Japan suffered a sustained period of stagnant economic growth. In 1997, the 
Government outlined six areas of structural reform, but the Japanese people only saw 
some improvements in the education system, in social security, in the health insurance 
system. Deregulation proceeded in finance, telecommunications, distribution, electricity, 
transportation, among other sectors. But the heart of the reform – total deregulation, real 
changes in the corporate governance and tax systems, and sweeping changes to the 
pension fund system – these proceeded very slowly or never really happened. With no 
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confidence that things were going to get better and no clear direction of progress in the 
near or long term, a bleak economic future embraced Japan in the new millennium.  
Dissatisfied and convinced that the incumbent leadership was not capable of 
effectively implementing any mid-term to long-term economic recovery plan, the 
Japanese people got impatient and desperately wanted an alternative.  
Wide spread protests occurred in major Japanese cities and a vote of no 
confidence forced the incumbent Prime Minister to resign in May 2001. In the July 
elections, the electorate made a never-seen-before turn-out of 80%. And even more 
surprising were the results of the election. The new political party that advocated honest 
reforms won a surprising land-slide victory. This party was founded by a young, more 
liberal and progressive leader, one who was genuinely committed to political and 
economic reforms for Japan, one who was against the “keiretsu” ways of doing business 
in Japan. 
 Drastic restructuring followed after the new leader was sworn in. The Japanese 
Cabinet was revamped and the new Diet immediately passed an emergency financial bill 
targeted at “Short-Term Pain for Long-Term Gain”12, calling for thorough and systematic 
changes to Japan’s financial and business way of life. The government took the lead by 
taking a hefty 25% cut in the entire civil service. The government made major reforms to 
the Japanese economic infrastructure (i.e. tax system, monetary and fiscal policies) and 
revamped the “inefficient” Japanese economic model. The massive Japanese ¥38,39013 
trillion in foreign reserves was drawn on initially as the new government increased 
                                                 
12 Based on Scenario 2: Crash and Rebirth from http://www.gbn.org/scenarios/japan. 
13 US$349 trillion based on US$1=¥110. This is a real figure, accurate as of 29 September 2000 from the 
following http://www.mof.go.jp. 
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spending to try to sustain the economy. At the same time, a demand-based economic 
recovery plan was being developed in order to sustain the economy in the longer term.  
 
b. Economic Response 
The economy responded negatively, but not unexpectedly, as it took a massive 
downturn registering a negative 8% GDP14 growth for the year 2001, the worst 
performance by the modern Japanese economy. Miraculously, the Japanese people 
showed confidence in the plan and the government this time. Believing in the new leader, 
the Japanese people showed great tenacity and demonstrated a strong national will to 
endure the short-term pain for long-term gain. This time, the Japanese economy 
demonstrated strong resilience and the economy improved in 2002 through 2005. 
Although the annual average GDP growth was a negative 3.59%, this five-year epoch 
ended on a high note for the Japanese economy, as it registered a positive half percentage 
point for the year 2005. Although meager, this was widely regarded by the Japanese 
public as good performance by the new government and signs of better days to come in 
the future, which won the new party further endorsement. Over the five-year period, the 
Japanese economy turned in an average annual GDP of ¥426.6 trillion, a drastic decline 
from the ¥497 trillion GDP of 2000.  
 With the recovery plan widely supported and underway, the early signs of 
recovery gave confidence of better economic performance in the future.  
                                                 
14 Although it is high improbable that Japan will turn in such a poor economic performance, it is possible 
that such a dire outcome could occur. The purpose of such a drastic change is to paint a scenario that the 
party time is over for Japan and for major and drastic changes to be implemented so as to “restart” the 
Japanese economy. 
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Chart 5-1 - GDP Growth from 2000 to 2005 and Projected GDP for 2006 to 2010. 
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c. Defense Spending 
 Despite the unfavorable economic situation, the new government strongly 
emphasized that a strong domestic and political environment was necessary for political 
and economic restructuring. It strongly believed that the presence of a credible and more 
self-reliant Japanese military was a critical pre-requisite for guaranteeing the stability 
needed to rebuild the economy and to sustain its growth in the long-term. There was 
therefore renewed emphasis on the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. In order to 
assure effective maintenance, modernization and build-up of the Japanese military 
defense spending was pegged very close to 1% of GDP although the Diet was not 
constitutionally bound to spend 1% for defense. The result was a total of ¥21.30 trillion 
spend on defense for the epoch, or an average annual spending of ¥4.26 trillion. Although 
a consistent ratio of the GDP, compared to the 2000 defense spending, this was a 
significant 8% absolute reduction. 
 
d. Demographics 
Japan’s population experienced its most rapid period of aging towards the end of 
the last century. By the end of 2005 almost one-fifth of the Japanese population was over 
the age of 65, making Japan one of the oldest nations in world. The situation was 
worsened by the average fertility rate of 1.4 children per woman, well below the desired 
2 or more required to replace the aging population. Although aging, the population 
remained relatively constant at 128 million. This was primarily due to better health 
service that resulted in a very high life expectancy of 80 years. This is a worrisome 
demographic picture. 
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 Demographics had two major implications for the Japanese economy. Firstly, the 
aging population had resulted in decline of the national labor force of the country from 86 
million in 2000 to 84 million in 2005. Secondly, the lack of adequate national pension 
schemes and retirement homes in Japan resulted in a rise in the welfare and social burden 
for the shrinking working population. The aging population also caused a decline in 
Japan’s household savings.  
The diminishing of the national labor force left the new leadership with few 
alternatives but to leverage technology and move towards a capital-intensive Japanese 
economy. The government encouraged more women to join the work force and continued 
import of skilled and unskilled workers. At the same time, the Diet raised the retirement 
age from 65 to 70 years old. In order to keep the aging population relevant in skill and 
knowledge, a comprehensive education and training system was developed. The 
government also planned to invest in information technology and productivity efforts in 
order to make up for the diminishing labor force. 
 
Chart 5-3 – 2000 and 2005 Comparison of National Labor Force 
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Chart 5-4 – Population Distribution in 2005 (from http://jinjapan/org/stat/stats) 
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Chart 5-6 – Projected Population Distribution in 2010 (from http://jinjapan/org/stat/stats) 
 
e. Energy Supplies 
 Japan lacked significant domestic sources of energy and continued to be one of 
the largest energy importers of crude oil, natural gas and other energy. At the turn of the 
century, Japan had to import over 80 percent of its total demand for energy. To move 
away from such strong reliance on the import of energy sources, Japan’s energy policy 
focused on the 3 Es15 :  
(1) Economic Growth 
(2) Energy security; and 
(3) Environmental protection 
                                                 
15 http://jin.jcic.or.jp/access/energy/warming.html 
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In June 1996, the Diet enacted the Law Concerning Promotion of the Use of New 
Energy sources, like the sun, wind, heat produced by waste incinerators, etc. The raison 
d’etre was to have renewable energy sources that have few negative impacts on the 
environment and assure adequate energy. In 2000, new energy sources (excluding 
geothermal energy) provided 2% of the domestic energy supply and this was projected to 
increase to 3% in 2005-2010. 
The last of the WW II generation of Japanese had passed, and together with them 
went the nuclear-allergy that had plagued Japan. Japan eyes nuclear power as its principal 
long-term solution for achieving a significant degree of energy independence. In 2000, 
nuclear energy supplied 12% of the total primary energy needs and the Japan Atomic 
Energy Research Institute (JAERI) has confidence that it will increase to 16% in 2010. 
Nuclear power not only assured Japan of a significant degree of energy independence, but 
it also contributed to a drastic reduction in Japan’s carbon dioxide emissions in 
accordance with the Kyoto global warming agreement. 
Japan was and will continue to be the world’s largest importer of steam coal for 
power generation and of coking coal for steel making. Japan accounts for about 28% of 
the total world coal imports. Despite this, Japan will continue to rely on oil imports from 
the Middle East via long transit across the Indian Ocean. In order to diversify its energy 
supplies, alternative oil fields for exploration were sought in Alaska, Tarim Basin, 
Siberia, Sakhalin, East China Sea and the much conflicted South China Sea. Japan 
embarked on a joint venture with the People’s Republic of China and the two Koreas for 
an overland oil and gas pipeline linking Central Asia (the Irkutsk Region), past 
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Ulaanbaatar, across Mongolia and northern China to Beijing, into the Korean Peninsular 
and via a subsea route into Japan.  
Environmentally, LNG is more attractive than oil and Japan plans to build an 
effective and comprehensive internal gas transmission and distribution network. In 
addition, changes will be made to the physical infrastructure and market organization to 
increase the use of LNG for electric generation. 
 




5. Japan Self-Defense Force 
a. Introduction 
 The geopolitical situation, coupled with the changing domestic policies in the 
Japan political arena, clearly influenced the way the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 
poised itself. 
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 The key event that has had strong bearing on the military was the launch of Taepo 
Dong I ballistic missile by North Korea on 31 August 1998. The missile flew across the 
Sea of Japan, over the Honshu Island, and fell into the Pacific Ocean off the Sanriku 
coast of Japan – flying for nearly 1000 miles.  
The key needs for the military were as follows: 
1) Improve current C4ISR; and 
2) Pursue a ballistic missile defense system. 
  The details of these efforts will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
b.  Three Principal Considerations for Force Planning 
 First and foremost, Japan must be militarily self-reliant in its homeland defense. 
Although in general, Article 9 renounced war as a sovereign right of Japan, it was 
interpreted that Japan will never start a war against another country. Furthermore, the 
right to self-defense dictates that Japan must be able to defend itself against any hostile 
invasion – whether the attack comes in the form of amphibious landing or a ballistic 
missile attack16. Hence, if the sovereignty of the homeland is threatened, the use of 
proportionate force is considered legitimate. 
Secondly, to be a credible force, the military must be prepared for the full 
spectrum of warfare. As Japan is constantly besieged with natural disasters, like 
earthquakes, the military must also respond with civil disaster relief efforts and other 
peacetime roles, like participation in UN missions. 
                                                 
16 Defense of Japan, 1999 white paper 
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Lastly, the US-Japan Security Arrangement will still be in place. Japan welcomes 
the stationing of troops in the Korea peninsula and in Okinawa as a stabilizing factor in 
the region. Coupled with a strong US naval presence, it also serves to control expansion 
of China and ensure the freedom of seas in the region. The US-Japan Security 
Arrangement also provided a nuclear umbrella over Japan and many numerous 
opportunities for technological cooperation. 
 
c. Japan Defense Strategy 
 With the three considerations in mind, we review the defense strategies that were 
adopted in the first epoch. 
 First, the cornerstone of Japan’s military self-reliance is defense and deterrent.  
By defense, Japan strives to nullify any attempt to bring hostility to itself – either through 
a conventional engagement or a ballistic missile attacks. On the need for a ballistic 
missile defense system, Japan was working closely with US for the Navy Theater Wide 
Defense (NTWD) system and the land-based Theater High Attitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system. All the Kongo-class (similar to the US Aegis destroyer) destroyers in 
the fleet have been retrofitted with the Navy Area Defense (NAD) capability. Similarly 
the Patriot PAC-2 systems are in the progress of upgrading to PAC-3 capability. Both the 
NAD and PAC-3 are capable of intercepting missiles up to a height of 25 km. However, 
in the last five years, despite committing substantial amount of money in R & D, there 
was no significant breakthrough in the development of THAAD and NTWD. 
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 As a deterrent, Japan strives to possess a credible force that would make an 
adversary to think again before considering hostile actions against Japan. Hence, Japan 
invested heavily in expanding its C4ISR and cruise missile technology. 
The second strategy is for the JSDF to maintain a full spectrum of military options 
so that a proportional retaliation could be mounted against any aggressors. 
The third strategy involves the development of Japan’s own defense industry. 
Whenever possible, Japan strives to produce her own indigenous weapon systems 
through her own R&D in cutting edge technologies. Otherwise, industry engages in 
partnerships with other countries for cooperative technological research and 
development. The end is an efficient industrial base reducing reliance on arms imports. In 
the times of dwindling manpower, the military will have to leverage technology.  
 
d. Defense Policy 
Japan’s Defense Policy17 for the years 2001 through 2005 is discussed in the 
seven paragraphs below: 
Promotion of efforts for peace and stability through CBMs and ODAs.  The 
foremost policy statement is the promotion of peace and stability through Confidence 
Building Measures (CBMs), for example, engaging in multi-lateral dialogues and joint 
training, and providing Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to other nations. 
Development of defense capability (especially in JBMD and C4ISR). The thrust 
of the military focus was the development of Japan Ballistic Missile Defense (JBMD) 
                                                 
17 Defense of Japan 1999, Urban Connection. 
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system & enhancing the C4ISR for surveillance so that sufficient early warning can be 
provided. 
Adherence to the US-Japan Security Arrangement. Japan will not employ her 
military as the first option to resolve any conflicts. US aid will be sought first if the need 
arises. Nonetheless, in the spirit of self-defense, proportional retaliation can be expected 
from the JSDF. 
Exclusively defense-oriented policy. Force may not be employed unless and until 
an attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and the use of these forces is kept to a 
minimum necessary for self-defense.  
Not becoming a military power. Japan does not intent to be a dominant military 
power in the East Asian region. 
Adherence to the three non-nuclear principles. Japan will not possess, produce, 
nor permit the introduction of nuclear weapons. 
Ensuring civilian control of the military. The precedence of the democratic 
political control over the military will be maintained. 
 
e. Defense Expenditure  
 With the implementation of the short-term pain, long-term gain policy, there was 
a crunch in the budget for defense expenditure. The JSDF adopted various measures to 
ensure that military expenses stayed within 1% of the GDP. Table 3-1 shows the major 
components of the defense budget. The 2000 figures were included for comparison. Refer 
to Annex 5A for the detailed expenditure spreadsheets. Most of the mission areas 
suffered a cut in their budget. The restructuring of the two Combined Arms Divisions 
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(CAD) created some savings in the categories of Personnel and Provision, and in 
Maintenance. Equipment acquisition was purposely slowed down. The available 
resources were generally channeled to a few key programs like the acquisition of the 
Type-03 SSM, F-2 fighters and some vessels like the Kongo-class destroyers and the 
Osumi-class LSTs. The construction of a National Command and Control System 
(NCCS) was also a priority item. 










1 Personnel & Provision 2,203.4 10,350.0 48.5% 2,070.0 -6.1% 
2 Maintenance 890.6 4,154.0 19.5% 830.8 -6.7% 
3 Facilities 168.7 850.0 4.0% 170.0 0.8% 
4 R&D 120.5 615.0 2.9% 123.0 2.1% 
5 
Equipment 
Acquisition 914.1 2,458.0 11.5% 491.6 -46.2% 
6 Others 638.4 2,900.0 13.6% 580.0 -9.1% 
 Total 4,935.7 21,327.0 100% 4,265.4 -13.6% 
Table 5-1: Defense expenditure for 2001 to 2005. 
 Knowing the importance of R&D to pursuit of cutting-edge weapon systems, 
Japan increased R & D expenditures. Key R & D expenditures were for the development 
of JBMD, the Type-03 SSM and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). 
 
f. Defense Industry 
At the turn of the century, Japan was efficient in long production runs, but 
relatively inefficient in short productions runs. Many military items, which were few in 
quantity, remained relatively expensive. Fortunately, the joint impacts of the economic 
reform and procurement reforms were able to transform the situation.  
Defense of Japan 2005 
 5 - 38   
g. Defense Research & Development Efforts 
Japan has always been a big investor in R&D – about 3 to 5% of its GDP18 
annually over the past 25 years. It has long realized that the most effective way to solve 
the aging population and increasing energy demand is through better technology.  
Every five years, the National Institute of Science and Technology Policy 
(NISTEP) would conduct a technological survey, using the Delphi survey method, for the 
next 30 years. The coverage is very comprehensive. 
Although defense-related R&D (about 0.3%) is very small, Japan could leverage 
dual-use commercial technologies to build better and cheaper military equipment. Japan 
also maintains bi-lateral or multi-lateral cooperation with other countries in the regime of 
technological exploration, especially the US. 
 
h. Defense Research & Development Programs (2001 to 2005) 
A total of ¥123 billion was spent over the last five years on R & D. Table 5-2 
shows the major R&D programs for the JSDF. Many of the items are related to the 
missile defense programs, a total of ¥160 billion. Almost ¥75 billion was spent to speed 
up the development of the Type-03 deterrent cruise missile. Also, a total of ¥100 billion 
was spent to expand C4ISR. 
 
                                                 
18 “1999 Survey of Research and Development”, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/1531.htm. 
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S/No Item Amount (Million ¥) Remarks 
1 Type-03 SSM 75,000 Completed, production began in 
2003. 
2 Patriot PAC-3 50,000 Completed, upgrading began in 
2002. 
3 Ballistic Missile Defense 
System 
75,000 In progress. 
4 SM3 Missile for NTWD 25,000 In progress. 
4 BMC3I 10,000 In progress. 
5 National C2 System 20,000 In progress. 
6 EU-1 (low observable 
UAV) 
25,000 Completed, production began in 
2004. 
7 EU-2 (HAE UAV) 25,000 In progress. 
 Total 305,000  
8. Others 310,000  
 Grand Total 615,000  
Table 5-2: Main R & D Programs. 
i. Japan’s R&D and Procurement Priorities 
 Japan’s priorities for military R&D and procurement for the next epoch will be as 
follows: (1) to find a cost-effective solution to defend Japan against long-range ballistic 
missiles and cruise missiles; (2) to expand JSDF’s Type 3 TEL missile force to provide a 
massive conventional strike and deterrent capabilities that will also enhance area denial 
capabilities for the waters surrounding Japan; (3) to improve JSDF’s C4ISR to enhance 
the mission effectiveness and to enable the conduct of long-range land-attack and anti-
ship strike missions; and (4) to invest R&D resources in unmanned platforms. 
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6. Key Defense Systems in 2001 to 2005 
 In this section, we examine some of the key defense systems that came into being 
during the period from 2001 to 2005. 
a. Japan Ballistic Missile Defense (JBMD) System 
As part of the defense strategy, the development of a credible ballistic missile 
defense system was deemed critical to the safety of the Japan homeland. First was the 
Japan Ballistic Missile Defense  (JBMD) system. A total of ¥160 billion was invested in 
R & D effort in conjunction with the US. The NAD and PAC-3 programs were 
successful. The existing fleet of Patriot PAC-2 is in the progress of upgrading and the 
Kongo-class destroyers are also equipped with the NAD capability. The NAD employs 
the 2-stage SM2 missiles, which could intercept up to 100,000 ft. The Patriot PAC-3 
systems could only intercept the missile within the atmosphere (endo-atmospheric). 
 
Figure 5-1: JBMD Major Components. 
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 However, both the NTWD and THAAD system, which are supposed to intercept 
the missile in the exo-atmosphere, did not demonstrate promising advancement. 
Nonetheless, Japan is willing to further invest in the development of these two systems. 
 
b. EU-1 Low Observable UAV. 
• Endurance: >8 hours 
@500nm 
• Cruise Speed: 250 kts 
• Payload: 1000 lbs 
• Altitude: 45 kft 
• Sensors: LPI SAR, EO, 
SIGINT 
Figure 5-2: EU-1 
As part of the effort to expand the C4ISR capabilities, Japan embarked on several 
UAV programs. EU-1, a low observable UAV, is the first in the series. Japan approached 
the US to revive their previously cancelled Dark Star project. The first EU-1 (the 
specifications are similar to Dark Star), at a cost of ¥2 billion per aircraft, was rolled out 
in 2004. A total of seven EU-1s were acquired over the last 2 years. 
 
c. Type-03 SSM. 
 Type-03 SSM is a long-range (about 1000 nm) sub-sonic cruise missile for 
surface targets. The design is largely based on the Tomahawk missile but re-designed and 
produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. Each launcher cost ¥1.2 billion and each missile 
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cost ¥100 million. The missile is modular; hence it can be easily configured for either 
land-attack or anti-ship roles. Every missile carries a 1000 lb warhead. 
 
• Range: 1000 nm 
• Length: 6.25 m 
• Weight: 1,440 Kg 
• Diameter: 51.8 cm 
• Standard VLS cell; or 21” 
Torpedo tube 
• Warhead: 1000 lb  
Figure 5-3: Type-03 SSM 
 
d. Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System. 
 
• Orbit: 500 km (LEO) 
• Sensors: EO 
• Resolution: 1 m 




Figure 5-4: Information Gathering Satellite 
 The purpose of introducing the information-gathering satellites is to prevent 
threats and crises. In 2003, Mitsubishi Electric Corp developed and launched a total of 
four satellites at a cost of ¥1700 billion. These LEO satellites orbit at 500 km above the 
Earth to get images of required regions regularly and reveal those factors that could 
become a threat. The satellites carry optical sensors that are able to resolve images as 
small as one square meter – such as ballistic missiles and combat aircraft.  
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As the satellite program comes under the purview of the National Space 
Development Agency (NASDA) of Japan, the cost did not appear in JSDF’s budget. 
Japan also established a MOU with the US to share satellite imageries. 
 
7. National Defense Program Outline 
 The National Defense Program Outline19 (NDPO) spelled out the desired end-
state of the JSDF.  The NDPO was drafted and approved in 1995. It was reviewed again 
in the late 2001. Table 5-3 shows the current NDPO and the corresponding order of battle 
in the JSDF.  
Classification  2001 NDPO  
At End of Revised 
Mid-Term Defense 
Program (2005) 
GSDF (Regular)  145,000  Approx. 158,000 
GSDF (Reserve)  25,000  Approx. 10,000 
MSDF  50,000  Approx. 46,500 
ASDF  50,000  Approx. 48,300 
Joint Staff  2,000  Approx. 1,600 
Total (Active)  247,000  Approx. 254,400 
Manpower 
Grand Total  272,000  Approx. 264,400 
Division  8 Infantry Division 1 Armored Division  
10 Infantry Division 
1 Armored Division 
Brigade  
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade
 
3 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade
1 Amphibious Brigade
Tank  Approx 1000  Approx 1030 
GSDF 
Artillery  Approx 1000  Approx 1000 
Destroyer  60  57 
Submarine  20  19 MSDF 
Combat Aircraft  200  Approx 210 
Fighter  400  Approx 330 
ASDF 
UAV  Approx 50  7 
Table 5-3: National Defense Program Outline 
                                                 
19 Defense of Japan 1999, Urban Connection 
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 The North Korean missile firing made the Japanese government realize that it is 
very weak in the area of missile defense. In view of the uncertainty in the BMD 
technology, there is also a need to enhance the deterrence capability.  Furthermore, the 
numerous incidents of intrusion by "suspicious boats" also prompted the JDA to review 
its intelligence collection and early warning capabilities. Hence, there was a need to 
expand both the maritime and the air force capabilities. 
The force structure of the GSDF was also reviewed.  It was ascertained that at the 
end-state, a total of nine divisions (8 Infantry and 1 Armoured), together with nine 
brigades (6 Infantry, 1 Amphibious, 1 Airborne, and 1 Heliborne) is sufficient to fulfill its 
mission.  Furthermore, part of the active force was converted to reserve appointment. At 
the end of 2005, there are a total of approximately 254,400 active personnel.  This figure 
will be trimmed to 247,000 active personnel.  The cut in the active posts in the GSDF 
will be used to fund the increase in the ASDF and MSDF. 
The subsequent sections will describe the changes to the various services. Main 
missile systems and C4ISR systems are discussed separately. 
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a. Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) 
      Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005) 









1 Infantry/Combined Div 12     2 10 
2 Infantry Bde 2 2     4 
3 Armored Div 1       1 
4 Heliborne Bde 1       1 
5 Airborne Bde 1       1 
6 Amphibious Bde 0 1     1 
7 Tanks 1,135   50   1,135 
8 APC 770 25 50   795 
9 Artillery (155mm SP) 831       831 
10 MLRS 128 50     178 
11 Attack Helicopters 88 5   5 88 
12 Other Helicopters 424 5   5 424 
Table 5-4: Major GSDF Order of Battle 
Over the last five years, there was quite a change in the GSDF order of battle. The 
two Combined Arms Divisions were closed down. At the same time, two infantry 
brigades and one amphibious brigade were raised. The saving of manpower was also 
reflected in the lower expenses in Personnel and Provision. There is an on-going program 
to modernize and upgrade the tanks and APCs, but there is minimal fluctuation in the 
quantity. As part of the efforts to reduce the reliance on manpower, more MLRSs were 
being purchased. The intention is to replace the 155 mm SP artillery in the near future. 
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b. Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) 
      Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005) 







1 Kongo & DD21 4 3 4   7 
2 Other DDs 53     3 50 
3 Submarine (SS) 18 2   1 19 
4 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 2   1 38 
5 Landing Ship (LST) 11 3     14 
6 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100   15   100 
7 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36       36 
8 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10       10 
9 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0       0 
10 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 2   2 78 
Table 5-5: Major MSDF Order of Battle 
The MSDF continued its modernization of the fleet. While the maritime force 
acquired 3 new Kongo-class destroyers, it also retired the three oldest destroyers.  Four of 
the Kongo-class destroyers were also upgraded with the new NAD capability. Two more 
submarines and mine warfare ships were acquired, while one each was retired 
respectively. The fleet of Osumi-class LSTs was also expanded so as to support the 
amphibious brigade. Also 15 of the 100 P3Cs were upgraded to extend their service life. 
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c. Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) 
      Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005) 







1 F-15 (J/DJ) 203     203 
2 F-22 0     0 
3 F-1 52     52 
4 F-2 45 30   75 
5 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133     133 
6 C-1 28     28 
7 C-130H 16     16 
8 CH-47J (Transport) 19 10   29 
9 KC-135 0 5   5 
Table 5-6: Major ASDF Order of Battle 
 The major change in the ASDF is the procurement of 30 new F-2s bringing the 
total to 75 fighters. The F-2 is meant to replace the F-15 in the near future. Also 10 new 
CH-47 transport helicopters were added to its inventory to improve its airlift capability. 
In order to extent the operating range of its aircrafts, the ASDF also began to equip itself 
with KC-135 refueling tankers. 
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d. Major Missile Systems  
      Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005) 







1 Patriot PAC-3 FU Upgrading 120   20  120 
2 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192   2  192 
3 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 68 12    80 
4 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 0 100    100 
5 Type-03 Missile 0 1,000    1,000 
Table 5-7: Major Missile Systems 
A significant amount of the expenditure was spent on missiles system upgrading 
and procurement. This is the high growth area because missiles offer high lethality, long 
range and low manpower requirement. 
Specifically, Japan invested in cruise missiles because of the difficulty in 
detection and counter-measures. Twelve more Type-88 TELs were procured. The 
objective was to build a deterrence capability using a large array of missiles, especially 
cruise missiles. When the R & D in Type-03 cruise proved successful, procurement was 
switched to the new Type-03 SSM and 100 TELs were procured, together with 1000 
missiles. 
Japan also embarked on the upgrading programs for its Patriot PAC-2 to PAC-3 
and the I-Hawk systems. The upgrading of the Patriot and I-Hawk system is expected to 
take the next 10 to 15 years. 
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e. Major C4ISR Systems 
      Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005) 







1 EU-1 (Low observable) [05] 0 7   7 
2 E-2C 13     13 
3 E-767 4     4 
4 Info Gathering Satellite 0 4   4 
5 National C2 System 0 1   1 
6 IW Platoon (30-men) 0 1   1 
Table 5-8: Major C4ISR Systems 
The JSDF also established the National Command and Control Systems (NCCS) 
for command and control, sensor fusion and distribution of cueing and targeting 
information. Continuous R & D effort is expected so as to improve the system using the 
best technologies available. 
There is a heavy investment in UAVs so as to enhance the surveillance and 
targeting capabilities. Through the revival of the US Darkstar project, the EU-1 was 
rolled out. It was hoped that this would mark the beginning of a series of UAVs that were 
indigenously manufactured in Japan. 
In addition, Japan will also have four information gathering satellites that would 
orbit at 500 km above the Earth. These are being developed and launched by Mitsubishi 
Electric Corporation. 
Realizing the importance of information warfare, the JSDF also trained and 
configured one platoon of IW warriors every five years. These IW platoons will report 
directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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8. Static Net Assessment - Japan Versus North Korea 
In this section, the static assessment of a confrontation between Japan’s forces 
and North Korean forces is presented.  Details of Japan’s forces can be found in the 
previous chapter.  Refer to the Korean chapter for details of North Korea Force Structure 
for 2005.  The data presented in this section has been reorganized and aggregated to 
provide a more focused comparison. 
 
a. Manpower 
Japan North Korea 
Joint : 1,600 
Army : 168,000 
(10 Div, 4 Bde, 1 Armored Div, 1 Airborne 
Bde, 1 Heli Bde, 1 Amphibious Bde) 
Navy : 46,500 
Air Force : 48,300 
Army : 1,140,000 + 600,000 Reserves 
Navy : 46,000 + 65,000 Reserves 
Air Force : 86,000 
Total : 264,400 Total : 1,937,000 
 
The total JSDF manpower is one order of magnitude smaller than that of North 
Korea.  Due to economic and demographic reasons, it is not possible for Japan to 
significantly increase the manpower of its armed forces. 
 
b. Air Force 








5 KC135 AAR 
35 MiG 29 
206 Lower-end Fighters 
80 Bomber 
334 Attack 
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 North Korean’s Air Force mainly comprises lower-end1 or older aircraft.  The 
only significant force in their inventory is the 35 MiG29s.  But this should not pose much 
problem to Japan’s 200 F15s. Hence, JASDF should not face much opposition when 
operating outside the coverage of North Korean’s land-based SAM systems, including the 
airspace over the Sea of Japan. 
 
c. Navy 
 Japan North Korea 
Surface Combatants 7 Kongo DDGs 
50 Other DDGs 
3 Missile Patrol Craft 
 
Maritime Safety Agency: 
13/46 Lg/Med Patrol Vessel 
38 Patrol Craft 
81 Coastal Patrol Craft 
180 Coastal/Rescue Craft 
48 Missile Armed Ships (3 
FF, 45 PC) 
403 Other small non-missile 
armed ships 
Submarines 19 SS 10 Romeo Class 
71 Other lower-end boats 
Mine Warfare 38 24 
Amphibious 14 LSTs 35 LSTs 
231 Others (LCPs etc) 
Aircraft 100 P3C 
78 ASW Helicopters 
46 Others 
10 ASW Helicopters 
 
North Korea’s surface fleet consists mainly of lower-end frigates and missile 
crafts, each with two to four missiles.  It is clear from the above table that the North 
Korean Navy is no match for the modern Japanese Navy in a force-on-force 
confrontation in open waters. The inclusion of air power considerations only serves to 
exacerbate the imbalance. 
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d. Army 
 Japan North Korea 
Tanks 1135 MBTs 3500 Tanks 
APC 795 2500 
Artillery 831 8200 
MLRS 178 2300 
Attack Helicopters 88 50 
 
 While numerically superior, North Korean equipment is mostly a generation or 
two behind the modern equipment of the Japanese army. But regardless of the relative 
combat power of the land forces, without the support of sea and air power, it is highly 
unlikely that the North Korean army can attack Japan in significant numbers. 
 
e. Missiles 
 Japan North Korea 
Strike 100 Type 03 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
80 Type 88 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
100 Scud B 
150 Hwasong 5 
250 Hwasong 6 
80 Nodong 1/2 
25 Taepo Dong 1/2  
Air Defense 120 Patriot FU (100 PAC2 
and 20 PAC3) 
192 I-HAWK FU 
5,500 SAMs 
 
 The majority of North Korean missiles do not have the range to hit Japan.  Of 
concern is North Korean’s development of long-range ballistic missiles, such as the 
Taepo Dong.  While the quantity and accuracy of these missiles may not pose a serious 
threat to Japan’s military, it may be used as a weapon of terror against the Japanese 
population.  The Japanese Type 3 missiles have the range to hit anywhere in North 
Korea.  Hence, they serve as a conventional deterrent as well as to provide, if necessary, a 
first-strike capability to remove the Taepo Dong threat on the ground. 
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f. C4ISR 
Japan North Korea 
4 IMINT Satellites 




National C2 System 
Unknown 
 
 Details of the North Korean C4ISR capabilities are not known but are assumed 
not to be technologically advanced.  However, it is assumed that they have the means to 
procure commercially available services such as satellite images, satellite 
communications etc. 
 
g. Summary (Japan versus North Korea) 
 Overall, given North Korean’s inability to project large-scale forces across the 
Sea of Japan, it does not pose a military threat to Japan.  The only significant capability is 
North Korean’s R&D efforts into long-range ballistic missiles with possible WMD 
capabilities.  Japan will commit resources in future epochs to find a cost-effective 
solution to this threat. 
 
9. Static Net Assessment - Japan Versus China 
In this section, the static assessment between Japan’s forces and China’s forces is 
presented.  Details of Japan’s forces can be found in the previous chapter. The data 
presented has been reorganized and aggregated to provide a meaningful comparison.   
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a. Manpower 
Japan China 
Joint : 1,600 
Army : 168,000 
(10 Div, 4 Bde, 1 Armoured Div, 1 
Airborne Bde, 1 Heli Bde, 1 Amphibious 
Bde) 
Navy : 46,500 
Air Force : 48,300 
PLA : 1,928,000 
Rapid Reaction : 55,000 
Navy : 280,000 
Marines : 10,000 
Special Forces : 7,000 
Intelligence : 3,000 
Total : 264,400 Total : 2,283,000 
  
The total JSDF manpower is one order of magnitude smaller than that of China.  
Due to economic and demographic reasons, it is not possible for Japan to significantly 
increase the manpower of its armed forces. 
Operationally, as shall be seen in the air and naval orders of battle, China’s sealift 
capability is assessed able to project no more than 20,000 troops and their airlift 
capability no more than 6,000, a small fraction of the total PLA order of battle. 
Qualitatively, although PLA personnel are generally well trained in basic skills, 
their leadership, training in combined operations and morale is low. Most soldiers are 
poorly educated and one-third leave active duty each year. There is also no professional 
NCO corps. 













2253 Lower-end fighters/attack 
235 Long-range Bombers 
58 Heavy/Medium Lift FW Transport 
264 Light FW Transport 
10 IL78 AAR 
224 Helicopters 
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 The majority of China’s over 2000 fighters are lower-end aircraft.  But with the 
inclusion of MiG31s and J11s in the last 5 years, China has finally caught up with 
Japan’s F15s qualitatively and has quantitatively surpassed JASDF’s fleet of current 
generation fighters.  But the actual outcome of an air war would depend very much on the 
training and competency of the pilots as well as its C4 capabilities.  Both are reportedly 
deficient for China’s Air Force. Hence the result of the battle for air superiority over East 
China Sea is uncertain. 
 
c. Navy 
 Japan China 
Surface Combatants 7 Kongo DDGs 
50 Other Destroyers 
3 Missile Patrol Craft 
 
Maritime Safety Agency: 
13/46 Lg/Med Patrol Vessel 
38 Patrol Craft 
81 Coastal Patrol Craft 
180 Coastal/Rescue Craft 
27 Destroyers 
41 Frigates 
149 other Missile Craft 
70 Torpedo Craft 
30 Speed Boats 
Submarines 19 SS 63 SS 
5 SSN 
1 SSBN 
Mine Warfare 38 83 
Amphibious 14 LSTs 26 LSTs 
66 Others 
Aircraft 100 P3C 
78 ASW Helicopters 
46 Others 
See “Air Force” 
 
 China’s surface fleet consists mainly of lower end destroyers, frigates and missile 
crafts, each with four to eight SSMs and up to eight SAMs.  The total missile capacity of 
all surface combatants is estimated to be about 1112 SSMs and 424 SAMs spread over 
217 ships, or about seven missiles per ship.  In contrast, while the Japanese surface fleet 
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is numerically inferior, it is technologically modern and carries missiles of far longer 
range.  For example, a Kongo-class DDG carries 90 VLS cells and eight Harpoon 
missiles.  Furthermore, the surface fleet is supported by a large fleet of surveillance and 
ASW aircraft. Overall, JMSDF has the edge in surface warfare. 
 Of the 63 China SS, only the six Song-class and eight Kilo-class are of more 
recent design.  These, together with the five SSN provide China with a more superior 
sub-surface capability.  However, with the 19 modern SS and ASW capabilities of its 
destroyers and aircraft, JMSDF should be able to maintain a very slight edge in an open-
ocean naval battle. 
 
d. Missiles 
 Japan China 
Strike 100 Type 03 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
80 Type 88 TELs 






84 SLBM (with 1 SSBN) 
5700 ASCM 
500 Tomahawk Equivalent 
1700 other LACM 
Air Defense 120 Patriot FU (100 PAC2 
and 20 PAC3) 
192 I-HAWK FU 
25 Long Range SAM Bns 
20 Short Range SAM Bns 
 
 Although China has a large ballistic and cruise missile inventory, the majority are 
SRBMs and shorter-range cruise missiles, which do not have the range to reach Japan 
when fired from the mainland.  Only 695 land-based missiles have the range to overfly 
the East China Sea, comparable in number to Japan’s 600 Type 3 missiles.  However, this 
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missile, presently equipped only with conventional warhead, does not constitute a 
deterrent to China’s nuclear weapons. 
 The 100 mobile land-based Type 3 TELs will play a big role in the defense 
against a scenario of a China large-scale invasion. With no clear winners in the 
comparison between air and naval combatants, Type 3 missiles will provide the 
additional firepower necessary to tilt the balance in JSDF’s favor in a defensive scenario. 
However, should China conduct an all-out invasion, a larger Type 3 TEL fleet will be 




4 IMINT Satellites 




National C2 System 
14 IMINT Satellites 
16 AEWCC 
 
Details of China’s spy satellite capability are not available and hence a 
comparison cannot be made.  Japan’s Airborne Early Warning fleet of E2Cs and E767s 
are assessed to be technologically superior as compared to China’s Y8s and A50s. 
 
f. Summary (Japan versus China) 
 Numerically, Japan lags far behind in most areas and this gap can never be 
bridged due to demographic and economic reasons.  Japan will therefore have to leverage 
advanced technology to overcome China’s numerical advantage; in short, to overcome 
quantity with quality.  With a smaller defense budget, Japan cannot afford to compete in 
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all capability areas, and must therefore be very selective in its military investment to 
achieve its defense objectives.  These include capabilities to counter a large-scale China 
invasion, as well as cost-effective solutions to counter China’s nuclear and missile 
capabilities. 
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10. Epoch 1 Summary 
More than a decade passed since the end of the Cold War, yet no new stable 
international order appeared from 2001-2005.  Rather, the combination of political, 
economic, military, and social factors that have undermined stability during much of the 
1990s remained at play. Given this security environment, Japan embraced a three-
pronged security policy of firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, 
building up Japan's defense capability, and making active diplomatic efforts to ensure 
international peace and security.  Japan moderately built up its defense capability during 
this period in accordance with the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively 
defense-oriented policy while not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to 
other countries.  Japan remained concerned with growing regional threats to our security. 
Specific concerns included, North Korea’s possession of weapons of mass destruction 
and the means to deliver them, the possibility of a more assertive China as a result of its 
growing economic and military might, and an unpredictable Russia that retains 
possession of a vast nuclear and conventional arms stockpile. 
 Domestically, a progressive political movement gained popular support as a result 
of its reform based platform.  The new party dominated the elections resulting in its 
members gaining majority of the seats in the Diet and occupying the seat of Prime 
Minister. This movement instituted drastic restructuring programs that overhauled the 
Cabinet and immediately passed an emergency financial bill targeted at “Short-Term Pain 
for Long-Term Gain”, calling for thorough and systematic changes to Japan’s economic 
infrastructure.   The economy responded with a massive downturn, registering negative 
8% GDP growth for the year closing December 2001.  Despite an average GDP growth 
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of negative 3.59%, the progressive movement maintained support, bolstered in 2005 by 
the government’s positive growth projections for the upcoming three years.   
 Even though the economic situation was unfavorable, the new government 
strongly emphasized a credible and more self-reliant military as being critical to the 
successful implementation of its reforms.  As a result, defense spending was maintained 
in the vicinity of 1% of GDP.   
 The new regime understood that Japan’s security was being compromised by our 
reliance on energy import and sought to rectify the situation by focusing on economic 
growth, energy security, and environmental protection.  The use of new energy sources 
was stressed and with the gradual disappearance of the nuclear allergy, renewed emphasis 
was placed on nuclear energy as a possible long-term solution to energy independence.  
Additional measures undertaken included the diversification of fossil fuel suppliers and 
the expanded use of liquid natural gas.  
 Movements toward self-reliance were also evident in the Japan Self Defense 
Force (JSDF).  Japan developed a strategic vision encapsulated by the twin pillars of 
defense and deterrence.  Under the pillar of defense, Japan sought to develop a force 
capable of responding to the full spectrum of warfare.  Under this guideline, Japan 
continued our collaborative efforts with the US to develop ballistic missile defenses.  
Japan’s Kongo-class destroyed fleet was retrofitted with the Navy Area Defense (NAD) 
capability and our Patriot PAC-2 systems are being upgraded to PAC-3 as a result of 
these efforts.  The JSDF also developed a long-term plan to indigenously manufacture 
and field large numbers of long-range conventional missiles to fulfill the role of 
deterrence.    
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 Japan continued to adhere to the US-Japan Security Arrangements.  These 
agreements remained the cornerstone of Japan’s defense due to both political realities and 
our inability to project significant levels of power.  In a similar vein, Japan’s defense 
policies remained exclusively defense oriented and adhered to the three non-nuclear 
principles (Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear 
weapons).  The dismal economic climate and subsequent lower levels of defense 
allocation predicated the prioritization of areas for defense expenditure.  The available 
resources were channeled to acquire more Type-03 SSMs, F-2 fighters, Kongo-class 
DDGs, and Osumi-class LSTs. The construction of a National Command and Control 
System (NCCS) also received significant funding. Research and Development 
expenditures were increased however, and resources were allocated toward the 
development of JBMD, the Type-03 SSM and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
The JSDF conducted two military net assessments against North Korea and China 
during this epoch in order to illuminate weaknesses in our force structure.  Upon 
examination North Korea is quantitatively superior in nearly all areas: manpower, 
number of air and maritime craft, armor, and missiles.  When examining qualitatively a 
different picture emerged.  Our modern aircraft and “blue water” naval fleet would 
preclude North Korea’s ability to gain air or sea dominance over the Sea of Japan. While 
numerically superior, North Korean equipment was a generation or two behind that of the 
Japanese army. Regardless of the relative combat power of the land forces, without the 
support of sea and air power it is highly unlikely that the North Korean army could have 
attacked Japan in significant numbers during this time period.  Given North Korean’s 
inability to project large-scale forces across the Sea of Japan, it did not possess the 
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capability to threaten the Japanese mainland by conventional means.  The one area of 
concern was North Korean’s R&D efforts into long-range ballistic missiles with possible 
WMD capabilities.  Japan evaluated this as a weakness in our force structure and 
committed resources in future epochs to find a cost effective solution to this threat. 
Similar to the North Korean comparison, China has far more military assets than 
Japan.  What differs is the quality of China’s high-end fighters, submarines, long-range 
missiles (nuclear and conventional), and C4ISR capabilities.  The acquisition of MiG31s 
and J11s has enabled China to match Japan qualitatively and has quantitatively surpassed 
JASDF’s fleet of current generation fighters.  The actual outcome of an air war would 
depend on the training and competency of the pilots as well as its C4 capabilities. Both 
are reportedly deficient for China’s Air Force and therefore the result of the battle for air 
superiority over East China Sea is uncertain.   
The evaluation of an undersea war also proved inconclusive.  Of the 63 China SS, 
only the six Song class and eight Kilo class are recent designs.  These modern diesels and 
China’s five SSN provide a formidable sub-surface capability.  Japan also has a 
formidable diesel fleet and other modern ASW platforms; therefore the outcome of a sub-
surface battle with China is unknown.   
Although China has a large ballistic and cruise missile inventory, the majority are 
SRBMs and shorter-range cruise missiles, which do not have the range to reach Japan 
when fired from the mainland.  Only 695 land-based missiles have the range to over-fly 
the East China Sea, comparable in number to Japan’s 600 Type 3 missiles.  However, this 
missile, presently equipped only with conventional warhead, does not constitute a 
deterrent to China’s nuclear weapons. 
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Details of China’s spy satellite capability are not available and hence a C4ISR 
comparison cannot be made.  Japan’s Airborne Early Warning fleet of E2Cs and E767s 
are assessed to be technologically superior when compared to China’s Y8s and A50s. 
 Numerically, Japan lags far behind China in most areas and this gap will remain 
for the foreseeable future due to demographic and economic reasons.  Japan will 
therefore have to leverage advanced technology to overcome China’s numerical 
advantage to overcome quantity with quality.  Japan’s smaller defense budget precludes 
competition in all areas, therefore we must be very selective in our military investment to 
achieve its defense objectives.  These investments must include capabilities to counter a 
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B. Epoch 2 (2006 ~ 2010) 
1. Foreign Policy 
 During the past five years (2005-2010) the static security environment in East 
Asia has evolved into new patterns of intra-Asian and trans-Pacific relations.  These 
relations have been driven by “reconciliation” of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), the growing move toward Korean reunification, and the subsequent draw 
down of US troops on the Korean Peninsula. The geostrategic patterns in the Asia-Pacific 
region remain defined by sophisticated hedging strategies on the part of the major powers 
in the Pacific. However, this fluid security environment is likely to congeal as uncertainty 
over the reunification of Korea and PRC/Taiwan consolidation has diminished.  
As the region’s security picture has become more lucid, Japan has reevaluated its 
three-pronged security policy: firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, 
building up Japan's defense capability, and making diplomatic efforts to ensure 
international peace and security.  Of particular concern is the lack of sustained American 
focus on the region and a renewed American Eurocentrism manifested in NATO 
expansion and long-term obligations in Europe. While Japan acknowledges US pre-
eminence, it is concerned that the US is driven more by narrow domestic interests and 
ideological imperatives than common goals or evident strategy.  Realizing that there is no 
viable alternative to counter-balance Chinese power, Japan must pursue its own identity 
as a major power by playing more of a leadership role in the region and by relying on the 
U.S. security presence for stability in the short term. 
The result of the evaporation of the top-down US-Japan command relationship 
has caused Japan to seek a more equal partnership with America.  The gradual extraction 
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of US troops from Korea in combination with the American economic slowdown has 
caused Japan to question the nature of American commitment to Japanese defense. The 
lack of American resolve in the region has forced Japan to increase its military autonomy, 
including clandestine efforts to develop its own nuclear umbrella.  
Concurrently, Japan’s assertive diplomacy must counter the declining U.S. 
political/military involvement in East Asia.  The rejection of Japan’s bid for a permanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council, a pillar of its foreign policy for more than a 
decade, has further cemented Japanese resolve to rely on both military and economic 
means as springboards to international prestige.  The significant domestic support for the 
Security Council seat provided the impetus to reinterpret Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution that prevented intervention into civil wars overseas.  The removal of this 
constraint enabled Japan to play a more active role in international affairs.  
Future Japanese policy must be made with China in mind.  Particular importance 
must be placed on the continuation of efforts toward a Japanese-Korean rapprochement 
and partnership with Moscow.  In the case of Korea, Japan must seek to influence the 
future geopolitical direction Korea pursues.  With regards to relations with Russia, a 
range of cooperative endeavors regarding oil and gas from Sakhalin and also eventually 
from Irkutsk, offers Russia alternatives to strategic cooperation with China.  Japan’s 
Russia policy is part of a larger "Eurasian diplomacy" extended to Central Asia with oil 
and gas resources as much the objective as geopolitical positioning.  
 
2. The International Military Situation – Overview 
See section 2 page 5-5 – no significant change 
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3. The International Military Situation – Specific Nations 
a. The Koreas 
The gradual move toward Korean reunification and subsequent pressure applied 
by North Korea on the South for US troop withdrawals is of obvious strategic importance 
to Japan.  American acquiescence has necessitated an American examination of other 
basing options in the region for the formerly Korean-based troops. Japanese domestic 
opinion on the current level of American troops based in Japan (10,000 troops in 2010) is 
fragile. American overtures toward Japanese basing options, and subsequent Japanese 
rejections of such proposals, have further fractured the increasingly tenuous alliance.  As 
America examines its regional basing options, the possibility of a significant reduction of 
permanently based US troops in the region has forced Japan to accelerate its efforts 
toward military autonomy.  Regardless of US military reactions to a unified Korea, Japan 
must evaluate the possible regional security posture of a future unified Korean state.  
Possible outcomes include: neutrality along Swiss lines; strategic independence; Sino-
Korean alignment or continued alliance with the United States.  The most likely mid-term 
outcome is a reconfigured US-Korean agreement with emphasis on access, logistic 
support, prepositioned equipment and joint training and exercising.  The definitely 
diminished permanent presence of the US in the region validates earlier Japanese hedging 
strategies and facilitates Japanese reevaluation of its strategic partnership with the US.         
 
b. China 
 Two decades of high levels of growth have moved China closer to its primary 
national goal: economic modernization.  This objective is the foundation of its 21st 
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century version of the slogan: Rich Country, Strong Army. Beijing’s long-term objective 
is to lay the foundation for becoming a multi-dimensional great power by attaining a new 
level of "comprehensive national strength" – the sum of economic, technological and 
military power which together define a country’s international standing (in their view).  
The peaceful reconciliation of Taiwan and the PRC will further enable the technological 
maturation of the Chinese economy and its military industrial complex.  China’s military 
modernization program will undoubtedly accelerate as a result of access to Taiwan’s 
burgeoning electronics industry.  The attainment of one of China’s primary national 
objectives, the reintegration of all former Chinese lands (Hong Kong, Macao, and now 
Taiwan) may cause China to become more assertive in the South China Sea, eliminating 
what it views as one of the barriers erected by the US to contain China.   
 To balance its near-term economic goals and longer-term security agenda, China 
has evolved its own hedging strategy, one beginning with efforts to neutralize potential 
threats along its enormous borders. China has crafted a diplomatic strategy designed to 
solidify ties with its neighbors as a result of the Tiananmen tragedy and US battlegroup 
intervention into the Taiwan Straits.  Specifically, China has normalized relations with 
Singapore and Indonesia, cultivated ties to other ASEAN nations (particularly to 
Thailand, Malaysia and Burma) and enhanced political and military/technical ties to 
Russia.  
In light of possible Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea and definite 
diplomatic attempts to neutralize threats along China’s borders, Japan must be doubly 
wary of being strategically isolated in the region.  Japan must continue to cultivate 
positive relationships with the nations of ASEAN, Korea, and Russia and develop the 
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appropriate military capabilities and partnerships to deal with threats to its national 
interests.    
 
c. Russia 
The Russia of 2010 remains in relative turmoil but is gradually recovering from 
its post-Soviet decline.  Russian policy-makers continue to have global ambitions, but are 
constrained by a lack of means.  This realization has caused Russia to focus primarily on 
regional security issues.  Russia remains encircled by strategic concerns: the possible 
inclusion of Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics into NATO in the West; the possible 
expansion of Turkish influence and Islamic fundamentalism in the South; and China, 
Korea, and Japan in the East.   The lack of inclusion into the European Union combined 
with the gradual withdrawal of permanent American forces from East Asia is viewed as 
destabilizing and has caused Russia to play regional actors against one another as a 
means of stabilization.  
Russia’s “chronic crisis” of the past twenty years (1990-2010) has brought neither 
a full collapse nor any real progress, but instead gridlock and a continued muddling 
along.  Japan does not view these developments as enduring and foresees an eventually 
successful integration of Russia into the new international world order in the long-term.  
During this integration Japan foresees stable relations among the former Soviet republics 
and a future territorial settlement with Japan, bringing investment and trade opportunities.  
Russia is viewed as a possible future strategic partner for Japan, enabling Japan to check 
Chinese expansionism in the region and granting access to Russian natural resources.  
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Japan must continue to pursue policies that are favorable to both Russia and Japan to 
prevent the possibility of Russian alliance with either China or Korea or both.  
 
d. United States 
The period of 2005-2010 was characterized by reversal of focus by all the major 
regional powers. China and Japan began to contemplate external ambitions, while the 
United States began to focus on domestic concerns.  The America of 2010 no longer has 
a relatively free hand to conduct international affairs.  Internal pressures, namely the 
competition between entitlements and defense for government dollars, coupled with 
competing international demands has resulted in American overextension.  While much 
continues to be made of the growing weakness of the United States, we must not 
exaggerate the supposed marginalization of America.  There has been a clear shift in the 
power equilibrium, especially when compared with the last 25 to 30 years (1980-2010), 
when the United States was certainly the first among equals. What has happened since 
then is not so much that the United States has weakened but that others have grown in 
power.  The United States is still the most powerful country in the world, and while it 
cannot do everything everywhere, it still maintains the capabilities to project power at 
places of its own choosing.  
As previously stated, the gradual withdrawal of American troops from Korea and 
rebuffed attempts to relocate these troops in Japan have caused Japan to reevaluate its 
security tenets.  While Japan is concerned about the lack of American resolve, we do not 
foresee the complete removal of American forces from the region in the near term due to 
American economic and security interests in the region.  This being said, we must build 
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up our military forces as a hedge against the possible security vacuum caused by US 
troop reductions. 
 
4. Internal Environment 
a. Domestic Political Situation 
 As described in Epoch 1, the Japanese people took a hard but correct (if only from 
hind sight) decision when they decided that the party was over and it was time to put the 
Japanese economy in gear again. The political evolution that took place in 2001, and the 
subsequent major changes that were made to the political and economic infrastructures, 
drastically changed the Japanese business way-of-life. Although times were hard for 
some years, the endurance and persistence paid dividends as the Japanese economy 
showed positive growth in 2005. Growth was sustained for the last five years from 2006 
to 2010. The reforms and restructuring efforts addressed the roots of the economic 
problems and were given credit for saving and redeeming the Japanese economy from the 
four-year recession from 2001 to 2004.  
The “Short-Term Pain for Long-Term Gain” strategy adopted by the government 
paid dividends as the resilient Japanese economy rebounded from the previous years of 
negative growth to register six straight years of positive and unprecedented sustained 
growth. Such a prompt recovery, although not without pain, gave the Japanese people 
renewed confidence in the government, and endorsed and reaffirmed its stewardship for 
the longer term.  
Deregulation in the finance, telecommunications, distribution, electricity, and 
transportation sectors were accepted and formed the baseline for the new economic boom 
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for Japan. The new economic infrastructures improved the efficiency of the Japanese 
economy and re-generated private-demand within the domestic market that was critical to 
the sustenance of longer-term economic growth. The success of the economic reforms 
renewed foreign confidence and interest in Japan again. New businesses and capital 
began pouring into Japan once more. These further boosted private demand and the 
government was now able to move away from using public spending to maintain the 
economy. 
Succumbing to unification pressures by North Korea on South Korea to ask the 
United States to withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsular, the United States 
announced in 2006 that it would reduce forces to 50% of the pre-existing levels by 2015. 
Although there were pressures by the United States for Japan to allow and indeed pay for 
basing the troops withdrawn from South Korean to be re-located in Okinawa, strong 
domestic political objections in Japan and the poor economic situation of the last five 
years did not allow acceptance by the Japanese government. With subsequent slowdown 
in growth and strong competition for resources at home, the United States slowly began 
relocating these troops back to the United States. 
The Japanese government projected that one day in the near future, the United 
States would eventually withdraw its forces from Japan and thereby leave Japan to fend 
for itself militarily. The developments on the Korean Peninsula provided the catalyst for 
the Japanese to begin re-interpreting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and re-
examining Japanese options for increasing its autonomous military capabilities for the 
defense of the Japanese homeland, as well as the protection of the Sea Lines Of 
Communications (SLOCs). At the same time, Japanese concerns for North Korea’s 
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ballistic missile capability and nuclear programs, coupled with the possible integration of 
launching technology from South Korea in the event of a Korean unification prompted 
renewed debates on Japan’s adherence to the three non-nuclear principles.  
 
b. Economic Performance 
After nearly five years of contraction in Epoch 1, the Japanese economy finally 
pulled itself out and recorded its highest growth in the new millennium, averaging an 
annual positive 5.2% growth from 2006 to 2010. This translated into an average annual 
GDP of  ¥479 trillion, and an average per capita GDP of ¥3.74 million, with the highest 
growth of 8.1% recorded for the year closing December 2008. Although substantial, this 
high annual average was still below the ¥497 trillion GDP of 2000. In effect, the 
recession early in the millennium has set the Japanese back almost a decade, and it was 
only in 2009 that the Japanese surpassed the 2000 GDP level. 
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Chart 5-9: Absolute GDP for the 2000 to 2010 
c. Defense Spending 
 With mixed signals by the United States in South Korea, the Japanese government 
continued its emphasis on defense and advocated the idea of a more autonomous 
Japanese military capability. Although the economy recovered from recession and 
enjoyed six years of positive growth, the defense spending continued to be pegged very 
close to 1% GDP for each of the five years. The result was a total of ¥23.91 trillion spent 
on defense for the five years, or an average annual spending of ¥4.78 trillion, 
representing a 12% average increase over the last five years. Although a substantial 
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Chart 5-10: Absolute Defense Expenditure from 2000 to 2010 
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d. Demographics 
The aging population problem continued to plaque Japan. The government 
continued to leverage technology towards a capital-intensive Japanese economy. While 
continuing the controlled import of skilled and unskilled workers, the government raised 
the retirement age from 65 to 70 years old, bringing the total workforce in 2010 from 81 
million to 89 million. This was only an interim measure as the population continued to 
age.  
 
Chart 5-12: Comparison of National Labor Force for 2000, 2005 and 2010 
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Chart 5-13: Population Distribution in 2010 (Chart obtained from 
http://jinjapan/org/stat/stats) 
 
Chart 5-14: Population Distribution Trend 
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e. Energy Supplies 
 Japan’s lack of significant domestic sources of energy continued to be a challenge 
especially now that the economy has picked up. The focus on adapting the Japanese 
economic, industrial and domestic infrastructures of the past ten years has begun to show 
effects on Japan’s energy consumption patterns. In terms of the breakdown in 
consumption of energy, about half of Japan’s total energy was used by industry, while 
about a quarter was used for the purposes of transportation and the rest by the residential, 
agricultural and service sectors. Japan continued to consume about 5.51 billion barrels a 
day, with most of its imports coming from the Middle East. Japan has diversified its 
dependence on crude oil import from its major sources2 (United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Qatar and Indonesia) to other oil fields in Central Asia, Alaska, the 
South China Sea and even Australia. These are viable alternative sources of energy, but 
the Japanese economy remained vulnerable to the global competition for these resources. 
. Therefore Japan continued its quest to move away from the strong reliance on the 
import of energy sources, aiming for zero-growth in Japan’s energy consumption by 
2020. 
The overland (oil and gas) pipeline from Central Asia (the Irkutsk Region), past 
Ulaanbaatar, across Mongolia and northern China to Beijing, into the Korean Peninsular 
and via a subsea route into Japan, provided an alternative supply to Japan. Phase I of the 
efforts to restructure its industrial and economic infrastructures for energy conservation 
                                                 
1 Provided by the Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/japan.html). This 
was the 1999 estimation for Japan’s energy consumption. Based on the economic downturn early in the 
millennium which reduced Japan’s consumption of energy, as well as the results of Japan’s investment in 
adapting and restructuring its economic, industrial and residential infrastructures for new energy sources, 
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and for use of new energy sources3 was also completed in 2007, substantially 
contributing to the reduction in Japan’s dependence on the import of oil. 
Back in 1998, Japan already had thirty-six operating nuclear reactors, providing 
the installed capacity for the generation of 44 gigawatts of energy, ranking Japan third in 
the world behind the United States and France4. However, in terms of percentage of 
nuclear power used in the generation of electricity for domestic use, nuclear power 
contributed only 20%5 of the total electricity capacity of Japan. This is comparable to the 
United States 19% but is small compared to the 77% in France. With the passing of the 
last of the WW II generation of Japanese and the nuclear-allergy that had plagued Japan 
for a long time, Japan plans to construct another 15 more nuclear reactors. The Japan 
Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) proposed the development of a self-sustaining 
plutonium-based nuclear power industry that includes breeder6 reactors and a complete 
plutonium fuel-cycle processing capability. It is expected that the result of such an 
activity will create a large stockpile of refined plutonium, a stockpile that is expected to 
amount to 45-90 tons7. 
                                                                                                                                                 
this figure remained a good estimate for the consumption of energy for 2010, after the economy has 
recovered. 
2 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/japan.html 
3 New energy sources refer to sources like solar power, hydropower, geothermal power, wind power, etc. 
4 http://www.iea.org/statist/keyworld/p_0106.htm 
5 These are 1999 figures obtained from http://www.icc.ru/fed/kovykt.html. The rest of the electricity being 
generated by: LNG-22%, coal-10%, oil-27%, and hydro-21%. 
6 A breeder reactor is a fast neutron reactor that is capable of producing more plutonium fuel than the 
uranium fuel it burns. The process involves the burning of the U-235 in electric power producing reactor, 
reprocessing the spent fuel to recover the residual U-235 and Pu-239 for use in subsequent reactors, 
Essentially, it converts waste U-235 into Pu-239. This implies that 100-times as much energy can be 
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Chart 5-17: Primary Energy Supply Sources (1990 and 2000 data from 
http://jin.jcic.or.jp/access/energy/profile.html) 
Primary Fuel Types Major Importing Countries 
Oil United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and China 
Natural Gas Southeast Asia (mainly Indonesia and Malaysia) 
Coal Australia, South Africa, United States and China 




Chart 5-18: Import of Energy for 1990, 2000 and 2010 
55.8 16.5 10.8 12 4.9
53.4 16.6 12.8 12.1 5.1
45.7 15.3 14.7 16.2 8.1
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5. Japan Self-Defense Force 
a. Introduction 
The call for unification in the Korea Peninsula warranted the withdrawal of US 
troops in South Korea. Although the number of troops trimmed by the US was not very 
significant over the last five years, nonetheless, it cast some doubts as to the US 
commitment in the Pacific Rim in the near future. This prompted Japan to begin to think 
about self-sufficiency rather reliance on the US for its security. 
 
b. Principal Considerations for Force Planning 
The principal considerations remained the same as the first epoch. Internally, the 
Japan Self-Defense Force had begun reviewing the scope of the US-Japan Security 
Arrangement for potential amendments. 
 
c. Japan Defense Strategy & Policy 
 There was no change to the Defense Strategy and Policy.  However, the lack of 
significant progress in the development of NTWD and THAAD systems shifted the 
emphasis to deterrence rather than defensive capabilities.  
 
d. Defense Expenditure  
As the Japan economy was recovering from the short-term pain, long-term gain 
policy, there was a consequent increase of 12.4% in military expenditure as compared to 
the first epoch. There was a sharp drop in R&D as Japan reviewed its commitment to the 
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BMD research with the US. Much of the funding was channeled to equipment acquisition 















1 Personnel & Provision 2,070.0 10,878.0 45.4% 2,175.6 5.1% 
2 Maintenance 830.8 4,298.0 17.9% 859.6 3.5% 
3 Facilities 170.0 913.0 3.8% 182.6 7.4% 
4 R&D 123.0 525.0 2.2% 105.0 -14.6% 
5 Equipment Acquisition 491.6 4,075.0 17.0% 815.0 65.8% 
6 Others 580.0 3,260.0 13.6% 652.0 12.4% 
 Total 4,265.4 23,949.0 100.0% 4,789.8 12.3% 
 
Table 5-10: Defense expenditure for 2006 to 2010 
 
e. Defense Research & Development Programs  
A total of ¥525 billion was spent over the last 5 years on R & D. Table 5-11 
shows the major R&D programs for the JSDF. The commitment to missile defense 
programs R&D was about ¥50 billion. The EU-2, the second in the series of UAV was 
completed and production started in 2007. Meanwhile, Japan embarked on a program for 
a strike UAV and ICBM. We were also pursuing a more advanced seeker for missiles so 
as to home on the new-generation stealth ship. 
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S/No Item Amount (Million ¥) Remarks 
1 Type-XX ICBM 20,000 In progress. 
2 Ballistic Missile Defense 
System 
30,000 In progress. 
3 SM3 Missile for NTWD 10,000 In progress. 
4 BMC3I 10,000 In progress. 
5 National C2 System 20,000 Upgrading. 
6 UF-3X 30,000 In progress. 
7 EU-2 (HAE UAV) 25,000 Completed, production in 2007. 
 Total 145,000  
8 Others 380,000  
 Grand Total 525,000  
 
Table 5-11: Main R & D Programs 
f. Key Defense Systems  
 In this epoch, the only new weapon system that was phased into operation was the 
EU-2. 
The EU-2 was designed as a high altitude and long endurance UAV. It was 
indigenously manufactured by Fuji Heavy Industries. It essentially functioned as a 
pseudo satellite that cost about ¥ 6 billion a copy. Speeding across the airspace at 300 
knots and with an endurance of 60 hours, the EU-1 could operate as far out as 5,000 nm 
and still had an on station time in excess of one day. Flying at an altitude of 100,000 ft, 
EU-2’s sensors would have an operating range of at least 300 nm. Another key mission 
for EU-2 would be to serve as communication relay for the ships or aircrafts (e.g. EU-1). 
This was important so that all the essential information would be able to pipe back to the 
NCCS for a consistent battlefield picture. 
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• Endurance: 60hrs  
• Cruise Speed: 300kts 
• Payload: 3000lbs 
• Power: 80kW 
• Altitude: 100kft 




o Air Search Radar 
o Comms relay 
o Pseudo Satellite 
Figure 5-5: EU-2 
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g. National Defense Program Outline 
 The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) that laid out the long-term, 
steady state order of battle for the various Services was last reviewed in 2001. The end-
state, at the end of another five-year mid-term review at 2010, was shown in Table 5-12.  
Classification  2001 NDPO  
At End of Revised Mid-
Term Defense Program 
(2010) 
GSDF (Regular)  145,000  Approx. 150,000 
GSDF (Reserve)  25,000  Approx. 20,000 
MSDF  50,000  Approx. 47,500 
ASDF  50,000  Approx. 48,900 
Joint Staff  2,000  Approx. 1,800 
Total (Active)  247,000  Approx. 248,200 
Manpower 
Grand Total  272,000  Approx. 268,200 
Division  8 Infantry Division 1 Armored Division  
9 Infantry Division 
1 Armored Division 
Brigade  
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
 
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
Tank  Approx 1000  Approx 1030 
GSDF 
Artillery  Approx 1000  Approx 1000 
Destroyer  60  57 
Submarine  20  19 MSDF 
Combat Aircraft  200  Approx 210 
Fighter  400  Approx 330 
ASDF 
UAV  Approx 50  7 
 
Table 5-12: 2010 Mid-Term Review of Defense Program 
Within the JSDF, there was a flow of active manpower posts from the ground 
forces to the other services. The GSDF continued to downsize its active forces and 
increase its reserve order of battle. The rest of the Services saw little change. 
The subsequent sections will describe the changes to the various Services. Main 
missile systems and C4ISR systems are discussed separately. 
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h. Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) 
      Epoch 2 (2006 ~ 2010) 





1 Infantry/Combined Div 10     1 9 
2 Infantry Bde 4 2     6 
3 Armored Div 1       1 
4 Heliborne Bde 1       1 
5 Airborne Bde 1       1 
6 Amphibious Bde 1       1 
7 Tanks 1,135   100   1,135 
8 APC 795 25 100   820 
9 Artillery (155mm SP) 831     100 731 
10 MLRS 178 100     278 
11 Attack Helicopters 88 5   5 88 
12 Other Helicopters 424 5   5 424 
 
Table 5-13: Major GSDF Order of Battle 
The major change was in the GSDF was the restructuring of another infantry 
division to form two more independent brigades. There was also an on-going digitization 
program and replacement of the 155mm artillery with MLRS. 
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i. Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) 
      Epoch 2 (2006 ~ 2010) 





1 Kongo & DD21 4 6     13 
2 Other DDs 53     3 47 
3 Submarine (SS) 18 2   1 20 
4 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 2   1 39 
5 Landing Ship (LST) 11 3     17 
6 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100   15 15 85 
7 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36       36 
8 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10       10 
9 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0       0 
10 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 3   2 79 
 
Table 5-14: Major MSDF Order of Battle 
The MSDF continued its modernization effort of the fleet. It now had 13 Kongo-
class destroyers and 20 submarines. The P3C was starting to be phased out and was being 
replaced by UAVs. 
Defense of Japan 2010   
 
 5 - 89 
 
j. Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) 
   Epoch 2 (2006 ~ 2010) 





1 F-15 (J/DJ) 203    203 
2 F-22 0 50   50 
3 F-1 52   17 35 
4 F-2 75 25   100 
5 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133   50 83 
6 C-1 28    28 
7 C-130H 16    16 
8 CH-47J (Transport) 29 10   39 
9 KC-135 5 5   10 
 
Table 5-15: Major ASDF Order of Battle 
There were significant changes in the ASDF. We brought in the new F-22 fighters 
with the intention to phase out the F-15 later.  We also increased the fleet of F-2 to 100 
and downsized the F/RF-4 squadrons. The CH-47 was increased to 39 as the main 
provider of airlift capabilities. To extent the reach of the fighters, more KC-135 were also 
being procured. 
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k. Major Missile Systems  
      Epoch 2 (2006 ~ 2010) 





1 Patriot PAC-3 FU Upgrading 120   60   120 
2 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192   2   192 
3 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 80       80 
4 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 100 450     550 
5 Type-03 Missile 1,000 4,500     5,500 
 
Table 5-16: Major Missile Systems 
The upgrading programs for Patriot and I-Hawk continued from the last epoch. 
The shift towards a more aggressive deterrent capability was visible through the 
procurement of additional 450 Type-03 TELs. Japan would have a total of 5,500 Type-03 
missiles in inventory. There would be more growth in this area. 
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l. Major C4ISR Systems 
      Epoch 2 (2006 ~ 2010) 





1 EU-1 (Low observable) 7 15     22 
2 EU-2 (HAE) 0 18     18 
3 E-2C 13       13 
4 E-767 4       4 
5 Info Gathering Satellite 4 6   2 8 
6 IW Platoon (30-men) 1  1     2 
 
Table 5-17: Major C4ISR Systems 
Japan continued to enlarge its fleet of UAVs.  The new EU-2 was rolled out in 
2007 and 18 aircrafts were procured.  We also acquired 15 more EU-1. The number of 
spy satellites was also doubled to eight.  The intention was to bring the number to 16 so 
that the revisit time of any particular spot of the earth could be reduced to one day. 
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6. Static Net Assessment - Japan Versus North Korea 
In this section, the static assessment between Japan’s forces and North Korean 
forces is presented.  Details of Japan’s forces can be found in the previous chapter.  Refer 
to the Korean Team’s submission for details of North Korea Force Structure for 2010.  
The data presented in this section has been reorganized and aggregated to provide a more 
focused comparison.  
 
a. Manpower 
Japan North Korea 
Joint: 1,800 (1,600) 
Army: 170,000 (168,000) 
Navy: 47,500 (46,500) 
Air Force: 48,900 (48,300) 
No reliable figures available for 2010 
Army: (1,140,000 + 600,000 Reserves) 
Navy: (46,000 + 65,000 Reserves) 
Air Force: (86,000) 
Total: 268,200 (264,400) Total: (1,937,000) 
(Figures in parenthesis denote figures for previous epoch) 
Over the last five years, the North Korean military underwent drastic cuts in 
manpower.  While reliable figures are not available, our intelligence was able to 
determine that the North Korean army demobilized 20 of its 117 divisions.  Even so, the 
total JSDF manpower remains one order of magnitude smaller than that of North Korea.  
Due to economic and demographic reasons, it is not possible for Japan to significantly 
increase the manpower of its armed forces. 
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b. Air Force 
Japan North Korea 
203 (203) F15 
50 (0) F22 
35 (52) F1 
100 (75) F2 
83 (133) F4/RF4 
28 (28) C1 
16 (16) C130 
39 (29) CH47 
10 (5) KC135 AAR 
35 (35) MiG 29 
206 (206) Lower-end Fighters 
80 (80) Bomber 
321 (321) Attack 
304 (304) Fixed Wing Transport 
275 (275) Helicopters 
 
 
 There has been no significant change to the North Korean Air Force and it mainly 
comprises lower-end8 or older aircraft.  The only modern fighter in their inventory is the 
35 MiG29s.  This should not pose much problem to Japan’s 50 F22s and 203 F15s. In 
short, the capability gap between the two Korean Air Forces has actually increased over 
the last five years.  Hence, JASDF should not face much opposition when operating 
outside the coverage of North Korean’s land-based SAM systems, including the airspace 
over the Sea of Japan. 
 
                                                 
8 In this section, “lower-end” is used to refer to military equipment with a capability (for which they have 
been designed) that is at the lower end of the spectrum. This term is relative and time sensitive. For 
example, a fighter aircraft that is considered state-of-the-art in 1960 would have become obsolete by 1990 
and hence referred to as a “low-end” fighter in 1990. 
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c. Navy 
 Japan North Korea 
Surface Combatants 13 (7) Kongo 
47 (50) Other DDGs 
3 Missile Patrol Craft 
 
Maritime Safety Agency: 
13/46 Lg/Med Patrol Vessel 
38 Patrol Craft 
81 Coastal Patrol Craft 
180 Coastal/Rescue Craft 
48 (48) Missile Armed 
Ships (3 FF, 45 PC) 
403 (403) Other small non-
missile armed ships 
Submarines 20 (19) SS 2 (0) Kilo Class 
21 (21) Romeo Class 
67 (71) Other lower end 
boats 
Mine Warfare 39 (38) 24 (24) 
Amphibious 17 (14) LSTs 35 (35) LSTs 
231 (231) Others (LCPs etc)
Aircraft 85 (100) P3C 
79 (78) ASW Helicopters 
46 (46) Others 
12 (12) Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft 
10 (10) ASW Helicopters 
 
Over the last five years, the only addition to the North Korean Navy is the 
acquisition of the two Kilo-class submarines.  North Korea’s surface fleet consists mainly 
of lower-end frigates and missile crafts, each with two to four missiles.  It is clear from 
the above table that the North Korean Navy is no match for the modern Japanese Navy in 
a force-on-force confrontation in open waters. The inclusion of air power into 
consideration only serves to exacerbate the imbalance. 
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d. Army 
 Japan North Korea 
Tanks 1135 (1135) MBTs 2800 (3500) Tanks 
APC 820 (795) 2000 (2500) 
Artillery 731 (831) 7325 (8200) 
MLRS 278 (178) 2000 (2300) 
Attack Helicopters 88 (88) 40 (50) 
 
 Over the last five years, no new equipment has been acquired.  Instead, a 
substantial amount has been decommissioned.  While still numerically superior, North 
Korean equipment is mostly a generation or two behind the modern equipment of the 
Japanese army. But regardless of the relative combat power of the land forces, without 
the support of sea and air power, it is highly unlikely that the North Korean ground force 
can attack Japan in significant numbers. Nor does Japan’s policy of deterrence require 
invasion of North Korea 
 
e. Missiles 
 Japan North Korea 
Strike 550 (100) Type 03 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
80 (80) Type 88 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
 
100 Scud B 
150 (150) Hwasong 5 
250 (250) Hwasong 6 
120 (80) Nodong 1/2 
50 (25) Taepo Dong 1/2 
may have 3 to 6 nuclear 
weapons 
Air Defense 120 (120) Patriot FU (40 
PAC2 and 80 PAC3) 
192 (192) I-HAWK FU 
3,000 (5,500) SAMs 
 
 The majority of North Korean missiles do not have the range to hit Japan.  Of 
concern is North Korean’s deployment of long-range ballistic missiles, such as the 
Nodong and Taepo Dong.  While the quantity and accuracy of these missiles may not 
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pose a serious threat to Japan’s military, it may be used as a weapon of terror against the 
Japanese population.  In addition, it is now known that they have enough plutonium to 
built three to six nuclear weapons.  The Japanese Type 3 missiles have the range to hit 
anywhere in North Korea.  While they are presently equipped only with conventional 
warhead and are not a direct deterrent to the North Korean nuclear weapons, they serve as 




Japan North Korea 
8 (4) IMINT Satellites 
60 (30)-person Computer Warfare Team 
22 (7) EU-1 
18 (0) EU-2 
13 (13) E2C 
4 (4) E767 




 Details of the North Korean C4ISR capabilities are not known. However, the 
reader could assume that they were not technologically advanced.  However, it is 
assumed that they have the means to procure commercially available services such as 
satellite images, satellite communications etc. 
 
g. Summary (Japan versus North Korea) 
 The relative military strengths of the two countries have not changed significantly 
over the five years.  Overall, given North Korean’s inability to project large forces across 
the Sea of Japan, it does not pose a conventional military threat to Japan.  The only 
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significant capability is North Korean’s investment in long-range ballistic missiles with 
WMD capabilities.  Japan will commit resources in future epochs to find a cost-effective 
solution to this threat. 
 
7. Static Net Assessment - Japan Versus China 
In this section, the static assessment between Japan’s forces and China’s forces is 
presented.  Details of Japan’s forces can be found in the previous chapter. The data 




Joint: 1,800 (1,600) 
Army: 170,000 (168,000) 
Navy: 47,500 (46,500) 
Air Force: 48,900 (48,300) 
PLA: 1,780,000 (1,928,000) 
Rapid Reaction: 70,000 (55,000) 
Navy: 300,000 (280,000) 
Marines: 13,000 (10,000) 
Special Forces: 12,000 (7,000) 
Intelligence: 4,000 (3,000) 
Total: 268,200 (264,400) Total: 2,179,000 (2,283,000) 
 
 Over the last five years, while China has made cuts in the overall manpower 
requirements, the numbers of the rapid reaction force, marines and special forces has 
increased.  The total JSDF manpower is one order of magnitude smaller than that of 
China.  Due to economic and demographic reasons, it is not possible for Japan to 
significantly increase the manpower of its armed forces. 
Operationally, (as shall be seen in the air and naval order of battle), Chinese 
sealift capability has not increased significantly over the last five years, and is assessed 
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able to project no more than 20,000 troops and their airlift capability no more than 
12,0009, a small fraction of the total PLA order of battle. 
Qualitatively, although PLA personnel are generally well trained in basic skills, 
their leadership, training in combined operations and morale is low. Most soldiers are 
poorly educated and one-third leave active duty each year. There is also no professional 
NCO corps10. 
 
b. Air Force 
Japan China 
203 (203) F15 
50 (0) F22 
35 (52) F1 
100 (75) F2 
83 (133) F4/RF4 
28 (28) C1 
16 (16) C130 
39 (29) CH47 
10 (5) KC135 AAR 
10 (0) J12 
300 (200) MiG31 
335 (298) J11 
200 (100) J10 
1500 (2253) Lower-end fighters/attack 
120 (235) Long-range Bombers 
68 (58) Heavy/Medium Lift FW Transport 
155 (264) Light FW Transport 
10 (10) AAR 
316 (224) Helicopters 
 
 The majority of China’s over 2000 fighters are lower-end aircraft.  But with the 
inclusion of MiG31s and J11s in the last 10 years, China has caught up with Japan’s F15s 
qualitatively and has quantitatively surpassed JASDF’s fleet of current generation 
fighters. In terms of advanced fighters, JASDF’s F22 fleet is significantly larger than that 
of China’s J12 fleet.  But the actual outcome of an air war would depend very much on 
the training and competency of the pilots as well as its C4 capabilities.  Both are 
                                                 
9 Extrapolated based on assessment by  http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/ohanlon/2000fall_IS.pdf. 
10 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm 
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reportedly deficient for China’s Air Force11. Hence the result of the battle for air 
superiority over East China Sea is uncertain. 
 
c. Navy 
 Japan China 
Surface Combatants 13 (7) Kongo DDGs 
47 (50) Other Destroyers 
3 Missile Patrol Craft 
 
Maritime Safety Agency: 
13/46 Lg/Med Patrol Vessel 
38 Patrol Craft 
81 Coastal Patrol Craft 
180 Coastal/Rescue Craft 
35 (27) Destroyers 
46 (41) Frigates 
166 (149) other lower end 
Missile Craft 
60 (70) Torpedo Craft 
30 (30) Speed Boats 
Submarines 20 (19) SS 63 (63) SS 
5 (5) SSN 
2 (1) SSBN 
Mine Warfare 39 (38) 83 (83) 
Amphibious 17 (14) LSTs 26 (26) LSTs 
66 (66) lower capacity craft 
Aircraft 85 (100) P3C 
79 (78) ASW Helicopters 
46 (46) Others 
See “Air Force” 
 
 China’s surface fleet consists mainly of lower end destroyers, frigates and missile 
crafts, each with four to eight SSMs and up to eight SAMs.  The total missile capacity of 
all surface combatants is estimated to be about 1,408 SSMs and 480 SAMs spread over 
247 ships, or about 7.6 missiles per ship.  In contrast, while the Japanese surface fleet is 
numerically inferior, it is technologically modern and carries missiles of far longer range.  
For example, the 13 Kongo-class DDGs have a total missile capacity of 1,274, a number 
comparable to the missile capacity of the entire China’s surface fleet.  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
11 http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR580/mr580.html 
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Japan surface fleet is supported by a large number of surveillance and ASW aircraft. 
Overall, JMSDF has the edge in surface warfare. 
 Of the 63 China SS, only the 10 Song-class and 10 Kilo-class are of more recent 
designs.  These, together with the five SSN provide China with a more superior sub-
surface capability.  However, with the 20 modern SS and ASW capabilities of its 
destroyers and aircraft, JMSDF should be able to maintain a very slight edge in an open-
ocean naval battle. 
 
d. Missiles 
 Japan China 
Strike 550 (100) Type 03 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
80 (80) Type 88 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
 
980 (900) SRBM 
90 (60) MRBM 
65 (90) IRBM 
62 (45) ICBM 
110 (84) SLBM 
(with 2 SSBN) 
5805 (5700) ASCM 
800 (500) Tomahawk 
Equivalent 
2200 (1700) other shorter 
range LACM 
Air Defense 120 (120) Patriot FU (40 
PAC2 and 80 PAC3) 
192 (192) I-HAWK FU 
46 (25) Long Range SAM 
Bns 
45 (20) Short Range SAM 
Bns 
 
 Although China has a large ballistic and cruise missile inventory, the majority are 
SRBMs and shorter-range cruise missiles, which do not have the range to reach Japan 
when fired from the mainland.  Only 1017 land-based missiles have the range to overfly 
the East China Sea.    While Japan also has long-range cruise missiles, these are presently 
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equipped only with conventional warhead and hence do not directly constitute a deterrent 
to China’s nuclear weapons. 
 In the last five years, Japan has vastly increased its Type 3 TEL fleet.  The 550 
mobile land-based Type 3 TELs will play a big role in the defense against a scenario of a 
China large-scale invasion. With no clear winners in the comparison between air and 
naval combatants, the Type 3 missiles will provide the additional firepower necessary to 
tilt the balance in JSDF’s favor in a defensive scenario.  Should China conduct an all-out 





8 (4) IMINT Satellites 
60 (30)-person Computer Warfare Team 
22 (7) EU-1 
18 (0) EU-2 
13 (13) E2C 
4 (4) E767 
National C2 System 
16 (14) IMINT/EW Satellites 
16 (16) AEWCC 
 
Details of China’s spy satellite capability are not available and hence a 
comparison cannot be made.  Japan’s Airborne Early Warning fleet of E2Cs and E767s 
are assessed to be technologically superior as compared to China’s Y8s and A50s.  In 
addition, Japan has invested heavily on unmanned platform and has thus far deployed 40 
C4ISR UAVs. 
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f. Summary (Japan versus China) 
 In the last five years both sides have continued to increase their inventories of 
modern military equipment.  Numerically, Japan continues to lag far behind in most areas 
and this gap can never be bridged due to demographic and economic reasons.  Japan will 
therefore have to leverage advanced technology to overcome China’s numerical 
advantage; in short, to overcome quantity with quality.  With a smaller defense budget, 
Japan cannot afford to compete in all capability areas, and must therefore be very 
selective in its military investment to achieve its defense objectives.  These include 
capabilities to counter a large-scale China invasion, as well as possible cost-effective 
solutions to counter China’s nuclear and missile capabilities. 
 
8. Japan’s R&D and Procurement Priorities 
 Japan’s priorities for military R&D and procurement for the next epoch will be as 
follows: (1) to find a cost-effective solution to defend Japan against long-range ballistic 
missile and cruise missiles; (2) given that both China and North Korea are equipped with 
nuclear weapons, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency will undertake a secret program to 
develop nuclear weapons.  The declaration and deployment of the nuclear weapons will 
be determined at a later date; (3) to expand on JSDF’s Type 3 TEL missile force to 
provide a massive conventional strike and deterrent capabilities. This will also enhance 
our area denial capabilities for the waters surrounding Japan; (4) to improve JSDF’s 
C4ISR capabilities to enhance the mission effectiveness of JSDF and to enable the 
conduct of long-range land-attack and anti-ship strike missions; and lastly (5) to invest 
R&D resources in unmanned platforms. 
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9. Epoch 2 Summary 
This epoch saw East Asia evolving into new patterns of intra-Asian and trans-
Pacific relations. As the region’s security picture has become more lucid, Japan has 
reevaluated its three-pronged security policy: firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements, building up Japan's defense capability, and making diplomatic efforts to 
ensure international peace and security.  Of particular concern is the lack of sustained 
American focus on the region. Realizing that there is no viable alternative to counter-
balance Chinese power, Japan must pursue its own identity as a major power by playing 
more of a leadership role in the region and by relying on the U.S. security presence for 
stability in the short term. 
The quest for a seat in the United Nations’ Security Council and the beginning of 
the withdrawal of United States forces from South Korea precipitated the reconsideration 
of the United States commitment in the region, especially that of the defense of the 
Japanese homeland. These developments provided the catalyst for the Japanese to begin 
re-interpreting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and re-examining Japanese options 
for increasing its autonomous military capabilities for the defense of the Japanese 
homeland, as well as the protection of the SLOCs. 
Domestically, the political and economic measures taken during the first two 
epochs resulted in drastic changes in the Japanese business way of life. But the endurance 
and persistence paid dividends as the Japanese economy showed positive signs of growth 
in 2005, and this was sustained for these last five years from 2006 to 2010. 
Riding on the recovering economy, the JSDF took steps to bolster its defense 
capabilities with new acquisition and R&D programs. The missile, naval, air and C4ISR 
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capabilities were significantly enhanced with the procurement of state-of-the-art systems. 
But there is as yet no cost-effective solution to comprehensive missile defense system. 
Realizing its limitations in manpower and defense budget, especially when compared to 
China, JSDF will continue to be very selective in its military investments. Key areas of 
focus in the next epoch will include finding cost-effective solutions to defend Japan 
against missile attacks and a large-scale invasion. 
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C. Epoch 3 (2011 ~ 2015) 
1. Foreign Policy 
During the past five years (2010-2015) the patterns of intra-Asian and trans-
Pacific relations that developed during the previous epoch have evolved into a more 
discernable triangular balance of power in the region involving the US, China, and Japan. 
This tripartite balance of power has resulted in the emergence of more predictable and 
sometimes constructive patterns of relations between the three regional powers. The 
gradual erosion of the unipolar world order has forced Asian states to fundamentally re-
orientate and re-examine their security policies. In light of this, the Asian states from 
2010 to 2015 were preoccupied with positioning for the regional power realignment. 
While no clear client-state relationships have developed, the seeds for this type of 
alignment have been sown.  
Against this backdrop, Japan continues to reevaluate our three-pronged security 
policy: firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, building up Japan's 
defense capability, and making diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and 
security. The continued deterioration of American regional commitment and the 
emergence of an expansive China places increased importance on the further 
development of Japanese strategic independence. However, given the persistent historic 
perception of Japan as an aggressor in the Asia-Pacific, we must continue to maintain 
remnants of the US-Japan security treaty to pacify our neighbors for the short term. Until 
Japanese forces can fully evolve to meet the new security requirements, the 
aforementioned treaty provides an anchor to manage the destabilizing effects of conflicts 
in the region. Thus, the treaty continues to provide a useful framework for the 
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development of balanced ties between Japan and the US in the context of growing 
interdependence on the one hand, and uncertainty on the other.  
The United States remains the leading power in the region and world, but due to 
its evolving Asian force structure, America is more dependent than ever on Japan for 
forward basing. This presents American policy-makers with being dependent on Japan 
for bases in Asia while Japanese domestic debate rages over the disposition of American 
forces inside its borders. The American dilemma, coupled with the very real possibility of 
forward-based Chinese forces in the Philippines, presents Japan with heightened security 
concerns. Japan must play a larger political and military role in the region to ensure our 
national security. We must also assure our neighbors that our resurgence does not 
threaten their interests. We must continue to conduct joint military exercises as both a 
means of reassurance to our friends and as a demonstration of resolve to our enemies. 
Japan's growing military power must be couched in terms of Japanese "burden sharing" 
in the context of American "burden shedding" as countries in the region continue to view 
the US-Japanese strategic partnership as the linchpin for regional stability.  
 
2. The International Military Situation – Overview 
 The international military situation remains similar to the overview given in 
section 2 page 5-5, with the exception of the rise of multi-polarity. While a multi-polar 
world has yet to fully take hold, it is evident that the increasing influence of both India 
and China present new challenges to Japanese security and that of our allies.  
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3. The International Military Situation – Specific Nations 
a. The Koreas 
The Korean reunification scheduled for early in 2016 has drastically altered the 
Japanese security picture. Concerns over the decreased American presence in the region 
and Korea’s strategic direction have forced Japan to vigilantly monitor the integration of 
North and South Korea. We assess the former military forces of the North and South as 
acting independently on operational and tactical levels, but pursuing a unified strategy as 
crafted by a coherent senior military leadership. While Japan views this as an exploitable 
command and control weakness, we are careful not to underestimate the formidable 
arsenals now combined as a result of reunification.  
The details of the impending reunification remain unclear, but it is apparent that a 
reconfigured US-Korean agreement with emphasis on access, logistic support, pre-
positioned equipment and joint training and exercising is emerging. Japan must continue 
efforts to cultivate a positive economic climate with the Koreas and continue to monitor 
Korean relations with China and Russia to assure that Japan does not become threatened 
by three nuclear states. 
 
b. China 
 China expects to become the dominant power in East Asia. It has evolved into the 
world’s second most powerful nation (as defined by its own terms of comprehensive 
national strength: economic, military, and technology) and believes that in due course it 
will surpass the U.S. economy in total size. These objectives will likely remain out of 
reach as China has yet to integrate Taiwanese business models or deal with 
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overpopulation, both huge obstacles to modernity which continue to drag China down 
despite its economic progress. China does represent a significant challenge to Japanese 
security. Our goals of economic and diplomatic engagement with China have been 
diluted by Chinese military activities in the South China Sea. We must now attempt to 
contain Chinese influence in the region. 
Military modernization and the conduct of naval exercises in the vicinity of the 
Philippines pose threats to Japanese regional trade routes. Russian arms sales and 
Taiwanese electronics expertise has begun to add technical depth to the vast human 
resources possessed by the Chinese armed forces. Taiwanese forces have been dubbed 
the Eastern Sea Protection Force (ESPF), however their operational doctrine remains in 
doubt. While the PRC claims these forces will only be used for regional defense, the PLA 
undoubtedly has long-term plans for military integration. China’s economic ties with 
ASEAN nations during the previous epoch resulted in a positive economic and political 
climate that has enabled China to conduct military exercises with relatively little 
diplomatic protests from her neighbors to the south. Reports of discussions between the 
Philippines and China regarding possible Chinese basing in Subic Bay also presents an 
increased threat to Japanese security.  
 
c. Russia 
The Russia of 2015 has yet to fully emerge from its post-Soviet decline but 
remains in control of a vast military stockpile that includes nuclear weapons. Russia 
remains encircled by strategic concerns, but has developed mutually beneficial 
relationships with both China and Japan. The sale of Russian arms to the Chinese and 
Defense of Japan 2015   
 
 5 - 109 
 
Indians continue to bring in much needed revenue, as has Japanese access to the natural 
resources of Siberia. Siberian development was made possible by the settlement of the 
Kuril Islands dispute and by other bilateral agreements.  
Russia’s economic situation has brightened somewhat, but not enough to 
discontinue its policy of “limited globalism” in which Russia engages the world and the 
Asia-Pacific region on a selective basis. Present economic resurgence aside, Russia still 
does not posses the means for wide-ranging global aspirations and is likely to continue its 
present policy. Continued economic cooperation with Russia remains essential to 
Japanese security due to our needs for the diversification of energy sources and to 
counteract Chinese economic ties brought about by Russian military sales. 
 
d. United States 
America has yet to fully emerge from its earlier financial difficulties in this 
decade. The USFK force reductions and Korean unification have alarmed Japan causing 
the present debate over what to do with American forces in Okinawa and Kadina. 
Australia and Vietnam are being examined as possible US basing options if forces are 
withdrawn from Japan. Internal pressures continue to compete for government dollars. 
Reliance on energy from the Middle East plagues America’s ability to commit resources 
for Japanese defense. While the United States is providing security insurance to Japan 
under the US-Japan Security Arrangement, Japan must begin to rely on our own means to 
counter threats to our security. 
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4. Japan Domestic Situation 
a. Japan Economy 
 The institutional reforms implemented in epoch 1 (2000-2005) continued to pay 
significant dividends as Japan’s GDP maintained levels of 4-6% GDP growth from 2010-
2015. The slowdown in labor force of 2010 exacerbated labor scarcity and caused labor 
costs to rise further. Japanese producers reacted by increasing automation and advancing 
less capital-intensive means of production. The government also encouraged more 
women to join the labor force and prolonged the participation of older workers. 
Government promotion of spending on education, training, and research and development 
also contributed to our positive economic climate.  
The structural and banking problems that plagued Japan were overhauled by 
adjusting the whole Japanese system: business, taxation, administration, legal/judicial, 
political/election, technological, and educational. Additional amelioration came from the 
allocation of economic resources to areas where Japan maintained competitiveness 
(automobile manufacturing, telecommunication, computer, internet, financial and other 
service industries) and where Japanese products set de facto global standards (fax 
machines, photo-copying machines, animation, and factory management).  
Goods, services, labor, real estate, and financial markets were deregulated 
enabling Japan to best utilize its limited human resources, land resources, domestic 
purchasing power, and vast household savings. These deregulations encouraged venture 
businesses and foreign subsidiaries, created new jobs, raised efficiency and reduced 
domestic price levels.  
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b. Nuclear Debate 
 In spite of the nuclear allergy, Japanese leaders have for 30 years maintained that 
Japan must retain the option to develop nuclear weapons. Japanese law and policy reveal 
two significant gaps: the discrepancy between the public’s perception of anti-nuclear 
statutes and their actual meanings; and more importantly, the gulf between the 
government’s stated policy and our actions regarding nuclear weapons.  
Most Japanese believe our constitution explicitly prohibits nuclear weapons, but 
the government has stated repeatedly and consistently that the constitution does not 
prohibit them. Article 9, which renounces Japan's right to make war and to possess 
‘armed forces,’ has no explicit provision against nuclear weapons. Post-war cabinets have 
consistently maintained that the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit the possession 
of nuclear weapons if they are kept to the minimum required for self-defense. As Japan 
reevaluates the provisions in Article 9, we must realize that the Constitution does not 
serve as a deterrent to nuclear armament regardless of our previously stated policies.  
Japan’s other anti-nuclear barricades are equally porous. We have ignored 
indications that the United States was routinely bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese 
ports, an action interpreted by American military planners as tacit permission to carry 
nuclear weapons into our harbors. We believe American aircraft carriers home-ported in 
Yokohama routinely brought nuclear weapons into the port. Additionally, our 
participation in joint military exercises in which U.S. forces simulated the use of nuclear 
weapons also underline the dichotomy between our government’s policies and its actions 
regarding nuclear weapons. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles were established as 
national policy more than 40 years ago, but are not stipulated by law. We have ruled out 
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the need for specific legislation because the principles are already well known both at 
home and abroad. A more binding constraint is the Japanese law governing nuclear 
energy, which strictly limits its use to peaceful purposes. Nonetheless, our present 
Japanese government must either change the law or choose to ignore it, as earlier 
governments have disregarded the three non-nuclear principles.  
International agreements prove more formidable because Japan cannot change 
them unilaterally. The NPT and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are two notable 
examples. Japan is a member of the NPT, but the treaty does not provide for any 
sanctions or punitive measures against members who violate treaty obligations. Any 
member is allowed to withdraw from the treaty with a three-month notice to the U.N. 
Security Council if "extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests”. Japan 
maintains unilateral nuclear agreements with six countries – the United States, Britain, 
France, Canada, Australia, and China. Each of these agreements excepting the one with 
China stipulates that everything Japan has imported from these countries must be used 
only for non-military purposes. If Japan were to use its civilian nuclear program for 
military purposes, a set of stringent sanctions could be imposed, including the immediate 
return of all imported materials and equipment to the original exporting country. The 
likelihood of sanctions actually being imposed is another matter. The history of American 
foreign relations suggests that sanctions are rarely the case, particularly when a major 
economic partner is involved.  
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c. Energy 
Our diversification of energy import routes (natural gas and oil shipments from 
Russian Far East) have lessened heavy reliance on the Persian Gulf and provided Japan 
with the supplements for internal generation. Natural gas resources of the Sakhalin 
Islands compare favorably with other substantial regional natural gas suppliers. Estimates 
indicate that Sakhalin proven and probable gas reserves are as high as 50 to 65 trillion 
cubic feet (TCF). By comparison, Indonesia, the world’s largest LNG exporter, has 
proven reserves of around 82 TCF. Sales from Sakhalin, either by pipeline or LNG 
carrier, have a substantial cost advantage over most suppliers. Sakhalin gas is the most 
economical by pipeline, reaching Japan for the equivalent cost of $2.00 to $2.80 per 
million BTU (million British Thermal Unit) as compared to Yakutia gas at $2.50 to $3.70 
per MMBTU or Irkutsk gas at $2.30 to $3.60 per MMBTU. Sakhalin LNG costs are 
equally competitive at $1.90 per MMBTU, about equal to the equivalent capital costs for 
shipment from Botang LNG in Indonesia and slightly cheaper than the $2.15 per 
MMBTU for shipments from Australia’s Northwest shelf.  
To facilitate higher natural gas imports, Japan must resolve issues that block the 
construction of a national transmission grid. Greater use of natural gas has more domestic 
support than nuclear power and oil imports because Japan has never experienced a major 
accident or disruption of its natural gas imports. Moreover, its 22 natural gas receiving 
terminals are no more subject to military attack than its 51 nuclear facilities. There are 
several groups with conflicting interests that make up the Japanese natural gas and 
electricity sectors. Some of these important players have entrenched positions for status 
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quo policies. But end-users are unlikely to continue to tolerate automatic expensive pass-
on of costs, creating some momentum for change in the system.  
Demand for change exists also in the electricity market of Japan. Currently, this 
market is heavily regulated, with the MITI agency in the center of pricing, entry and 
planning decisions. Electricity prices are very high by world standards (more than twice 
as high as in the U.S. or U.K. for example) but also do a poor job of signaling the real 
costs of electricity. A major obstacle to reform is that private companies own most of the 
facilities, and deregulation may erode their profits. This may also explain why proposed 
reforms have focused so far on the retail segment of the market. Most of the gains from 
reform of electricity supply in other countries have arisen from exploiting technological 
changes that have allowed wholesale electricity markets to become more competitive. By 
delaying the adoption of measures in line with world best practice, Japan has foregone 
the large efficiency gains that are benefiting the economies of other countries.  
Successful deregulation requires an understanding of the sources of monopoly 
power in the industry, separation of competitive from natural monopoly elements, and a 
compensation package to the industry for losses expected during a transition period. 
Partial reforms that relax controls in the retail market while leaving monopolies in 
generation and transmission in place may be more harmful than beneficial. In order to 
institute positive changes in the energy market within Japan, MITI would need to garner 
the support of the relevant industries to engineer the necessary reforms. 
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Chart 5-19: Economic Overview (GDP Growth) 
Japan’s GDP has sustained significant positive growth from 2010 to 2015. The 
economic difficulties resulting from reforms instituted earlier this century began to pay 
dividends in 2009 when GDP attained its former levels in year 2000. As is evident from 
the chart, GDP has grown over 30 percent since 2009. Per capita GDP in 2015 is about 
US$44K.  
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Chart 5-20: Economic Overview (GDP Performance) 
This chart represents GDP performance by percentage from 2000-2015. The slow 
down in economic growth experienced 2008-2010 leveled off and Japan experienced 


























































Chart 5-21: Defense Spending (2000 ~ 2015) 
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Japan’s total expenditure on defense has increased from 5 trillion yen in 2010 to 
nearly 7 trillion at 2015. While this is a significant increase, spending as percentage of 










































Chart 5-22: Demographics  
Japan’s population continued to gradually decline during this epoch, however 
over the past 15 years (2000-2015) population growth remained relatively constant. The 
2015-2020 projection demonstrates a continuation of this trend.  
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Chart 5-23: Demographics Shift 
As is evident by the peak shifts on this chart Japan’s population continues to age.  








Chart 5-24: Demographics (Workforce) 
The total workforce has not decreased significantly during this epoch, however 
the short- term solution of an increased retirement age has begun to show decreased 
dividends. 
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Chart 5-25: Energy Sources 
Japan continues to diversify sources of energy. Our dependence on oil imports is 
projected to decrease in 2020 by nearly 12% from 2010 levels. Due to domestic 
generation and cooperative endeavors with Russia, we project that oil dependence will 
lessen to 1/3 of the total. While we are not fully self-reliant for energy production, we 
have limited vulnerabilities by both diversifying fossil fuel suppliers and means of 
internal generation.  
 
5. Japan Self-Defense Force  
The third epoch saw Japan at the crossroads, apprehensive about the events that 
evolved in the region. 
First and foremost, there was a diminishing US presence in the East Asia. US 
troops had already begun withdrawing from the Korea Peninsula and 50% of the forces 
were out by 2015. The peaceful unification of the Koreas would dictate that the rapid 
reaction forces being stationed in Okinawa could be recalled in the near future. The 
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economic reality of the first decade of the new millennium and the negative feeling of the 
Japanese towards the US military in Okinawa dictated recall or repositioning in Australia. 
US DoD was also in the process of downsizing the Pacific fleet as part of the effort to 
scale down US military deployments overseas. 
Secondly, the unification of North and South Koreas, may not signal the 
beginning of a new era of peace in East Asia. The combined Koreas’ military arsenal was 
definitely a sizeable force.  
  Lastly, China’s expansion in the South China Sea was also worrisome. China had 
been conducting large-scale exercises in the South China Sea in recent years. 
Occasionally, China had forced the re-routing of Japan shipping around East Philippines. 
Furthermore, China had also acquired some US military technologies through the 
unification with Taiwan. 
These events had strong implications for the Japan military. Firstly, would the US 
still have the will and capability to shield Japan from an invasion, bearing in mind that 
there might not be any permanent stationing of US troops in Japan? What would the 
scope of the US-Japan Security Arrangement be in the near future? Secondly, was our 
homeland defense system sufficient to counter any invasion from China or Korea? If not, 
what were the alternatives? Thirdly, could we protect our critical SLOC through the 
South China Sea so that Japan economy and energy supplies would not be threatened? 
Lastly, how can we defend, counter or deter the long-range missile and nuclear threats 
from both China and Korea? The Sea of Japan might be too narrow a space to give Japan 
the sufficient and necessary time to react and respond to a missile attack from either 
Korea or China.  
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Despite jubilation over unifications of the Korea Peninsula and China-Taiwan, 
some in Japan could not applaud. Since World War II, Japan had been a passive country 
in the geopolitical arena – mainly reacting to events that happened and the posture 
adopted by the US. For better or worse, that was changing. The new generations of 
Japanese (and thus the military leadership) preferred a take-charge attitude.. As the public 
debated over a long-term vision for Japan, the JSDF was undergoing a revolution in 
military affairs. The thought of creating a nuclear force was no longer an objectionable 
endeavor. 
 
a. Defense Strategy and Policy 
There was no change to the Defense Strategy and Policy in this epoch. The third 
epoch was really a time of reflection for the military – there were numerous discussions 
and deliberations on what would be the best direction for the JSDF to be charted. The gist 
of the arguments centered on these four topics: (1) how self-reliant do we become? (2) 
what would be the scope of the US-Japan Security Arrangement? (3) would a cost-
effective comprehensive missile defense system be feasible? (4) or would adopting a 
nuclear strategy be a better deterrent measure? 
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1 Personnel & Provision 2,175.6 12,000.0 39.3% 2,400.0 10.3%
2 Maintenance 859.6 4,500.0 14.8% 900.0 4.7%
3 Facilities 182.6 1,920.0 6.3% 384.0 110.3%
4 R&D 105.0 560.0 1.8% 112.0 6.7%
5 
Equipment 
Acquisition 815.0 8,225.0 27.0% 1,645.0 101.8%
6 Others 652.0 3,300.0 10.8% 660.0 1.2%
7 Total 4,789.8 30,505.0 100% 6,101.0 27.4%
Table 5-18: Defense expenditure for 2011 to 2015. 
In the third epoch, there was a substantial increase in absolute terms for defense 
spending. The money for equipment acquisition was doubled and the military was able to 
acquire those systems that it had shelved during the period of economic recovery. 
Nonetheless, the total expenditure averaged only 0.99 % of the total GDP. 
One of the key projects was to enhance infrastructures survivability under the 
program National Survivability and Enhancement Project (NSEP). That was a ¥2 trillion, 
10-year program beginning in 2011. The objective was to harden key military installation 
like airbases, naval bases and C4 assets. Redundancy was also built through additional 
runways, alternative C2 headquarters, etc. By 2015, phase I (which comprised priority-
one military installations) had been completed. 
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c. Defense Research & Development Programs  
A total of ¥560 billion was spent over the last five years on R & D. There was an 
increase of 6.7% over the second epoch. Table 5-19 shows the major R&D programs for 
the JSDF. The commitment to missile defense programs R&D was about ¥70 billion. The 
SM3 missile was ready for fielding on the Kongo-class destroyer. The interceptor could 
engage incoming ballistic missiles that had a velocity of five km/s or less. The R&D on 
ICBM was also completed and initial deployment started in 2012. The UF-3, the third in 
the series of UAV was completed and production started in 2014. Meanwhile, Japan 
secretly embarked on a black program for a nuclear warhead1, in cooperation with Japan 
Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI). We also invested heavily on unmanned 
underwater vessels and ship-based and land-based laser targeting systems. R&D with 
France & Russia on nuclear propulsion system was also in the pipeline. 
S/No Item Amount (Million ¥) Remarks 
1 Type-12 ICBM 10,000 Completed, production in 2012. 
2 Ballistic Missile Defense 
System 
35,000 In progress. 
3 SM3 Missile for NTWD 10,000 Upgraded Kongo DD for NTWD. 
4 BMC3I 25,000 In progress. 
5 National C2 System 30,000 Upgrading in progress. 
6 UF-3 (Strike & F/R) 45,000 Completed, production in 2014. 
7 Nuclear Warhead 25,000 In progress. 
8 UUV & Laser Systems 30,000 In progress. 
 Total 210,000  
9. Others 350,000  
 Grand Total 560,000  
Table 5-19: Main R & D Programs 
                                                 
1 For more details on Japan nuclear capability, refer to Public Education Center: “Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Will Japan deploy the Bomb?” at http://www.publicedcenter.org/japan.html.  
Defense of Japan 2015   
 
 5 - 124 
 
d. Future R&D and Procurement Priorities 
 Japan’s priorities for military R&D and procurement for the next epoch are as 
followed: (1) to find a cost-effective solution to defend Japan against long-range ballistic 
missile and cruise missiles; (2) to increase the size of the JMSDF so as to improve the 
SLOC protection role; (3) to further develop the Ryukyu Islands to support extended 
operations to the south of Japan; (4) to improve the survivability of key military 
installation and facilities on the Japanese homeland; (5) to increase the number of Type 3 
TEL missiles in order to provide a more massive and survivable conventional strike and 
deterrent capability. This will also enhance our area denial capabilities for the waters 
surrounding Japan; (6) to improve JSDF’s C4ISR; and (7) to invest R&D resources in 
unmanned platforms. 
 
e. Key Defense Systems 
1) Missile Defense System 
By the end of 2015, the capability of our missile defense system 
was still not comprehensive. 
Upgrading of the Patriot system to PAC-3 capability has been 
completed. Japan had 24 batteries of Patriot of five missile launchers each. 
The Patriot batteries were then able to fire both the PAC-2 (two out of the 
five missile launchers) and PAC-3 missiles, providing air defenses against 
aircrafts, and cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles in the exo-atmosphere. 
The I-Hawk upgrading program was also completed. There were 32 
batteries of I-Hawk with six launchers each. 
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All the existing Kongo-class destroyers were also upgraded with 
NTWD capabilities (against ballistic missile of speed five km/s or less) 
and carried the necessary SM-3 missiles. 
 
2) UF-3 (Strike & Fighter Recce UAV) 
 
 
• Max Speed: Mach 2.0 
• Cruise Speed: Mach 1.2 
• Payload: 12,000 Lbs 
• Altitude: 65,000 Ft 
• Range: 1,200 nm 
Figure 5-36: UF-3 
UF-3 was a low observable unmanned combat aerial vehicle 
(UCAV) that was a follow-on development of US X-362 program. The 
project was co-developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Boeing Co. 
It had an operating range of 1,200 nm while cruising at Mach 1.2. This 
system would substantially enhance our strike and fighter recce capability 
without increasing the demand for pilots. 
                                                 
2 Ref : Boeing Co. - http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/x36/x36.htm 
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 Like EU-1, command and control of UF-3 would be very versatile. 
Depending on the mission needs, the C2 could originate from (1) the 
NCCS for specific Joint mission; (2) a destroyer, e.g. Kongo, for extended 
range of operation; or (3) a manned fighter, e.g. F-22, controlling a fleet of 
four UF-3 for strike mission. 
The operating range of UF-3 could be easily extended, for 
example, by operating in tandem with the EU-2 (a pseudo-satellite) that 
provided the communication relays. 
 
3) Type-12 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)  
 
 
• Power Plant: 3 solid-propellant rocket 
motors 
• Speed: 15,000 mph at burnout (7 km/s) 
• Range: 5,218 nm 
• Ceiling: 700 miles 
• Payload: 2,640 lb  
• Length: 59.9 ft  
• Weight: 79,423 lb 
• Diameter: 5.5 ft 
Figure 5-37: Type-12 ICBM 
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Type-12 ICBM was designed and built by Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries in 2012. It was equivalent to a US Minuteman III3. It employed 
three solid-propellant rockets motors to deliver ordnance more than 5000 
nautical miles. In this epoch, only two ICBMs were deployed. 
 
f. National Defense Program Outline 
Amidst all the deliberations, JSDF reviewed its National Defense Program 
Outline (NDPO) again in 2012. The NDPO spelled out the long-term plan for the 
military.  
Classification  2001 NDPO  2012 NDPO 
GSDF (Regular)  145,000  Approx. 120,000 
GSDF (Reserve)  25,000  Approx. 50,000 
MSDF  50,000  Approx. 60,000 
ASDF  50,000  Approx. 55,000 
Joint Staff  2,000  Approx. 12,000 
Total (Active)  247,000  Approx. 247,000 
Manpower 
Grand Total  272,000  Approx. 297,000 
Division  8 Infantry Division 1 Armored Division  
8 Infantry Division 
1 Armored Division 
Brigade  
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
 
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
Tank  Approx 1000  Approx 1140 
GSDF 
Artillery  Approx 1000  Approx 1020 
Destroyer  60  70 
Submarine  20  22 MSDF 
Combat Aircraft  200  200 
Fighter  400  450 
ASDF 
UAV  Approx 50  300 
Table 5-20: Comparison of NDPO 2001 & 2012 
                                                 
3 Ref : FAS US Minuteman III - http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/lgm-30_3.htm.  
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In essence, the plan was to gradually downsize the active component of the GSDF 
and transfer the posts to the other services. Nonetheless, the capability of the GSDF 
would be maintained by expanding the reserve units. The MSDF was expanded so as to 
accommodate the need for a larger SLOC protection role. The Joint Services had been 
restructured to create a unified missile command to include the Type-03 missiles and the 
newly added ICBMs. At the end state, there was no net increase in the active personnel. 
Classification  2012 NDPO  
At End of Revised Mid-
Term Defense Program 
(2015) 
GSDF (Regular)  Approx. 120,000  Approx. 134,000 
GSDF (Reserve)  Approx. 50,000  Approx. 35,000 
MSDF  Approx. 60,000  Approx. 53,600 
ASDF  Approx. 55,000  Approx. 51,200 
Joint Staff  Approx. 12,000  Approx. 8,400 
Total (Active)  Approx. 247,000  Approx. 247,200 
Manpower 
Grand Total  Approx. 297,000  Approx. 282,200 
Division  8 Infantry Division 1 Armored Division  
8 Infantry Division 
1 Armored Division 
Brigade  
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
 
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
Tank  Approx 1140  Approx 1,130 
GSDF 
Artillery  Approx 1020  Approx 920 
Destroyer  70  60 
Submarine  22  21 MSDF 
Combat Aircraft  200  Approx 200 
Fighter  600  480 
ASDF 
UAV  300  137 
Table 5-21: 2015 Mid-term Review of Defense Program 
 Table 5-21 compares the order of battle at 2015 versus the latest NDPO that was 
established in 2012. 
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g. Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 
      Epoch 3 (2011 ~ 2015) 





1 Infantry/Combined Div 9     1 8 
2 Infantry Bde 6       6 
3 Armored Div 1       1 
4 Heliborne Bde 1       1 
5 Airborne Bde 1       1 
6 Amphibious Bde 1       1 
7 Tanks 1,135   300   1,135 
8 APC 820 100 300   920 
9 Artillery (155mm SP) 731     100 631 
10 MLRS 278 150     428 
11 Attack Helicopters 88 20   5 103 
12 Other Helicopters 424 30   5 449 
Table 5-22: Major GSDF Order of Battle 
The restructuring of the divisions and brigades had been completed. The GSDF 
now comprised eight Infantry Divisions, one Armored Division, and six Infantry 
Brigades. In addition, it also had three brigades with special roles. 
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h. Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) 
      Epoch 3 (2011 ~ 2015) 





1 Kongo & DD21 13 15 20   28 
2 Other DDs 47     15 32 
3 Submarine (SS) 20 6   5 21 
4 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 39 5   2 42 
5 Landing Ship (LST) 17 10     27 
6 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 85   15 15 70 
7 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36       36 
8 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10       10 
9 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0 200     200 
10 SH-60J (anti-sub) 79 10   2 87 
Table 5-23: Major MSDF Order of Battle 
The MSDF began another era of rapid expansion. Another 15 Kongo-class 
destroyers were acquired, partly to replace the older destroyer fleet. All the Kongo-class 
destroyers were upgraded to NTWD capability and 200 SM3 missiles were purchased 
from the US. 
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i. Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) 
      Epoch 3 (2011 ~ 2015) 





1 F-15 (J/DJ) 203     101 102 
2 F-22 50 200     250 
3 F-1 35     17 18 
4 F-2 100 25     125 
5 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 83     50 33 
6 C-1 28       28 
7 C-130H 16       16 
8 CH-47J (Transport) 39 20     59 
9 KC-135 10 20     30 
Table 5-24: Major ASDF Order of Battle 
ASDF also embarked on a rapid modernization program, following the economic 
recovery. We brought in another 200 F-22 fighters while phasing out the 101 F-15. We 
also increased the fleet of F-2 to 125 but downsized the F-1 and F/RF-4 squadrons. We 
also acquired another 20 CH-47 and 20 KC-135 refueling tankers. 
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j. Major Missile Systems  
      Epoch 3 (2011 ~ 2015) 





1 Patriot PAC-3 FU Upgrading 120  40  120 
2 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192  0.25 gp  192 
3 Type-12 ICBM 0 2   2 
4 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 80    80 
5 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 550 750   1,300 
6 Type-03 Missile 5,500 7,500   13,000 
Table 5-25: Major Missile Systems 
The upgrading programs for Patriot and I-Hawk were completed in this epoch. All 
the Patriot batteries were now able to fire both the PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles. We 
continued to field another 750 Type-03 TELs. A new addition to the inventory was the 
Type-12 ICBM. 
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k. Major C4ISR System 
      Epoch 3 (2011 ~ 2015) 





1 EU-1 (Low observable) 22 35     57 
2 EU-2 (HAE) 18 37     55 
3 UF-3 (Strike & F/R) 0 25     25 
4 E-2C 13       13 
5 E-767 4       4 
6 Info Gathering Satellite 8 6 4 4 10 
7 IW Platoon (30-men) 2 1     3 
Table 5-X: Major C4ISR Systems 
Finally, with the inclusion of 25 UF-3, the overall UAV fleet had increased to 137 
unmanned aircraft. There was a net increase of two spy satellites. The Ballistic Missile 
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6. Static Net Assessment - Japan Versus China 
In this section, the static assessment between Japan’s forces and China’s forces is 
presented. Details of Japan’s forces can be found in the previous section. The data 




Joint: 8,400 (1,800) 
Army: 169,000 (170,000) 
Navy: 53,600 (47,500) 
Air Force: 51,200 (48,900) 
PLA: 1,600,000 (1,780,000) 
Rapid Reaction: 90,000 (70,000) 
Navy: 310,000 (300,000) 
Marines: 15,000 (13,000) 
Special Forces: 14,000 (12,000) 
Intelligence: 5,000 (4,000) 
Total: 282,200 (268,200) Total: 2,034,000 (2,179,000) 
(Figures in parenthesis denote figures for previous epoch) 
 Over the last five years, China has continued to make cuts in overall military 
manpower. At the same time, the buildup of the rapid reaction force, Marines and Special 
Forces has persisted. The total JSDF manpower remains an order of magnitude smaller 
than that of China. Due to economic and demographic reasons, it is not possible for us to 
significantly increase the manpower of our armed forces. 
Operationally, (as shall be seen in the air and naval orders of battle), China’s air 
and sealift capability have improved, and is assessed to be capable of projecting an 
estimated 19,000 troops by fixed-wing transport aircraft and 27,000 troops by sea. But 
this is only a small fraction of the total PLA order of battle. 
Qualitatively, although PLA personnel are generally well trained in basic skills, 
their leadership, training in combined operations and morale is low. Most soldiers are 
Defense of Japan 2015   
 
 5 - 135 
 
poorly educated and one-third leave active duty each year. There is also no professional 
NCO corps4. 
 






25 (0) UF3 
33(83) F4/RF4 
28 (28) C1 
16 (16) C130 
59(39) CH47 





700(1500) Lower end fighters/attack 
50(120) Long Range Bombers 
100(68) Heavy/Medium Lift FW Transport 
100(155) Light FW Transport 
13 (10) AAR 
397(316) Helicopters 
 
 The modernization of China’s Air Force continues unabated. The last five years 
saw further procurement of current generation fighters, such as the MiG31s and J11s, 
while trimming its large fleet of older generation aircraft. Over the last 15 years, China 
has effectively caught up with our F15s qualitatively and has quantitatively surpassed our 
fleet of current generation fighters 
 However, we have previously decided to maximize our limited pool of pilots by 
providing them with the best fighters money can buy. Hence, we have pushed ahead with 
the replacement of our fleet of fighters with F22s. In so doing, China’s main fighter fleet 
is once again a generation behind that of Japan. 
                                                 
4 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm 
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 The actual outcome of an air war would depend very much on the training and 
competency of the pilots as well as its C4 capabilities. Both are reportedly deficient for 
China’s Air Force5. This is assessed to be the main reason for China’s decision to invest 
in current generation fighters rather than acquiring larger quantities of the technologically 
superior J12s. Overall, it is assessed that China is very unlikely to prevail in the battle for 
air superiority over East China Sea. 
 
c. Navy 
 Japan China 
Surface Combatants 28(13) Kongo DDGs 
32(47) Other Destroyers 
3 Missile Patrol Craft 
 
Maritime Safety Agency: 
13/46 Lg/Med Patrol Vessel 
38 Patrol Craft 
81 Coastal Patrol Craft 
180 Coastal/Rescue Craft 
35(35) Destroyers 
52(46) Frigates 
179(166) other lower end 
Missile Craft 
50(60) Torpedo Craft 
30(30) Speed Boats 
Submarines 21(20) SS 55(63) SS 
5(5) SSN 
3(2) SSBN 
Mine Warfare 39(38) 83(83) 
Amphibious 27(17) LSTs 43(26) LSTs 
66(66) lower capacity craft 
Aircraft 70(85) P3C 
87(79) ASW Helicopters 
46(46) Others 
See “Air Force” 
 
 Over the last five years, the only significant additions to China’s surface fleet are 
the two DDGX and six FFX. But the majority of the surface fleet comprises lower-end 
destroyers, frigates and missile crafts, each with four to eight SSMs and up to eight 
                                                 
5 http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR580/mr580.html 
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SAMs. The total missile capacity of China’s surface fleet has improved and is now 
estimated to be about 1612 SSMs and 496 SAMs. This represents an increase of 12% 
over the last epoch. Spread over 267 missile armed ships, the average is about 7.9 
missiles per ship. 
In contrast, while our surface fleet is numerically inferior, it is technologically 
modern and carries missiles of far longer range. We have invested heavily on our surface 
fleet, with the procurement of an additional 15 modern DDGs to replace the older 
destroyers. This fleet of 28 Kongo DDGs, each carrying 90 VLS Cells and 8 Harpoon 
missiles, has a total missile capacity that exceeds the entire China’s Navy. Furthermore, 
our surface fleet is supported by a large number of surveillance and ASW aircraft. 
Overall, our Navy has a definite edge in surface warfare. 
 China continues to modernize its submarine fleet with the procurement of 3 Song-
class, three Kilo- class and three SSX Class submarines, bringing their total number of 
modern diesel electric submarines to 29. These, together with the five SSN provide China 
with a superior sub-surface capability. However, with our 21 modern SS and ASW 
capabilities of our destroyers and aircraft, our Navy should be able to maintain a slight 
edge in an open-ocean naval battle. 
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d. Missiles 
 Japan China 
Strike 1300(550) Type 03 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
(Missiles: 13,000) 
80(80) Type 88 TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 











5300(2200) other shorter 
range LACM 
Air Defense 120(120) Patriot FU 
192(192) I-HAWK FU 
90(46) LR SAM Bns 
100(45) SR SAM Bns 
 
 Although China has a large ballistic and cruise missile inventory, the majority are 
SRBMs and shorter-range cruise missiles, which do not have the range to reach Japan 
when fired from the mainland. But over the last five years, China has acquired more 
missiles, bringing the total number of land-based missiles having the range to fly over the 
East China Sea to 2,736. While we have also have substantial number of Type 3 missiles, 
these are presently equipped only with conventional warhead and hence do not directly 
constitute a deterrent to China’s nuclear weapons. 
 In the last five years, we have vastly increased our Type 3 TEL fleet and Type 3 
missiles. The 1300 mobile land-based Type 3 TELs will play a big role in the defense 
against a scenario of a China large-scale invasion. The Type 3 TEL fleet will provide the 
additional firepower necessary to decisively tilt the balance in our favor in a defensive 
scenario. Should China conduct an all out invasion, a large Type 3 TEL fleet will ensure 
a complete destruction of all the forces afloat. 
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To date, while we have acquired an initial ballistic missile defense capability in 
our Kongo Class NTWD ships and Patriot PAC3 missiles, we are still unable to defend 




10(8) IMINT Satellites 
90(60)-person Computer Warfare Team 
57(22) EU-1 
55(18) EU-2 
13 (13) E2C 
4 (4) E767 
National C2 System 
28(16) IMINT/EW Satellites 
15(16) AEWCC 
 
Details of China’s spy satellite capability are not available and hence a 
comparison cannot be made. Over the last five years, we have improved our C4ISR 
capability substantially with the acquisition of more EU1s and EU2s. Together with our 
AEW fleet of E2Cs and E767s, our airborne C4ISR capabilities are assessed to be 
technologically superior as compared to China’s Y8s and A50s. 
 
f. Summary (Japan versus China) 
 In the last five years both sides have continued to increase their inventory of 
modern military equipment. Numerically, we continue to lag far behind in most areas and 
this gap can never be bridged due to demographic and economic reasons. We will 
therefore have to leverage advanced technology to overcome China’s numerical 
advantage; in short, to overcome quantity with quality. Examples of this include our 
acquisition of F22s and Kongo DDGs. With a smaller defense budget, Japan cannot 
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afford to compete in all capability areas, and must therefore be very selective in its 
military investment to achieve its defense objectives. These include capabilities to 
counter a large-scale China invasion, as well as cost-effective solution to counter China’s 
nuclear and missile capabilities. 
 
7. Static Net Assessment - Japan Versus Korean Federation 
In this section, the static assessment of Japan’s order of battle against that of the 
combined order of battle of both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is conducted. The reason for the conduct of such an 
assessment being that the impending unification on the Korean Peninsular aroused 
worries and concerns in Japan. As such, the Japanese military needed to examine its 
military capabilities against such a rising threat from a unified Korea.  
A few assumptions are taken with regards to the combined forces of the ROK and 
DPRK: (1) all forces in the ROK and the DPRK are integrated and jointly under the 
command and control of one Unified Korean Commander; (2) any issues pertaining to 
the C4ISR, training, and equipment interoperability at the different levels of command of 
the ROK and DPRK have been resolved; and (3) the minimum effective strength of the 
military is assumed to be at least the sum of the two military forces combined. For the 
purpose of the assessment, it is taken to be simply the sum of the two, although the above 
assumption could take a long time to resolve in reality.  
The orders of battle have intentionally been reorganized and aggregated to 
provide a meaningful evaluation and comparison. Details of Japan’s order of battle can be 
found in the section above and details of the ROK and DPRK were attained from 
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interactions with the Korean team. Some epoch 3 Korean figures were projected from 
epoch 2 due to the unavailability of data. 
 
a. Economy 








¥617.8 trillion = 
US$5.616 trillion 
US$663 billion US$17.7 billion plus 
US$13 billion in aid 
package 
Average Annual Per 
Capita GDP 




Spending on Defense 
as Ratio of GDP 
0.99% 3.5% 27% 
Average Annual 
Spending on Defense  
¥5.9 trillion = 
US$54 billion 
US$23.2 billion US$4.8 billion 
 
In terms of percentage of GDP spent on defense, DPRK’s spending was one order 
of magnitude higher than that of Japan’s, whilst the ROK’s was three times higher. 
Although the total of these two percentages was much higher than that of Japan, their 
combined total in dollar terms was only half that of Japan’s because Japan had a much 
higher GDP than the two Koreas combined. Japan spent about 30% of its defense 
expenditure on new equipment acquisition, old equipment upgrade and replacement. Both 
the ROK and the DPRK spent a comparable 30% on their equivalent force improvement 
programs. However, it is assessed that the DPRK’s expenditure was for the replacement 
and modernization of a technologically much older order of battle. Therefore, the existing 
technological gap between the two forces is assessed to remain.  
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b. Manpower 
Japan ROK DPRK 
Joint: 8,400 
Army: 169,000 
(8 Div, 6 Bde, 1 Armored 
Div, 1 Airborne Bde, 1 Heli 
Bde, 1 Amphibious Bde) 
Navy: 53,600 
Air Force: 51,200 
Army: 560,000 (23 
Active Div and 23 
Reserve Div) 
Navy: 67,000 
Air Force: 63,000 
Army: 607,000 (50 Active 
Div and 17 Reserve Div) 
Navy: 46,000 + 65,000 
Reserves 
Air Force: 86,000 
Total: 282,200 Total: 690,000 Total: 804,000 
(Note: The ROK Navy and Air Force figures were 2000 figures obtained from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis-docs/defense08.htm, whilst the DPRK figures were 
from 2005, as no reliable figures were available.) 
 
In terms of manpower, the JSDF is one order of magnitude smaller compared to 
those of the ROK and the DPRK combined. In view of its demographic and economic 
considerations, it is assessed that Japan’s investment in better training and more 
technologically advanced combat systems make up for this numerical disadvantage. 
 
c. Navy 
 Japan ROK DPRK 
Surface Combatants 28 (13) Kongo  
32 (47) other 
destroyers 
30 Missile 
Armed Ships (6 
DD, 24 FS) 
13 DD, 91 PB  
48 Missile Armed 
Ships (3 FF, 39 PB) 
5 FS 
297 PB  
Submarines 21 (20) SS 9 Type 209 
(Chang Bogo) 
6 Type 214 
4 Kilo  
14 Romeo 
51 Others 
Mine Warfare 42 (39) 15 24 
Amphibious 27 (17) LSTs 33 223 
Aircraft 70 (85) P3C 
87 (79) ASW 
Helicopters 
36 Others 
28 P3C  




Defense of Japan 2015   
 
 5 - 143 
 
There are more missile-armed ships from the two Koreas combined than that in 
the Japanese fleet. But in terms of missile counts, Japan is comparable. The DPRK’s 
missile-armed crafts comprise lower-end frigates and a sizeable number of patrol boats, 
each with two to four missiles. Those from the ROK are slightly more comparable to the 
Japanese, with 19 Aegis KDX series destroyers, six of which are armed with eight 
Harpoons, and some equipped with the SM-2 missiles. However, these are few in 
numbers compared to those of Japan’s more modern Kongos, which are equipped with 
two squads of Harpoon SSMs. However, the Korean acquisitions of additional Kilo-class 
and Type 214 diesel submarines are a concern to the Japanese military. All in all, it is 
assessed that the combined surface fleets of the ROK and DPRK is no match for the more 
modern Japanese Navy.  
 
d. Air Force 
Japan ROK DPRK 
250 (50) F22 
102 (203) F15 
125 (100) F2 
18 (35) F1 
25 UF 3 
33 (83) F4/RF4 
28 C1 
16 C130 
59 (39) CH47 
30 (10) KC135 AAR 
65 FXxx 




10 RF 4/5 
62 Fixed Wing Transport 
30 Helicopters 
5 KCxxx 
35 MiG 29 
206 other fighters 
80 bomber 
214 ground attack 




 Comparing current generation fighters, Japan has slightly more F15s and F2s 
compared with the ROK and DPRK’s F16s and MiG 29 respectively, although the 
ROK’s F-16 and F5 fleets have been U.S. built, trained and supported. More importantly, 
Japan has significant numerical advantage in terms of advanced fighters with its fleet of 
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250 F22s versus the ROK’s fleet of 65 FX fighters. The other fighters in the DPRK air 
force are lower-end ones comprising MiG 23s and MiG 21s and are assessed 
incomparable to the modern Japanese fighters.  
 
e. Army 
 Japan ROK DPRK 
Tanks 1135 MBTs 2300 3875 Medium Tanks 
1000 Light Tanks 
APC 920 2500 2700 
Artillery 631 4050 Gun Arty 6450 Gun Arty 
MLRS 428 180 1700 
Attack Helicopters 103 146 78 
 
 The ROK’s equipment alone is numerically superior to those in the Japanese 
inventory. This gap is further expanded with the inclusion of the even higher numbers 
from the DPRK. However, the latter’s equipment is assessed to be at least a generation or 
two behind the modern equipment of the Japanese army. Although this is a serious threat, 
it is assessed to be remote unless significant numbers of these can be brought to bear on 
Japanese soil, which in reality would require the support of their air forces and navies 
combined. 
f. Missiles 
 Japan ROK/DPRK 
Attack 1300 (550) Type 03 TELs (6 
msl per TEL) 
80 (80) Type 88 TELs (6 msl 
per TEL) 
2 Type 12 ICBM 
 
300 Scud B 
150 Hwasong 5 
250 Hwasong 6 
120 Nodong 1/2 
60 Taepo Dong 1 
60 Taepo Dong 2 
(may have 3 to 6 nuclear weapons) 
25 KSR 1180 
Air Defense 120 Patriot FU 
192 I-HAWK FU 
1024 SAMs 
(6100 ADA) 
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 The close proximity of Japan to the Korean Peninsular and DPRK’s possession of 
240 Nodong 1/2 and Taepo Dong 1/2 ballistic missiles, means that the ROK and DPRK 
has the capability to bridge the Sea of Japan and readily hit all major cities in Japan, even 
though Japan has a sufficient number of SAM firing units. In return, Japan has 7800 Type 
3 TEL land-based missiles that can hit any part of both the ROK and the DPRK – the 
Koreas only have about 1500 SAM firing units combined. Although Japan has twice as 
many SAM firing units than the number of offensive missile that the two Koreas have, 
Japan has the additional handicap of having to spread its firing units over a wide area 
while the attacker has the choice to dictate its targets. It is assessed that Japan may have 
difficulty in effectively defending itself against massive missile attack from the two 
Koreas if such an attack could be mounted. An additional concern is the potential use of 
these missiles for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction in acts of terror against 
Japanese cities and its population. 
  
g. Summary (Japan versus ROK and DPRK Combined) 
 In summary, the combined total of the two Korean’s military forces may have 
been numerically higher than that of Japan’s but it is still not a serious threat. The large 
armies of the two Koreas appear formidable but their inability to effectively be projected 
onto Japanese soil makes this threat remote. However, of concern is the DPRK’s 
possession of ballistic missiles and WMD capabilities that may potentially be used as a 
weapon of terror against Japanese cities and its population. Japan shall continue to 
commit resources in the future to find a cost-effective solution to this threat. 
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8. Dynamic Assessment Scenario 1 – Defense Against Amphibious 
Operation 
 This scenario is set in the East China Sea in 2016, whereby China decides to 
conduct a large-scale amphibious operation onto the west coast of Kyushu. The 
amphibious task force comprises 80% of their surface combatants, or 214 missile-armed 
ships, and 80% of their sealift capability, or 87 transport ships. 
 Our primary strategic intelligence collection and early warning capabilities 
include our human intelligence network and our 10 spy satellites providing imagery 
intelligence updates of any part of the world at a rate of once in 1.5 days. This will be 
supplemented by information obtained through our intelligence exchange agreement with 
USA. The agreement stipulates that the USA will provide any information that pertains to 
threats to Japan, and vice versa. With these in place, it is assumed that there will be no 
strategic surprise, and that any invasion by China will be preceded by a discernable 
period of tension. Our forces will be on alert, and will be deployed or dispersed in 
accordance with doctrine and operational requirements. 
 Our normal peacetime surveillance requirements include round-the-clock air and 
maritime surveillance by EU2s and ground-based radar stations. During this period of 
tension, an additional three EU2 stations west of Kyushu will provide persistent coverage 
over the area. This will be supported by P3Cs and EU1s for shadowing and investigation. 
 Forward imagery intelligence and electronic reconnaissance missions will be 
carried out by our stealthy EU1s and UF3s. The targets-of-interest includes key air and 
naval bases, key missile sites, likely troop concentration areas, as well as other early 
warning indicators of an impending attack. 
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 China is likely to precede the amphibious operations with a massive missile strike 
on our air and naval bases. We will retaliate with Type 3 missile strikes on their key 
airbases and ships in port. In addition, we will also strike key military targets such as C4 
facilities, missile sites, power plants etc. Given the completion of Phase I of our 
improvement in survivability and repair and recovery capabilities, our airbases should be 
able to recover in four to eight hours. Since the East China Sea is more than 400nm wide, 
China’s amphibious task force should still be more than 200nm away. 
 
a. Concept of Operation 
 We will adopt a layered defense against the amphibious task force (ATF). The 
concept of operations will be as follows: 
 
Maritime Defense Zone 1 (less than 500nm) – We will attack the ATF with up to 5000 
Type 3 missiles. Surveillance and targeting information will be provided by EU1s and 
EU2. On a worst-case assumption, the ATF carries 500 SAMs, and that each SAM 
successfully engage one of our Type 3 missiles. That will leave 4500 missiles, or 15 anti-
ship missiles for every one of the 300 ships in the ATF. With no SAM remaining, it is 
unlikely that any ship will survive this attack. However, should the ATF somehow 
manage to survive, we will proceed to the next defense zone. 
 
Maritime Defense Zone 2 (less than 200nm) – We will attack the ATF, which by now 
would have expended all their air defense missiles, with our submarines, destroyers and 
aircraft. China’s Air Force is unlikely to achieve air superiority in this area more than 
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200nm off its shores given our superior fighter fleet of F22s and our highly capable ship-
based air defense. With our ships and continuous waves of air attacks, none of the ships 
in the ATF is likely to survive. However, should the ATF somehow managed to survive 
the attacks in Zone 1 and 2, we still have a third and fourth line of defense. 
 
Maritime Defense Zone 3 & 4 (less than 60nm) – These lines of defense are based on 
our shorter-range anti-ship missiles (Type 88 and Type 96 missiles) and the tanks, 
artillery and other weapons of the army inventory. At this point, the Japan Air Force will 
also be able to attack the ATF with impunity. We should be able muster two Div++ for 
defense. Hence, on the assumption of 4:1 force ratio, China will need at least 10 to 11 
divisions for a successful amphibious operation. This is not possible since the total sealift 
capability is less than three divisions. 
 
b. Conclusion 
 From the analysis, it is clear that at 2016, China will not be able to successfully 
conduct an amphibious operation against Japan. Their amphibious task force stands little 
chance of surviving the transit across the East China Sea. This is due to the following 
reasons: (1) China’s inability to shut down the Japan Air Force due to the high 
survivability and repair and recovery capabilities of our upgraded airbases. China was 
also not able to shut down our Type 3 TELs due to their mobility and dispersion; (2) 
China’s surface fleet’s ship-based air defense is inadequate and hence could be easily 
overwhelmed by our massive anti-ship missile strike; and (3) China’s Air Force is not 
able to achieve air superiority over East China Sea. 
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Even beyond these reasons we will have a robust ground and air defense if the 
amphibious force lands. 
 
9. Dynamic Assessment Scenario 2 – SLOC Protection 
 This scenario is set in the South China Sea, where Chinese naval military forces 
are conducting extended maritime exercises in the seas between Guangzhou and islands 
in the Philippines. The PLAN Task Force comprises 40 missile-armed ships (8 
destroyers, 12 frigates and 20 other missile armed craft), an SSN, MPA support and a 
whole host of auxiliary support ships. These ships number 1/5 of China’s operationally 
available major surface combatants (assuming that a Chinese operational availability of 
two-thirds of the total force). Japan’s main source of oil imports from the Middle East 
and trade from South East Asia transits through the Indian Ocean and the South China 
Sea SLOC. As part of the exercise, the PLAN task force, citing missile-firing exercises as 
the reasons, occasionally closes the SLOC. This interrupts the inflow of trade, energy and 
other critical resources into Japan. There is a subsequent fall in confidence with regards 
to the safety of shipping plying the seas in this area. This frustrates the Japanese leaders, 
as shipping to and from Japan declines. Japan begins to feel the “strangulating effects” of 
the PLAN’s maritime exercise.  
In order to ensure the safety of its shipping, as well as to restore confidence for 
the inflow of trade and other critical resources, a Japanese SLOC-Protection task force, 
comprising five Kongos, five DDs and round-the -clock surveillance from the EU-2s, is 
quickly dispatched to the area to enforce the freedom of navigation through the South 
China Sea and to deter and protect any Japan bound shipping from potential harassment. 
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The table below is a summary of the major combatants from the two navies. 
 Japan China 
Missile Armed Ships 5 Kongo DDG 
5 Asagiri DD 
8 Luhu/Soveremenny/Luda/DDGX DDs 
12 Jiangwei/Jianghu/FFX FFs 
20 (Huan/Houxin/Huangfeng/Hega/PCMX) 
Submarines - 1 Han class SSN 
Others EU-2 MPA 
 
a. Assessment 
 A static assessment of the major combatants between these two task forces has 
been conducted and the findings are summarized in the paragraphs below. 
 The PLAN task force is numerically superior to that of the Japanese task force. 
 In terms of surface action, the Japanese Task Force (JTF) is slightly inferior as 
there is eight SSMs per ship (total 80 missiles) versus 240 SSM spread over 40 ships (six 
per ship) for the PLAN Task Force. However, the Japanese Harpoon (and the SM-2/3) 
SSMs are also qualitatively superior to the PLAN’s mixed bag of C-801/802/201 SSMs, 
except for the 250 km SSN 22 (Sunburn) SSM on the Soveremenny-class DDG.  
In terms of air defense between the surface combatants, the JTF is superior with 
its ships’ 90 cell VLS configured for AAW, as compared to the PLAN’s mixed bag of 
SAN-7s and HQ-7s. Although large in numbers, the Japanese Task Force may not be able 
to sustain any prolonged battle because the close proximity of the southern coast of China 
subjects the Japanese ships to constant land-based fighter and missile attacks as well. On 
the other hand, the massive numbers of Japanese Type 3 TEL missiles and its large 
numbers of fighters and bombers are of no use because the long distances put the Type 3 
missiles at the rim of their effective range. Also the nearest Japanese airbase is further 
than the combat radius of its fighters and bombers. 
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 The threat from the single SSN is of some concern as there is no solution for 
tracking it, except for “flaming datum”. Japan will continue to look for an effective 
solution for this. 
 
b. Conclusion (Japan SLOC-Protection)  
We could draw the following conclusions from this scenario assessment. First of 
all, Japan needs to increase the size of its SLOC-Protection force to match that of the 
PLAN task Force. The vulnerability of the SLOC-Protection task force against land-
based missile and fighter attacks is a big problem that will reduce the survivability of the 
ships significantly. Hence, more anti-air capability is needed for the SLOC-Protection 
task force to ensure its survivability. Lastly, there is no effective solution to counter the 
SSN threat. 
For remedial actions, Japan may need to turn to several alternatives as the way 
ahead. We can seek assistance from the United States, although this may not be a reliable 
option. At the same time, we can also adopt a diplomatic strategy of getting more of the 
countries in the region (countries like the ASEAN, Australia, India, Russia, etc) involved 
in order to garner more strength. Domestically, we can route Japanese shipping to the east 
of the Philippines, or into the Pacific so as to stretch the reach of the PLAN forces. 
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10. Epoch 3 Summary 
  This epoch saw a more discernable triangular balance of power in the region 
involving the US, China, and Japan. Japan continued to reevaluate our three-pronged 
security policy: firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, building up 
Japan's defense capability, and making active diplomatic efforts to ensure international 
peace and security. At the same time, the regional countries poised themselves for the 
impending unification of the Koreas. 
Domestically, the long-term dividends for the drastic economic measures taken in 
2001 were reaped as Japan enjoyed a decade of sustained positive growth since 2005. 
Japan’s efforts to sustain the national workforce level remained intact, though they were 
beginning to show diminishing dividends. Domestic reliance on imported energy 
continued to decline.  
On the military front, there was substantial increase in absolute terms for defense 
spending; for example, the amount of money was doubled for equipment acquisition. The 
National Survivability and Enhancement Project was also initiated. With regard to 
technology, the US-derivative BMD system had matured by 2015 for field deployment. 
Meanwhile, we embarked on a black program for a nuclear warhead. 
The static net assessment analysis against a potential unified Korean military 
showed that although quantitatively Japan’s military was one order of magnitude lower, 
its more modern equipment and better training and C4I capabilities put the Japanese 
military qualitatively ahead of the unified Korea and only their missiles remain a serious 
threat.  
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On the other hand, the static net assessment analysis against China showed that 
we continued to lag far behind in most areas and this gap can never be bridged due to 
demographic and economic reasons.  We would therefore have to leverage advanced 
technology to overcome China’s numerical advantage. A separate scenario study on 
China’s capability to invade Japan clearly demonstrated that at 2016, China would not be 
able to successfully conduct an amphibious operation against Japan.  This was because 
their amphibious task force was unlikely to survive the transit across East China Sea 
against our layered defenses.   
Lastly, a separate analysis of our SLOC protection capabilities highlighted some 
areas of concerns, which would require remedial actions in the near future. 
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D. Epoch 4 (2015 ~ 2020)  
1. Geopolitical Arena 
Diplomatic relations in East Asia during the past five years (2015-2020) have 
largely been an extension of the patterns developed during the beginning of the decade. 
The regional triangular balance of power remains but the relative influence of each of the 
respective powers continues to shift.  The declining role of America and the gradual 
ascension of both China and Japan has yet to force Asian states to choose sides between 
the three, however these three states are beginning to assert pressure on their neighbors in 
order to shift the balance in their favor. The gradual emergence of the new regional order 
continues to force Asian states to re-examine their security policies.  The indicators of 
this new regional alignment have been abundant and most Asian strategic planners have 
anticipated a gradual realignment.  What most did not plan for though, is the roll back of 
American presence.  In light of this rollback nations are beginning to feel compelled to 
align with either China or Japan. 
Japan continues to reevaluate its three-pronged security policy: firmly 
maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, building up Japan's defense capability, 
and making diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and security.  The continued 
deterioration of American regional commitment and the emergence of an expansive and 
globally significant China places increased importance on the further development of 
Japanese strategic independence. However, given the persistent historic perception of 
Japan as an aggressor in the Asia-Pacific, Japan must continue to maintain some 
remnants of the US-Japan security treaty to pacify its neighbors at least for the short term.  
Until Japanese forces can fully mobilize to meet the security requirements in the new era, 
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the aforementioned security treaty provides an anchor to contain and manage the 
destabilizing effects of conflicts in the region. Thus, the treaty continues to provide a 
useful framework for the development of balanced ties between Japan and the US in the 
context of growing interdependence on the one hand, and uncertainty on the other.   
The United States remains the leading world power, but Japan must continue to 
strive for self-sufficient means of assuring its security.  The American dilemma, coupled 
with the ongoing possibility of Chinese forces based in the Philippines, presents Japan 
with heightened security concerns.  Japan must continue to play a larger political and 
military role in the region to ensure its national security while also assuring its neighbors 
that its resurgence does not threaten their interests. Japan continues to conduct joint 
military exercises as both a means of reassurance to its friends and as a demonstration of 
resolve to its enemies.  Japan's growing military power must be couched in terms of 
Japanese "burden sharing" in the context of American "burden shedding" as countries in 
the region continue to view the US-Japanese strategic partnership as the linchpin for 
regional stability.  
 
 a. The Koreas 
Korean reunification early in 2016 and the nearly complete withdrawal of 
American troops from the Korean Peninsula continue to concern Japan.  Japan remains 
unsure of the status of military integration but still assesses the former military forces of 
the North and South as acting independently on operational and tactical levels, but 
pursuing a unified strategy as crafted by a coherent senior military leadership.  Japan also 
remains concerned regarding the closer ties between Korea and China. Japan must 
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continue efforts to cultivate a positive economic climate with the Koreas and continue to 
monitor Korean relations with China and Russia to ensure that Japan does not become 
surrounded by three nuclear states. 
 
 b. China 
China expects to become the dominant power in East Asia. It aspires to replace 
the United States at the top of the world hierarchy of power.  Its power continues to grow, 
however institutional reforms have been slow in coming and continue to hold China back 
from achieving its full potential.  China does represent a significant challenge to Japanese 
security and Japan must pursue the best course of action to secure its interests.  Japanese 
goals of economic and diplomatic engagement with China have been diluted by Chinese 
military activities in the South China Sea, and it must now attempt to contain Chinese 
influence in the region. 
China’s military modernization and conduct of naval exercises in the vicinity of 
the Philippines pose threats to vital Japanese regional trade routes. Russian arms sales 
and Taiwanese electronics expertise have begun to add technical depth to the vast human 
resources possessed by the Chinese armed forces. Reports of discussions between the 
Philippines and China regarding possible Chinese basing in Subic Bay also presents an 
increased threat to Japanese security.  
  
c. Russia 
In 2020, Russian remains in control of a vast military stockpile, including nuclear 
weapons. Russia remains encircled by strategic concerns, but has developed mutually 
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beneficial relationships with both China and Japan. The sale of Russian arms to the 
Chinese and Indians continue to bring in much needed revenue, as has Japanese access to 
the natural resources of Siberia. 
Russia continues its policy of “limited globalism” in which Russia engages the 
world and the Asia-Pacific region on a selective basis.  Russia still does not posses the 
means for wide-ranging global aspirations and is likely to continue its present conflicted 
foreign policy.  Continued economic cooperation with Russia remains essential to 
Japanese security due its needs for the diversification of energy sources and to counteract 
Chinese economic ties brought about by Russian military sales. 
 
 d. The United States 
America continues its rollback from East Asia including the withdrawal of all US 
forces in Japan aside from one carrier battle group in Yokosuka.  The US has shifted its 
forces to Darwin enabling America to project significant power into East Asia but on a 
decelerated timeline.   Japan must maintain positive relations with the US while at the 
same time developing internal means to counter threats independently or until American 
forces arrive. Internal US pressures continue to compete for government dollars and 
reliance on energy from the Middle East plagues America’s ability to commit resources 
for Japanese defense.  
 
2. Domestic Situation 
 The institutional reforms implemented in epoch 1 (2000-2005) continued to pay 
significant dividends as Japan’s GDP grew between 2-5% from 2015-2020. The 
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government has continued to encourage women to join the labor force and for older 
workers to continue to participate in the economy. These measures are showing 
decreasing utility and are not providing enough workers. Japan must seek new ways to 
either decrease its reliance on labor or bring in workers from outside Japan. 
The successes of deregulation during the previous epoch continued to encourage 
venture businesses and foreign subsidiaries, created new jobs, raised efficiency and 
reduced domestic price levels. Japan maintained competitiveness in automobile 
manufacturing, telecommunication, computer, plus Internet, financial and other service 
industries. The deregulation of goods, services, labor, real estate, and financial markets 
enabled Japan to best utilize its limited human resources, land resources, domestic 
purchasing power, and vast household savings.  
 
  
Chart 5-26: GDP Growth (2000 to 2020) 
Japan’s GDP has sustained significant positive growth from 2015 to 2020. The 
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dividends in 2009 when GDP attained its former levels in year 2000. As is evident from 
the chart, GDP has grown nearly 60% since 2009.  Per capita GDP in 2020 is US$51K. 
Chart 5-27 represents GDP performance by percentage from 2015-2020.  
Economic growth has slowly decreased since 2010 but remains healthy.  
 Japan’s total expenditure on defense has increased by nearly 1 trillion yen from 
2015 to 2020. While this is a significant increase, spending as percentage of GDP has 
remained at a nearly constant rate of 1 percent. 
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Chart 5-28: Defense Spending (2000 to 2020) 
 a. Nuclear Debate  
 In spite of the nuclear allergy, Japanese leaders have maintained that Japan must 
retain the option to develop nuclear weapons. Many believe the Japanese constitution 
explicitly prohibits nuclear weapons, but the government has stated repeatedly and 
consistently that the Japanese Constitution does not prohibit them. Article 9, which 
renounces Japan's right to make war and to possess ‘armed forces,’ has no explicit 
provision against nuclear weapons. As Japan reevaluates the provisions in Article 9, it 
must realize that the Constitution does not serve as a deterrent to nuclear armament 
regardless of its previously stated policies.   
The Three Non-Nuclear Principles were established as national policy more than 
40 years ago, but are not stipulated by law.  Japan has ruled out the need for specific 
legislation because the principles are already well known both at home and abroad.  A 
more binding constraint is the Japanese law governing nuclear energy, which strictly 
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government must either change the law or choose to ignore it, as earlier governments 
have disregarded the three non-nuclear principles.  
International agreements prove more formidable because Japan cannot change 
them unilaterally. The NPT and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are two notable 
examples. Japan is a member of the NPT, but the treaty does not provide for any 
sanctions or punitive measures against members who violate treaty obligations. Any 
member is allowed to withdraw from the treaty with a three-month notice to the U.N. 
Security Council if "extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests”.  
 
b. Energy 
Japan’s diversification of energy import routes, adding natural gas and oil 
shipments from the Russian Far East, has lessened heavy reliance on the Persian Gulf and 
provided Japan with supplements to internal generation.  Japan must continue to import 
natural gas resources from the Sakhalin Islands during the short term as they compare 
favorably with other substantial regional natural gas suppliers.  Greater use of natural gas 
has more domestic support than nuclear power and oil imports because Japan has never 
experienced a major accident or disruption of its natural gas imports. 
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Chart 5-29: Primary Energy Sources 
Japan continues to diversify energy sources.  Its dependence on oil imports 
decreased in 2020 by nearly 12% from 2010 levels. Due to domestic generation and its 
cooperative endeavors with Russia, oil dependence will lessen to 1/3 of the total. While 
not fully self-reliant for energy production, Japan has limited vulnerabilities by 
diversifying both fossil fuel suppliers and means of internal generation.      
 
c. Demographics 
The total workforce has begun to decrease. Japan must continue to examine 
means to reduce its dependency on labor. 
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Chart 5-30: Children Population (1950 to 2020) 
Japan’s population continued to age gradually during this epoch, however over 
the past 20 years (2000-2020) population growth rates remained relatively constant. 
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As is evident by the shifting peak on this chart Japan’s population continues to 
age.  
 
Chart 5-32: Japanese Workforce 
 
3. Japan Self-Defense Force 
In the last five years, the US forces had almost completed its withdrawal from the 
Korea Peninsula. By 2020, token US forces had started leaving Okinawa. The tentative 
plan was to reposition those US troops in Darwin, Australia. In the near future, there 
would be a sizable decrease of US presence in this region. For the moment, the US-Japan 
Security Arrangement was still in place and the US had reiterated its support for the NPT. 
Even though North Koreas had disarmed their nuclear weapons, Japan remains wary of 
the fact that they did possess the technological know-how. Furthermore, China had been 
expanding their military rapidly in the recent years and their nuclear missiles could easily 
threaten Japan. 
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a. Principal Considerations 
 First and foremost, Japan must be militarily self-sufficient in its homeland 
defense. Having no land border would imply that any invasion would come via the sea or 
air. The massive withdrawal of US troops from the region compelled Japan to rethink 
how it could ensure its sovereignty. The right to self-defense dictates that Japan must be 
able to defense itself against any hostile invasion. Secondly, to be a credible force, the 
military must be prepared for the full spectrum of warfare.  As Japan is constantly 
besieged with natural disasters, like earthquakes, the military must also respond civil 
disaster relief efforts and other peacetime roles, like  participation in UN missions. 
Thirdly, with the limited manpower due to demographic and economic reasons, Japan 
needs to overcome its numerical disadvantages by leveraging  technology and high-
quality training. Lastly, Japan depends on external resources.  Hence, it needs to protect 
these critical lifelines. 
 
b. Defense Strategy and Policy 
For the past 20 years, Japan’s defense strategy had remained essentially the same.  
The primary focus was the twin pillars of defense and deterrent. 
 By defense, Japan strived to nullify any attempt to bring hostility to itself – either 
through a conventional engagement or by air/missile attacks. Therefore, Japan had 
increased its Patriot batteries and equipped its Sapporo and Kongo-class destroyers with 
NTWD (Navy Theatre Wide Defense) capability. 
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 By deterrent, Japan strives to possess a credible force that would cause any 
adversary to think again before considering hostile actions against Japan.  Hence, Japan 
invested heavily in expanding its C4ISR capabilities for early warning and cruise missile 
technology for retaliation. 
 As with the Defense Strategy, there was no amendment to the Defense Policy. 
Japan had not deployed any nuclear weapons although it does possess the necessary 
materials and technical know-how to put existing fission materials onto a Type-03 SSM 
warhead.   
 














1 Personnel & Provision 2,400.0 14,534.0 39.8% 2,906.8 21.1% 
2 Maintenance 900.0 4,512.0 12.4% 902.4 0.3% 
3 Facilities 384.0 2,000.0 5.5% 400.0 4.2% 
4 R&D 112.0 770.0 2.1% 154.0 37.5% 
5 
Equipment 
Acquisition 1,645.0 11,216.0 30.7% 2,243.2 36.4% 
6 Others 660.0 3,500.0 9.6% 700.0 6.1% 
7 Total 6,101.0 36,532.0 100% 7,306.4 19.8% 
Table 5-27: Defense Expenditure from 2016 to 2020 
The ten-year defense survivability program was successfully completed. All the 
key military installations were hardened. In some cases, redundancy was built – for 
example, alternate runways, etc. Repair and recovery facilities were also enhanced. There 
was also a major salary revision in 2018. All military personnel would see an average 
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increase of 8% in pay. Overall, the defense expenditures averaged about 0.98% of the 
GDP.  
 At the beginning of the decade, when the national economy took a downward 
turn, the military felt the squeeze as it strived to maintain  total expenditures within 1% of 
the GDP. Hence, there was a significant reduction in equipment acquisitions and many 
on-going programs were either reprioritized or cancelled. Nonetheless, this trend was 
reversed in the second decade as the economy picked up, as reflected below. 
 
Chart 5-32: Defense Expenditure Trend from 2000 to 2020 
 
d. Defense Research and Development Programs 
The nuclear warhead development program was essentially completed. However, 
there was no physical deployment by 2020. But Japan had increased the stock of weapon-
grade plutonium. The JAMSTEC UUV and the High Energy Laser Systems (HELS) were 
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that were fielded over the twenty years. Believing that hedging with technology could 
compensate forany numerical disadvantage facing the JASF , Japan was relentless in 
research and development investments, both as a national policy and in the military. Over 
the twenty-year period, the main defense research and development programs are as 
listed below: 
S/No Item Amount (Billion ¥) Remarks 
1 Nuclear Submarine  160 Production by 2025. 
2 JAMSTEC UUV 55 3 prototypes fielded. 
3 Ballistic Missile Defense 160 NTWD, PAC-3, BMC3I. 
4 Type-12 ICBM 30 10 ICBM deployed. 
5 Type-03 SSM 75 2000 TELs deployed. 
6 200 KT Nuclear device 50 Completed. 
7 High Energy Laser systems 45 3 prototypes fielded. 
8 UAV (EU-1, EU-2 & UF-3) 150 300 UAVs fielded. 
9 National Command and 
Control System 
120 All services C4ISR fully 
integrated. 
Table 5-28: Main Defense Research and Development Programs from 2000 to 2020 
  
 e. National Defense Program Outline 
By 2020, the JSDF force structure had almost approached the desired end-state as 
spelled out in the 2012 NDPO. For the last 10 years, the number of active personnel in 
the entire JSDF had remained relatively constant. 
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Classification  2012 NDPO  
At End of Revised Mid-
Term Defense Program 
(2020) 
GSDF (Regular)  Approx. 120,000  Approx. 121,000 
GSDF (Reserve)  Approx. 50,000  Approx. 49,000 
MSDF  Approx. 60,000  Approx. 60,500 
ASDF  Approx. 55,000  Approx. 54,500 
Joint Staff  Approx. 12,000  Approx. 11,500 
Total (Active)  Approx. 247,000  Approx. 247,500 
Manpower 
Grand Total  Approx. 297,000  Approx. 296,500 
Division  8 Infantry Division 1 Armored Division  
8 Infantry Division 
1 Armored Division 
Brigade  
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
 
6 Infantry Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
1 Amphibious Brigade 
Tanks  Approx 1140  1,135 
GSDF 
Artillery  Approx 1020  1059 
Destroyer  70  65 
Submarine  22  22 MSDF 
Combat Aircraft  200  Approx 200 
Fighter  600  600 
ASDF 
UAV  300  300 
Table 5-29: 2020 Mid-Term Review of Defense Program 
 The table above compares the order of battle at 2020 versus the latest NDPO that 
was established in 2012. 
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f. Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 
      Epoch 4 (2016 ~ 2020) 





1 Infantry/Combined Div 8     1 8 
2 Infantry Bde 6       6 
3 Armored Div 1       1 
4 Heliborne Bde 1       1 
5 Airborne Bde 1       1 
6 Amphibious Bde 1       1 
7 Tanks 1,135  300  1,135 
8 APC 920 100 300  1,020 
9 Artillery (155mm SP) 631   400 231 
10 MLRS 428 400   828 
11 Attack Helicopters 103 30  5 128 
12 Other Helicopters 449 45  5 489 
Table 5-30: Major GSDF Order Of Battle 
The main procurement in the last five years was the MLRS. To-date, the ratio of 
MLRS to 155 mm SP artillery is about 4:1. The Army digitization effort was also 
completed. Their C4I systems had also been effectively integrated into the National 
Command and Control System (NCCS). 
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 g. Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) 
      Epoch 4 (2016 ~ 2020) 





1 Kongo Destroyer 28    28 
2 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 200 800   1,000 
3 Sapporo DDGs 0 20   20 
4 Other DDs 32   15 17 
5 Submarine (SS) 21 2  6 17 
6 Meiji SSN (Akula-class) 0 5   5 
7 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 42 8  3 47 
8 Landing Ship (LST) 27 15   42 
9 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 70  15 15 55 
10 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36    36 
11 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10    10 
12 SH-60J (anti-sub) 87 20  2 105 
13 JAMSTEC UUV 0 3   3 
Table 5-31: Major MSDF Order Of Battle 
The Maritime force acquired 20 new Sapporo DDGs (US DD21 variant that has 
ASW capabilities) instead of the Kongo destroyers. In total, there were 48 modern and 
high-tech destroyers, which required less manning and maintenance. Japan also bought 
five new Meiji-class submarine – these were the Akula1 class nuclear submarines from 
Russia. Japan also spent about ¥160 billion yen to acquire an additional Akula-class 
submarine for reverse engineering.  It was desired that by 2025, Japan would be able to 
manufacture nuclear submarines. 
 
                                                 
1 FAS Russia Akula-class Nuclear Submarine - http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/rus/971.htm. 
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h. Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) 
   Epoch 4 (2016 ~ 2020) 





1 F-15 (J/DJ) 102   102 0 
2 F-22 250 200   450 
3 F-1 18   18 0 
4 F-2 125 25   150 
5 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 33   33 0 
6 C-1 28    28 
7 C-130H 16    16 
8 CH-47J (Transport) 59 30   89 
9 KC-135R 30 30   60 
Table 5-32: Major ASDF Order Of Battle 
The ASDF had completed its modernization programs. The 450 F-22 would 
completely replace the F-15 and the F-2 was meant to replace the F-1 and F/RF-4.  That 
would greatly streamline the logistics facilities in the Japan Air Force. The fleet of KC-
135R refueling tankers was also expanded to 60 in number. 
 
i. Major Missile Systems 
    Epoch 4 (2016 ~ 2020) 





1 Patriot PAC-3 FU Upgrading 120 120   240 
2 Type-12 ICBM 2 8   10 
3 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 80   80 0 
4 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 1,300 700   2,000 
5 Type-03 Missile 13,000 7,000   20,000 
6 High Energy Laser System 0 3   3 
Table 5-33: Major Missile Systems 
Japan fielded another 120 Patriot firing units to provide air-defense for some of 
the key national installations that were identified in the national survivability study. The 
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Type-88 was phased out. However, the Type-03 TEL force was expanded to 20,000 
missiles. Eight more ICBMs were also deployed. 
 
j. Major C4ISR Systems 
      Epoch 4 (2016 ~ 2020) 





1 EU-1 (Low observable) 57 43   100 
2 EU-2 (HAE) 55 45   100 
3 UF-3 (Strike & F/R) 25 75   100 
4 E-2C 13    13 
5 E-767 4    4 
6 Info Gathering Satellite 10 8 6 2 16 
7 IW Platoon (30-men) 3 1     4 
Table 5-34: Major C4ISR Systems 
By 2020, Japan would have fielded a total of 300 UAVs, 100 each of EU-1, EU-2 
and UF-3.  There was also a total of 16 Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), thus 
Japan would have a revisit rate of once daily over any region. Their resolution was also 
enhanced to 30 cm. 
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4. Static Net Assessment 
a. Japan Versus Unified Korea 
In this section, the static assessment of Japan’s order of battle against that of the 
new Unified Korea is conducted. The following assumptions are taken with regards to the 
military forces of a Unified Korea: 
(1) There is a Unified Korean Commander who has overall command and 
control of the military forces, which are essentially the combined forces of the 
ROK and DPRK prior to unification.  
(2) Any issues pertaining to the C4ISR, training, and equipment 
interoperability at the different levels of command have been resolved, although 
these normally can take a long time to resolve.  
The orders of battle have intentionally been reorganized and aggregated to 
provide a meaningful evaluation and comparison. Details of Japan’s order of battle can be 
found in the section above, while details of the Unified Korea are referred from the 
Korean chapter, with some numbers inferred from Epoch 3 as data for Epoch 4 is not 
available. 
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 1) Economy 
 Japan Unified Korea 
Average Annual 
GDP Growth 
3% K(N) - 12-7.2 %  tapering 
off 
K(S) - 5.9 % 
Average Annual 
GDP 
¥745.6 trillion = 
US$6.778 trillion 
K(N) - US$33.1 billion 
K(S) - US$884.7 billion 
Average Annual 
Per Capita GDP 
¥5.87 million = 
US$53,000 
K(N) - US$1,525 
K(S) - US$18,600 
Defense as 
Ratio of GDP 
0.98% K(N) - 27 % 




¥7.4 trillion = US$67 
billion 
K(N) - US$8.9 billion 
K(S) – US$31.0 billion 
Table 5-35: Economic Comparison Between Japan and Unified Korea 
Although the average annual GDP of Unified Korea was one-seventh that 
of Japan’s ¥745.6 trillion, its defense spending is two-thirds that of 
Japan’s. The high defense spending as a ratio of its GDP is the result of 
the North’s continued spending on its huge military force. However, both 
countries spent an equivalent 30% of their defense monies on force 
improvement programs like new equipment acquisition, old equipment 
upgrade and replacement.  
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2) Manpower 
Japan Unified Korea 
Joint: 11,500 (8,400)2 
Army 170,000 (169,000) 
Navy 60,500 (53,600) 
Air Force: 54,500 (51,200) 
Army: 863,000 
Navy3: 113,000 + 65,000 
Reserves 
Air Force: 126,000 
Total: 296,500 (282,200) Total: 1,167,000 
Table 5-36: Manpower Comparison Between Japan and Unified Korea 
With the unification of the ROK and the DPRK, there was a general effort 
to reduce the size of both militaries, especially those of the armies. Even 
with such efforts, the Unified Korea military continues to be an order of 
magnitude higher than that of Japan. Therefore, Japan continues to invest 
in better training and more technologically advanced combat systems to 
make up for this superior numerical disadvantage.  
 
3) Navy 
 Japan Unified Korea 
Surface 
Combatants 
20 (0) Sapporo 
28 (28) Kongo 
17 (32) other destroyers 
25 (19) KDX destroyers 
334 (382) PBs (39 
missile armed) 
Submarines 5 (0) SSN 
17 (21) SS 
 
10 Type 214 
9 Type 209 
4 Kilo 
10 Upgraded Romeo 
Mine 
Warfare 
47 (42) 42 (39) 
Amphibious 42 (27) LSTs 98 (256) 
Aircraft 55 (70) P3C 
105 (87) ASW Helicopters 
36 (36) Others 
60 (40) MPA 
30 ASW Helicopters 
Table 5-37: Navy Comparison Between Japan and Unified Korea 
                                                 
2 Figures in parenthesis denote figures for previous epoch. 
3 The Unified Korean Navy and Air Force figures are 2015 figures as no reliable figures were available. 
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Comparing the fleets, the combatant of significance is the introduction of 
20 Sapporo DDGs into the Japan’s, replacing some of the older DDs, as 
compared to the 25 KDX destroyers of the Unified Korea, only six of 
which are equipped with the Harpoon and the Aegis system. The Unified 
Korea continues to maintain the former DPRK’s substantial fleet of small 
and old patrol boats, 39 of which are armed with two to four missiles. In 
terms of total missile capacity, the 20 Sapporos exceed that of the entire 
Unified Korean Navy. The introduction of the 5 Meiji-class SSNs into 
Japan’s existing fleet of diesel submarines gives it a qualitative edge over 
the Unified Korea’s fleet of 33 diesel submarines. Whilst the overall naval 
numbers may be comparable, Japan operates a more modern fleet and 
therefore is assessed to have the qualitative advantage over the Unified 
Korea. 
 
  4) Air Force 
Japan Unified Korea 
 450 (250) F22 
150 (125) F2 
 100 (25) UF 3 
28 (28) C1 
16 (16) C130H 
89 (59) CH47 
60 (30) KC135 AAR 
468 (566) fighters 
[133 FXxx, 55 UCAV, 140 
F16 C/D, 20 MiG 29, 20 
MiG 23, 100 MiG 21] 
336 (374) Ground Attack 
10 (5) RF 4/5 
188 (180) Fixed Wing Transport 
305 Helicopters 
10 (5) KCxxx 
Table 5-38: Air Force Comparison Between Japan and Unified Korea 
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There was no significant change to the air force of the Unified Korea as it 
continues to maintain the same fleets from the former ROK and DPRK. 
On the other hand, Japan continues with its modernization efforts with the 
procurement of more advanced fighters while retiring the old. Therefore, 
Japan continues to enjoy its numerical superiority in its advanced fighter 
fleet with the additional purchase of 200 F22s to replace the F15s, as 
compared to the 133 FX fighters of Unified Korea, an increase of 68 from 
the former ROK’s fleet of 65. The aging F1s and F4/RF4 were also 
retired, as Japan modernizes its air force. On the other side, the Unified 
Korea increased its fleet of UCAVs from five to a substantial force of 55. 
In terms of current generation fighters, these are comparable for both 
countries.The Unified Korea continues to maintain the remainder of its 
lower-end fighters, MiG 23s and MiG 21s. With higher quality training, 
better C4 capabilities and more modern aircraft, it is assessed that the 
Japanese air force also enjoys a qualitative advantage over the Unified 
Korea.   
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  5) Army 
 Japan Unified Korea 
Troops 8 (8) Div,  
6 (6) Bde,  
1 (1) Armored Div,  
1 (1) Airborne Bde,  
1(1) Heliborne Bde,  
1 (1) Amphibious Bde 
53 (73) Div 
 
 
Tanks 1135 (1135) MBTs 2880 (4300) 
APC 1,020 (920) 3040 (4040) 
Artillery 231 (631) 8250 (10500) Gun Arty 
MLRS 828 (428) 1380 (1880) 
Attack Helicopters 128 (103) 386 (242) 
Table 5-39: Army Comparison Between Japan and Unified Korea 
The Unified Korea has reduced the size of its army, although it continues 
to maintain a sizable force for domestic and economic reasons. Even with 
this reduction, the Unified Korea Army is still numerically larger than 
Japan’s. Japan has one airborne brigade, one heliborne brigade and one 
amphibious, but these are not large enough to effectively take over 
anything on the mainland of Unified Korea. On the other hand, the Unified 
Korea may have a large army, but it has limited lift capability, and 
therefore chances that such a huge force can be brought to bear on the 
Japanese homeland is highly remote, and will require the support of its air 
force and navy which face heavy qualitative and quantitative handicaps 
when operating away from the homeland. 
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  6) Missiles 
 Japan Unified Korea 
Attack 2000 (1300) Type 03 TELs 
(6 msl per TEL) 
10 (2) Type 12 ICBM 
 
60 (40) KSR 14 
25 (0) Hyon Mu5 
100 (150) Hwasong 56 
250 (250) Hwasong 67 
296 (216) Nodong 1/28 
135 (105) Taepo Dong 19 
85 (55) Taepo Dong 210 
(may have 3 to 6 nuclear 
weapons) 
Air Defense 240 (120) Patriot PAC-3 FU 
192 (192) I-HAWK FU 
1138 (1524) SAM 
1100 (3100) ADA 
Table 5-40: Missile Comparison Between Japan and Unified Korea 
 The Unified Korea has increased its numbers of ballistic missiles 
from 376 to 516, almost a 40% increase. These are missiles that can hit the 
Japanese cities. To counter these, Japan has doubled its Patriots to 240 
FUs, and maintaining its 192 I-Hawks FUs. Japan also has a fleet of 48 
NTWD DDG that has an initial ballistic missile defense capability with 
the Patriot PAC311 missile. These are assessed to be insufficient to defend 
against any massive missile attacks from the Unified Korea. It is assessed 
that to increase the number of SAMs is a not a cost-effective way to 
counter such a threat. On the other hand, Japan increased its Type 3 
missiles to 2000 units, or a total of 12,000 missiles. This is one order of 
                                                 
4 Range of 180km. 
5 Range of 300km. 
6 Range of 330km. 
7 Range of 500km. 
8 Range of 1300km. 
9 Range of 2000km. 
10 Range of 6000km. 
11 The PAC3 missiles are still not able to intercept ballistic missile re-entering the atmosphere at velocities 
higher than 5 km/sec.  
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magnitude higher than the 1100 SAM units in the Unified Korea. It is 
intended that this ability to retaliate can be deterring and is the more cost-
effective answer to the Unified Korea’s increasing ballistic missile 
inventory. 
 
7) Summary (Japan Versus Unified Korea) 
 In summary, despite its smaller GDP, the Unified Korea continues 
to spend a substantial portion of its GDP on defense, to improve and 
replace its old and obsolete equipment. This amount is comparable to 
Japan’s 1% GDP spending in dollar terms. Although the Unified Korea 
continues to reduce its military, especially its army, it is still numerically 
larger than that of Japan. But it does not pose a serious threat to Japan. 
However, Japan continues to leverage quality training and advanced 
technology to maintain a advanced military force. The Unified Korea’s 
force of ballistic missiles and its possession of WMD capabilities continue 
to worry Japan. Japan must find cost-effective solutions to these threats. 
Japan shall continue to commit resources in this area.  
 
b. Japan Versus China 
In this section, the static assessment between Japan’s forces and China’s forces is 
presented.  Details of Japan’s forces can be found in the previous chapter. The data 
presented has been reorganized and aggregated to provide a meaningful comparison.   
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Air Force: 54,500(51,200) 
PLA: 1,500,000(1,600,000) 
Rapid Reaction: 100,000(90,000) 
Navy: 310,000(310,000) 
Marines: 15,000(15,000) 
Special Forces: 14,000(14,000) 
Intelligence: 10,000(5,000) 
Total: 296,500(282,200) Total: 1,949,000(2,034,000) 
Table 5-41: Manpower Comparison Between Japan and China 
Over the last 5 years, China has continued to downsize its overall military 
manpower.  At the same time, the buildup of the rapid reaction force has 
persisted.  The total JSDF manpower remains an order of magnitude 
smaller than that of China.  Due to economic and demographic reasons, it 
is not possible for Japan to significantly increase the manpower of JSDF. 
Operationally, (as shall be seen in the air and naval order of battle), 
China’s air and sealift capability have improved, and is assessed to be 
capable of projecting an estimated 22,000 troops by fixed wing transport 
aircraft and 36,000 troops by sea.  But this constitutes only a small 
fraction of the total PLA order of battle 
 
Qualitatively, although PLA personnel are generally well trained in basic 
skills, their leadership, training in combined operations and morale is low. 
Most soldiers are poorly educated and one-third leave active duty each 
year. There is also no professional NCO corps12. 
 
                                                 
12 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm 
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28 (28) C1 
16 (16) C130 
89(59) CH47 





580(700) Lower end fighters/attack 
112(100) Heavy/Medium Lift FW Transport 
100(100) Light FW Transport 
16(13) AAR 
439(397) Helicopters 
Table 5-42: Air Force Comparison Between Japan and China 
 The modernization of China’s Air Force continues unabated. The 
main acquisition for China over the last 5 years is the 100 of fifth-
generation J12s. At the same time, they continue to phase out their large 
fleet of older aircraft. China’s ORBAT of fourth-generation fighters have 
remained stagnant, indicating that their future procurement will probably 
be focused on fifth- generation fighters. However, JASDF has previously 
decided to maximize the limited pool of pilots by providing them with the 
best fighters money can buy.  Hence, Japan pushed ahead with the 
replacement of the fleet of fighters with 450 F22s. In so doing, JASDF has 
now commanded a definite qualitative edge over the PLAAF. 
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Chart 5-34: Numerical Comparison of Fighter Fleets over 20 Years 
The chart above presents a numerical comparison of the two fighter fleets 






4th + 5th Generation Fighters                        5th Generation Fighters 
Chart 5-35: Fighter Comparison by Generations 
If the fighters were to be compared qualitatively, the picture shifts in favor 
of Japan. From the trends, it is assessed that the ability for China to 
institute advanced fighters is about 7 to 10 years behind that of Japan. The 
actual outcome of an air war would depend very much on the training and 
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deficient for China’s Air Force13. This is assessed to be the main reason 
for China’s decision to delay large-scale procurement of fifth-generation 
fighters until now.  Overall, it is assessed that China is very unlikely to 
prevail in the battle for air superiority over East China Sea. 
   
3) Navy 
 Japan China 
Surface 
Combatants 
28(28) Kongo DDGs 
20 Sapporo DDGs 
17(32) Other Destroyers 
3 Missile Patrol Craft 
Maritime Safety Agency: 
13/46 Lg/Med Patrol Vessel 
38 Patrol Craft 
81 Coastal Patrol Craft 
180 Coastal/Rescue Craft 
41(36) Destroyers 
58(52) Frigates 
197(179) other lower end 
Missile Craft 
50(50) Torpedo Craft 
30(30) Speed Boats 








Amphibious 42(27) LSTs 63(43) LSTs 
66(66) lower capacity craft 
Aircraft 55(70) P3C 
105(87) ASW Helicopters 
46(46) Others 
See “Air Force” 
Table 5-34: Navy Comparison Between Japan and China 
Over the last five years, the only significant additions to China’s surface 
fleet are the five DDGX and four FFX. But the majority of the surface 
fleet comprises lower-end destroyers, frigates and missile crafts, each with 
four to eight SSMs and up to eight SAMs.  The total missile capacity of 
China’s surface fleet has improved and is now estimated to be about 1908 
                                                 
13 http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR580/mr580.html 
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SSMs and 512 SAMs.  This represents an increase of 15% over the last 
epoch. Spread over 296 missile armed ships, the average is about 8.2 
missiles per ship. 
In contrast, while the Japanese Navy surface fleet is numerically inferior, 
it is technologically modern and carries missiles of far longer range. Japan 
has invested heavily on the surface fleet, with the procurement of 20 
Sapporo to replace the older destroyers. The fleet of 28 Kongo DDGs and 
20 Sapporo has a total missile capacity that exceeds that of  the entire 
China Navy. Furthermore, Japan’s surface fleet is supported by a large 
number of surveillance and ASW aircraft. Overall, JMSDF has a definite 
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Chart 5-37: Comparison of Missile Capacity 
The two charts above compare the number of missile platforms and 
missile capacities of both fleets.  They clearly indicate a differing 
philosophy of building a surface fleet. China has built its surface fleet 
more for littoral waters while Japan focuses on building an ocean-going 
navy.  
With a fleet of modern and highly capable destroyers, supported by a large 
number of UAVs, MPAs and ASW aircraft, Japan should be able to defeat 
China in a naval engagement over the open waters of East China Sea. 
Japan has made inroads into nuclear propulsion with the procurement of 
five Meiji-class (Akula-class) SSNs.  On the other hand, China continues 
to modernize its submarine fleet with the procurement of two Song-class, 
one Kilo-class and six SSX-class submarines, bringing their total number 
of modern diesel electric submarines to 38. They have also acquired two 
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These provide China with a superior sub-surface capability.  But with 
Japan’s ASW capabilities of the destroyers and aircraft, JMSDF should be 
able to maintain a slight edge in an open-ocean naval battle. 
 
  4) Missiles 
 Japan China 
Strike 2000(1300) Type 03 
TELs 
(6 missiles per TEL) 
(Missiles: 20,000) 






183(155) SLBM (with 8 SSBN) 
8340(7640) ASCM 
4000(2500) Tomahawk Equivalent 
8050(5300) other shorter range LACM
Air 
Defense 
240(120) Patriot FU 
192(192) I-HAWK FU 
120(90) LR SAM Bns 
150(100) SR SAM Bns 
Table 5-44: Missile Comparison Between Japan and China 
Although China has a large ballistic and cruise missile inventory, the 
majority are SRBMs and shorter-range cruise missiles, which do not have 
the range to reach Japan when fired from the mainland.  But over the last 
10 years, China has acquired more missiles, bringing the total number of 
land-based missiles having the range to over-fly the East China Sea to 
4270 missiles.  While Japan’s Type 3 missiles outnumber those of China 
by better than 4:1, these are presently equipped only with conventional 
warhead and hence do not directly constitute a deterrent to China’s nuclear 
weapons. 
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    Long range = sufficient range to over-fly the East China Sea     
 
Chart 5-38: Numerical Comparison of Missile Stockpile 
In the last 5 years, Japan has vastly increased the Type 3 TEL fleet and 
Type 3 missiles.  The 2000 mobile land-based Type 3 TELs will play a big 
role in the defense against a scenario of a China large-scale invasion.  The 
Type 3 TEL fleet will provide the additional firepower necessary to 
decisively tilt the balance in Japan’s favor in a defensive scenario.  Should 
China conduct an all-out invasion, a large Type 3 TEL fleet will ensure 
destruction of all the forces afloat. 
To date, while Japan has acquired an initial ballistic missile defense 
capability in the Kongo and Sapporo NTWD ships and Patriot PAC3 
missiles, it is still unable to defend against ballistic missile of velocity 














Defense of Japan 2020 
 5 - 191   
  5) C4ISR 
Japan China 
16(10) IMINT Satellites 





National C2 System 
42(28) IMINT/EW Satellites 
16(15) AEWCC 
Table 5-45: C4ISR Comparison Between Japan and China 
Details of China’s spy satellite capability are not available and hence a 
comparison cannot be made. Over the last five years, Japan has improved 
the C4ISR capability substantially with the acquisition of more EU1s and 
EU2s. Together with the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) fleet of E2Cs 
and E767s, JSDF’s airborne C4ISR capabilities are assessed to be 
technologically superior as compared to China’s AEWCC aircraft. 
 
  6) Summary (Japan Versus China) 
In the last five years both sides have continued to increase their 
inventories of modern military equipment.  Numerically, Japan continues 
to lag far behind in most areas and this gap can never be bridged due to 
demographic and economic reasons.  Japan will therefore have to leverage 
advanced technology to overcome China’s numerical advantage; in short, 
to overcome quantity with quality.  Examples of this include the 
acquisition of F22s and Sapporos.  With a smaller defense budget, Japan 
cannot afford to compete in all capability areas, and must therefore be 
very selective in its military investment.  These include capabilities to 
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counter a large-scale China invasion, a cost-effective solution to counter 
China’s nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as capabilities to protect 
its SLOCs. 
 
5. Dynamic Net Assessment 
a. Scenario 1 – Nuclear Counter-Strike 
 As of 2020, Japan does not possess any nuclear weapons. The reasons are mainly 
political and not technical, as explained in previous chapters.  Over the last ten years, 
Japan has secretly committed R&D and other resources to successfully develop (though 
not fully test) a 200kt nuclear warhead that can be delivered by the Type 3 SSM and 
Type 12 ICBM. Japan has also collected sufficient weapon-grade nuclear materials for 
the production of 200 warheads. Upon receiving the approval from the political 
leadership, Japan should be able to rapidly deploy up to 200 nuclear weapons.  This 
scenario is constructed to analyze Japan’s nuclear counter-strike capability against China, 
should this capability be realized in the near future. 
 The nuclear warheads will serve as Japan’s main strategic deterrent capability. 
Against China, the weapons will be employed in the form of a limited “Mutual Assured 
Destruction”. The warheads will be mounted on the Type 3 SSMs and be launched from 
any of the land-based Type 3 TELs, Kongo/Sapporo or submarines. The nuclear Type 3 
missiles will externally resemble the conventional missiles. Pre-launch survivability will 
therefore be dependent on platform quantity (2000 TELs, 48 ships and 22 submarines) 
and mobility. 
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 As shall be seen in subsequent scenarios, Type 3 missiles will also play a key role 
in conventional defense. However, at any point in time, 2000 missiles (including the 200 





Figure 5-8: Range Envelope of Type 3 Missile 
The map above shows the key China cities that are within striking distance of the 
Type 3 missiles.  20 of the largest cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
Taipei, Guangzhou etc, will be targeted in the nuclear counter-strike. Each city will be 
attacked with a single salvo of 90 conventional missiles and 10 nuclear missiles. This 
salvo is assessed to be more than sufficient to overwhelm any cruise missile defense 
within the city’s locality. As the missiles are externally similar, it will not be possible for 
China’s defenses to pick out the nuclear missiles from the conventional ones. 
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  b. Scenario 2 – Defense Against Airborne and Amphibious Operations 
 This scenario is set in East China Sea in 2020, whereby China has decided to 
conduct a large-scale airborne and amphibious invasion onto the western coast of 
Kyushu, perhaps as intimidation against nuclear arming by Japan. It is not the principal 
objective of this section to examine why China would decide to conduct the invasion, but 
to examine how the scenario would unfold should the invasion take place. 
It is assumed that that the entire scenario does not involve the use of non-
conventional weapons. If nuclear, biological or chemical weapons are used, then Japan 
will retaliate using the nuclear weapons in accordance with Scenario 1. 
Japan’s primary strategic intelligence collection and early warning capabilities 
include the human intelligence network and the 16 spy satellites (providing imagery 
intelligence update of any part of the world at a rate of once a day).  These will be 
supplemented by information obtained through Japan’s intelligence exchange agreement 
with USA. The agreement stipulates that USA will provide any information that pertains 
to threat to Japan, and vice versa.  With these in place, it is assumed that there will be no 
strategic surprise, and that any invasion by China will be preceded by a discernable 
period of tension.  Japan’s forces will be on alert, and will be deployed or dispersed in 
accordance to established doctrine and operational requirements. There will also be an 
increase in the levels of surveillance and intelligence collection activities. 
 Japan’s normal peacetime surveillance requirements include round-the-clock air 
and maritime surveillance by EU2s and ground-based radar stations.  During this period 
of tension, an additional three EU2 stations will be set up west of Kyushu to provide 
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persistent coverage over the area.  These will be supported by P3Cs and EU1s for close-
in shadowing and investigation. 
 Forward imagery intelligence and electronic reconnaissance missions will be 
carried out by the stealthy EU1s and UF3s.  The targets-of-interest includes key air and 
naval bases, key missile sites, likely troop concentration areas, as well as other early 
warning indicators of an impending attack. By this time, Japan will also have inserted 
specialforces for reconnaissance and real time reporting of significant enemy activities. 
 
  1) Airborne Assault Operations 
China’s airborne assault force is assumed to comprise 80% of their fighter 
and fixed-wing transport fleet, or 894 fighters and 170 transport aircraft. 
In this scenario, JASDF’s fighter fleet will play a pivotal role in defense. 
Hence, the biggest threat would be a massive cruise-missile strike by 
China in an attempt to shut down Japan’s airbases and disrupting its ability 
to launch the fighters.  But given the estimated 450nm distance, China’s 
sub-sonic cruise missiles would take more than 50 minutes to reach their 
targets in Kyushu. Tactical early warning of missile launch is therefore 
vital to Japan’s ability to successfully launch enough fighters for air 
defense. 
Given the short reaction time, Japan will pre-configure the fighters for 
maximum endurance in air-to-air missions. Upon detection of enemy 
preparatory activities, such as massive arming, fueling, troop embarkation 
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etc, 100 F22s will be placed on 15 minute alert and another 150 on 30 
minute alert. 
Upon detection of massive missile strike, the F22s will be upgraded in 
readiness and/or scrambled accordingly14. At the same time, Japan will 
retaliate with Type 3 missile strikes on China’s airbases, missile sites and 
C4 facilities. Having maximum endurance on the F22s allows time for 
Japan’s Type 3 missiles to shut down China’s airfields. The external fuel 
tanks would of course be jettisoned prior to engaging the enemy. Should 
China’s missile strikes continue, Japan would further retaliate by striking 
China’s ships, naval bases, power plants and other military targets. 
It is assumed that 50% of China’s airborne task force managed to take off 
before their airfield is closed, or 447 fighters and 85 transport aircraft. 
JASDF will have 250 F22s airborne to intercept the task force. Given 
these forces, JASDF will require a fighter exchange ratio of 2:1 or better 
to emerge victorious. 
Extensive computer simulations conducted by British Aerospace and the 
British Defense Research Agency shows that the kill ratio between F22s 
and Su35s (a representative of a Russian fourth-generation fighter) is 
10:115. In addition, JASDF has better trained pilots and better C4ISR 
                                                 
14 JASDF has completed the survivability enhancement program, which includes the building of alternate 
runways. On a conservative assumption of 5 airbases with 3 runways each, pair take-off, 2 minutes apart, 
250 aircraft can be launched in less than 20 minutes. 
15 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/98-111.pdf. This study was conducted before either aircraft 
was put into operational service. By 2020, JASDF would have operated the F22s for about 10 years. During 
this time, JASDF have also upgraded the associated air defense C4I systems to maximize the capabilities of 
the fleet of advanced fighters. Hence it is assumed that the kill ratio would remain essentially the same as at 
2020. 
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support for air operations. With the F22s capitalizing on stealth to avoid 
the sweepers and engage the transports, it is highly likely that JASDF will 
succeed in defeating the airborne assault force. Any “leakages” will be 
dealt with by Japan’s capable ship-based (Kongo DDGs and Sapporo) and 
land-based air defenses (Patriots, I-HAWKs and other SHORADS). 
Even if any troops managed to land on Japan, they will be effectively cut-
off from support and further reinforcement from China. With the heavy 
investment in survivability and repair and recovery capabilities, Japan 
would be able to launch fighters within four hours and establish air 
superiority over the landing zone. Japan will also be able to augment the 
defenses by redeploying the appropriate ship-based and land-based SAM 
units. The enemy’s sea lines-of-communications will also be cut-off by 
JMSDF and the Type 3 TEL fleet. 
 
2) Amphibious Operations 
The amphibious task force is assumed to comprise 80% of China’s surface 
combatants, or 237 missile-armed ships, and 80% of their sealift 
capability, or 103 transport ships.  
China is likely to precede the amphibious operations with a massive 
missile strike on Japanese air and naval bases.  Japan will retaliate with 
Type 3 missile strikes on their key airbases and ships in port.  In addition, 
Japan will also strike key military targets such as C4ISR facilities, missile 
sites, power plants etc.  Given the completion of Japan’s efforts to enhance 
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survivability and repair and recovery capabilities, the airbases should be 
able to recover within four hours.  Since East China Sea is more than 
400nm wide, China’s amphibious task force should still be more than 
200nm away. 
Japan will adopt a layered defense against the amphibious task force 
(ATF).  The concept of operations will be as follows: 
1 Maritime Defense Zone 1 (less than 500nm) – Japan will attack the 
ATF with up to 7000 Type 3 missiles.  Surveillance and targeting 
information will be provided by EU1s and EU2.  On a worst-case 
assumption, the ATF carries 500 SAMs, and each SAM successfully 
engages one of the Type 3 missiles.  That will leave 6500 missiles, or 19 
anti-ship missiles for every one of the 340 ships in the ATF.  With no 
SAMs remaining, it is unlikely that any ship will survive this attack. 
2 Maritime Defense Zone 2 (less than 200nm) – Japan will attack the 
ATF, which by now would have expended most of their air defense 
missiles, with submarines, destroyers and aircraft.  China Air Force is 
unlikely to achieve air superiority at this area, which is more than 200nm 
off their shores, given JSDF’s superior fighter fleet of F22s and highly 
capable ship-based air defense.  With the ships and continuous waves of 
air attacks, none of the ships in the ATF are likely to survive.  However, 
should both highly unlikely events happen in quick succession (that is, the 
ATF somehow managed to survive the attacks in Zone 1 and 2), there is a 
third line of defense. 
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3 Maritime Defense Zone 3 (less than 15nm) – This line of defense 
is based on the shorter-range Type 96 anti-ship missiles and the tanks, 
artillery and other weapons of the army inventory.  At this point, JASDF 
will also be able to attack the ATF with impunity.  Japan should be able 
muster two Div++ for defense.  Hence, on an assumption of 4:1 force 
ratio16, China will need at least 10 to 11 divisions for a successful 
amphibious operation.  This is not possible since the total sealift capability 
is less than three divisions. 
 
  3) Conclusion for Scenario 2 
From the analysis, it is clear that in 2020, China will not be able to 
successfully conduct an amphibious operation against Japan.  Their 
airborne and amphibious task forces stand little chance of surviving the 
transit across East China Sea.  This is due to the following reasons: (1) 
China’s inability to shut down JASFD due to the high survivability and 
repair and recovery capabilities of the airbases. China is also not able to 
shut down Japan’s Type 3 TELs due to their mobility and dispersion; (2) 
China’s ship-based air defense is inadequate and hence could be easily 
overwhelmed by Japan’s massive anti-ship missile strike; and (3) China’s 
Air Force is not able to achieve air superiority over the East China Sea. 
                                                 
16 This is a conservative estimate. Some experts have estimated this ratio to be as high as 10:1. 
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 Early warning of incoming missiles is vital to Japan’s success in 
the air defense scenario. Japan will therefore continue to invest heavily to 
develop this capability domain. 
  
c. Scenario 3 – SLOC Protection 
 Rather than relying on sheer terror and intimidation associated with the conduct of 
a massive invasion to seize Japan, the PRC can use its military force in a more limited but 
coercive manner by interdicting Japanese commercial vessels plying to and from 
Japanese ports. Such an action is deemed to be more troubling and coercive to Japan than 
the former as it takes advantage of the following facts: 
1 Japan is more vulnerable to any disruptions to the SLOCs than the PRC 
because the former has fewer natural resources and has no other way to import or 
export except through the sea or the air. 
2 Japan’s foreign trade17 accounts for 20% percent of its GDP (in contrast, 
this is only 10% for the PRC). 
3 The sea routes in and out of Japan’s four major commercial seaports, 
though numerous, are predictable.  
 
                                                 
17 Regional trading contribution to Japan’s total foreign trade (1999 data from http://www.jin.jcic.or.jp): 
 Asia Europe N. America S. America Africa Oceania 
Exports 40% 20% 36% 1% 1% 2% 
Imports 49% 17% 25% 2% 1% 6% 
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 1) PRC Strangulation Strategy 
Therefore, the PRC’s strategy is strangulation of the Japanese economy 
for an indefinite period of time. If the PRC can sink sufficient commercial 
ships to scare others, it can convince most commercial shippers not to risk 
sea-borne trade with Japan.  
The PRC attempts to introduce a significant risk factor into all maritime 
voyages in and out of Japan by occasionally sinking a cargo ship. This can 
be done using one or a combination of the following PRC assets: (1) 296 
missile-armed-ships; (2) 1117 fighters; (3) numerous mines; (4) 57 diesel 
submarines; and (5) 7 nuclear submarines.  
  The use of missile-armed ships and fighters are considered too 
overt and easily attributable and are therefore likely to escalate the 
situation into hot war. It would be rather easy for the Japanese military to 
retaliate, considering the qualitative superiority of the Japanese air force 
and navy.  
  The PRC’s mines can pose a problem too. Each of the PRC’s 
submarines usually carry two to three dozen of these, so half of its diesel 
submarine fleet will be able to carry about 1,000 mines. If they are able to 
place mines near major Japanese harbors they may cause attrition rates of 
a few percent each time commercial or military ships try to enter or leave 
Japanese ports or naval bases until the mines are swept 
As for using submarines, each of the PRC’s diesel submarines may be able 
to sink one or two cargo vessels before the flaming datum draws 
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substantial Japanese counter attacks from the surface, air and subsurface 
units assure that the attacking PRC diesel submarine is destroyed The 
Chinese diesel submarines have limited endurance and require charging of 
batteries every so many days. The comprehensive surveillance capabilities 
of Japan are likely to be able to detect and destroy the subs, sometimes 
even before they are able to destroy any  shipping. However, considering 
the large numbers of diesel submarines in the PLAN, this can pose a 
serious concern to Japan. 
For the PRC, the least risky and most effective asset for the conduct of 
such SLOC disruption operations shall be its fleet of seven SSNs. Unlike 
the diesel submarines, these have long endurances when submerged 
(approximately 10018 days) and much higher speeds than the diesels. They 
will be elusive against any Japanese anti-submarine efforts except against 
Japan’s fleet of five newly-acquired SSNs. 
   
2) Japan’s SLOC Protection Strategy 
What kind of SLOC protection strategy shall Japan adopt and what kinds 
of military options does it have? Japan can take a number of steps to break 
such a PRC SLOC disruption strategy and to mitigate any effects it may 
have.  
Firstly, cargo ships can be routed east to the Pacific Ocean and then south 
and east of the Philippines, through the Indonesian Archipelago thereby 
                                                 
18 This is limited by the amount of provisions that can be carried onboard. 
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avoiding the South China Sea totally. This will force the PRC to attempt 
attacks in the open ocean far from its territory.  Such an approach will add 
a few thousand miles and modest cost to the merchant ships’ journey. 
Such an approach allows Japan’s anti-submarine surface ships to operate 
either within cover of land-based Japanese air power or out of range of 
most of the PRC’s combat planes. Japanese air power will be well 
positioned to defend ships to the east of Japan from any PRC aircraft that 
might pursue them.  
Secondly, Japan can use its surface fleet to accompany convoys of 
merchant ships, though this is harder to do for ships approaching Japan 
than for ships leaving its harbors because those that approach come from 
many different places. If they assemble east of Japan to wait for escorts, 
they will be vulnerable at that point. PRC submarines lying quietly in wait 
in the right places can hear approaching convoys before they themselves 
are detected, making it very likely for them to get in the first shot. The 
outcome of such a struggle is very hard to predict.  
And finally, Japan can maintain presence and deterrence through 
the deployment of five groups of naval ships at critical points along the 
SLOCs. If there are any attacks on Japanese commercial shipping, these 
ships could prosecute the aggressors. 
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  3) Concept of Operation 
The following assumptions are taken with regards to the concept of 
operation for the maintenance of presence and deterrence through the 
deployment of five TGs of naval ships at critical points along the SLOCs: 
(1) there will be no strategic surprise; (2) the United States Navy continues 
to maintain freedom of navigation of the seas; (3) the PRC is unable to 
threaten trans-Pacific shipping; (4) based on the possibility of SLOC 
disruption, Japan has secured special arrangements with the United States 
for oil and other critical supplies to be directly shipped to Japan, and also 
to trans-ship European or Middle East supplies through the United States; 
and (5) a period of up to three months is required for diplomatic resolution 
of the situation. 
Japan will maintain sea control out to 200nm, with a continuous sea 
situation picture provided by EU1s and EU2s. Surface combatants will be 
employed to enforce sea control, supplemented by fighters and land-based 
anti-ship missiles if the need arises. In the waters between Japan and the 
Singapore Straits, five Task Groups (TGs), each comprised of two 
Sapporo, two Kongo DDs, one Meiji SSN and one minesweeper, will 
patrol critical areas, as a show of presence and to deter any disruption to 
Japanese shipping. Each TG will also be assigned a permanent presence of 
one EU 1 or EU 2 station for the maintenance of SSP. All Japan-bound 
ships will also be electronically tracked through the use of transponders 
via the EU 1 and EU2 or through Japanese satellites. If any PRC 
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submarine makes an attack on any Japanese commercial shipping, a 
“flaming datum” is established, and all commercial vessels shall be routed 
away, while the nearest on-scene TG prosecutes the aggressor. 
 
  4) Analysis 
Given the Japanese naval order of battle, it will be able to sustain the five 
TGs for such an operation over an extended period of up to three months. 
Although Japan has a comprehensive suite of surveillance capability and a 
modern surface fleet, it still does not have a robust solution for the 
continuous tracking of the PRC’s SSNs. However, considering the limited 
numbers of PRC SSNs, Japan is willing to accept the sinking of one 
commercial vessel to establish a datum (called “flaming datum”) to the 
subsequent prosecution by the nearest on-scene TG. Once the datum has 
been established, with a sizable force of four ships all carrying ASW 
capable helicopters, and the Meiji SSN, it is assessed that the TG has a 
very good probability of localizing, targeting and eventually destroying 
the aggressor submarine. 
   
5) Conclusion for Scenario 3 
In conclusion, the PRC’s fleet of seven SSNs is a serious threat to Japan as 
it can be effectively deployed to sink sufficient Japanese shipping to scare 
off any subsequent sea-borne trade with Japan. While the JMSDF is able 
to maintain a substantial presence at critical points along SLOC to deter 
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any such attacks, it still does not have a capability to shadow and track the 
SSNs continuously. The introduction of the five Meiji SSNs into the 
JMSDF has improved the TGs capability against the SSN threat. Also, 
Japan will continue to diversify its supplies through other SLOCs so as to 
increase its resilience against the PRC’s attempt to disrupt Japanese sea-
borne trade in the South China Sea. Lastly, Japan may need to turn to the 
following alternatives as the way out: (1) to seek assistance from the 
United States, although this may not be a reliable option; and (2) to adopt 
a diplomatic strategy of getting more countries in the region (countries 
like the ASEAN, Australia, India, Russia etc) involved in order to garner 
more strength against an ever more muscular China. 
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6. 2020 and Beyond  
a. JSDF at 2020 
After twenty years of evolution and modernization, the JSDF has the following 
major strengths at 2020: (1) it is self-sufficient in terms of its abilities to defend the 
Japanese homeland from any attacks; (2) it has developed and fielded an advanced and 
comprehensive C4ISR network that is critical for the forewarning of any hostilities on 
Japan; (3) it has fielded a massive conventional missile force in its 20,000 Type 3 SSMs 
that can be launched from the 2,000 Type 3 TELs, the 48 DDGs, and the 22 submarines; 
(4) it has modernized and maintained a state-of-the-art inventory of weapons systems; 
and (5)  Japan has developed and established an indigenous defense industry to support 
the JSDF’s efforts to be more self-reliant. 
Despite its many strengths at 2020, the JSDF is also conscious and aware of the 
following key weaknesses: (1) it does not possess any nuclear weapons in its inventory 
and therefore is not able to provide a visible nuclear deterrent; (2) it does not have 
comprehensive capabilities to defend against massive missile attacks on its homeland; (3) 
it lacks robust continuous tracking and shadowing of enemy submarines. 
 
b. 2021 and Beyond 
For 2021 and beyond, the following are few issues of consideration for Japan to 
progress from 2021 and beyond: (1) strive for self-determination not only economically, 
but also politically and militarily; (2) further diversify its energy sources so that there is 
lesser reliance on the SLOC for imports; (3)  re-examine the provisions in the U.S.-Japan 
Security Arrangement; (4) remove the nuclear allergy completely; (5) strive to increase 
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its capabilities while maintaining zero-manpower growth, or even a manpower reduction 
in view of Japan’s aging population; (6) look towards the establishment of coalitions with 
its regional allies to ensure freedom of navigation of the SLOCs; (7) examine and explore 
the concept and viability of forward defense; (8) find cost-effective solutions to the 
missile and nuclear threats (through the deployment of a nuclear-deterrent capability, 
investments in research and development in comprehensive missile defense capability, 
and improvements in early warning and intelligence collection capabilities); (9) find cost 
effective solutions to the submarine threat (through the development and deployment of a 
comprehensive underwater surveillance network around Japan, and around the Ryukyu 
Islands, investment in research and development in air-independent-propulsion, and 
development in unmanned submarine capability; and finally (10) improve capabilities on 
unmanned platforms.  
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7. Epoch 4 Summary 
 
The regional triangular balance of power in the region remained but the relative 
weight of each of the respective powers continued to shift in this epoch. The declining 
role of the U.S. and the gradual ascension of China forced Japan to continue reevaluating 
its three-pronged security policy: firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements, building Japan's defense capability, and making diplomatic efforts to 
ensure international peace and security. Despite the nuclear allergy, Japan leaders 
maintained that it must retain the option to develop nuclear weapons. To this extent, 
Japan began re-evaluating the provisions in Article 9 of the Constitution and debated on 
its adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.  
By 2020, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsular was almost 
completed and token U.S. forces had begun to leave Okinawa. While the U.S.-Japan 
Security Arrangement remained intact, Japanese leaders continued to project that the U.S. 
would one day be gone from Japan, and may not fulfill its military commitments to 
defend Japan. Therefore Japan continued to develop a credible force for deterrence. As of 
2020, Japan does not possess any nuclear weapons. However, Japan has the all the 
resources necessary for two hundred 200kt nuclear warheads that can be delivered by its 
huge Type 3 SSM fleet and 12 ICBMs. 
The institutional reforms implemented in the first epoch continued to pay 
significant dividends as Japan’s sustained 15 years of positive economic growth. It 
continued to spend only 1% of its GDP on defense. Earlier efforts to sustain the national 
workforce remained intact but were beginning to show diminishing dividends as the 
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Japanese population continues to age. Domestic reliance on imported energy sources 
continued to decline.  
Japan continues to lag behind the PRC as the latter maintained its military 
modernization efforts. However, Japan’s dynamic net assessments concluded that the 
PRC is still not able to successfully conduct a massive airborne or amphibious assault on 
Japan. In another assessment on SLOC protection, Japan does not have the capability to 
continuously shadow and track the PRC’s SSNs deployed for SLOC disruption 
operations. For the final scenario, it was assessed that Japan would possess a credible 
nuclear counter-strike capability against 20 PRC cities with 90 conventional and 10 
nuclear missiles each if the nuclear warheads were to be produced and tested.  
Defense of Japan (Defense Expenditure)
Annex 5A : Japan Defense Expenditure





R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost
(Mil Yen) 2005 Qty
Grand Total 615,000 2,457,740
1 GSDF
2 Infantry/Combined Div 12 0 2 0 10
3 Infantry Bde 2 0 2 0 4
4 Armoured Div 1 0 1
5 Heliborne Bde 1 0 0 1
6 Airborne Bde 1 0 0 1
7 Amphibious Bde 0 0 1 0 1
8 Tanks 1,135 861 50 50 2,500 1,135
9 APC 770 182 50 25 50 7,050 795
10 Artillery (155mm SP) 831 1,040 0 831
11 MLRS 128 1,840 50 92,000 178
12 Attack Helicopters 88 4,500 5 5 22,500 88
13 Other Helicopters 424 2,935 5 5 14,675 424
14 Other Equipments 47,500 95,000 0
15
16 MSDF
17 Kongo DDG (DD51 variant) 4 110,000 5,000 3 4 350,000 7
18 Sapporo DDG (DD21 variant) 0 125,000 0 0
19 Other DDs 53 64,071 3 0 50
20 Submarine (SS) 18 46,394 2 1 92,788 19
21 Meiji SSN (Akula class) 0 160,000 0 0
22 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 14,745 2 1 29,490 38
23 Landing Ship (LST) 11 37,286 3 111,858 14
24 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100 500 15 7,500 100
25 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36 0 36
26 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10 0 10
27 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0 100 25,000 0 0
28 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 5,075 2 2 10,150 78
29 UUV 0 30,000 0 0
30 Other Equipments 100,000 245,000 0
31
Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005)
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R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost
(Mil Yen) 2005 Qty
Epoch 1 (2001 ~ 2005)
32 ASDF
33 F-15 (J/DJ) 203 0 203
34 F-22 0 8,800 0 0
35 F-1 52 0 52
36 F-2 45 11,830 30 354,900 75
37 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133 0 133
38 C-1 28 0 28
39 C-130H 16 0 16
40 CH-47J (Transport) 19 4,457 10 44,570 29
41 KC-135R 0 6,000 5 30,000 5
42 Other Equipments 110,000 220,000 0
43
44 Missile Systems
45 Patriot PAC-3 FU 120 2,000 2,000 50,000 20 40,000 120
46 Patriot Ops/Maintenance 99,815 0
47 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192 52,188 2 104,376 192
48 Type-12 SSM (ICBM) 0 1,000 0 0
49 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 68 1,214 12 14,568 80
50 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 0 1,200 75,000 100 120,000 100
51 Type-03 Missile 0 100 1,000 100,000 1,000
52 200 KT Nuclear Warhead 0 0 0
53 Missile Defense (include BMD) 0 0 75,000 0 0
54 High Energy Laser System 0 50,000 0 0
55 Other Equipments 32,500 65,000 0
56
57 Major C4I System
58 EU-1 (Low observable) [2005] 0 2,000 25,000 7 14,000 7
59 EU-2 (HAE) [2007] 0 6,000 25,000 0 0
60 UF-3 (fast; strike) [2014] 0 3,500 0 0
61 E-2C 13 0 13
62 E-767 4 0 4
63 Info Gathering Satellite 0 4 0 4
64 National C2 System 0 150,000 20,000 1 150,000 1
65 BMC3I (Missile Defense) 0 10,000 0 0
66 IW Platoon (30-men) 0 5,000 1 5,000 1
67 Other Equipments 20,000 15,000 0
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2 Infantry/Combined Div 12 0
3 Infantry Bde 2 0
4 Armoured Div 1
5 Heliborne Bde 1 0
6 Airborne Bde 1 0
7 Amphibious Bde 0 0
8 Tanks 1,135 861 50
9 APC 770 182 50
10 Artillery (155mm SP) 831 1,040
11 MLRS 128 1,840
12 Attack Helicopters 88 4,500




17 Kongo DDG (DD51 variant) 4 110,000 5,000
18 Sapporo DDG (DD21 variant) 0 125,000
19 Other DDs 53 64,071
20 Submarine (SS) 18 46,394
21 Meiji SSN (Akula class) 0 160,000
22 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 14,745
23 Landing Ship (LST) 11 37,286
24 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100 500
25 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36
26 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10
27 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0 100
28 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 5,075
29 UUV 0 30,000
30 Other Equipments
31
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost









25 100 9,550 820
100 0 731
100 184,000 278
5 5 22,500 88





2 1 92,788 20
0 0
2 1 29,490 39
3 111,858 17




3 2 15,225 79
0 0
110,000 245,000 0
Epoch 2 (2006 ~ 2010)
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33 F-15 (J/DJ) 203
34 F-22 0 8,800
35 F-1 52
36 F-2 45 11,830
37 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133
38 C-1 28
39 C-130H 16
40 CH-47J (Transport) 19 4,457




45 Patriot PAC-3 FU 120 2,000 2,000
46 Patriot Ops/Maintenance
47 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192 52,188
48 Type-12 SSM (ICBM) 0 1,000
49 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 68 1,214
50 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 0 1,200
51 Type-03 Missile 0 100
52 200 KT Nuclear Warhead 0
53 Missile Defense (include BMD) 0 0
54 High Energy Laser System 0 50,000
55 Other Equipments
56
57 Major C4I System
58 EU-1 (Low observable) [2005] 0 2,000
59 EU-2 (HAE) [2007] 0 6,000
60 UF-3 (fast; strike) [2014] 0 3,500
61 E-2C 13
62 E-767 4
63 Info Gathering Satellite 0
64 National C2 System 0 150,000
65 BMC3I (Missile Defense) 0
66 IW Platoon (30-men) 0 5,000
67 Other Equipments
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost
(Mil Yen) 2010 Qty
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2 Infantry/Combined Div 12 0
3 Infantry Bde 2 0
4 Armoured Div 1
5 Heliborne Bde 1 0
6 Airborne Bde 1 0
7 Amphibious Bde 0 0
8 Tanks 1,135 861 50
9 APC 770 182 50
10 Artillery (155mm SP) 831 1,040
11 MLRS 128 1,840
12 Attack Helicopters 88 4,500




17 Kongo DDG (DD51 variant) 4 110,000 5,000
18 Sapporo DDG (DD21 variant) 0 125,000
19 Other DDs 53 64,071
20 Submarine (SS) 18 46,394
21 Meiji SSN (Akula class) 0 160,000
22 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 14,745
23 Landing Ship (LST) 11 37,286
24 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100 500
25 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36
26 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10
27 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0 100
28 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 5,075
29 UUV 0 30,000
30 Other Equipments
31
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost









100 300 33,200 920
100 0 631
150 276,000 428
20 5 90,000 103
30 5 88,050 449
60,000 95,000 0
15 20 1,750,000 28
0 0
15 0 32
6 5 278,364 21
0 0
5 2 73,725 42
10 372,860 27
15 15 7,500 70
0 36
0 10
10,000 200 20,000 200
10 2 50,750 87
15,000 0 0
122,500 245,000 0
Epoch 3 (2011 ~ 2015)
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33 F-15 (J/DJ) 203
34 F-22 0 8,800
35 F-1 52
36 F-2 45 11,830
37 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133
38 C-1 28
39 C-130H 16
40 CH-47J (Transport) 19 4,457




45 Patriot PAC-3 FU 120 2,000 2,000
46 Patriot Ops/Maintenance
47 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192 52,188
48 Type-12 SSM (ICBM) 0 1,000
49 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 68 1,214
50 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 0 1,200
51 Type-03 Missile 0 100
52 200 KT Nuclear Warhead 0
53 Missile Defense (include BMD) 0 0
54 High Energy Laser System 0 50,000
55 Other Equipments
56
57 Major C4I System
58 EU-1 (Low observable) [2005] 0 2,000
59 EU-2 (HAE) [2007] 0 6,000
60 UF-3 (fast; strike) [2014] 0 3,500
61 E-2C 13
62 E-767 4
63 Info Gathering Satellite 0
64 National C2 System 0 150,000
65 BMC3I (Missile Defense) 0
66 IW Platoon (30-men) 0 5,000
67 Other Equipments
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost
(Mil Yen) 2015 Qty
























45,000 25 87,500 25
0 13
0 4
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2 Infantry/Combined Div 12 0
3 Infantry Bde 2 0
4 Armoured Div 1
5 Heliborne Bde 1 0
6 Airborne Bde 1 0
7 Amphibious Bde 0 0
8 Tanks 1,135 861 50
9 APC 770 182 50
10 Artillery (155mm SP) 831 1,040
11 MLRS 128 1,840
12 Attack Helicopters 88 4,500




17 Kongo DDG (DD51 variant) 4 110,000 5,000
18 Sapporo DDG (DD21 variant) 0 125,000
19 Other DDs 53 64,071
20 Submarine (SS) 18 46,394
21 Meiji SSN (Akula class) 0 160,000
22 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 14,745
23 Landing Ship (LST) 11 37,286
24 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100 500
25 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36
26 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10
27 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0 100
28 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 5,075
29 UUV 0 30,000
30 Other Equipments
31
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost









100 300 33,200 1,020
400 0 231
400 736,000 828
30 5 135,000 128





2 6 92,788 17
160,000 5 800,000 5
8 3 117,960 47
15 559,290 42




20 2 101,500 105
40,000 3 90,000 3
130,000 260,000 0
Epoch 4 (2016 ~ 2020)
5A - 7
Defense of Japan (Defense Expenditure)
Annex 5A : Japan Defense Expenditure






33 F-15 (J/DJ) 203
34 F-22 0 8,800
35 F-1 52
36 F-2 45 11,830
37 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133
38 C-1 28
39 C-130H 16
40 CH-47J (Transport) 19 4,457




45 Patriot PAC-3 FU 120 2,000 2,000
46 Patriot Ops/Maintenance
47 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192 52,188
48 Type-12 SSM (ICBM) 0 1,000
49 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 68 1,214
50 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 0 1,200
51 Type-03 Missile 0 100
52 200 KT Nuclear Warhead 0
53 Missile Defense (include BMD) 0 0
54 High Energy Laser System 0 50,000
55 Other Equipments
56
57 Major C4I System
58 EU-1 (Low observable) [2005] 0 2,000
59 EU-2 (HAE) [2007] 0 6,000
60 UF-3 (fast; strike) [2014] 0 3,500
61 E-2C 13
62 E-767 4
63 Info Gathering Satellite 0
64 National C2 System 0 150,000
65 BMC3I (Missile Defense) 0
66 IW Platoon (30-men) 0 5,000
67 Other Equipments
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost
(Mil Yen) 2020 Qty
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2 Infantry/Combined Div 12 0
3 Infantry Bde 2 0
4 Armoured Div 1
5 Heliborne Bde 1 0
6 Airborne Bde 1 0
7 Amphibious Bde 0 0
8 Tanks 1,135 861 50
9 APC 770 182 50
10 Artillery (155mm SP) 831 1,040
11 MLRS 128 1,840
12 Attack Helicopters 88 4,500




17 Kongo DDG (DD51 variant) 4 110,000 5,000
18 Sapporo DDG (DD21 variant) 0 125,000
19 Other DDs 53 64,071
20 Submarine (SS) 18 46,394
21 Meiji SSN (Akula class) 0 160,000
22 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 14,745
23 Landing Ship (LST) 11 37,286
24 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100 500
25 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36
26 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10
27 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0 100
28 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 5,075
29 UUV 0 30,000
30 Other Equipments
31
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost
(Mil Yen) 2020 Qty
2,470,000 25,973,626
0 0 0 4 0 8
0 4 0 0 0 6
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 750 0 37,500 1,135
0 250 750 0 83,000 1,020
0 0 0 600 0 231
0 700 0 0 1,288,000 828
0 60 0 20 270,000 128
0 85 0 20 249,475 489
247,500 0 0 0 395,000 0
0 24 24 0 2,760,000 28
0 20 0 0 2,500,000 20
0 0 0 36 0 17
0 12 0 13 556,728 17
160,000 5 0 0 800,000 5
0 17 0 7 250,665 47
0 31 0 0 1,155,866 42
0 0 60 45 30,000 55
0 0 0 0 0 36
0 0 0 0 0 10
45,000 1,000 0 0 100,000 1,000
0 35 0 8 177,625 105
55,000 3 0 0 90,000 3
462,500 0 0 0 995,000 0
Summary (2001 ~ 2020)
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33 F-15 (J/DJ) 203
34 F-22 0 8,800
35 F-1 52
36 F-2 45 11,830
37 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133
38 C-1 28
39 C-130H 16
40 CH-47J (Transport) 19 4,457




45 Patriot PAC-3 FU 120 2,000 2,000
46 Patriot Ops/Maintenance
47 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192 52,188
48 Type-12 SSM (ICBM) 0 1,000
49 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 68 1,214
50 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 0 1,200
51 Type-03 Missile 0 100
52 200 KT Nuclear Warhead 0
53 Missile Defense (include BMD) 0 0
54 High Energy Laser System 0 50,000
55 Other Equipments
56
57 Major C4I System
58 EU-1 (Low observable) [2005] 0 2,000
59 EU-2 (HAE) [2007] 0 6,000
60 UF-3 (fast; strike) [2014] 0 3,500
61 E-2C 13
62 E-767 4
63 Info Gathering Satellite 0
64 National C2 System 0 150,000
65 BMC3I (Missile Defense) 0
66 IW Platoon (30-men) 0 5,000
67 Other Equipments
R & D $$
(Mil Yen) Acquire Upgrade Retire
Acq Cost
(Mil Yen) 2020 Qty
Summary (2001 ~ 2020)
0 0 0 203 0 0
0 450 0 0 3,960,000 450
0 0 0 52 0 0
0 105 0 0 1,242,150 150
0 0 0 133 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 28
0 0 0 0 0 16
0 70 0 0 311,990 89
0 60 0 0 360,000 60
455,000 0 0 0 900,000 0
50,000 120 120 0 480,000 240
0 0 0 0 399,260 0
0 0 4 0 221,799 192
30,000 10 0 0 10,000 10
0 12 0 80 14,568 0
75,000 2,000 0 0 2,400,000 2,000
0 20,000 0 0 2,000,000 20,000
50,000 0 0 0 0 0
165,000 0 0 0 0 0
45,000 3 0 0 150,000 3
180,000 0 0 0 295,000 0
25,000 100 0 0 200,000 100
50,000 100 0 0 600,000 100
75,000 100 0 0 350,000 100
0 0 0 0 0 13
0 0 0 0 0 4
0 24 10 8 0 16
120,000 1 0 0 150,000 1
55,000 0 0 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 20,000 4
125,000 0 0 0 170,000 0
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2 Infantry/Combined Div 12 0
3 Infantry Bde 2 0
4 Armoured Div 1
5 Heliborne Bde 1 0
6 Airborne Bde 1 0
7 Amphibious Bde 0 0
8 Tanks 1,135 861 50
9 APC 770 182 50
10 Artillery (155mm SP) 831 1,040
11 MLRS 128 1,840
12 Attack Helicopters 88 4,500




17 Kongo DDG (DD51 variant) 4 110,000 5,000
18 Sapporo DDG (DD21 variant) 0 125,000
19 Other DDs 53 64,071
20 Submarine (SS) 18 46,394
21 Meiji SSN (Akula class) 0 160,000
22 Mine warfare ship (MSC) 37 14,745
23 Landing Ship (LST) 11 37,286
24 P3C (Fixed wing patrol) 100 500
25 HSS-2B (Patrol) 36
26 MH-53E (Mine sweeping) 10
27 SM3 Missile (NTWD) 0 100
28 SH-60J (anti-sub) 78 5,075




The 2 CADs will be restructured first.
Type-90 Tank
Buy 10% of Type-89 and 90% of Type-96
Price assumed
Average cost of OH-1, UH-60JA, UH-1J, & CH-47A
Price assumed; NO Aegis NTWD upgrade till 3rd epic; upgraded to NAD initially
Price assumed
To retire gradually
Price assumed; buy one for reverse engineering.
3 Osumi class LST by 1999
Price provided by SMCB.
Prototyping (with JAMSTEC)
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33 F-15 (J/DJ) 203
34 F-22 0 8,800
35 F-1 52
36 F-2 45 11,830
37 F-4/RF-4 (E/EJ) 133
38 C-1 28
39 C-130H 16
40 CH-47J (Transport) 19 4,457




45 Patriot PAC-3 FU 120 2,000 2,000
46 Patriot Ops/Maintenance
47 I-HAWK Upgrading (in group) 192 52,188
48 Type-12 SSM (ICBM) 0 1,000
49 Type-88 TEL (c/w 6 missile ea) 68 1,214
50 Type-03 TEL (6 missile ea) 0 1,200
51 Type-03 Missile 0 100
52 200 KT Nuclear Warhead 0
53 Missile Defense (include BMD) 0 0
54 High Energy Laser System 0 50,000
55 Other Equipments
56
57 Major C4I System
58 EU-1 (Low observable) [2005] 0 2,000
59 EU-2 (HAE) [2007] 0 6,000
60 UF-3 (fast; strike) [2014] 0 3,500
61 E-2C 13
62 E-767 4
63 Info Gathering Satellite 0
64 National C2 System 0 150,000
65 BMC3I (Missile Defense) 0




To replace F-1 and F/RF-4
The new R variant of KC-135
Upgrading to fire PAC-3
8 groups
Upgrade program (6 groups); 1.75 gp upgraded before 2001
Matured tech for Japan
To phase out in epoch 4.
Ready for deployment by 2020.
Prototyping 
Advance HAE, Surveillance UAV with C4ISR capabilities
US Darkstar equivalence
US X-36 equivalence
Treaty with US to share imagery
Continuous R&D to upgrade
5A - 12
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Annex B: JSDF New Weapon Systems 
 The following is a list of new weapon systems that were created during the period 
from 2001 till 2020. 
1. Air/Missile Defense System 
2. EU-1 (Low Observable UAV) 
3. EU-2 (HAE UAV) 
4. UF-3 (Strike & Fighter Recce UAV) 
5. Type-03 SSM 
6. Type-12 ICBM 
7. Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) 
8. JAMSTEC UUV (Prototype) 
9. High Energy Laser Systems (Prototype) 
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Air/Missile Defense System 
  
As part of the defense strategy, the development of a comprehensive air/missile 
defense system is deemed critical to the safety of the Japan homeland. By 2020, the state-
of-the-art technology for the Japan missile defense system was as follows: 
(a) The entire fleet of 28 Kongo class destroyers and the newer 20 DD21 were 
retrofitted with both the Navy Area Defense (NAD) and Navy Theater Wide Defense 
(NTWD) systems. The NAD and NTWD were able to intercept ballistic missiles in the 
endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric altitudes respectively. However, the NTWD was 
able to engage incoming ballistic missile of speed 5 km/s or less. 
(b) There was no procurement of the THAAD system as it was deemed that the more 
mobile and versatile NTWD system on the destroyers was more cost effective. 
(c) All the Patriot batteries were upgraded to be able to fire PAC-3 interceptors. 
There were a total of 48 batteries of five launchers each capable of firing 4 missiles. As a 
norm, two of the five launchers were configured to fire PAC-3 interceptor. The Patriot 
batteries were able to provide air and missiles defenses against aircrafts, cruise missiles, 
and ballistic missiles in the exo-atmosphere.  
(d) All the 32 batteries of I-Hawk were also upgraded. 
(e) The ballistic missile (BM) C3I system was also fully integrated into Japan 
National Command and Control System (NCCS). 
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 The total cost of investment (in million yen) was as follows: 
 Item R&D Upgrading/ 
Procurement 
Remarks 
a. PAC-3 50,000 480,000 Upgrading PAC-2 to 
PAC-3 
b. NTWD 45,000 100,000 200 SM3 missiles 
c. I-Hawk - 221,799  
d. BMC3I 55,000 - Subsequently 
integrated into NCCS. 
e. BMD (Misc) 165,000 -  
 Total 315,000 801,799  
 
References:  
• Patriot PAC-3: FAS - http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/patriot.htm 
• Patriot PAC-3: DefenseLink - 
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a36efead7561b.htm 
• BMD: DOT&E FY’99 Annual Report - 
http://sun00781.dn.net/spp/starwars/program/dote99/ 
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EU-1 (Low Observable UAV) 
• Endurance: >8 hours 
@500nm 
• Cruise Speed: 250 kts 
• Payload: 1000 lbs 
• Altitude: 45,000 ft 
• Sensors: LPI SAR, EO, 
SIGINT 
• Cost: ¥2 Billion 
• Quantity: 100 
 
 As part of the effort to expand the C4ISR capabilities, Japan embarked on a few 
UAV programs. EU-1, a low observable UAV, is the first in the series. Japan approached 
the US to revive their previously cancelled Dark Star project. The first EU-1 (the 
specifications were similar to the US Dark Star project), at a cost of ¥2 billion per 
aircraft, was rolled out in 2004. A total of 100 EU-1 was acquired over the last 20 years. 
 
 The command and control of the EU-1 could either originate from the National 
Command and Control System (NCCS) Center or from a DD21 and Kongo destroyer. 
Communication between the UAV and the Ground Control System (GCS) could be relay 
via ship-based SATCOM, or other UAV. 
 
Reference:  
• FAS DarkStar (LO HAE UAV) Program - 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/uav96/22-23.html.  
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• Endurance: 60 hrs  
• Cruise Speed: 300 knots 
• Payload: 3000 lbs 
• Power: 80 kW 
• Altitude: 100,000 ft 




o Air Search Radar 
o Comms relay 
o Pseudo Satellite 
• Cost: ¥6 Billion 
• Quantity: 100 
 
 EU-2, a high altitude and long endurance UAV, was indigenously manufactured 
by Fuji Heavy Industries.  
 It was essentially a pseudo satellite that cost about ¥6 billion a copy. Speeding 
across the airspace at 300 knots and with an endurance of 60 hours, the EU-1 could 
operate as far out as 5,000 nm and still had an on station time in excess of one day (note: 
10,000 nm/300 kts = 26.7 hrs). 
 Flying at an altitude of 100,000 ft, EU-2’s sensors would have an operating range 
of at least 300 nm. Furthermore, another key mission for EU-2 would be communication 
relay for the ships or aircrafts (e.g. EU-1). This was important so that all the essential 
information would be able to be piped back to the NCCS for a consistent battlefield 
picture. 
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• Max Speed: Mach 2.0 
• Cruise Speed: Mach 1.2 
• Payload: 12,000 Lbs 
• Altitude: 65,000 Ft 
• Range: 1,200 nm  
• Cost: ¥3.5 Billion   
• Quantity: 100 
 
 UF-3 was a low observable unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) that was a 
follow-on development of US X-36 program1. The project was co-developed by 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Boeing Co. It had an operating range of 1,200 nm while 
cruising at Mach 1.2. This system would substantially enhance our strike and fighter 
recce capability without increasing the demand for pilots. 
 Like EU-1, command and control of UF-3 would be very versatile. Depending on 
the mission needs, the C2 could originate from  
a. the NCCS for specific Joint mission; 
b. a Destroyer, e.g. Kongo, for extended range of operation; or 
c. a manned fighter, e.g. F-22, controlling a fleet of four UF-3 for strike mission. 
d. on Autonomous mission – the EU-2 could be preprogrammed with routes to 
attack fixed land targets using JDAM or JSOW, or preprogrammed for fighter and/or 
electronic recce. 
 The operating range of UF-3 could be easily extended, for example, by operating 
in tandem with the EU-2 (a pseudo-satellite) that provided the communication relays. 
 
Reference: 
• Boeing Co. - http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/x36/x36.htm 
                                                 
1 Due to the lack of information, performance specifications are the team’s assessment and not based on 
any authoritative reference on the X-36 project. 
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Type-03 SSM 
 
• Range: 1,500 nm 
• Length: 6.25 m 
• Weight: 1,440 Kg 
• Diameter: 51.8 cm 
• Standard VLS cell; or 21” 
Torpedo tube 
• Warhead: 1000 lb  
• Nuclear: 200 kt (possible)  
• TEL Cost: ¥3.5 Billion  
• TEL Quantity: 2,000  
• Missile Cost: ¥100 Million  
• Missile Quantity: 20,000 
 
 Type-03 SSM was a long-range sub-sonic cruise missile for surface target. The 
design was largely based on the Tomahawk Missile but re-designed and produced by 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. Each launcher cost ¥1.2 billion and each missile cost ¥100 
million. The missile was modular; hence it can be easily configured for either land attack 
or anti-ship roles. It can be mounted on a standard VLS cell or 21” torpedo tube. It could 
carry a 1000 lb conventional warhead or a 200 kt nuclear device. A total of 2000 TELs 
and 20,000 missiles were procured. 
 
Reference: 
• FAS BGM-109 Tomahawk Missile - http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm.  
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• Power Plant: 3 solid-propellant rocket 
motors 
• Speed: 15,000 mph at burnout (7 km/s) 
• Range: 5,218 nm 
• Ceiling: 700 miles 
• Payload: 2,640 lb  
• Length: 59.9 ft  
• Weight: 79,423 lb 
• Diameter: 5.5 ft 
• Cost: ¥1 Billion  
• Quantity: 10  
 
 Type-12 ICBM was designed and built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 2012. It 
was equivalent to a US Minuteman III. It employed 3 solid-propellant rockets motors to 
deliver ordnance more than 5,000 nautical miles. A total of 10 ICBMs were deployed. 
 
Reference: 
• FAS US Minuteman III - http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/lgm-30_3.htm.  
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Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) 
 
• Orbit: 500 km (LEO) 
• Sensors: EO 
• Resolution: 30 cm 
• Managed by NASDA 
• Cost: ~ ¥450 Million 





 The purpose of introducing the information-gathering satellites was to provide 
surveillance and early warning so as to identify arising threats and crises. In 2003, 
Mitsubishi Electric Corp developed and launched a total of 4 satellites at a cost of ¥1,700 
billion. These LEO satellites that orbit at 500 km above the Earth and acquired images of 
required regions regularly and revealed those factors that could become a threat. The 
satellites carried optical sensors that were able to resolve images as small as one square 
meter – such as ballistic missiles and combat aircraft. By 2010, the resolution was further 
enhanced to 30 cm. As the satellite program came under the purview of the National 
Space Development Agency (NASDA) of Japan, the cost did not appear in JSDF’s 




• BBC Online Network – http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-
pacific/newsid_204000/204700.stm.  
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JAMSTEC UUV 
 
• Cruising Distance: 2,000 km 
• Cruising Speed: 20 kt (30 kt max) 
• Depth: 5,000 ft 
• Weight in Air: 10 tons. 
• Power Source: Fuel Cell (Nuclear ?) 
• Guidance: Pre-programmed, Autonomous navigation, Acoustic remote control & 
UROV modes. 
• Navigation: INS combining ring-laser gyro and Doppler sonar, and acoustic-homing, 
obstacle avoidance, expendable optical fiber cable remote control. 
• Sensors: CTDO, Multi Sea Beam, Water Sampler (200 samples), a digital camera. 
• Can be enhanced to carry 4 x MK-112 torpedoes. 
 
Concept Of Operations (Draft) 
For An Unmanned Underwater Vehicle With Nuclear Cruise Missiles 
Peacetime Roles: Geological Research, Real-time seafloor seismic observation, Deep sea 
floor topography, Search and Rescue mission, & Communications relay. 
Defense Roles: Monitor and track surface ship activities, Monitor and track submarines 
activities, Mine neutralization, Anti-ship & ASW capabilities. 
 
The following addresses methods of basing, communications and positive control 
for an unmanned underwater vehicle carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles (TLAM-N 
equivalents). 
1.   BASING: intended to provide a secure second-strike capability against a few 
dozen warheads in a surprise or accidental attack in peacetime and against several 
hundred warheads during an acute crisis. 
a.   Peacetime:  The majority of the vehicles are kept in port, but ready to 
launch if the proper messages are passed.  A small number are kept at sea, some 
armed and some not.  While at sea, they could be tethered to buoys for part of 
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their time at sea and transiting the rest.  The locations themselves would be 
connected with command authorities and would be one means of passing strike 
messages to attached underwater vehicles. 
b.   Crisis:  The bulk of the force is at sea, and armed.  While still tied to the 
buoy system, they would spend a larger fraction of their time in transit. 
2. COMMUNICATIONS MEANS:  VLF communication will be used, if a suitable 
transmitter site is found.  Underwater sound transmitters can be used in the Inland Sea, as 
this might be simply a means of notifying the vehicles that an important message is 
coming.  Alternative is the space-based lasers (blue-green?).  The vehicles would place 
themselves at an appropriate depth and location for message reception at preprogrammed 
times. 
3. POSITIVE CONTROL, for both the missile and the warhead. An authenticated 
launch message is needed to launch the missiles. Likewise, the proper code is needed to 
arm the warheads.  The warheads would be equipped with something like the US PAL.  
The warheads themselves would have built-in means to disable themselves in response to 
detected tampering attempts – electronic or physical. 
 
Japanese planning allows for a significant percentage of warheads unavailable 
because of failure to receive or properly respond to launch messages.  
By 2020, three UUVs were field for prototyping. 
 
Cost per system: ¥30 billion (estimate) 
Quantity: 3 (for prototyping) 
R&D effort: ¥55 billion 
 
Acknowledgement: 
• The team would like to thank Prof. Franck for his guidance on scripting the concept 
of operation for the UUV. 
Reference: 
• JAMSTEC Marine Technology Department - http://www.jamstec.go.jp/jamstec-
e/tech/now.html 
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The High Energy Laser (HEL) program was an on-going R&D effort that was 
started in 2012. The HEL was designed to be compact and mountable either on a land-
based platform or on a destroyer. The laser-firing unit can be used in conjunction with an 
EU-2 that had an adaptive optics to reflect and focus the laser energy on over the horizon 
target.  The HEL was designed to engage a wide array of targets: 
(a) Against ballistic missile (engaging in the re-entry phase) 
(b) Air defense against aircraft/cruise missile 
(c) Surface targets: Anti-ship & Land targets (missile silo, C2 HQ, ADA, etc) 
(d) Anti-satellite (LEO) 
 
By 2020, three systems were fielded for prototyping – two ship-based and one 
land-based. 
 
Cost per system: ¥50 billion (estimate) 
Quantity: 3 (for prototyping) 
R&D effort: ¥45 billion 
  
Reference: 
• Rockwell Team ABL Homepage - 
http://sun00781.dn.net/spp/starwars/program/abl/rockwell/ 
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Annex C: Epoch by Epoch at a Glance 
 
Epoch I II III IV 
Period 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 




Commencement of US troop 
withdrawal from ROK. 
Reunification of the PRC and 
Taiwan. 
Rejection of bid for seat in UN 
Security Council. 
Battle for influence over 
Korea’s strategic direction. 
 
Korean reunification. 
Minimal US forces in Korea. 
US troops withdrawing from 
Japan. 
Gradual ascension of the PRC. 
Domestic 
Situation 
Diet passed economic policy 
aimed at “short term pain for 
long term gain”. 
Japan entered into recession. 
“Long term” dividends enjoyed 
as economy recovered. 
Re-evaluation of 3 pronged 
security policy.   
Re-interpretation of Article 9. 
Positive economic climate. 
Medication of Japan’s nuclear 
allergy. 
Re-evaluation of US-Japan 
Security Arrangement. 
Re-evaluation of provisions in 
Article 9. 




















































NAD and Patriot PAC-3. 
Type-03 SSM. 








UF-3 low observable UCAV. 
F-22 fighter. 
NTWD capability against 






Completion of nuclear warhead 
program (short of deployment). 
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Annex D: List of Acronyms 
Acronym Description 
AAR Air-to-Air Refueling 
ADA Air Defense Artillery 
AEWCC Air Early Warning Command and Control 
AIP Air Independent Propulsion 
APC Armored Personnel Carrier 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
Arty Artillery 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ATF Amphibious Task Force 
BAe British Aerospace Engineering 
Bde Brigade 
BDRA British Defense Research Agency 
BMC3I Ballistic Missile Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 
Bn Battalions 
BW Biologic Weapons 
C2 Command and Control 
C4 Command, Control, Communications and Computers 
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
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Acronym Description 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
CAD Combined Arms Division 
CBM Confidence Building Measure 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CW Chemical Weapons 
DD Destroyer 
DDG Guided Missile Destroyer 
Div Division 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
EO Electro Optic 
ESPF Eastern Sea Protection Force 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FU Firing Unit 
GCS Ground Control System 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HAE UAV High Altitude, Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
HAWK Home All the Way Killer 
HEL High Energy Laser 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency  
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
IGS Information Gathering Satellite 
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Acronym Description 
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
IMINT Imagery Intelligence 
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
IW Information Warfare 
JAERI Japan Atomic and Energy Research Institute 
JBMD Japan Ballistic Missile Defense 
JDA Japanese Defense Agency 
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JSDF Japan Self-Defense Force 
(J)ASDF (Japan) Air Self-Defense Force 
(J)GSDF (Japan) Ground Self-Defense Force 
(J)MSDF (Japan) Maritime Self-Defense Force 
JSOW Joint Stand-Off Weapon 
JTF Japanese Task Force 
LACM Land-Attack Cruise Missile 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
LPI Low Probability Intercept 
LR Long Range 
LST Landing Ship Tank 
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Acronym Description 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MDZ Maritime Defense Zone 
MLRS Multiple Launcher Rocket System 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime 
NAD Navy Area Defense 
NASDA National Space Development Agency 
NCCS National Command and Control System 
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 
NCS Nuclear Counter Strike 
NDPO National Defense Program Outline 
NISTEP National Institute of Science and Technology 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NTWD Navy Theatre Wide Defense 
NSEP National Survivability and Enhancement Project 
ODA Overseas Development Assistance 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
ORBAT Order of Battle 
PAC Patriot Advanced Capability 
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Acronym Description 
PB Patrol Boats 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
R & D Research and Development 
ROK Republic of Korea 
RRF Rapid Reaction Force 
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SATCOM Satellite Communication 
SHORAD Short Range Air Defense 
SIGINT Signal Intelligence 
SLBM Submarine Launched Cruise Missile 
SLOC Sea Lines Of Communication 
SM Standard Missile 
SP Self-Propelled 
SR Short Range 
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile 
SS Ship Submersible – Diesel Submarine 
SSBN Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear – Ballistic Missile Submarine 
(Nuclear Propulsion) 
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Acronym Description 
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile 
SSN Ship Submersible Nuclear – Attack Submarine (Nuclear Propulsion) 
SSP Sea Situation Picture 
TD Taepo Dong 
TEL Transportable Erector Launcher 
TF Task Force 
TG Task Group 
THAAD Theatre High Altitude Area Defense 
THAWK Tomahawk 
TLAM Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile 
TLAM-N Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile Nuclear 
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicles 
UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UN United Nations 
US United States 
USFK United States Forces in Korea 
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
VLF Very Low Frequency 
VLS Vertical Launch System 
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction 
WW II World War II 
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Annex F: Biography  
 
1. Lieutenant Colonel Nee Bor Wei was enlisted in the Singapore Armed Forces in 
Dec 1984. He was awarded the Overseas Training Award to study Engineering Science in 
Oxford University (United Kingdom) the following year. After graduating in 1988, he 
joined the Republic of Singapore Air Force as an Air Operations and Communications 
Officer. He subsequently served as a Branch Head in HQ RSAF.  After graduating from 
the Singapore Command and Staff Course, he was assigned to the Joint Staff. In 1999, he 
was selected to attend the Systems Engineering/Integration curriculum in Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
 
2. Major Chiu Eng Tatt, of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), was enlisted in 
1986 and graduated from the Britannia Royal Naval College (UK) in 1987. He obtained 
his Bachelor of Engineering (Honours) in Electrical and Electronics Engineering, from 
the University of Birmingham (UK) in 1990, under the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 
Overseas Training Scholarship, and completed the Singapore Command and Staff Course 
in 1997. He has served onboard most classes of ships in the RSN, his last appointment 
being the Commanding Officer of a Missile Corvette. He has also done a staff tour as a 
force plans officer in the Navy Headquarters. For three years, he served as an Honorary 
Aide-De-Camp to the President of the Republic of Singapore. In 1999, he was awarded 
the SAF Postgraduate Scholarship to study the first System Engineering Integration (SEI) 
course at the Naval Postgraduate School (USA). Major Chiu is married with a three-year-
old daughter. 
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3. Major Lye King Siong, of the Singapore Army, was enlisted in 1989. He 
graduated from National University of Singapore in 1994 with a Bachelor of Science 
(Hons, 2nd Upper) in Computer Science (Information Technology). He joined the Signals 
Formation in 1995 and had since held several staff appointment in HQ Signals and HQ 
Engineers. His last appointment was OC, Trunk Communication Company in a CAD 
Signal Battalion. In 1999, he was awarded the SAF Postgraduate Scholarship to study the 
System Engineering Integration course at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is married 
with 2 Cavalier King Charles Spaniels. 
 
4. Lieutenant McCullough is a native of Birmingham, Alabama. After graduating 
from the U.S. Naval Academy in May 1995, he reported to his initial assignment in USS 
MERRILL (DD 976) where he served as Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and Public 
Affairs Officer. His next assignment began in August 1998 where he served as Fire 
Control Officer and Ship’s Material Maintenance Officer in USS Lake Champlain (CG-
57). In September 1999 he was ordered to the Naval Postgraduate School where he 
completed Joint Professional Military Education Phase I and earned a Masters of Science 
Degree in Systems Integration (C4I). His personal awards include the Navy 
Commendation Medal and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal. 
 
